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INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: 
A mSTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 
Greg Clydesdale 
This thesis set out to explore the forces that determine the rise and fall of industrial 
leadership. It attempted to do this by applying an industry life cycle model to the 
~hipping industry. The industrial life cycle was posited on the basis of existing literature, 
particularly the growth of knowledge, evolutionary and institutional literature, which lend 
themselves to patterns of industrial growth and entrapment. On this basis, this thesis set 
out to examine whether industrial leadership can be explained by a four-staged process of 
imitation, catch up, advance and entrapment. However, this thesis has exposed 
something more complicated. Processes of imitation, catch up advance and entrapment 
were shown to be at work in the shipping industly, but they were tempered by the effects 
of military and political forces that may not be exogenous, and the trend from 
regionalism to globalisation. The original model did not encompass early indigenous 
developments that are not based on imitation that do not immediately lead to a position of 
advanced leadership. In this light, a better description of the first stage would be 
capability building. 
Key Words: Evolutionary Economics, Economic History, Shipping, Maritime Industries, 
Instihltional Economics. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In order simply to maintain itself intact... all empire must be continually improving its technology at a pace 
sufficient to counter balance the improvements made by its neighbours (Elvin 1973: 18). 
When Marco Polo visited China at the end of the thilieenth century, he was visiting the richest nation in the 
world. Its very productive agriculture was inigated by a sophisticated system of canals that also served as 
mieries for trade and stimulation of industly. Paper money was in use, while in the north, iron production 
reached levels not equaled in Europe for another four hundred years. China could have been described as the 
world's leader teclmologically, industrially and in tenns of quality of life. However, China's day in the sun 
eventually came to an end. Its decline relative to the West was such that, by the middle of the twentieth 
centUlY, it had become one of the world's poorest countries on a per capita basis. As we enter the 21st century, 
the East is once again on the rise, giving bilih to the age old economic questions regarding what it is that causes 
the wealth and poveliy of nations. 
r f any nation, company or sporting group wishes to remain at the top of any comparative ranking, it must either 
have an advantage that others can not better or imitate, or it must be capable of generating improvements at a 
faster rate than those with which it is compared. The ability of any economic unit to attract resources and 
surpass the achievement of its competitors depends on its ability to improve its process, product and 
organisational teclmologies at a faster rate than its competitors. Continuous innovation has been the hall mark 
of industlialleadership. 
History is punchtated with periods of rapid innovation in which a nation has been able to establish positions of 
in dustli al leadership. China dming the late T'ang(618-907AD) and Sung (960-1279AD) dynasty achieved 
such a rate of innovation and improvement as did the Dutch in the late sixteenth-early seventeenth centmy. 
Britain's period of leadership was also born from a period of innovation. As Mc Closky(1981:118) states 
'contrary to much thinking on the matter, innovation was widespread. The industrial revolution was not the 
Age of Railways or even of Steam entirely; it was an age of improvements'. Plumb (1982:332) goes as far as 
saying 'improvement' was the most over-used word of the eighteenth cenhlry in the United Kingdom, followed 
closer by 'new method' and 'latest fashion'. In the late twentieth century, it was the Japanese who made 
'Imizen' (continuous improvement) a corporate philosophy, which propelled them into global leadership. 
Ironically, these nations began their periods of innovation by imitating nations, which previously had a superior 
record of innovation. For example, in the early seventeenth century, as European nations were beginning to 
carve out their malitime empires, Francis Bacon claimed that the three greatest inventions that the world had 
known were the compass, printing and gunpowder. These inventions, which allowed Europe to rise to global 
supremacy, were all created in China. This is not an isolated phenomenon. At the end of the nineteenth 
centUlY, the United States imitated technologies that had been developed in Europe and took them to a higher 
level. In the second half of the twentieth century, many Amelican inventions fell in to the master hands of the 
Japanese who were cliticised as only being capable of imitating. They soon shook off this criticism. 
It appears that the process of innovation and supremacy is preceded by a process of imitation .. This opens 
several questions. Why did the compass have to travel to Europe before its potential was more fully 
developed? Why weren't the Chinese the first to circumnavigate the world? Why was it, that at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Americans proved more resourceful in developing European inventions than the 
peoples who invented them? These questions shed light on one last process that appears to be at work here, 
namely, the relative stagnation or failure ofthe old leader to develop innovations at a rate necessary to maintain 
its position of pre-eminence. 
From a preliminary view, it appears that industtial leadership can be seen as a process of imitation, innovation, 
supremacy and decline. If there is such a process at work, economists require a closer understanding of the 
forces involved in order to understand indusuial development and competition. 
In explaining the reason why Chinese innovations developed fLll1her in Europe, Jones et al. (1993:22) stated 
'The key difference between China and the West was not really technological - it was in social organisation, 
which in Europe extended the use of advanced methods and pursued their further development'. 
Freeman(l992: l71) made a similar observation when referring to the United Kingdoms' loss of indusnial 
leadership: 
British scientists and inventors from Faraday to Swann made an outstanding contribution to the development of 
electricity. The really important point of Britain's' loss of technological leadership in the 1880s and 18905 was not 
that Britain ceased to make scientific discoveries or radical inventions, but that British institutions proved 
incapable of diffusing these innovations, of scaling them up and of using them in a wide variety of applications ... 
Clearly, the domestic environment is not neun'a!' P0l1er (1990) recognised this in his landmark Competitive 
A dvantage of Nations in which he recognised that "Competitive advantage is created and sustained through a 
highly localised process. Differences in national economic structures, values, cultures, institutes and histories 
contribute profoundly to competitive success" (1990: 19). What is less clear is why one environment can 
produce a high level of innovation in one period and low levels of innovation in another. 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question what determines the rise and fall of industlial powers? The 
literature on industrial evolution reveals processes that lend themselves to an industrial life cycle so, on the 
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basis of that literature, I propose that industry follows a life cycle. This is not a rigid, mechanistic cycle. It 
is one that accepts variation and the unpredictability of events such as wars and other chance events. 
The proposed model states that the changing face of global indusuial leadership is an on-going process of 
imitation, catch-up, advance and entrapment. The process is driven by institutional and technological 
dynamics that affect not just producers but the entire environment in which producers operate. The model 
is sU'ongly influenced by POlier (1990) who emphasises the importance of the environment in determining 
competitive advantage and Perez (1983) who emphasises the ligidity the techno-economic environment in 
which a film operates. 
To help identification of the key issues, this thesis focuses on one industry, shipping. This is a new area of 
research for, although many books and miicles have been wlitten about the industry, no one has taken a long 
telm view of shipping from the stand-point of economic literature, particularly evolutionary and institutional 
literature. There are several reasons why shipping has been chosen. Firstly, it is a very old industry. 
Consequently, considerable historical data are available providing a chance to review the industry over a 
long time horizon. Secondly, shipping's intemational nature provides a chance to give possibly the best 
indication of international commercial leadership compared with other industries. Finally, shipping is a 
highly illuminating indusu'y as its derived demand aspect gives an indication of underlying commercial 
activity. 
Over the peliod in review, the shipping industry has thrown up a diversity of growth patterns and changes of 
leadership. DUling the earliest peliod of examination (12th to 16th centuries), the Chinese were clearly the 
most advanced shipping nation, as they were in many industries at the time. The fifteenth century gave birth 
to a new path of development when growing political stability and the lise of Malacca created an 
environment conducive to maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean. It was the nation of Gujarat which rode 
this wave to its greatest possibilities, gaining a position of pre-eminence which it held for three centuries. 
At the end of the fifteenth century, the Spanish and POliuguese opened up new economic paths when they 
opened new routes in the Atlantic, Pacific and routes inter-linking the oceans. Quickly establishing first 
mover advantages, the Iberians maintained pre-eminence on these routes for over a century. In the 
seventeenth century, the Dutch mastered the necessary skills to lmock them off their perch and achieved a 
mastery based on industrial and institutional innovations. In the eighteenth century, the British acquired the 
mantle of leading shipping nation which it cemented with innovations in iron, coal, and steam. Britain held 
this position until the 1960s, at which point the time frame of this thesis ends. 
By understanding the hist0l1cai forces at work, this thesis attempts to explore to what extent a life cycle of 
imitation, advance and decline can explain the varying fortunes of these nations. In covering such a long 
3 
time peliod, it seeks to reveal the underlying dynamics of industrial competitiveness while at the same time 
recognising the changing nature of global commerce. 
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Chapter 2 
The Literature on Shipping, Dynamic Competition and Entrapment 
2.1 Literature on International Merchant Shipping 
The key advantage that the shipping industry lends to such a long-tenn analysis is the availability of 
information on the industry over such a long peliod. There are a number of books dealing with the 
industry's long 'history. For example, Fayle's (1933) A Short history of the World's Shipping details the 
industry from antiquity to the twentieth century. However, it is now dated and suffers from a eurocentlic 
focus. More recent is the excellent series published by Conway Maritime Press and edited by R.Gardiner. 
This selies examines the industry from the earliest ships through to the container revolution. Although 
technical in focus, it does include chapters on economic issues and refers to environmental factors that 
shaped the development of technology. Perhaps its only weakness is its eurocentlicity, although it does 
address eastem traditions in a minimal fonn. 
The definitive work on Chinese shipping technology is Joseph Needham's (1971) Science and Civilisation 
in China Vol.4 PartIII. More recently, Gang Deng (1995, 1997 and 1999) has released a number of works, 
on economic and institutional aspects of Chinese shipping. On Gujarat and Indian, a number of authors 
have written on different aspects of the trade, in particular, M.N. Pearson's (1976) Merchants and Rulers in 
Glljarat, S.Arasaratnam's (1994) Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century. K. Chaudhuri's (1985) Trade 
and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean and Kenneth McPherson's (1993) The Indian Ocean: A hist01JI of 
People and the Sea give excellent summaries. 
On early European shipping and trade, R. Unger (1978, 1980) has produced two definitive books with a 
technical aspect while C.R Boxer (1965, 1969, 1985) has produced a number of definitive works on the 
Dutch and Portuguese mmitime accomplishments with a broader social-economic approach. These can be 
augmented by works from a large range of authors dealing with technical, commercial and institutional 
aspects of their trade. It is in this period that two of the texts in the series edited by R.Gardiner stand out, in 
particular Cogs, Caravels and Galleons (1994) and the Heyday of Sail (1995). 
There is a wealth of material available on British shipping. Standing out are Ralph Davis's The Rise of 
English Shipping in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centu/J' (1967) which presents an industry of growing 
capabilities while Stunney's (1962) British Shipping and World Competition presents the same industry in 
decline. Ronald Hope's A New Hist01J' of British Shipping (1990) provides an excellent examination of the 
industl-y. 
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Two books stand out on American Shipping and both by the same author. Rene de la Pedraja's The Rise 
and Decline of US Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century (1992) and A historical Dictionary of the 
US Merchant Marine and Shipping indust!JI have no peers, although Bauer(1988 and 1979), Safford (1979 
and 1985) and Whitehurst (1983) also make invaluable contributions. Kilmarx's (1979), America's 
Maritime Legacy contains contributions from a number of authors and must also be considered a 'must 
read'. Contributions on American and British shipping also appear in T.Yui's and K.Nakagawa's (1985) 
Business HistOlJ) of Shipping: Strategy and Structure, a vital book on the rise of Japanese shipping. As its 
name suggests Chida and Davie's (1990) The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A histOlJI of 
their modern growth is a key source while more general books such as Hirschmeier and Yui's The 
Development of Japanese business /600-/980 also deal with rise of firms like Mitsui and give a good 
account of environmental forces operating at the time. For an account of the all-pervasive government 
policies, refer to Miwa's (1985) Maritime Policy in Japan: /868-1937. 
A number of journals have occasionally produced articles of interest, particularly on British shipping. 
These can be easily found in the Journal of Transport HistolJl, International Journal of Maritime HistolJ) 
Marriner's Mirror and Transport HistoIJI. Aliicles on American shipping are to be found in American 
Neptune. The occasional miicle appears in more general histOlicaljoumals such as Moyen Orient et Ocean· 
indien, Journal of the Economic and Social HistOlY of the Orient, but these are generally historical and lack 
economic analysis. Aliicles in these joumals are most useful in defining the economic and social 
environment in which the indush·y operated. The occasional article in the Journal of Economic HistOlY, 
such as Harley.C.Knick's (1988), Ocean Freight Rates and Productivety 1740-1930, is stronger in economic 
analysis but, they are a rmity. Clearly, this list is not exhaustive and a more comprehensive list appears in 
the bibliography. 
This thesis depmis from these works in one very clear way in that it attempts to apply modem economic 
theory in aIlalyzing shifting positions of industlial leadership: In particular, there has been no attempt to 
apply institutional theory to the industry. In the next section, we examine the economic literature relating 
to industlialleadership. 
2.2 Competitive Advantage and Life Cycles 
With regard to the amount of prosperity and business activity in them, cities and towns differ in accordance 
with the different size of their civilisation ..... what is obtained through the co-operation of a group of human 
beings satisfies the need of a number many times greater than themselves. For instance, no one, by himself, 
can obtain the share of the wheat he needs for food. But when six or ten persons, including a smith and a 
carpenter to make the tools, and others who are in charge of the oxen, the ploughing of the soil, the harvesting 
of the ripe grain, and all other agricultural activities, undertake to obtain their food and work toward the 
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purpose either separately or collectively and thus obtain through their labour a certain amount of food, that 
amount will be food for a number of people many times their own. (Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, ed Franz 
Rosenthal, Princeton, 1967, II 271-2) 
The paragraph above was written by a fOlllieenth century Islamic poet and political economist, Ibn 
Khaldun. He introduced the concepts of specialisation and division of labour four centuries before Adam 
Smith raised them in Europe. Standing out is the idea that productivity improvements based on 
specialisation are determined by the size of the market (or civilisation). To this, Ibn Khaldun added it was 
the 'conditions and customs of luxury' that laid the basis of trade. The rich import from those with a 
surplus and therefore those with a surplus build up wealth. It is no coincidence that Ibn Khaldun made 
these observations four centuries before Adam Smith. Islamic market activity was far more active and far 
more prosperous than anything in Europe at the time. Adam Smith's observations only came in Europe, 
when he could observe the same phenomenon on a significant scale in his own environment. 
Further east, Chinese literahlre on intemational trade was bome out of the political debate over whether 
China should trade with foreign nations that they perceived as barbarians. Pin-tsun Chang (1989), who 
examines the official literature on the subject, notes that most of the economic debate related to arguments 
for and against trade, not the causes of competitive advantage. However, standing out is the concept of 
'mutual benefits' expounded by progressive officials such as T'ang Shu and Chang Han who advocated 
freeing trade in the mid-sixteenth century. The concept of mutual benefits recognises that different regions 
had different goods in different levels of abundance. Trade was based on the simple idea of 'exchanging 
what you have for what you do not have'. Countries should also trade if there were cost differentials 
between the two nations. Absolute cost advantages were touched on by Lan Ting Yuan (1680-1733) who 
noted that ships and rice could be produced much more cheaply in South East Asia than in China. By 
contrast, China was a low cost producer of ma11Y manufactured goods. Many of these manufactures were 
relatively wOlihless in China but regarded as valuable overseas. Officials of Ming and Ching China were 
well aware of the importance of demand elasticities. The greater the level and more elastic the foreign 
demand, the more favourable were the terms of trade to the home counny. 
[n the West, it was not until the eighteenth century that Adam Smith enunciated the concept of absolute 
advantage in which a nation exports if it is the world's low cost producer. David Ricardo introduced to 
Europe the notion of comparative advantage where a nation might forgo its low cost advantage in one 
industry if it is more competitive in producing other goods. John Stuart Mill expanded on this to introduce 
the concept of reciprocal demand which recognised that terms of trade are determined by levels and 
elasticities of demand in various countries. 
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While China eventually adopted Socialist models, the concept of comparative advantage became the 
bedrock of Western classical thought on il1ternational trade. The dominant version was embodied in 
Heckscher and Ohlin's model and is based on differences in factor endowments of land, labour, natural 
resources and capital. It was assumed that nations all have equivalent technologies but different 
endowments. Posner (1961) challenged the idea that nations have similar technologies and production 
functions. His model was based on the idea that trade is generated by differences in the rate and nature of 
innovation between nations. Comparative advantage in indusuies where factor endowments are similar 
(such as machille tools) is determined by the rate of technical change in an industry which is a result of 
differences in illVestment. 
Vemon (1966) continued this emphasis on innovation. Vemon introduced a life cycle to international u'ade 
recognising that when a product became standardised, its cenu'e of production was likely to shift to a nation 
with lower costs. Driving Vernon's model were two environmental forces, domestic demand and prices of 
labour. Innovation was most likely to come in a wealthy l1ation where the level of demand could suppOli 
innovations while at the same time, expensive labour would put pressure on the development of innovations 
that reduced costs. Porter (1990) continued this emphasis on environmental forces and questioned the 
relevance of models based on factor endowments. The old models may have been relevant in previous· 
centuries but, they could not accurately desclibe modem industries with higher levels of technology, 
multinationals, and economies of scale. The old notion of comparative advantage needed to be replaced by 
'competitive advantage' which recognised that standardisation was not a once-and-for-al1 event as posited 
by Vernon. Innovation was continuous and an industry's ability to derive competitive advantage was a 
function of interactive features in the home environment. 
2.3 Evolution and Economics 
Much of the CUlTent theory on economic evolution draws on Marshall's life cycle theory of the firm (for 
example Porter (1990), Nelson and Winter (1982), Downie (1958). Marshall's theory was centred on the 
'representative firm', a firm whose features were considered normal for the industry. Anyone firm was a 
tree in an industrial forest and like all living organisms, they went through a cycle of birth, growth and 
death. Marshall(1890:377) noted 'that in almost every trade there is a constant rise and fall of large 
businesses'. Behind this cycle, lay the abilities of the businessmen themselves. A businessman with energy 
and ability gains a footing in a trade and his enterprising zeal causes the business to grow. Growth brings 
with it economies of specialisation. Every 'improved process is quickly adopted and made the basis of 
further improvements' (ibid). Success breeds success until death or loss of faculties causes the business 
reins to eventually fall into the hands of less capable businessmen, after which decline sets in. This 
biological-evolutionary description appeared in Marshall's Principles of Economics in which he also 
outlined his descliption of market activity. UnfOliunately, economic thought seized upon his mechanical 
analogy of the market and over-looked the evolutionary development of the firm. In neo-classical 
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economics, the finn became a black box assembler of factors of production according to their marginal 
productivity, in response to equiliblium prices. Economists lacked understanding of variation and evolution 
ofthose organisations that were responsible for much economic activity. 
Marshall recognised the imp01iance of the en vironment as a contributor to competitive strength through the 
external economies of 'Marshallian' districts. However, he did not see the environment as a determining 
factor in the lise and fall of particular films or indushies. For Marshall, this was driven by the energy and 
ability of the entrepreneur. Marshall's theory of the 'clogs to clogs' family may have been overly 
influenced by exposure to his his immediate commercial environment in Britain which, even as he was 
wliting, was falling behind its rivals in the USA and Germany. The clogs to clogs film lost its descriptive 
relevance when family firms gave way to large corporations controlled by managers. This change was not 
lost on Schumpeter. In the TheOl)' of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) praised the industry 
structure of small films that characterised Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. With relative ease of 
entry, these structures generated innovation as new enh·epreneurs arrived with new ideas and continuously 
disrupted the old ways of production. However, in 1942, Schumpeter's position changed with the 
publication of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in which he recognised the superiority ofDS firms in 
the first half of the twentieth century. With their large scale R&D laboratories, engineers, technicians, 
production and disuibution faciltities, these corporations could generate innovation far in advance of the old 
structure. 
Schumpeter recognised that economic systems evolved and the nature of the economic system was 
imp01iant in generating technological advance. For Schumpeter, capitalist systems generated technological 
evolution because films would advance technology to compete with their rivals. A process of creative 
destruction revolutionised 'the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one'(1942:83). With innovation, new firms rose to prominence, dethroning old 
leaders who operated with older techniques. As innovative as his work was for the time, Schumpeter lacked 
access to the more detailed business histories and historical perspectives available to a later generation of 
wliters, such as Chandler and Landes. Consequently, he failed to anticipate some of the relationships 
between strategy, management and innovation. 
Drawing on both Marshall and Schumpeter, Downie (1958:28) believed the most fundamental characteristic 
of a capitalist economy is growth and change, not equilibrium. Downie put forward a model in which two 
mechanisms detelmined whether a finn succeeds. The transfer mechanism (TM) is a selection process by 
which films invest profit in increased capacity, cOllsequently a firm grows at a rate proportional to its rate of 
profit. The films with the greatest efficiency, or what is now called total factor productivity, earn the highest 
profits and increase their market share at the expense of others. Propensity to invest is determined by the 
rate of market growth and growth in the economy. Downie's theory also includes an adaptive mechanism. 
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A firm facing death can respond by innovating. The innovation mechanism (1M) occurs when a firm that 
finds its market share slipping so improves its efficiency by investing some of its funds on innovations. The 
population of firms that exist at any time, and the success of any given firm, is a consequence of processes 
of selection and mutation (or adaptation), and contains a high degree of variation. 
Peilrose (1959) opened up the 'black box' firm ofneo-classical economics and revealed that firms can vary 
in their make up. Films have different endowments, in particular human resources. The efficiency of 
human resource·s improves over time as personnel become more knowledgeable and more adept in their 
positions (see Robel1son and Langlois 1994:365). In the course of its operations a firm will choose to use 
its resources in a way that most closely fits the types of knowledge and scope of operations that they have 
evolved from their earlier experience. Penrose's thinking anticipated Richardson (1972) who introduced 
the term 'capabilities' to refer to the skills, experience and knowledge that a firm possesses. 
[n putting cumulative change at the centre of economic progress, writers such as Penrose and Downie attack 
the existence of a stable equilibrium as posited by the classical economists. For the evolutionists, the 
economy is in a constant rate of change. For Penrose, this is a consequence of continuous adaptation to the 
environment which itself is changing as other· films and institutions also adjust to the changes around them. 
[n such a state of change, a position of static equilibrium cannot exist. However, while Penrose disregarded 
equiliblium she did not offer a theory of industries and markets in which the film operated (Nightingale 
1996:22). 
The evolutionary nature of capitalism was put centre place by Nelson and Winter (1982), who offered an 
evolutionary theory of economic growth. Their analysis shows strong similmities to Downie in the 
development of biological conceptions of economics, although Downie does not appear in their sources 
(Nightingale 1997:149). In contrast to Downie whose focus is on the firm, Nelson and Winter's focus is on 
changing best practice techniques. Consequently, the emphasis is not on firms but the tec1miques with 
which they operate. According to this theory, all firms cany out procedures and use technologies that 
detennine their success or failure. They labelled these behaviours 'routines'. They include standard 
operating procedures, investment behaviour and, the process of finding better ways of doing things. The 
company with the most effective routines will become more profitable, and its success will indicate to other 
companies that they should adopt those behaviours. Hence, the most profitable routines will be broadly 
accepted and tend to become predominant over time. The profitability of routines will depend on the 
characteristics of the environment (which in tum will be shaped by the routines of existing firms). Under 
this model, it is the need to cope with a varied environment that leads to flexible and mutating behaviours as 
films adopt new processes and routines. Consequently, routines change over time in an evolution of 
commercial technology. Nelson and Winter place films at the centre oftheir analysis of economic change. 
10 
This has left some room open to explore the influence of the environment in shaping the decisions and 
prosperity of finTIs. 
Metcalfe (1984) recognised that any population of producers is based on a technological regime which they 
use to produce their output. Commercial competitive struggle is not so much a competition between finns i 
I', 
but a competition between technological regimes. Metcalfe drew on Downie's model and introduced 
Population Ecology theory in which population of firms have difficulty adapting to change due to 
institutional inel:tia, rules and vested interests. With restIicted ability to adapt, populations of finns can die 
and be replaced by finns more suited to the changing environment. The Imowledge base and capacity of a 
firm is largely shaped by its past history and previous technological commitments. This restricts finns to a 
limited set of design configurations. Because of varying previous commitments, films have different 
capacities to innovate and improve productivity, and consequently firms vary in their profit levels. A firm's 
survival and prosperity depends upon the possibilities of the technological regime on which they have 
invested. It also depends upon extemalities of adoption; the extent to which the environment is wedded to 
that regime. 
2.4 Industry Formation and Entrepreneurship 
Three classes of entreprenerial activity can be identified as arbitI'age, speculation and innovation (Harper 
and Earl 1996:309). The entreprenelllial-type we would most expect to give birth to a new regime is the 
innovative or Schumpeterian entI'epreneur, although this is not neccesarily always the case. The 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur innovates through the introduction of new goods, new production methods, 
opening of new markets, conquest of new source of materials and/or the creation of a new type of industrial 
organisation (Schumpeter 1934). The entrepreneur is motivated by a dream, creative instincts and a will to 
conquer. Schumpeter's analysis down plays the role of prices because prices are not yet available for these 
markets. 
By contI'ast, Hayek and Kirzner place prices at the forefront of the explanation of the role played by 
entrepreneurs (see Casson 1982:367-373). Hayek (1949) ties entrepreneurship to the assumption of market 
equiliblium. It is a world of continuous discovery, new technologies and new awareness of individual wants 
at pmticular time and places. These discoveries are localised so that different people have different 
infOlmation. Through the market, these discoveries are acted on and entI'epreneurs co-ordinate their 
decisions in a movement towards a state of eguilibliulTI. For Kirzner (1973), alertness to disequilibrium is 
the distinguishing characteristic of the entrepreneur. This alertness is reflected in their buying, selling and 
plicing plans. However, Kirzner and his fellow Austrians provide no description on how resources are 
developed, a key aspect of entreprenelllial innovation. His is a market-based description that ignores 
organisational and technical determinants of innovation. 
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Kil-zner also lacks an explanation for the supelior alertness and foresight of the entrepreneur. Knight (1921) 
linked entrepreneurship with confidence in one's own judgement coupled with a low aversion to risk. Since 
then psychological literature led by McClelland (1967) has sought to identify personality traits consistent 
with entrepreneurship. Such a focus runs in danger of down-playing the importance of environmental 
factors which give rise to entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Leibenstein's (1978) concept of X-efficiency has also been applied to entrepreneurship. In this theory, a 
number of fact~rs cause the economy to operate inside the production possibility frontier. These include 
psychological costs that cause agents not to exhibit full rationality and incomplete contracts which allow 
discretionary employee effort. EffOli is required to break old habits and psychological inertia. 
Entrepreneurship is a creative response to this situation. By mediating in the market place (in particular 
management ski1ls and capital markets) the entrepreneur improves information flows and fills gaps in the 
economy where holes exist. 
A key problem faced by an entrepreneur considenng enteling a market is anticipating the response of other 
players (Richardson 1960). If a large number of players enter the field, profits will be low. On the other 
hand, if few players enter, profits will be high. Consequently, information problems on other agents 
behaviour create lisk. Films must also ensure they have sufficient supply of their own imputs. Richardson 
(1972) notes that firms can guarantee supplies through a number of strategies including forward purchasing 
orders, vertical integration, taking pmiial ownership of potential suppliers and developing close relations 
with suppliers. 
For Casson (1982:25-8), opportunities for entrepreneurship are provided by the availability of new 
infOlmation, through discovelies and updates. Consequently, there will be a greater market for 
entrepreneurs in times of change. However, there is a level of uncertainty, otherwise everybody would act. 
The entrepreneur is someone that has better or more relevant information than others. This is a rejection of 
the neo-classical concept where everyone has access to the same information. Constraints on 
entrepreneurship are derived from the existing theory on the way the world works. The entrepreneur makes 
judgements different from the norm. 
There is a big difference between the entrepreneur who moves an economy closer to equilibnum and one 
who makes new paths for an economic development through the introduction of new products and 
processes. In effect this latter entrepreneur introduces greater uncertainty and takes the market further away 
from the old equilibrium. To some extent, George Shackle's (1988) portrayal of an entrepreneur, as 
someone endowed with creative imaginations, bridged this divide. Shackle's entrepreneur takes existing 
notions and puts them together in new ways 
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Porter (1990) moves away from the individual to the environment as the determinant of innovation. He 
(1990: 174) gives a biological analogy in stressing the role of the environment in the development of 
competitive industJies. It is the environment that gives birth to diversity and new methods of competing, 
and Porter saw a number of environmental factors that contribute to the growth of a new industry. 
Sometimes industJies grow purely from chance; however, in practice, anyone of three factors can give bilth 
to an industry. These include an endowment of factors of production such as iron ore giving birth to the 
Swedish steel industry, or university research and training giving birth to more advanced indusuies. 
Industlies can also grow from related and supp01ting indusu·ies. For example, the Italian ski boot industry 
grew out of the manufacture of climbing and hiking boots. Finally, local demand conditions can provide a 
stimulus for the formulation of new industries. Porter's environmental focus can be married with both 
Hayek who emphasised localised differences and the Shackle-type entrepreneur who puts ideas together in 
new ways. 
2.5 Securing Competitive Advantage 
Abemathy and Utterback (1975) descJibe a pattelll of indusnial evolution upon the amval of a new 
technology. When a major new technology anives and creates a new industry, customers are unfamiliar 
with the technology so demand is small. Producers are still grasping the potential of the technology and a 
number of variants will exist in what is a rather experimental stage. However, as the quality of the products 
improves and the market grows, the number of films will increase. Eventually, a dominant design emerges, 
specialised production processes are developed, and as films get bigger, the economies of scale and capital 
they build up provide them with competitive strength which acts as a bamer to entry to any potential new 
entrants into the industry. This clearly suggests that there are advantages to being an early (if not first) 
mover. Other advantages of being a first mover include the ability to define the market in terms of product 
charactelistics and exploit customer rigidity (see Davis and Devinney 1997:77). It also allows a firm to 
develop a reputation and build up assets gradually over time. First movers also have an opportunity to gain 
expelience, leam by doing, and build up of economies of scale and scope; these last three all leading to 
reduced costs which make it difficult for new entrants to enter the industry at a later date. However, first 
movers or pioneers face one big problem - they are investing in unsteady technologies and this opens up the 
high possibility of failure. In an hist01ical analysis, Golder and Tellis (1992) showed that pioneers failed 
47% of the time. Consequently, they state that being first is less important than holding and capturing the 
position of leader dUling a period of early market growth. 
A key factor in reapillg the benefits of innovation is appropriability; to what extent can a firm appropriate 
the retullls of their innovation. If an innovation can be easily replicated, a firm faces the danger ofbealing 
all the costs of development which other companies can then exploit without having to bear the 
development costs. Kay (1995: I 00-1) notes that innovation can be protected through patents and secrecy, 
and also via strategic responses in which the innovation is combined with a distinctive capability such as 
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reputation, organisational architecture, or strategic assets (including economies of scale, experience curves 
and other entry baniers). In many industries, competitive advantage can be maintained due to the difficulty 
new players have in acquiring technologies. [n 1967, Polanyi noted that some tacit knowledge can only be 
acquired by expelience and can not be easily be transferred (see N0l1h 1990:74). This acts as an obvious 
banier to late movers attempting to catch up in an industry at a later stage. A nation that gains experience 
with a technology early in its life will have greater opportunity to transmit tacit knowledge to its workers. A 
nation acquiling the technology late is at a disadvantage. 
Vernon's(1966) International Product Life Cycle model was based on the assumption that imitation was 
likely to occur once a product technology had developed to the point of standardisation where, it was easily 
imitated. Producers transfer their operations to low wage nations who become the new cenh'es of 
production. However, Perez and Soete (1988:459) note that a follower nation faces huge catch up costs. 
They face higher investment costs than the first mover who built up assets gradually. They must acquire 
experience and the science and technical knowledge to run the necessary productive equipment. These 
costs place a high threshold on anyone wanting to enter the indush-y. Consequently, they suggest the 
window of opportunity for enteling the industry should be grasped in the early stages of major transition. 
During phases of transition, everyone is leaniing so old and new producers are at the same level and the 
threshold costs are lower. 
First mover advantages can also extend into the environment that an industry builds around it. Hirschman 
(1958:99&119) notes that the founding of a new indush'y stimulates economic activity in a number of areas, 
including experimentation with technologies and searching for industrial supplies. This demand for 
supplies creates opportunities for satellite finns to grow in their wake. At the same time, the leading film 
will attempt to promote the use of their product among customers. We can recognise these forward and 
backward linkages as the development of industrial clusters which Porter(1990) stated were key 
contributants to a nation's economic success. Clusters reduce transaction costs and create collective assets 
in the fonn of infonnation, specialised institutions and reputation. These assist innovation and speed 
productivity growth. Porter's theory builds on Marshall's (1890) description of industrial districts where 
extemal economies of scale could be gained outside of the film due to the pool of labour and other 
infrastructural resources that could be shared among the resident businesses. 
While accepting the importance of first mover advantages, Porter (1990: 163) suggests that more significant 
is the need to be the first to create a national 'diamond' that sustains competitive advantage. This 'diamond' 
is a diagram portraying forces such as sophisticated buyers, a large number of competing industries, factor 
endowments (including knowledge resources and infrastructure) and clusters as mentioned above. The 
factors that make up the diamond are mutuall y dependent and reinforcing. The state of these factors has an 
effect on the dynamic nature of an economy and on its constituent industlies. For example, in the same way 
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that demand can affect the quality of supply, the inverse can happen, the result being that users and 
producers serve to raise each other's standards. If a producer has competent firms in related and supporting 
industlies, mutually reinforcing industrial advancement can occur. Suppliers help firms obtain new methods 
of production, providing a greater opportunity to apply new teclmology and buyers in turn, are in a position 
to influence the suppliers technical advances. Through exchange of research and development and joint 
problem solving, the rate of innovation is accelerated, and costs can be spread throughout the industry. 
Having a number of companies in compatible industries, increases the nation's total industry knowledge. It 
can also lead to economies of scale in infrastructure and, there can be a flow on effect whenever one pali of 
the industry has success. A high degree of co-ordination benefits all. A nation gains competitive advantage 
when it has established a unique diamond. The components take time to establish however, this time factor 
also affects would-be competitors thinking of imitation. 
It is important to note that these industrial charactelistics do not just appear. They are the consequence of 
history and commercial evolution. Similarly, the sources of competitive advantage at the level of the film 
are products of its past history. The foundations of corporate success identified by John Kay (1995) include 
reputation, experience and other strategic assets. Competitive strengths clearly go beyond any initial 
endowment. They are 'the outcome of processes of innovation, learning, imitation and diffusion' (Dosi 
1988b:234). As Porter (1991: 163) notes, the' process of gaining national advantage is one where history 
matters and where cause and effect become increasingly difficult to separate'. 
2.6 Advance and Improvement 
When an economy adopts a technological invention it has a momentum which wil1 stimulate further 
invention. As Carter (1963 :687) states, this 
... may be done by creating new demands: for instance, an improved design of motor car engine, giving rise to 
higher speeds, stimulates the invention of improved designs of brakes. Or the stimulation may occur because 
the primary invention alters the relative scarcity of factors of production .... The most interesting possibility is 
that the primary invention may create new opportun ities for the interaction of ideas between different types of 
technology -- it may turn out to be the missing element which makes a practical possibility of something which 
was previously only a theoretical dream. 
A new technology creates pressures and compulsions that propel innovative activity in particular directions. 
For example, Rosenberg (1969:5) noted that the invention of Kay's flying shuttle led to the need to speed 
up spinning operations. Once this was achieved, it revealed a shortage of weaving capacity which 
eventually led to the invention of Catiwright's power loom. It is an illustration of technological innovation 
creating imbalance which propels innovation in celiain directions. This non-neutrality of the direction of 
technological advance is supported by Nelson and Winter (1982), who state the solutions we create to 
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tecl11lical problems are determined by our knowledge, investment and routines built up over time. A new 
technology is developed along a path that reflects these endowments. Nelson and Winter call these paths 
'natural trajectories', a reflection that advance follows advance in a way that appears almost inevitable 
given the technical endowment. Dosi (1982) uses the telm "technological trajectory" to define this path-like 
nature of advancement. The technological paradigm defines for the scientist and the industrialist what is 
technologically possible, shaping the way they perceive, approach and resolve technological problems. 
They detelmine what technological directions to pursue or not to pursue. 
As technology advances along a path or trajectory, greater knowledge is gained on the potential of the 
technology. New oppOliunities are revealed, pushing development further along the path in a cumulative 
effect. As a country progresses along a trajectory, it gains greater tacit lmowledge of the technology and, is 
in a better position to exploit the cumulative mture of technological development (DosiI988b:393). 
Success breeds success and a technological gap is opened up between it and other countries. With a well 
established paradigm, advancement becomes endogenous along the trajectory. 
POlier (1990) saw environmental features as the chief factor in determining the rate of innovation in the 
economy. The interplay of the nation's factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting· 
industries, finn strategy, structure and rivalry. This emphasis on the environment is supported by studies of 
'National Systems of Innovation'. The first explicit use of the concept 'National Systems of Innovation' 
came from Christopher Freeman who, in his 1987 book, identified that Japan's success was strongly 
determined by its organisation of sub-systems and interaction between those sub-systems in a manner that 
was specific to that countly. The organisation of R&D, films and government organisation such as MITI, 
played a key role in generating innovation. 
Lundvall (1992:12) defines National Systems of Innovation as 'all parts and aspects of the economic 
structure and the institutional set up affecting learning as well as searching and exploring'. The concept of 
NSI recognises that teclmology is not easily transferable and is country specific (Archibugi and Michi 
1995). It is rooted in skills, capabilities and lmowledge that has been built up over time; a factor of prime 
impOliance given Polanyi's (1967) identification that much knowledge is tacit and can not be easily 
acquired. National differences in the adoption and development oftechnologies are the result of a nation's 
peculiar ideologies, cultures, histmical expelience and language. These forces create the inter-firm 
relationships and other factor environments that determine the level of innovation in a country. While there 
is much similarity between POlier and those studying NSI, Porter presents the national system as an 
environment for a particular industry involved in international competition whereas those studying NSI 
focus on the environment in its own right. To that extent, this thesis will take a line more akin to Porter's in 
that the domestic environment is presented in relation to the shipping industry. Both Porter and those 
studying NSI stress the role ofhistmical forces. 
16 
A key feature of many authors is the central role of competition in forcing firms to take innovative actions 
and deliver technological change. However, other factors might deliver an innovative response. Dosi 
(l988a:227) provides a list of other factors that can influence technological innovation. This includes 
technological bottlenecks and scarcities of critical inputs; or, conversely an abundance of particular inputs 
(eg energy, raw materials, etc). He also identified changes in the rates of growth of demand, changes in 
relative plice levels (especially the price of machines relative to the price of labour) and patterns of 
industrial conflict which affect the supply of labour. 
For Schumpeter (1942), perfect competition was not the sole harbinger of advance. Small firms in perfectly 
competitive markets might not be so well placed to advance technology as their larger counterparts with a 
larger resource base for development. Consequently, technological advance could also occur under 
socialist planned economies where improvement would occur by decree. In fact he recognised that 
monopoly lights promoted innovation as they increased the certainty that an innovation might be worth 
financing and pay a return. Hence patents, copYlights and grants of exclusive lights are a necessary 
condition for progress. By contrast, Klein (1977: 17) disputes the advantages of larger companies. In 
analysis of some fifty major inventions, he found none came from a large company. Large companies might 
provide resources for R&D but not the incentives. Through specialisation and constraints on internal 
interactions, large companies seek static efficiencies via exploitation of existing technological choices. 
They make choices on the existing production possibility frontier using existing inputs but, do not push the 
frontier out. For Klein, the main reason a company enters 'slow history' is not the diminishing returns of 
technology (ibid:S8) but the fact that an industry over time becomes more structured and less adaptable to 
uncertainty in the environment. For 'fast history' a high level of competition with ease of entry into the 
industry was the best prescliption for technological advance (or dynamic efficiency). This seems to be 
supported by Abernathy and Utterback (1988) who note that once a company has established high sunk 
costs in an industry, it is not likely to introduce radical innovation that lays those sunk costs redundant. The 
company will create a formalised structure to exploit the model which has become standardised and 
improvements will tend to be only incremental improvements in process technology. Consequently, major 
product change often comes from outside the industry. 
Klein's theory is highly compatible with Burn's and Stalkers's (1961) characterisation of organisations as 
mechanistic or organic. Klein saw large films as becoming mechanistic. However, his views are not so 
compatible with Chandler (1962) and Contingency Theory. They are consistent in that large static firms can 
only advance through acquisition, a fact Chandler's research seems to bear out. However, while Chandler 
sees organisational competition as a process of survival of the fittest, Klein notes that sometimes large 
inefficient films can succeed on the basis of their ability to influence their environment through advertising, 
lobbying, political influence and exploitation of tax loopholes. Clearly, this last argument lends itself well 
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with the thoughts of Institutional Theory which stresses the importance of legitimisation in the institutional 
environment, and Resource Dependency Theory which stresses the importance of managing relationships in 
order to secure access to resources. 
Chandler's work did not concern itself with innovation per se, with the exception of organisational 
innovation which was a function of strategy. However, Lazonick (1991), who built on Chandler's work, did 
link the processes identified by Chandler to innovation. Lazonick recognised that innovation was not born 
from technology alone. It involves an interaction between machines and people, and an incentive to 
innovate. In contrast to the competition stressed by Porter, it is co-operation that induces innovation. He 
identified that vertical specialisation in the production chain can create a balTier to innovation that co-
operation CUll overcome. Large firms with their advantages in resource and lmowledge utilisation are more 
likely to generate innovation. However, given the unce11ain nature of change, Langlois and Robertson 
(1995) do not believe that intemalising change is always the best option. In times of high uncertainty and 
changing resource needs, flexible relationships with outsiders may more effectively generate innovation. 
The Chandlerian-type film appears only when the rate of innovation has slowed. For Langlois and 
Robel1son, the most effective organisational fmm for generating innovation and growth depends upon the 
problems confronted, the stage in the product life cycle, the availability of infmmation and many other 
factors. It is a theory in which organisational moulds are made and broken over time. 
2.7 Organisations, Institutions and Production Technology 
Once a significant innovation is adopted, the economy will build up institutional relationships that help to 
maximise it. These will include educational institutions and literature to diffuse knowledge of the 
technology, transpm1ation, government services, and producers. A follower nation seeking to catch up by 
adapting the same technologies faces the problem that diffusion and advancement of a teclmology requires 
these institutional and environmental features that the leading nation has built up over time. As Dalum, 
Johnson and Lundvall( 1992:311) note laggards are sometimes slow to catch up because 'product or process 
technologies do not automatically fit into new institutional set up'. 
Success in exploiting a production technology is likely to depend on the co-ordinated actions of many 
individuals. This raises the problems of how to ensure that each individual performs his or her required 
task. Economic organisations must co-ordinate the activities of a large number of individuals towards the 
common goal while maintaining motivation. Over-riding this is the importance of aligning objectives 
between agent and plincipal. Therefore, organisational structures must address these issues of limited 
infOlmation and incentives. 
The incentives that institutions embody provide a number of benefits that enhance the performance of an 
economy. Firstly, they provide stability. Institutions provide mechanisms to ensure that the activities of the 
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members do not stray too far from that required to maximise potential. As North(1990:25) states they 
provide information and discipline waywardness by regulating patterns of human interaction. By providing 
a degree of certainty in human interaction, institutions allow economic agents to perform their tasks in 
confidence. 10hnson (1992:26) notes that through their ability to mediate conflicts and provide incentive 
systems, the stability they provide can actually assist implement necessary change. Incentives can take a 
number of fOlms. Rules, nOlms, and values all provide the incentive structure of an economy, telling 
members how to direct their economic activity. They also reflect what is considered rational behaviour. 
Vanberg (1988:248) notes that for recuning problems of choice, rules provide standard solutions which 
improve the quality of outcomes, reduce costs and mistakes. Consequently, despite the short telm 
imposition, they provide a greater payoff overtime. 
Institutions provide Imowledge on production and economic conditions. They create and co-ordinate the 
lise of Imowledge and information for the individual decision maker (Boland 1979, 10hnson 1992). They 
also provide social knowledge which may be needed for interaction with other individual decision makers'. 
The importance that institutions play in handling information is very important in dictating economic 
activity given the limitations of human cognitive activity. Decision makers information about the world is 
full of omissions and distortions and is only an approximation of the real environment (Simon 1959:96). 
Infmmation is heavily filtered through the perception process. Through the handling of information, 
institutions can strongly shape the schemas and belief systems in which decision makers base their 
decisions. 
In identifying the role that rules, incentives and values play in directing business and productive behaviour, 
the work of Lakatos must be mentioned (see Harper and Earl 1996:314). The Lakatosian approach suggests 
films behave in different ways because they are charactelised by different hard core assumptions and 
operational heuristics. Like scientists, businesses follow a program which consists of a hard core that is 
rigid, and a peliphery which contains those aspects of the program that can be changed or sub-contracted. 
Hence, a business programme is capable of flexibility but within constraints. It is based on a particular way 
of viewing the world. The resulting helllistics provide the rules of thumb and define what can and cannot be 
done. Earl (1987 :25-7) gives some insight into how such management philosophies are created. They may 
result from personally designed experiments of tlial and enor, or they may be derived through social 
leaming of pre-existing doctrines. Such philosophies can occur at the firm and individual level and may 
exhibit a co-evolutionary aspect in which corporations can shape the view of individuals while individuals 
can contribute to corporate philosophy. 
If organisations are infused with values as ends in themselves Selznick (1957) states they have become 
institutionalised. With institutionalisation, a unique organisational character emerges which is crystallised 
by the forces of custom and precedent. Organisation values and nmms shape the actions of their members 
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while newcomers to the organisation undergo a process of socialisation in which the values are internalised, 
shapillg their subsequent judgement and commitment. 
Where beliefs are widely held, they become encapsulated as culture. Camerer and Vepsalainen (1988) see a 
firm's culture as a mechanism for governing rational behaviour by firms. Written contracts can not 
sufficiently cover all behaviour because of the cost of making them complete. Unwritten 'cultural 
contracts' fill the void. They state that a 'companies early history often determines its culture for a long 
time because precedent is a powerful focal principle' (ibid: 124). Stories and anecdotes serve to help install 
the rules of culture. Due to its tacit nature, culture is difficult to change which can become a large problem 
for an organisation if an environmental shift renders a culture inappropliate for the changing circumstances. 
2.8 Change and Rigidity 
An important feature of innovation is the rate at which it occurs. Klein (1977) believed that progress 
occuned at different rates but clung to the notion of equilibrium. In plotting performance over time, Klein 
produced an S shape curve which illustrated periods of 'slow history' and 'fast history'. This decline of 
innovation is related to a decline in competition and producers taking a more structured and predictable 
approach to business where they seek incremental not discontinuous change. Mokyr (1990) notes that 
economic history reveals long periods of stagnation and very slow gradual change punctuated by leaps in 
technology like the industrial revolution. By contrast, Schoenberger (1997) speaks of a quiclcening of 
change over time, a compression of time and space. 
Gersick (1991) explored the evolutionary work from a number of scientific disciplines and noted that 
periods of relatively stable equilibrium are punctuated by revolutions, a fnding not dissimilar to Mokyr 
(although cautions this is not the only way change occurs (ibid:33)). These revolutions require a 
dismantling of the old structures and a breaking of the old inertia. Therefore the system goes through a 
period of instability before pieces of the old system and new pieces assemble into a new system with a new 
set of rules. Gersick notes that these revolutions (punctuated paradigms) are most likely to occur in systems 
that have confining deep structures, the depth of the previous structure being resistant to gradualism. A 
more flexible system will adopt innovation more gradually and without friction. This view lends itself to 
Potts (2000) who examines the role of connections in an economic system. Potts applies complexity theory 
to economic systems with the conclusion that a system that becomes too ordered with large numbers of 
connections, loses its ability to change and yet retain coherence and stability. The economy becomes over-
c01l1lected and agents in that system become bound to an old structure unable to malce change. 
Perhaps the pace of change is less imp01iant than the extent to which the innovations are compatible with 
the existing set up. Langlois and Robelison (1995: 116) state that if an innovation is compatible with 
existing capabilities, a leader will probably retain leadership. On the other hand, an entirely new innovation 
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will be appropliated by those finns that already have access to the most relevant capabilities, which need 
not be the existing leader. 
Freeman and Perez (1988) created a taxonomy of innovations that varied from incremental innovations 
which can readily be adopted by an existing industry through to technological revolutions. It is these last 
ones which pose the greatest threat to established producers. It is associated with a cluster of interrelated 
innovations that leads to a new style of technology and management (techno-economic paradigms) which 
clearly has similinities with the notion of regimes that Metcalfe raised the following year. A new techno-
economic style raises productivity to a level that is clearly superior to what was 'normal' with the previous 
technological style. Perez (1983) uses the term 'technological style' (or mode of development) to desclibe 
a kind of ' ideal type' of productive organisation or best technological 'common sense' which develops given 
the dynamics of the time (ibid:361). The alTival of a new style of management and technology requires 
accompanying changes in the socio-infrastructure of the economy in areas such as education and politics. 
However, when a new mode of development is first introduced, the surrounding social, educational and 
market infrastructure is one which has developed in response to the needs of the previous style of 
production. Until there is a change in the broader social and institutional spheres, the new technology can 
not be fully exploited. The economy enters a penod of expenmentation and reassessment in the face of 
tradition, established ideas, vested interests and other inertial forces which actively oppose the required 
transfonnations(ibid:365). The result is a social-institutional crisis which needs to be resolved before the 
economy can reap the benefits of this new technology and enter a new wave of growth. Eventually, the 
complimentary innovations in the social and institutional spheres are made and the crisis is resolved. 
Educational, political and other systems are adapted to the Ii sing technological needs, and the economy 
enters a new peliod of growth. 
While economies making the transfonnation from the old mode of development to the new undergo clisis, 
newcomers can sometimes make social and institutional innovations with more ease than leaders trapped by 
their own success, whose institutions Freeman and Perez (1988:64) describe as 'arthritic'. This suggests 
that industlial productivity, and hence leadership, can be to some degree accounted for by the broader 
institutional environment. 
2.9 The Chains of Entrapment 
The literature discussed so far p01irays an industry as being far more than the sum of the finns that make it 
up. It also conflicts with a view of firms that make changes to their production function on the basis of 
changing plices. An industry's success is based on external economies, rules, cultures, supporting 
institutions, etc. In contrast to a neo-classical view of free flowing technologies and market adjustlnent, this 
section will discuss psychological, technological and institutional baniers to change and also the costs of 
change itself. Some barriers have already been alluded to in the previous discussion so will not be repeated. 
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2.9.1 Psychological Barriers to Adjustment Herbert Simon and James March (1958) are credited 
with introducing cognitive science to the study of Industrial Organisation. They criticised the classical 
eC01lOmic model where decision makers choose from fixed and known alternatives, each of which has a 
known consequence. In reality, there are limits to human cognitive ability. Decision maker's information 
about the real world is fuIl of omissions and distortions, so the decision maker's model is only an 
approximation of the real world. It encompasses only a fraction of the relevant characteristics of the real 
environment and'inf01mation is heavily filtered through the filtering process. People tend to be receptive to 
inf01mation that is consistent with previously held beliefs wllile contrary information tends to be down-
played. 
Coupled with this idea of a limited model is the idea of 'schemas'. These are beliefs and propositions based 
on our personal expelience. A piece of inf01mation which is at odds with our belief system (eg: that the 
way we do business is no longer good enough) can encounter a great deal of psychological resistance before 
it is accepted. Cognitive dissonance can result when information appears to contradict our previously held 
belief systems. In such a situation, Festinger (1957 :3) noted that humans will seek to reduce that dissonance 
and/or avoid situations and information which would increase the dissonance. Such options could lead to 
decision makers seeking social conoboration of their views and selecting with who they mix or, they 
emphasise negative aspects of inf01mation that conflicts with their own views (Elster 1983). Decision 
makers may go to some lengths to avoid recognise inecoverable sunk costs and actually escalate their 
commitment to projects that information now shows to be unwise, Escalation of commitment literature dates 
from Staw (1976) who found that subjects who invested in an under-performing R&D project invested more 
in an attempt to tum things around. The escalation was a consequence of their perceived responsibility for 
the O1iginal decision. 
Baniers to change also include motivational effects. Levinson (1978) describes the pain of loss, the 
uncertainty and fear of failure as balTiers to changing existing life structures. Lost opportunities, losing 
power struggles, and failure all serve to dampen motivation for change. Levinson also suggests fear of 
losing control of the situation under the new regime. People with expertise based on the last technology 
will no longer be perceived as expelis (Earl 1984). They may use their remaining expert status to resist 
innovation and therefore protect their status and power base. 
The notion of schemas can be seen in Thomas Kuhn's (1963) notion of paradigms. Kuhn noticed that 
innovative momentum is not without order. Outside of divine intervention and chance happenings, 
innovators can only solve problems within their inteIlectual and educational constraints. Scientific 
education plays a key role. It inculcates the scientific community with a deep commitment to a particular 
way of viewing the world and practising science in it. That education determines how discoveries are 
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interpreted and, results in an emphasis on finding scientific discoveries which support what is already 
known. In effect, the existing scientific paradigm detennines how science advances and, is so strong that 
fill dings not fitting the existing paradigm can be discarded. Occasionally, findings inconsistent with the 
paradigm once accepted, serve to create a new paradigm. However, commitment to the old paradigm is so 
strong that scientists can not merely give up their old way of viewing the world. There is a resistance to 
new modes of thinking. 
Kuhn's approacll was applied to business by Earl (1984: I 02-3) who saw changes in corporate strategy 
mirroring Kuhn's scientific revolutions. When a strategy fails it requires transition to a new strategy but 
myopic vision (with the old) can throw a company on the corporate rocks. Lorsch (1986) had a similar line 
of thinking and suggested culture was an invisible barrier to change because it (i) produces a sh·ategic 
myopia which distorts incoming signals and (ii) even if this myopia could be overcome, management's 
response is still guided by the old belief system. When persistent problems finally led to a recognised need 
for a change in beliefs, there is frequently a period 'of what psychiatrists label denial. They choose to 
ignore the possibility that key beliefs could and should be modified'. This is followed by a period of 
confusion, development of new sh·ategic visions, and expelimentation. Sometimes the new strategic vision 
does not work as they go through a process of forming new beliefs 
Cultures became a popular area of attention in the 1980's, a consequence of Japanese industrial success, but 
its origins can be found in the work of Selznick (1957) mentioned earlier. Schoenberger (1997) recognised 
that cultures can be vulnerable to changes in the competitive environment (although with no refernce to 
Selznick). For Schoenberger, an indusuial climate is borne from the temporal-spatio rhythms and practices 
at work and the environment, competitive practices, traditions, processes of valuation, etc. As a competitive 
environment undergoes dramatic change with time-space compression, the old capacities are thrown into 
question leading to a 'cultural crisis of the firm'. The ability of a firm to respond to these environmental 
changes is restricted by bureaucratic resistance, economics of inf01mation and uncertainty, problems of 
capital-labour relations and regional obsolescence. Finns will not be totally resistant to change but the 
underlying cultural processes playa vital role detelmining patterns of change and resistance. 
Schoenberger (1997:11) recognised that cultural values occur at valious levels including indush·y and 
internal production sites. However, Schoenberger's focus is on the culture of the firm as this is where 
strategy is made and the finn is more accessible to analyse. The effect of the broader culture on the 
functioning of an indusu·y has not yet received much attention in the literature and my thesis will hopefully 
contlibute to closing this gap. 
Culture is paJ1icuiarly compelling in that the institutions and inf01mation flows in an economic system 
mutually reinforce each other to accept that the cultural values are correct. Leaming in the culture is itself 
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an accumulation of past learning and this affects the interpretation of new lmowledge and its relevance. 
Colleges employ staff who have graduated within the broader educational system and seek to advance 
existing knowledge on the basis of what they know. Leading schools develop with particular ways of 
thinking which recruit staff with similar philosophies. Similarly, top management in industry, who have 
graduated with such a philosophy, recruit staff who can operate within their company's culture and method 
of operations and consequently, employ staff with some degree of compatibility. Educational institutions 
tum out graduates to meet the demand in a self-buttressing interaction of supply an demand. Chambers of 
commerce, newspapers and other literature reillforce the infOlmation flows. The system is not immune to 
innovation but there is an economic and social pressure to conform to the values of society and industry. 
2.9.2 Technological Paradigms, Path Dependency and Lock-In Throughout an economy's 
histOlical development investments are made in technologies and institutions. These investments and 
linkages cannot be broken easily and effect the later development of the economy (Perez 1983:365). These 
past investments can detelmine the progress ofindustlialleadership. 
Inertia is also a consequence of the persistence of practices or routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). In the 
course ofa firm's development, it will acquire "skills and experience necessary to function profitably. These 
routines have not been acquired with ease. Nor can they be discarded with ease. Consequently, routines 
have a rigidity that makes change hard to implement. A nation with large technological/productive 
investments may find it very hard to switch from one technological trajectory to another requiring different 
skills and experience. One may have to start almost from the beginning. The result can be 'firm specific 
trajectories' in that firms will 'search in zones that enable them to use and build on their existing 
technological base' therefore future achievement is constrained by the past (Dosi 1988b:224). With a 
consequence, firms and industries suffer fi'om 'lock-in'. 
The notion of being 'locked-in' to a specific technology was illustrated by David (1985) who noted that 
industries can be locked-in to a given technology despite the existence ofbetler altematives. Economies of 
scale and technical intelTelatedness meant that an industry would benefit from the adoption of a single 
standard. This leads to 'lock-in' for a change in the standard has repercussions for other parts of the 
industry. Once a technology becomes locked in, it is very hard to reverse because the industrial system in 
itself is not planned or under the control of any designer. Alihur (1988) explains that for an individual film 
'lock-in' can be attractive because of (i) learning by using (ii) Network externalities ie: advantages in all 
llsing (iii). Scale economies in production (iv) informational increasing retums ie: better understood (v) 
technological intelTelatedness. Technical rigidity can also be influenced by local factor prices. Given the 
feasibility of technology is dependent on factor plices, these can have an impact on the diffusion of a best 
practice technology (Salter 1966). 
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Salter (1966:64) noted that when an industrial plant is built, it nonnally embodies the leading technology at 
the time. Consequently, any industry will complise a number of plants embodying a number of 
technologies reflecting the rate of investment when they were built. These plants are embedded in a 
technology that it is indivisible. They can not flexibly be re-moulded as classical economics would suggest. 
New technologies can only be embodied when fresh capital is created. This clearly inhibits the possibility 
of piecemeal change and makes change expensive. 
These authors recognise that any individual producer's production technology is part of a larger economic 
system. It can not make technological decisions in ignorance of its environment and institutionalised 
relationships which may be born in economic advantages. For a country, specialisation along a specific 
technological trajectory and paradigm can lead to a trade off between allocative efficiency and 
Schumpeterian efficiency (Dosi 1988b:398;403). A country may have trouble choosing between (i) 
increasing efficiencies and continue to progress down a technological trajectory with which it has a lead or 
(ii) change to a new mode of development with which it possesses no lead but has greater long telm 
potential. The greater the lead a nation has, the .less likely it is to change. In effect, technological 
leadership in old technological pathways may be a hindrance to quick adoption of new ones. 
2.9.3 Institutional Entrapment Earlier we noted that institutionalisation can assist the diffusion of a new 
technology. However, by definition institutionalism also involves a creeping conservatism and an ineltial 
quality. As mechanisms are put in place to stop waywardness, they direct people's behaviour in ways that 
may be difficult to change when external circumstances change or a new paradigm comes along. This 
creeping conservatism can best be understood by examining the problems an organisation faces as it grows. 
Greiner (1972) notes that as an organisation becomes older and grows in size it evolves through crises that 
must be solved if the organisation is to survive. An organisation initially characterised by its technically or 
entrepreneurially driven founder and an infOlmal structure finds with size it incurs crises of planning, co-
ordinating and controlling. The introduction of a more formal hierarchical structure and work standards 
solves these problems but creates problems of excessive centralisation. Increased delegation and a more 
decentralised organisation structure will solve these problems but leads to a loss of control. The use of 
more formal systems solves this problem but leads to a 'red-tape crisis'. Eventually, the firm that reaches 
an evolutionary phase which emphasises strong personal collaboration, greater spontaneity in management 
action and increased use of teams and education. 
Greiner's model shows that growth requires some measures of control for an organisation to maximise its 
potential. Gjerding (1992) states that innovation design in organisations must overcome two conflicting 
requirements (i) diversity (ii) fOlmalisation and centralisation. While diversity increases flexibility and 
innovation, rules are intended to secure conformity. Rules constrict waywardness that undennines the 
efficiency of the economic system but, at the same time, restlict the flexibility of behaviour. They result in 
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behaviour that is more predictable and more reliably administered (Heiner 1983 :343). Effectively, rules 
maximise cunent production teclmology (static efficiency) but sacrifice the opportunity to develop new 
productive technologies. Values can also act as a barrier to the adoption of innovation (Bush 1987). 
Institutionalisation can also affect market relationships. In this light, it is important to note that the market 
involves a selies of institutionalised relationships and is far from being a neutral environment (Pagano 
1991 :420). Organised markets involve relationships that go beyond mere exchanges of price and volume. 
They involve flows of qualitative infOlmation and an on-going leaming process about each others 
capabilities and requirements. Over time, trust and investment in information channels build up, exchange 
of infOlmation becomes more efficient and routinised with common codes and channels of information 
(Lundvall 1988:356-7). While this increased efficiency reduces transaction costs, they create an ineltia 
resistant to change and severing these connections will involve some cost. 
Markets have another in-built resistance to change in that their decentralised and dispersed nature can make 
it difficult to co-ordinate a change that affects the whole system - systematic innovation. As a producing 
nation experiences market growth it will be ;n a position for producers to increasingly specialise and further 
increase its productivity. However, this speclalisation occurs within a given technology. As the routines 
that workers perfOlm become more specialised they become less flexible (Langlois and Robel1son 
1995:23). It may be possible to overcome barriers to systematic change by intemalising production within 
large films. It can, for example, overcome powerful resistance to innovation by suppliers who must serve 
others, may have asset specificity and, may not share the innovators vision. On the other hand, large 
organisations may resist innovations that have the effect of destroying the value of investments already in 
place. 
Growth has a ftnther negative consequence for flexibility in that decision making tasks become separated 
from productive tasks. In effect, decision makers become more isolated from core technologies and perhaps 
the market. Acquiring accurate information becomes more difficult. This has particular importance if the 
decision makers are also responsible for enforcing "control" of industrial activity. Greiner's model (above) 
suggests economic growth results in changes in the skill requirements of leaders with the early 
teclmological-entreprenemialleaders being replaced over time by more administrative skills. In the modem 
context, Galbraith (1967) noted how the creative entrepreneurial role had been replaced by a managelial 
role being perfOlmed by a techno-structure. It reflects an increased distancing of decision makers from core 
economic activities. The lise of a specialist professional management class noted by Hayes and Abemathy 
(1988) could also be interpreted as a consequence of growth which invariably creates a barrier to effective 
change as decision makers become more distanced from core activities. 
26 
The ability of institutions to direct our thinking along a particular paradigm or direction is reinforced by the 
role they play in learning. Johnson (1992) notes institutions affect learning by defining communication 
flows and interaction inside and between firms. They also provide the educational and communication 
infrastructure, the incentive system, social nOlms, etc, which shape the learning process. Change is 
dependent on the infonnation received and the processing of that infonnation (North 1990:8). The 
institutional structure filtering the infolmation therefore sets the preconditions for certain types of change. 
Consequently, institutional change is rather incremental and slow because of the inherent inertia. Dramatic 
changes in knowledge that depmt from previollsly held learning paths can find the institutionalised directed 
learning and ineltia a barrier to the adoption of major change. The ability to influence the learning process 
can result in a situation where institutions continue to teach new members of a society that an institution is 
required long after the need for it has gone (Boland 1979:323). By referring to the importance of the earlier 
need or problem for which the institution was created, they continue to justify their existence, with 
consequent socialligidities. 
Stake-holders can be particularly powelful barriersto change. Olson (1982:44) states that, over time, a 
stable society will build up a number of distributional coalitions - organisations that are 'overwhelmingly 
oriented to struggles over the distribution of income and wealth than to the production of additional output'. 
Their effect is to reduce efficiency and aggregate income and contribute divisiveness to the nation's 
political life. The incentive structure, of which the distIibutional coalition are a part, encourages its 
members to keep organisations alive even after its Oliginal purpose has disappeared. This they can do with 
the advantage of an established organisation. This gives them an advantage over groups which might not 
have the incentive or, have too large a number to effectively organise. These coalitions are particularly 
damaging in their ability to influence what the people in that society find 'customary and fitting'. The role 
of distributional coalitions is particularly relevant given the recent theOlies of organisational economics that 
see films as a set of stakeholders who come together through a nexus ofrelated contracts. All stakeholders 
require a minimum pay-off in order to secure co-operation. 
POlter( 1990) identifies that 'Nations will succeed in industries where their goals and motivations are in line 
with the sources of comparative advantage'. An intrinsic beauty of the 'invisible hand' is the congruity 
between individual goals and economic growth, but I suggest that this congruity is limited by circumstances. 
An example of this are capital markets in which, during growth stages, investors' pursuit of short term 
retums can be combined with long tenll industlial growth as the broader economic environment provided 
the opportunity to do so. However, during decline, shOlt-telm retums can only be obtained by sacrificing 
long term investment and growth. (Perhaps if a film is privately owned or has significant resources, it can 
reduce its reliance on self seeking agents with conflicting goals). 
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Congruity between institutions and industtial growth can also occur between institutions that have no direct 
economic incentive, most obviously, military institutions. For example, in Portugal and Spain economic 
goals coincided with military goals providing a two-engined motor for growth. In the twentieth century, US 
growth enjoyed a beneficial congruity when the US departtnent of defence helped explore computer, semi-
conductor and aircraft technology, developing new industties and embedding US companies with 
capabilities and expelience in TOutines in those industties. However, as the technology developed, there 
were fewer spill-overs, and the industlial and military institutions began to conflict as they competed for 
resources - growth and decline dliven by a chance congruity. 
2.9.4 Cost of Change A further difficulty in implementing large scale organisational and technological 
change is the costs associated with that change. PenTOse (1959) claimed the costs of change place limits on 
the rate at which change can occur. The "Penrose effect" occurs when managers have to employ and induct 
new staff with the consequence that managers are detracted from perfOlming their day to day tasks with the 
danger that they lose touch of operations. 
The costs in shifting to a new production technology include rett"aining or hiting workers for different skills 
and routines, obtaining different capital endowments and production facilities. These costs can act as a 
barrier to change. As figure 2.1 shows, as a technology develops, a producer gains more experience with 
that technology and costs decrease. An established producer(A) would be far down this cost curve. If a 
new technology arrives, it will be initially be more expensive (at B). If the technology has potential, new 
entrants in the industry would be wise to adopt it but, the old leader must take into account the costs of 
change. They may finally change when supeliority of technology is evident but at this stage, the new films 
have advanced fmiher down the curve (to C). Even with the benefits of the now available public knowledge 
concerning the technology, the old leader must enter the new technology further back along the cost curve 
(ie; they are 110W the followers). 
Costs of 
Production 
B 
.A 
.C 
Old Technology 
New Technology 
Cumulative output 
Figure2.1. The effect of innovation on the relative cost structure of firms (adapted from Langlois and 
Robelison 1995) 
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Consequently, Langlois and Robelison (1995; 112) hypothesise that: 
a fiml that is adept at employing an existing technology will be less likely to adopt a new technology that is 
incompatible with its current capabilities than will a firm that is less adept at using the existing technology, 
even if the new technology offers the prospect of long-rull increases in profits for both firms. 
Given that, the superiority of the new technology is not always evident on its introduction, an established 
film is not likely to incur the costs of change until the potential of the technology is evident. This gives 
competing producers the chance to gain expelience and perhaps an early lead with the technology. Once 
the potential of the technology has been displayed, an established producer may find it can still compete by 
reducing slack in its own operations (Hirschman 1970). The existence of slack allows decision makers to 
canyon going down existing pathways in a changing environment (Earl 1984 sections 1.7 and 11.2). 
Another cost of change to consider are the psychological effects of decline in a competitive environment. 
Kets de Vries and Miller (1988:96) note that stress in a failing organisation can cause a leader to become 
depressed. A depressed or paranoid manager can in tU111 have a negative effect on the performance of 
organisation with destructive cultures developing. 
Table 2.1 
Psychological 
Technological 
Institutional 
Costs of Change 
Barriers to Change 
Cognitive Dissonance 
Bounded rationality 
Satisficing 
Schema/paradigms/cultures 
Motivation-Loss 
Routine persistance 
Lock-in 
Embedded Technology 
Path Dependency 
RuleslV alues/hemistics 
Institutionalised Relationships 
Isolated Decision Makers 
Specialisation 
Institutionalised learning 
Stakeholders. 
New Capital, retraining, etc 
Time required for implementing change 
Psychological stress 
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2.10 Summary 
Tn table 2.2, the various baniers to productive flexibility are summarised. They stand in sharp contrast to 
the economic world desclibed by classical economics of perfect lmowledge and instantaneous adjustments 
to changes in the environment. There is no ineltia from previous technological investments, values and 
institutional constraints and, technology was seen as a free flowing public good. But, reality would appear 
not to support this position. Changes in the environment, and in particular recent teclmological innovations 
in process technology, can lead to massive displacements, in industries such as automobiles (Robertson and 
Langlois 1994:361). Clearly, management and orgaIlisational perfonnance goes beyond a flexible 
production function. 
The true picture is one in which history matters. There are 'economies of time' which include (i) the timing 
of industry entry (ii) the subtlety between first mover adVaIltages versus the costs of being a pioneer or late 
follower, but most importantly (iii) the legacy that histOlical investments have on shaping future industrial 
activity. The question this thesis asks is can these forces of advance and entrapment be built into a model 
that explains the nature of industrial development, pai·ticularly given the long life of many industries? 
POlter( 1980) had earlier examined industrial evolution within a framework of the product life cycle. 
However, while recognising that industrial phases include introduction, growth, maturity and decline, he 
rejected the idea that one model or pattern of evolution could be used as a predictor of industry evolution, 
preferring instead to examine the underlying forces and relationships. Apart £i'om Porter, there has been 
limited effOlt at applying a life cycle to industry. Lambkin and Day (1989) believe this is because industlies 
embrace several classes of non-competitive products each with its own pattern of evolution. Population 
ecology theory applies a life cycle at the level of organisation populations, with clear implications for 
industry. In the model posited by Hannan and Freeman (1977), it is the environment that selects the 
organisational fonn that fits the available resource space. At some point environmental change exceeds the 
organisational rate of change leading to death. There are a number of problems with this model (see 
Donaldson 1995). In paIticular it fails to explain environmental change, it sees population density as the 
driver of births and deaths, and leaves no room for managerial action. It stands in sharp contrast to 
contingency theory which provides organisations with the ability to adapt their structure in response to 
changes in contingency factors such as strategy, size and technology. 
Given the previous reluctance to apply a life cycle at the industry level, I face the danger of walking where 
angels fear to tread. However, the history reveals that many industries have gone through phases of bilth 
and growth, and those industries that no longer exist have obviously died. On the other hand, those 
industries that still exist have not died. The whole notion of commercial 'Life Cycles' is not without 
controversy. The product life cycle has been subject to frequent criticism. For example, Tellis and 
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Crawford (1981) criticise its sequential nature and orderly bell-curve shaped progress. Their alternative 
was a Product Evolutionary Cycle with phases that are non-sequential and allow for periods of stabilisation, 
differentiation and divergence. Neveliheless, I suggest there is stiII room for a flexible application of a life 
cycle. Any organism goes through processes of behavioural adaptation, disease, growth, resource loss 
(famine or drought) and reproduction. Identification of phases such as birth, growth, and death does not 
preclude the existence of variation. 
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Chapter 3 
A Model of an International Industry Life Cycle 
3.1 Description ofthe Model This model attempts to answer the question what 
detemlines the rise and fall of industlial powers? The literature on industrial evolution reveals processes 
that lend themselves to an industJial life cycle. On the basis of that literature, I propose the following life 
cycle. This is n6t a rigid, mechanistic cycle. It is one that accepts valiation and the unpredictability of 
events such as wars and other chance events. As stated in the previous chapter, identification of phases 
such as birth, growtl1, and death does not preclude the existence of variation. 
The model states that the changing face of global industrial leadership is an on-going process of imitation, 
catch-up, advance and entrapment. The process is dliven by institutional and teclmological dynamics that 
affect, not just producers but, the entire environment (or system of innovation) in which producers operate. 
The model is strongly influenced by Porter (1990) who emphasises the importance of the environment in 
determining competitive advantage and Perez (1983) who emphasises the rigidity the techno-economic 
environment in which a firm operates. This thesis posits that these dynamics can be built into a four stage 
industJ·y life cycle: 
Stage 1. Imitation - In the first stage, the people in a nation (or influential members of it) come to the 
awareness that another nation has obtained greater wealth through better production and commercial 
technologies. That awareness may come about through a demonstration effect, extemal threats or the on-
going process of communication and interaction. Consequently, we would expect diffusion of best practices 
(and stage 1 of the cycle) to be influenced by proximity and ease of interaction. Such a proposition is 
consistent with Downie's innovation mechanism in which firms seek to innovate (including imitation) when 
faced with possible decline. However, even with awareness of a new pathway to growth, a decision maker 
might still decide not to imitate. For example, Earl (1984:76) identifies four strategies that decision makers 
can use when an existing way of doing things begins to perform poorly. They include (1) continue with the 
existing programme but make ad hoc adjustments and sinking further resources in an attempt to preserve the 
existing system (2) narrow the scope of existing programmes (3) attempt to use existing programmes in 
unfamiliar teITitory (4) seek a new programme. 
A number of barriers to adoption could occur if the country has belief systems with which the new 
economic pathway is not compatible. Religious and military values and institutions can present barriers, as 
can psychological baniers such as the persistence of schemas and cognitive dissonance. Conflict over 
change will occur between those who benefit from the change and those who suffer and in many cases, the 
result will be detell11ined by circumstances, for example, an extemal threat that hastens the need for change. 
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Once people in the nation become aware that it is in their best interests to adopt the new techniques, those 
members of society with access to the necessary resources and skills, and incentive to change, attempt to 
adopt those production and organisation technologies. There are clear advantages in adopting an existing 
technology as opposed to developing an indigenous one. Firstly, adoption saves on development costs. 
The imitator can adopt the new techniques without going through the long process of trial and error that the 
O1iginator had to incur. Secondly, the adopted technology has already been proven to work so can provide 
an improvement in the conditions of the imitator. This can provide a level of confidence in the change 
process as long as the technology is consistent with the existing infrastructural system and environment. 
The ease of imitation will be affected by the sophistication of the technology or processes involved. 
Obviously, more simple processes are easily imitated. In some cases we might find that first attempts with 
the new technology are hampered by inexpelience and the small scale of production so, they frequently 
require some level of government assistance or protection. The nation may also benefit from protection 
provided by wars that upset the imports of superior s;ompeting products. This allows the young nation to 
imitate the production technologies of the early leader and adopt the necessaJY productive requirements to 
their local markets. Initial production in the imitating country will be on a small scale and consequently, the 
process of imitation is more often than not driven by -£i'ont-line workers and engineers who are having to 
perf01m a number of tasks. 
The imitation process faces the inevitable problem of how to graft new processes on to an existing system 
while the old system still generates an element of ine11ia. The new technologies may continue to encounter 
resistance as they impact on old values and old methods of production. Some workers or power groups may 
find their prestige and incomes are sacrificed with the new production methods. Imitation may also be 
restJicted by a lack of resources, trained staff, or supporting industJies. Attempts to overcome these 
problems may lead to innovative solutions that lead to greater competitiveness. Consequently, continuous 
improvement dllling this stage may include both imitated and indigenous advances. 
Stage 2. Catch Up - In stage two, the nation successfully acquires the skills, experience, capital and other 
supporting industJies to compete intemationally. The rate of catch up is determined by a number of factors. 
Abramovitz (1986:388), who recognised that a number of counmes caught up to the United States after 
World War 2 in a 'convergence' of productivity levels, noted that the pace at which catch-up occurs 
'depends on factors limiting the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of 
capital, and the expansion of demand'. Drawing on Salter (1966), we would expect the rate of catch-up to 
be hindered where productive investments embody an older technology that can not merely be remodelled 
to adapt the new technologies. But clearly, this depends on the nature of the teclmology involved existing 
capital. 
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The rate of catch-up will be affected by the speed at which that nation acquires the new capabilities and this 
involves a process of learning of new knowledge and techniques. Much lrnowledge might be able to be 
required through formal education institutions depending on the sophistication of those institutions and the 
nature of the knowledge. However, it is most likely that a great deal of tacit knowledge will need to be 
required in its journey down the experience curve. 
Successful imitation requires some degree of technology capabilities, factor endowment and institutional 
similarity to the current leader. This includes educational institutions, government policies, organisational 
structures, etc. The new industries wi II require institutional support that the country might not be able to 
provide. In these instances, the imitation eff0l1 may fail or not reach a high level of efficiency. 
The rate of catch up is also determined by the pace of technological advance in the industry. If the industry 
is not generating a great deal of technological advance, it is far easier for an imitating nation to catch up. 
The slow rate of improvement and innovation results in a period of stability in which followers can easily 
catch up by mere imitation. The leader suffers from its failure to improve continuously, and therefore 
maintain the gap. Part of the problem may lie in the fact that it is on the technological frontier of an 
increasingly exhausted trajectories and, its R&D functions need to peddle twice as fast just to maintain the 
lead. 
Stage 3. Technological Advance - Throughout the process of catch-up, the imitating nation borrowed ideas 
and processes that it needed to develop its own industry. However, some of these ideas and institutions may 
need to be modified to suit local conditions. The requirement for modification may give birth to a number 
of innovations that enhance competitiveness. For example, there may be something in the local 
environment that is new and adds stimulus to continuous improvement, or alternatively, the imitating 
country may have to develop a substitute to accommodate for weaknesses in its infrastructure/factor 
endowment. Innovations may result from a need to overcome specific bottlenecks of the old technologies, 
in particular, the dramatic change in availabillty of a key factor (or factors) of production (eg: iron, coal, 
steel and electricity). On the other hand, the imitator may take up a technological advance developed in the 
old leader but not actually applied in that country due to socio-institutional resistance (an example being 
transistors or Deming's work on Quality Control - developed in the US but not applied until introduced in 
Japan). This may result in a new productive style more efficient than that preceding it. The source of the 
innovation is not so important as the country's ability to adopt and diffuse it. This will be affected by the 
state of the nation's endowments in finance, production, education, science and marketing; those factors 
identified in the National System of Innovation (Lundvall 1992). 
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Some innovations can be so broad in their effect that they are adopted by a large number of industries and 
create a new techno-economic paradigms. The new paradigm may be more effective for its greater ability to 
solve the control-flexibility debate, resulting in institutions with a greater capacity to generate continuous 
improvement. Given the reduced geographic limitations on competition as the 'world is getting smaller', 
the increased intensity of competition suggests a paradigm is likely to be replaced by one that can generate 
continuous improvement at a faster pace. 
The new development path provides opportunities for entrepreneurs to become rich and build up new 
centres of production. It creates a new techno-economic system with an underlying rationality that allows it 
to exploit the new production technology. It will be fed by educational institutions that provide skilled 
workers and trade associations that maintain standards and diffuse knowledge. Supporting industries will 
be spun off creating clusters that reduce trallSaction costs and enhance the flow of information within and 
between companies. The nation may also develop a reputation for excellence in the area. In effect, the 
nation has developed the sources of competitive advantage identified by Porter (1991 :340). 
Once adopted, an innovation can have a cumulative effect, it can lead to a clustering of investment, and that 
such investment can increase the rate of progress in an industry, leading in tum to an eventual flllther 
clusteling of innovations (Posner 1961). The developing industry will require supplies and this would help 
development of other related industries. Over time, the nation builds up a cluster of related industries which 
complement the competitiveness of each other through infOlmation flows and extemal economies of scale. 
Stage 4. Entrapment - In stage three, a new imitator adopts an innovation which enables it to improve its 
competitiveness alld tackle the old leader who is in now in a similar situation to that the imitator found itself 
in stage one ie: it must consider whether to adopt a foreign innovation. When the innovation first arrives, it 
may only be marginally superior to existing techniques. Until the superiority of the new technology is 
threatening, it is economically logical for the old leader to pursue existing methods in which it has invested 
in routines, capabilities, and specific assets. But even with recognition of superiority, a raft of 
psychological, technological and institutional bauiers can inhibit successful change. 
Potts (2000) view that economies become over-connected and agents in that system become bound to an old 
structure unable to make change can be wedded with Earl's (1986) view that economic agents become 
strongly attached to old decision making pathways because of the perceived negative implications from 
doing otherwise. InfOlmation-processing limitations call cause agents to resist significant shifts that 
threaten their core beliefs of how they see their world. Consequently, a combination of cognitive and 
systemic forces act to reduce the flexibility of economic systems. 
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While Potts focuses on how systems are put together, another approach would be to stress what the 
economic systems are made of. The effect of an innovation on industIial leadership depends on the extent 
to which a technological innovatioll depmis from the past. A country whose existing capabilities are 
compatible with the requirements of the new paradigm could easily make the tI·ansition. If an innovation, is 
highly compatible with existing capabilities, the incumbents could possibly retain leadership. However, if 
the innovation is entirely new then the benefits of the innovation will be appropriated by those 'firms that 
already has access to the most important relevmlt capabilities. These may be either entirely new firms or 
incumbent firms In related fields' (Langlois and Robertson 1995: 117). Conflict over change will occur 
between those who benefit from the change and those who suffer and once again, the may be determined by 
circumstances 
With a significant shift, the biggest losers are likely to be those countties with the deepest commitInent to 
the old stI·ucture. They will incur the most intemal resistance to change (Gersick 1991). The success that 
the old leader has had with the old techno-economic paradigm are the anchors that may stop it sailing with 
the new. It has large scale investInents in the old technologies. This includes tI'aining institutions, capital 
investInents, relationships and methods of doing business. Most impOliantly, the whole value system and 
rationality of the economic system is associated with its old production base (Schoenberger (1997), 
Freeman and Perez (1988)). When a techno-ecOllOmic shift occurs, the rules change. 
The old leader loses markets and is left with surplus production capacity and reduced eammgs. This 
reduces the incentive and ability to invest in new technologies, making it harder to push the technological 
frontier forward and keep up with the new tivals. Its producers may ask its government to provide 
protection from the imports now coming in. Protection might serve to give the leader a breathing space 
which allows the necessary adjustInent. On the other hand, if the nation is too deeply entrapped by its past, 
its glory days will have passed it by. 
In the mean time, the imitator is now armed with capital, skills and a greater inertia for continuous 
improvement. The nation eventually takes a strong lead creating a new economy based on the new 
technologies. As the new leader, it grows large, institutes controls necessary to exploit the new technology, 
and institutionalises values associated with that success. The system will be able to accommodate change 
and will have nothing to fear until a major shift in production technologies erode the source of the nation's 
competitive advantage, and the system begins again. 
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Immitation Leadership 
Entrapment 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Criticism 
This thesis seeks to determine to what extent the entrapment-based model outlined in chapter 3 can explain 
the historical shifts of the locus of industrial leadership. To achieve this, the historical literature on each 
epoch is examined with regard to the fortLmes of the shipping industry in each nation. Primary and 
secondary sources will be stLldied. In each case, the histOlical literature is contrasted with the model to see 
if a fit can be achieved without recourse to ad hoc modifications. 
There are several problems with such an approach. The first is the time frame and the different economic 
circumstances under which each epoch operates. The time frame is so long it poses the question 'do 
different economic systems have similar underlying forces?' and 'how reliably can twentieth century 
theories be applied to the longer time frame?' There is nothing new in applying models over long time 
frames. For years, economists have clung to the sLipply-demand model of market behaviour. But it is 
persistence that has been attacked and modified. For example, Galbraith (1967) noted that in the United 
States, a market of entrepreneurs has been replaced by an economy of large organisations and technocrats. 
Lazonick (1991) goes as far as saying the market economy is a myth. Porter (1990) observed that changed 
business practices have reduced the accuracy of the old model, and this throws open the question to what 
extent any model could be applied across a time frame spanning many centuries when practices and 
environments have dramatically changed. There is growing recognition of the dangers in applying a model 
over a long time frame in which methods of resource allocation change. 
The view of industry taken in this thesis is strongly institutionalist in nature and stands in sharp contrast to 
the neo-c1assical industry of free-flowing technologies and firms who adjust their production functions in 
responce to innnovations and changing market conditions. Neo-c1assical theory does not conceive markets 
institutional terms, seeing it as an institutional-free 'state of nature' (Hodgson 1993:58). For example, 
Williamson (1975 :20) writes 'in the beginning there were markets'. This view appeals to the Principle of 
the UnifOlmity of Nature, which states a ptinciple or generalisation that has held in the past will continue to 
do so (Pheby J 988:8). However, anyone with even the basic lmowledge of economic history will be aware 
that 'in the beginning' markets played a minimal role in resource allocation. Markets are a form of 
economic co-ordination that has evolved over time. A number of writers, including Hodgson (1988) and 
Oosi (1988b), have argued that the market is not a natural but a social institution governed by its own set of 
rules that restrict some behaviours and legitimise others. 
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Classical theory can be criticized for an over-commitment to the market model as an explanation of 
economic activity throughout time. However, any model which seeks to appeal to the Principle of the 
UnifOlmity of Nature is in danger of being exposed to the same criticism. Models are descriptions of 
activity in a given context and there are difficulties in aJlticipating future contexts. The model I propose is a 
dynamic model that incorporates change (ill contrast to the static equilibrium model). In fact, it is change 
that the model seeks to explain. However, even if my model provides a more accurate description of the 
past, it leads to an important consideration; the predictive value of the model. Even if the hypothesis is 
upheld, does this 'necessarily give it predictive power? Future economic activities will occur in contexts 
very different to those in the past and present. With this in mind, my model will hopefully reveal forces that 
are capable of having greater or declining stTength in the future but, it does not attempt to state that 
countervailing forces will or will not appear or the strength of those forces will wane because of 
circumstances. 
Economic evolution was a process stressed by Veblen (1934:8), who saw the key question as 'not how 
things stabilize themselves in a "static state", but how they endlessly grow and change'. Veblen saw the 
evolution of social structures as a process of natural selection of institutions. This institutional view has 
been taken fmiher by a number of authors including Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986:115) who noted that 
innovations in business institutions (eg: banking and insurance) in Western Europe contributed strongly to 
economic growth. Alfred Chandler (1977) emphasised the importance of a number of managerial 
innovations while Langlois and Robeltson (1995) examined a number of organisation forms and structures 
by which capabilities are organised, from decentralised markets to integrated companies. In chapter two, 
we discussed the impOltance of institutions in providing economic incentives and information. Clearly, any 
model on economic perfonnance must address the evolution of institutional forms. 
An historical approach to research has much to offer evolutionary and institutional economics. It is an 
approach that is best represented by Alfred Chandler (1984:3) who explicitly suggests generating theory 
from historical research: 
The historian has at least two exacting and exciting challenges. One is that of relating specific human events 
and actions to the ever-changing broader economic, social, political and cultural environment. A second is the 
development of generalisations and concepts which, although derived from events and actions that occur at a 
specific time and place, are applicable to other times and places, and are, therefore, valuable as guideposts for 
or as tools of analysis by other historians as well as economists, sociologists, anthropologists and other 
scholars. 
The approach of generating relevant theory through the study of history was pioneered by Karl Marx who, 
in Capital, examined the relationship between organisation and technology, or what he called the 'relations 
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and forces of production' (see Lazonick 1991 :267-71). However, Marx's model and predictions led to the 
misplaced anticipation of class-conflict between capitalists and workers. Fortunately, since Marx's day, 
there has been much progress in the sheer depth of historical infOimation available and methodology. 
A problem I face in coveling such a long time period is in dealing with data. While some data can be 
interpreted as fact, for example the date of an invention, other evidence is more problematic (Robertson 
1996: 132). Some data can only be interpreted in the context from which it has arisen. In the period 
covered by this thesis, there have been numerous changing contexts in which shipping and business activity 
occurs and at any given time, a number of contexts might co-exist. To overcome this problem, it is 
important to reveal as much infonnation as possible. However, history offers a wealth ofinfonnation. It is 
not linear or orderly and sometimes there is too much infOimation. With this comes the problem of 
identifying causal links for events and processes that can be quite complex and multi-faceted. James Burke 
(1968) illustrated these problems in Connections in which he reveals that an invention is not merely the 
product of an inventor but is part of a causal chain of what can be seemingly unrelated events. It is an 
approach to history that moves beyond heroes, themes and periods and shares some common ground with 
the approach taken in this thesis. In this light, we no longer see entrepreneurs and decision makers as 'great 
men', but as products of an inherited legacy, a viewpoint that has much in common with Dosi's (1982) and 
Nelson's and Winter's (1982) work on trajectories. 
[n dealing with these problems, I have been aided by the fact that much of the historical data has already 
been interpreted. Most of my research is based on secondary sources in which the weeding has already 
occulTed. This means that I might inhelit the weaknesses of those who have gone before me, but cross 
referencing can help over-come this problem as can reference to original sources where they are available. 
For example, it is common to cross-reference the records of the Dutch and English East India Companies, 
especially given the scarcity of Indian records Oil Indian Ocean trade. However, the sheer mass of original 
sources and, in some cases, language problems places restrictions on the extent to which this can be done 
within the confines of a study of this length. FOitunately, there is a broad variety ofinfonnation on shipping 
that has only become available relatively recently. In fact, it could be said that ten years ago, it would not 
be possible to conduct this thesis. Fortunately, writers such as Gang Deng (1995, 1997, 1999) and Yoneo 
Ishii (1998) offer interpretation and translations of work previously unavailable to the English speaker and 
have made this thesis possible. 
One problem in interpreting infOimation (i) over such a long period and (ii) on an international scale is the 
possibility that contexts are bluned, which make the interpretation of evidence biased. Robertson 
(1996: 137) has identified these weaknesses in Chandler's Scale and Scope (1990), which explores only 
three nations over a far shorter time period. It is important to capture the environmental factors that 
underpin development. For that reason, I go beyond the actual industry and include the environmental 
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features that have shaped development in the industry. This is consistent with POlier (1990) who highlights 
the importance of the national environment in detelmining competitive advantage. Although Chandler 
recognised that the large organisations on which he focused were not suitable for all industries, by making 
such a focus his study is biased towards a population of large finns operating in mature industries. It 
ignores finns at different stages of development. So not to encounter the same problem, I have 
endeavoured to start my histories, not only at the bilih of the industry in each country, but also of the key 
factors that have shaped the industry. Neveliheless, my selection is biased to those countries that at one 
stage became industry leaders. A more comprehensive study would provide greater detail on the 'also 
rans'. While I do note the positions of competitors I do face problems of (i) limited information on the 
small players in the early years and (ii) limited time and space constraints of the thesis which already covers 
seven nations over six hundred years. 
This leads to the question of where do you draw the line? Comprehensive histories should contain 
everything relevant but, as Pearson notes can we write a history of Akbar without considering his 
predecessors and legacy? Pearson (1987) states that 'everyone slices up the real world, which is monistic, 
to suit themselves, so there is no methodological reason why we should not also?' At some point we have 
to draw a line and this comes down to judgemei1t that the important issues of relevance have been included. 
Robertson (1996:146) gives a good guide when he suggests that good business history 'must attempt to 
cover a story in its complexity. This entails admitting contradictions in the evidence and placing the 
material in its context.' 
While my model is put forward as an attempt to find amore accurate explanation of indusnial forces over 
time, it runs the lisk of imposing meaning, order and patterns on hist01ical activity. The patterns I am 
imposing are designed in the late twentieth century. In recognizing an evolution of improving productive 
technique, my judgment is based on modem values. Given that the cunent epoch has cultural values of a 
commercial society very different to those of earlier societies, each history includes an outline of the 
dominant institutions in each country that shape the value system of the time. 
One weakness, I overtly tIied to avoid was too ligorously applying explanations bound by economic 
viewpoint where it might limit the revelation of more accurate explanations. This has been done before and 
r wished to avoid falling in the same trap. For example, in explOling maritime history and international 
trade, Douglas NOlih has faithfully applied the concept of transaction costs to a degree that blurred 
accuracy. In 1968, North claimed that in the two centlllies after 1650, productivity in British shipping rose 
significantly due to the decline in piracy and improvements in economic organisation. However, as French 
( 1995 :28-9) notes this understates the role of technology and many technological improvements were made 
during this period which advanced productivity. These include the movement to larger ships which 
reduced the man/ton ratio, breaking up of sail units which allowed greater flexibility, and the adoption of 
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the wheel for steering and the fore and aft sail. By 1991, North aclmowledged the role of technology but, 
repeated the old emphasis stating 'what distinguished Westem Europe from other places in the world where 
persistent growth failed to occur, was that they evolved a set of adaptive efficient institutions that 
persistently tended to lower the costs of transacting, producing and transporting in a way that produced a 
continuous evolution of productivity increases' (ibid:35). Although no one disagrees with this, it ignores 
many other forces that at times were more important. However as Brady (1991) notes only certain types of 
propeliy lights led to economic development. In many cases, economic development occurred at the 
expense of peasantry. The Westel1l European states came to favour merchant property lights over other 
forms of property rights. While the transaction cost view offers a valuable perspective, in the East, 
European businessmen operated without the same property rights and acted as plunderers, slavers and 
extOll1oners on their road to enrichment (ibid: 160). 
For this reason, my first priority was to examine the histOlical data and find the reasons that historians 
asclibe for events. The opportunity to explore such a long history and explore so much evidence relatively 
free of economic bias seemed too good to waste. I use the term "relatively free" to indicate my sources are 
historical not economic. They have been wlitten with the eye of the historian not the economist and this 
should reduce their exposure to economic do gina. Although this should not be taken too far. Historians 
also have their own interpretative dogmas. We only need think of the post-independence literature of the 
1970's, which frequently blamed colonisation for national economic, political and social problems. Even 
many of the Oliginal historical sources were full of intention that contaminated historical records. We need 
only think of Prince Henry's chronicles and the attempts to justifY actions such as slavery. The other 
problem with this statement is my own interpretative leanings. I am obviously not totally free of bias. 
While trying to avoid the confines of dogma, I opened up many other problems for myself, many of them 
identified by Finch(1999) in his discussion on grounded theory. First, as much as I try to cleanse myself, I 
am not free of personal bias nor the effects of previous training. This can affect my selection and 
interpretation of data. Second, although I fonllulated my model after observing trends in historical data, I 
may have seized upon my ideas earlier than I recognised in myself. Probably the biggest problem with this 
fOlID of research is the lack of co-ordinating Plinciples needed to deliver neutrality. Traveling through a 
world history of this scale without guidance of principles is like traveling through an ocean without 
navigation equipment. 
My research method is clearly inductive in its early stages and exposes itself to the cliticisms associated 
with inductive research, in particular the collection of superfluous detail before identifying what data is 
relevant. In the early stages, several pattems appeared in the data that suggested a cycle of growth of 
productive capabilities followed by eventual entrapment. On the basis of these preliminary findings, I 
conducted a review of the literature on industlial development and institutional economics. This theory 
42 
provided me with co-ordinating Plinciples but at the possible expense of channeling my vision, although I 
made a deliberate and conscious eff0l1 to try to avoid this trap. From the literature and preliminary 
historical research, I fonTIulated a model which uses elements from Growth of Knowledge and Evolutionary 
Economics that provides grounds for expecting entrapment at some point. My next stage was to conduct a 
more extensive histOIical review to see how the data fit the expectations delived from the model, thereby 
adopting a more deductive approach at this latter stage. The demons of bias versus lack of co-ordinating 
principles and information overload were consistent problems with which I had to contend, but I feel that 
this approach was'perhaps the safest approach. 
A major problem with this study stems from the lack of quantitative infOImation over such a long time 
period consequently, the data will be principally qualitative. There is an obvious lack of quantitative 
infOImation in the earlier periods and this presents problems in tell11S of defining leadership. There are no 
market share figures. Neve11heless, it is possible to detell11ine from historical data which merchant shippers 
conquered the oceans in tell11S of miles covered and technology. These will be the gauges of leadership 
used. In some instances, statistics will be provided. However, for the early years, these can not be accurate 
and should only be interpreted as indications of shipping activity and interpreted with fbll awareness oftheir 
limitations. Those limitations include the sheer scarcity ofrecords and the limitations of those that do exist. 
Records reliant on estimations by observers can regularly be found but can only be classed as estimates with 
all the subjectivity that entails. Where a number of observers have refened to shipping levels, it is possible 
to make cross-references. 
At times govemments may have required official recording of shipping activity but, those records are 
generally limited in the time period and geographic area. Such figures do not include clandestine trade 
which at times could be plentiful, and are very limited in the amount of information they provide. Ship 
numbers and routes may be registered but leave out infOImation on size, leaving an obvious problem if we 
want to compile infoll11ation on volume of trade. In the last two centuries, national ship registers have 
become available but, until relatively recently these have been Plincipally a Westem concept and still leave 
a problem whereby ships might be registered in one nation but owned and managed in another. 
Where tonnage figures are provided, they are fraught with difficulties due to the different terms used. For 
example, the terms 'tuns burthen' was a terms initially used in the Bordeaux wine trade in the twelfth 
century and referred to the number of barrels (or tuns) which a vessel could carry while, the tell11 'tuns and 
tunnage' also included the empty spaces between the barrels. The problem is many observers did not 
differentiate what method they were using. This example also illustrates that differences in interpretation 
are related to how the cargo is packed (a tun is reckoned to be equivalent to 60 cu.ft or 2,0001b giving 
figures based on either weight or volume). There can also be confusion when compared with modem 
definitions of tonnage. Some infOlmation is only available in gross tonnage (gt), which does not actually 
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measure weight at all but, the cubic capacity of the ship (100cu ft = I ton). Other information may be in 
dead weight tonnage (ie: the difference between the weight of the ship when fully laden and empty). The 
two cannot be directly compared. 
Another waming in interpretation relates to one of the reasons I chose shipping. Shipping is a highly 
illuminating industry as its delived demand aspect gives an indication of underlying commercial activity. 
However, it does not provide an overall picture of industJ;al leadership. China, due to its high agricultural 
productivity, was probably the world's most productive nation on a per capita basis until the end of the 
eighteenth century, long after it sUlTendered its lead in shipping. In choosing shipping, I am opening up the 
possibility that I am presenting an industry with a 'Euro-centric' bias. Maritime activity was one of the first 
areas in which Europeans gained early pre-eminence. This in no way suggests universal industrial 
superiOlity. Vasco de Gama discovered this on his first visit to Calicut. Despite aniving in state of the 311 
European ships, the locals laughed at the European expOl1s he offered, suggesting he offer them gold 
instead. In fact, the Europeans would be dependent on bullion to pay for imports with Asia up until the 
industrial revolution. (NB: Some of the products in which Europe had a competitive advantage had no 
market in Asia, for example woolen products were wasted on peoples living in the tropics, and clocks had 
no demand in societies not requiling precise time measurements). Industrial supremacy must be handled 
with care. 
Other criticisms refer to the model itself. It is possible that have no relationship to the shifting paradigms 
exogenous factors could contribute to a nation's industrial decline. These include luck, wars, bad strategic 
decisions, and values not related to the paradigm. There is also the question of timing. Any decision of 
technological change is going to involve a debate between those who gain and those who lose. The balance 
of debate will be affected by circumstances at the time. Therefore exogenous factors can play an important 
role. 
It is important not to be obsessed with the concept ofa 'best practice' commercial or productive technology. 
It is important to note that 'for a technical problem there is often no correct or even best, solution in the 
long run. In fact there is frequently 110 telminal state: both problems and solutions are themselves often 
dynamic' (Frischmuth and Allen 1969). Similarly, in terms of organisational practice and design, Pelikan 
(1988:376) states 'there is no single-type anangement - neither markets nor hierarchies - which would be 
universally optimal for all innovation activities'. 
There are other problems with rigidly clinging to the notion of 'technological style' (or best practice) as 
posited by Perez. If an older technological style continues to improve, it may still be able to compete with 
the new. It is possible that some producers using the old technological style may be able to survive; for 
example, the Morgan Motor Company who have maintained a market niche on the basis of these 
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"traditional" values. In shipping we see the same thing in some regional waterways where traditional fonns 
survive on a combination of cheap labour and labour-intensive technologies. Similarly, not all industries 
wiII be suited to any new teclmological style when they arrive. For example, despite gaining much success 
from mass production technologies, Lund et al (1977) found that in the United States over 75% of all metal 
working films engaged in small batch production. The mass-production style of production, on which 
Amelican success was so strongly built, was only suitable for manufacturing with large economies of scale. 
Finally, we must 'consider examples where the new teclmological style opens up the production of new 
products with no effect on the production of older products. In this case, a nation may remain the industrial 
leader but lose its position of overall economic pre-eminence. The resulting new consumer expenditure 
pattems can deflect purchases from the older good and the old leader can go into decline even though it is 
still the leader in that industry. 
Clearly, we can have competing and co-evolving techno-economic styles. This can present problems in 
telms of definition. For example, what constitutes a techno-economic style? When does one style or 
paradigm finish and become a new one. This problem of definition can be seen in Todd (1991) who 
applied the intemational product life cycle(IPLC) to the ship-building industry. For Todd, the 1970's and 
1980's reperesented a period in which ships had reached product maturity with standard technologies, little 
innovation leading to a consequent change in production location from high to low income counuies as 
suggested by the IPLC. Yet, dming this period of so-called stagnation, Japan's century old ship-building 
industry was producing a large number of innovations including on-board automation, a dramatic U'ansition 
in size of ships and and many organisational changes in production. Japan's achievement stood in sharp 
defiance to the IPLC. The Japanese did not see the 'steel-hull shipped' as having matured as suggested by 
Todd. This suggests that definition and technological potential is in many ways in the eye of the beholder. 
In this case, the telm maturity and its theoretical basis represents an example where Westerners had 
theoretically justified what this thesis would see as entrapment. But it brings us back to the problem, why 
were the Japanese not enu'apped by this so-called mature product. Although stopping before the 1970-80's 
time period, it is on these issues that this thesis (and its instihltional and behavioural economic sources) 
endeavours to throw some light. 
The last criticism of this thesis refers to the time frame. In stmting with China, I do a disservice to Islamic 
shipping (see Appendix 1). However, some restJiction must be placed on what is by any description, a long 
time frame. Despite these problems, this research has much to offer. Its wide scope reveals much on 
commercial and industJial evolution while dramatically reducing Euro-centJic bias. I have attempted to think 
beyond 'The Rise of the Western World' and 'How the West grew rich' to present a more global picrure ofthe 
rise and decline of indusnial fommes. The shipping industry is observed in a number of environments, time 
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contexts and cultures while, at the same time, identifYing the forces that have acted on evolution, success and 
decline. 
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Chapter 5 
The Nature of International Merchant Shipping 
By defillition, international merchant shipping is the transpOliation of cargoes between nations. The focus 
of this thesis is oc~anic merchant shipping ie: the shipping of goods across oceans. The difference between 
the two is that sometimes international shipping might not be transoceanic if the two nations are 
neighbouring. The reason for the approach I have taken is to provide some common level of comparison. 
For example, a voyage from Amsterdam to Calais would be considered international whereas a voyage 
along China's coast could be three times as long and still only be considered domestic. Secondly, 
transoceanic shipping reaches a higher skill and technological level to those trade routes that hug the coast 
line. Consequently, it illustrates an industry of high productive requirements, many of which are 
transferable across oceans around the world. 
However, the transferability of capabilities should not be overstated. In maritime trade, the quickest route 
between two points is not a straight line. It involves Imowledge of wind and tidal patterns which are 
regional in nature and acquired tacitly. Ship type must also be wedded to the appropriate conditions. On-
shore, lmowledge of local trading practices and conditions is also a factor that cannot be instantly applied to 
regions operating under different practices and conditions. The key tasks associated with transporting goods 
across the open seas include: 
i. Acquiring marketable cargoes. Tn the early days, the activities of a ship-owner and a merchant 
were joined. A ship-owner was a merchant who invested in ships to transport goods to a distant market. 
The merchant was involved in arbitrage benefiting from price differentials in geographically separated 
locations which he could solve through the provision of shipping services. To justify the investment in a 
ship, the trade must reach a certain size. Altematively, the ship-owner might be able to lease space on the 
ship to other merchants. In theory, a fisherman with sailing skills could invest in a larger ship and hire it out 
to merchants, but this was lisky as there was no certainty of cargo. As technology advanced, the 
relationship between merchant and ship-owner became separated as telegrams, telephones, radio, 
semaphore and computers could alert ship-owners to the presence of cargoes in various pOliS. 
Organisational development also assisted this division as businessmen found other ways of reducing lisle, 
such as pooled resources and insurance. However, the ship-owner merchant structure still exists today with 
many companies integrating into tral1sportation services. 
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ii. Finding and developing markets. These two tasks include many market making tasks as outlined 
by Casson (1985 :22). This includes establishing contact between buyers and sellers, specifying and 
communicating details, of the parties involved, negotiating and monitoring performance of agreements, 
exchanging and transporting goods, payment of the necessary taxes and other institutional requirements, and 
enforcement of the agreement. When merchant and ship-owning activities are combined, it also involves 
gaining Imowledge on consumer preferences in numerous POltS and familiarisation with regional productive 
conditions, thereby gaining awareness of supply and demand by which intelligent pricing and quality 
decisions can be rriade. 
iii. Skills in dealing with foreigners and foreign languages. International shipping by definition 
involves conducting business with people from different nations. Where cultural and language differences 
exist this increases the risk and level of skills required of those involved in transacting. The transacting 
patty may have to be skilled in two commercial cultures in order to acquire information and communicate 
deals to the satisfaction of both patties without inculTing conflict. This goes beyond language to 
relationship building, awareness of local methods of negotiating, dealing with breach of contract, 
knowledge of local institutions, etc. 
iv. Raising capital to acquire the ship. Shipping is a capital intensive industry in which large sums of 
capital can be tied up for very long peliods of time without generating a return. In the early days, voyages 
might take up to two years before generating a retU1ll so the investor had to have sufficient capital free to do 
without such funds. The importance of raising capital is given added importance in that this in the early 
days was a very high-risk business. Storms, pirates and other natural and political catastrophes could 
undelmine the best planned ventures. 
v. Ship structure. The shipper must have access to ship building technology that can create a ship 
which has the strength to handle a wide range of conditions, sufficient cargo calTying capacity and speed, 
and provides ease of handling. The structure must also allow it access to a port's infrastructure where it can 
load and unload without difficulty. 
vi. Sailing skills. A crew with the ability to handle ships and cargo requirements under a range of 
conditions. 
vii. Knowledge of routes. A knowledge of ocean routes between ports reduces the chance of having an 
accident. Captains must have sufficient knowledge of routes to reduce time spent at sea and the costs of 
staying afloat (eg: wages and victuals). Fast routes also allows the boat to be used for another voyage and 
make greater LIse of the capital invested in the boat. 
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viii. Navigation techniques. Success in any transp01t industry is obviously enhanced if you do not get 
lost. In the open ocean with no landmarks in sight, a captain must have the ability to identify the ship's 
position relative to its destination. This invariably meant a knowledge of wind systems, ocean currents and 
the position of the stars. 
ix. Defence from predators, ill pmticular piracy. 
x. Crew and'Voyage management. A number of managerial tasks are required including the co-
ordination of seamen's duties on board, meeting loading and unloading time schedules, maintaining 
discipline, meeting victualling requirements, handling disease outbreaks, etc. 
xi. Co-ordinating activities over long distances. When a ship and a foreign agent are located 
thousands of kilometres away from the owner, problems are opened regarding the co-ordination of activity. 
The nature of this problem vmies depending on the level of technology involved. For example, in the 
earliest days a retUl11 trip to the East Indies from Europe would take well over a year. Given the arbitrage 
nature of shipping, in which inf01mation on market conditions are a vital aspect on decision making, the 
time involved presents a particular problem. Time and distance problems also create information 
asymmetries and great potential for opportunism by distant agents. Motivating agents and captains to act in 
the interests of their employers at all times is exceptionally hard to monitor and enforce performance and 
was velY reliant on reputational effects for future hiling. Options to deal with this include integration or 
open-ended contracts with much discretion left to the captain, and overall performance can be monitored 
when the ship retums home. 
There is a key need to co-ordinate the transp0l1ation and market making functions (i and ii above). This 
could be done through other organisational forms including spot markets, reputation effects, relational 
contracting and integration. The n01mal arguments for integration, excluding measurement and control 
measured above, include asset specificity, in which a company integrates its operations to include a key 
asset which, if in the hands of an outside contractor, might expose it to 'hold up' or higher costs. In contrast 
to this Kay (1997) posits 'asset replaceability' in which a firm integrates to incorporate a key asset, which it 
can not easily replace if another user captmes it. Probably more applicable to shipping are the arguments of 
Casson and Silver. Silver (1984) states that in innovating, an entrepreneur may require the performance of 
complementary activities in which it has no expelience. If others are not prepared to supply that function, 
the entrepreneur may have to integrate forward and provide this function himself. In other words, ifno one 
else going to incur the large financial risk of a ship that will be exposed to the whims of nature, a merchant 
will have to integrate into ship-owning if he wants to get his goods overseas. This particularly applies to the 
development of new routes where ship-owners or other suppliers might not share the innovator's vision. In 
these instances, the innovator runs into what Langlois and Robertson call "dynamic transaction costs' ie: the 
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cost of persuading, negotiating, co-ordinating and teaching outside suppliers to provide capabilities that the 
innovator does not possess. This can be costly if the potential supplier is in a position exploit 'hold up' or 
infOlmation impactedness. Under such circumstances, integration can be a the best option. 
Casson's argument relates to modern multi-national enterplises. If we accept that shipping companies 
exhibit many characteristics of multinational corporations in their trans-national nature, we can see from 
Casson (1985) an explanation for the integration of the merchant/ship-owning in early trade. For Casson, 
integration is one way of ensming a chain of confidence in the supply and quality of product (or in this case 
shipping services eg: ensuring goods are canied on time and free of damage). Of course, the level of co-
ordination depends on the nature of the product. For example, Binswanger and Rosensweig(1986:529) note 
that if bananas are not put on a cold boat within 24 hours of harvesting, they will ripen too early. 
Charactelistics of bananas require close co-ordination of picking, loading and shipping. 
Another aspect of co-ordination that must be considered is that of hOlizontal integration, the concunent 
management of a number of ships or routes. In some instances, this could provide economies of scale in 
which the company's reputation is spread across a number of ships or economies of scope if different types 
are used.. Joint production economies might be obtained through the sharing of facilities such as 
warehouses or skilled management required on specific routes (in which case the finn acts as a store-house 
of knowledge), and the finn may be able to offer greater customer satisfaction by offering a range of ship 
types. 
Those people who can best provide the skills and capabilities listed above will succeed in the international 
shipping. Cost reduction in these tasks is often associated with minimising the time in which ship and 
labour are required to create a unit of production (a voyage) and reduce losses. At the same time these 
attributes add value to the customer who is hoping for a full and rapid delivery of cargo in good condition. 
In aiming to provide these services, a number of trade-offs exist. Bulky ships with high canying capacity 
saclifice speed, while over-loading sacrifices safety. Established routes are nOImally chosen on the basis of 
speed and safety. In some cases, a captain might be tempted to sacrifice safety for speed. Given that the 
loss from a mistake is very high in this industry, the tendency is to conservative decision making and this 
contributes to a strong persistence of hemistics. 
If a national environment can add proficiency in these tasks, leadership might not be dispersed throughout 
the oceans but concentrated in specific regions. As this thesis reveals, regional environments have played a 
strong palt in creating competitive advantage. For example, if a sailor's home environment provides access 
to capital, cargoes and markets it reduces the costs of completing the first three tasks listed above. If a 
region has access to good shipbuilding technology and resources, it can gain competitive strength. 
Consequently, under certain conditions, ship-building and cargo producing industries can be very important 
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supporting industries in producing competitive success in the shipping industry. Similarly, if warehouse, 
POlt facilities and location in the home environment perform an entrepot function, search and co-ordination 
costs can be reduced favouring the expansion of a shipping industry. A national environment with high 
levels of scientific and geographic knowledge in areas that help navigation and route development can also 
assist shippers developing competitive advantage if that Imowledge can not be easily acquired by 
competitors. 
The costs inculTed' while perfonning these tasks can be classified in four categOlies; operating costs, voyage 
costs, capital costs and cargo handling costs (Stopford 1988:100). Operating costs constitute the expenses 
involved in the day-to-day running of the ship, no matter what route the Sllip is engaged in. These include 
crew, stores and maintenance costs. Voyage costs are the variable costs associated with a specific voyage 
including fuel, port charges and canal dues. Capital costs are associated with how the ship itself has been 
financed. This includes interest and capital repayments. Finally, cargo-handling costs are expenses 
associated with loading, stowing and discharging cargo. 
Revenue from these activities can come in a number of ways. If the shipper carries his own goods, revenue 
comes from the eventual sale of those goods. 011 the other hand, if the ship acts only as a shipping operator 
caITying the goods of others, a number ofrevenue eaming possibilities exist (ibid:122). These include unit 
freight rate whereby revenue is a consequence of the freight rate the shipper charges for cartage and the 
productivity of the ship ie: the number of tons a ship carries in a year. Other common aITangements include 
time chmier in which a shipper can contract the use of a boat including charter for a specific period of time, 
and bareboat charter where by the chmierer not the owner pays the voyage and cargo handling costs and 
pays a fee. 
On the demand side, greatest utility is provided to the customer when a good arrives in the proper place at 
the proper time in the proper condition. Given that ocean carriers are part of the broader system, co-
ordination becomes a key feature of the system to ensure customer value. This is no easy task given the 
range of environments that a ship might travel through and the distances involved. Associated with this is 
the impOltance of time. The common rationale is that the faster the movement of goods is perfonned, the 
better the service (Abrahamson 1980:21). Although time-based competition has only recently been stressed 
in management text books, the shipping industry has always accorded it pride of place. 
Additional utility can also be provided by expanding the range of services to include new routes or to 
accommodate new types of goods. Different cargoes demand different services. For example, a new 
market for many highly perishable cargoes opened up with the advent of refrigeration. Technology clearly 
has a role to play in this. Other examples include the development of the compass and steam engine which 
reduced the reliance on natural conditions and increased the speed and safety of delivery. Advances in 
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medical technology, such as the elimination of scurvy, can reduce labour losses and costs while advances in 
cartography, time keeping and many other areas served to reduce costs and increase utility. 
Stopford (1988:61) defines the five key influences on demand of shipping to be: 
- the world economy (the dliver of intemational trade. It is the resulting level of economic activity that 
generates trade and the demand for shipping. 
- the effect of paIticular commodity trades using sea transpOli 
- the average haul. 'Longer routes obviously use more shipping than shmier voyages 
- transport costs. Some routes are only viable altematives if their cost come down to a level that does not 
increase the price of the cargo out of the market. 
- Political events eg: wars can have a huge impact on seabome trade. 
The five key influences on supply identified by Stopford are: 
- the size of the world shipping fleet 
- shipbuilding output which obviously adds to the fleetsize. 
- scrapping and losses of ships which clearly reduces fleet size 
- fleet perfollllance ie: how well that fleet is used 
- operating environment 
The movement of sea-bome trade can not be viewed in isolation, and must be viewed as part of a total 
transpOliation system (Abrahamson 1980:22). That system includes (i) land-based carriers that calTY the 
goods to the pOlis (ii) the loading port and its associated facilities (iii) the ocean carriers themselves (iv) 
foreign pOlis where the unloading occurs and (v) land caniage in the foreign port. From this, we can see 
that shipping is an industry reliant on an impOliant infrastructure and a system of related activities. 
SuppOliing activities include training facilities, brokerage, insurance and chandlering. Enveloping the 
transpOliation system are the vaIious constraints and conditions imposed by the policies and institutions of 
the countries in which they operate. This includes taxation, subsidies, safety rules, certificates of 
construction, etc. 
Shipping is a service of delived demand. It is derived from the demand for the goods that the ships calTY 
and this in turn is detelmined by the level of economic activity that produces the goods and the wealth to 
buy those goods. Because ofthe direct linkage to trade, the system in which shipping operates is influenced 
by the forces affecting international trade. This places it in an environment 'determined by complex and 
numerous sets of relationships that involve both domestic and international economic, technological, social, 
and political factors influencing world trade in general' (Ibid:23). Clearly, any analysis of the shipping 
industry must take a broad perspective and include all these environmental forces. 
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Stopford (1988:61) adds an interesting comment to his description of the market model: 
Although this is an economic model, it is important to remember that shipping is a tightly knit intemational 
community, and actions may be influenced by fashion or emotion as by economic logic. For this reason, the 
market may not always act in the logical way and recent history offers many examples of decisions that are 
difficult to explain in purely economic or financial terms. [n 1973, ship owners ordered far more tankers than 
could possibly have been required to meet any plausible growth of demand in the oil trade. Slow to learn from 
experience, exactly the same error was made for bulk calTiers in 1982/3. 
To some extent, Stopford's comment adds suppoli to the problem that ruchardson (1960) noted underlies 
all markets, and that is the need to make investment decisions in ignorance of competitors' investment 
decisions and how this could lead to situations of over-supply and disequiliblium. However, in a tightly 
knit community such as shipping, there is some knowledge of other people's expansionary behaviour. In 
1891, Marshall recognised the role business communities can play in keeping prices above equilibrium out 
of fear of spoiling the market and inctlning the resentment of other producers (see Loasby 1978). In the 
1970's 'market spoiling" in the shipping industry occurred as the prevailing 'fashion' for investment over-
rode economic logic. Stopford's comment also reminds us that economic descriptions bound solely to 
market models will be inaccurate. Economists need to go beyond plice and fully examine the incentives, 
information and emotions that decision makers are engaged with. 
Another important consideration is technology. Changes in technology have impacted on all the key tasks 
and associated activities. It has at time lead to faster ships and facilities that increase the speed of loading 
and hence the time a ship is laid up in pOli. At other times, it could improve the handling and reduce the 
loss of cargoes. The benefits of advances such as refligeration, the compass and steam propulsion have 
already been mentioned. InfOlmation advances have also had their impact. For example, the introduction 
of cable telegrams in the nineteenth century and computers in the twentieth have dramatically reduced co-
ordination costs and transaction costs (especially in regard to searching for cargoes). At question is the 
way in which technology changes affect the status of industry leaders and market share, an issue that will be 
explored in this thesis. 
Economists must also be aware of the impOliance of past economic activity and the effect it has on the 
present. For example, in 1987, a select committee was investigating the decline of British shipping. In the 
course of its proceedings, the managing director of P&O Cruises was asked why Norwegians predominate 
the Cmibbean cruise market. The answer was explicit: 
You have to go back historically. The Norwegians were the ones who opened lip cruising in today's terms. 
They used their expertise in the ferry industry. They lIsed their ferries and they found a niche market in those 
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days in the Caribbean, they developed their expertise, and it grew from that. They had the foothold there. 
(Transport Committee, Report and Minutes of Meeting, first report, Session 1987-8, YoU, pg 297). 
This answer illustrates the impOliance of historical investment in capabilities. This is an industry in which 
first mover advantages exist. These include the gaining of expelience and expertise, trust and reputation 
with which they attract custom, and building of infrastructure by which costs are reduced and value is built 
into services against which late comers have h'ouble competing. 
Clearly, competitiveness in the shipping industry goes beyond price relationships and market forces. A 
more sophisticated economic model is needed that embodies incentives, information, history and 
charactelistics of the business environment. It is for this reason that a dynamic industry life cycle is posited. 
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Chapter 6 
Chinese Shipping from the Tenth to Sixteenth Centuries 
6.1 Evolution of the Chinese Economic System 
The f01mation of any industry is a consequence of the opportunities and constraints in the business 
environment. To understand Chinese shipping it is necessary to have an understanding of the domestic 
economy to which it was pali. 
During the T'ang (618-907AD) and Sung (960-1279) dynasties, the Chinese economic system underwent a 
transformation that created a healthy environment supportive of shipping entrepreneurs. During this period, 
China became one of the first nations in the world to abandon the confines of a feudal economy and became 
one of the earliest and largest market economies in the world at the time, supported by a sophisticated 
government bureaucracy. It provides an example of Ibn Khaldun's observation that business prosperity is 
associated with the size of the civilisation to which it is attached. The consequence was a leap in 
productivity in manufactured goods (and therefore cargoes for ships), an increase in wealth and demand for 
foreign cargoes, an increase in the availability of capital to finance shipping ventures and an increase in 
education and technology with applications to shipping. 
The reason for the early adoption of a market economy can be attributed to geographic and political 
reasons. As early as the first dynasty, it was recognised that feudal lords had regional power bases that 
could destabilise the nation, so a systematic effort was made to get rid of them (Merson 1989:29). 
Throughout the following centlllies, feudal lords disappeared and were replaced by an administrative 
bureaucracy, the Mandarins. The rationality and value system of Mandarins was intrinsically linked to 
Confucianism which was adopted as the state doctrine about the same time (Balazs 1964: 18). 
Confucianism preached viliues of respect, humi lity, obedience, and submission; values that would help gain 
compliance from the peasantry to the authority of the scholar-officials. In return, the state had an obligation 
to provide 'harmonious government'. The emperor only maintained his mandate from heaven while he ruled 
effectively and fairly. It was through the scholar officials that the resources were managed in order to attain 
that hmmony. They did this by perf01ming key tasks in the economy. To protect against famine and other 
natural disasters, Mandarins organised and managed public granmies which kept stores of grain in reserve. 
Another key task was controlling the nation's waterways. Agriculture, which was the foundation stone of 
the economy, was dependent on the ebbs and flows of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers. Controlling them 
was fundamental to maximising the nation's economic potential and, the Mandarins introduced many 
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innovations in hydraulic engineering with a consequence lise in productivity (Merson 1989: 18). Other 
govemment activities included preparation of the calendar by which agricultural operations were 
maintained and maintenance and construction of all public works. They promoted economic exchange 
through the maintenance of uniform weights, measures and currency; they organised the nation's defence 
and were responsible for selecting and training their successors. As a consequence of their economic role, 
the scholar officials gained a positioll of omnipotence even though they were small in number (Balazs 
1964: 16). 
The roots of the Confucian economy Jay in the productivity of agliculture. This could be seen in the status 
accorded to different professions. Scholar officials were placed at the top of society, followed by farmers 
and artisans. Merchants, who produced nothing and made money from buying and selling other people's 
output, were given a low position on the Chinese social ladder. 
Despite the low ranking given to merchants, the Confucian paradigm actually contributed to the 
development of a market economy. Mandarins helped to provide national unity, a factor which combined 
with geogl'aphic features contIibuted to the development of a national market. The Chinese landscape was 
relatively open and easy to rule (Kennedy 1988: 17). It provided a 'geographic unity' over which the peoples 
living developed a cultural and economic unity (Elvin 1973:21). The resulting political stability and ease of 
communication provided by a unified empire would make it easy to conduct domestic trade. 
During the T'ang and Sung dynasties, improvements in transport and agricultural production occurred, 
giving bilth to a market based economy. The plime factors increasing output were the improvements in 
production techniques and equipment that were adopted across the nation. Falmers learned the benefits of 
preparing their soil with manure, lime and river mud for fertiliser. Tools were improved and new ones 
developed. New seeds were introduced, the most common being Champa rice from Vietnam in about 
10 12AD (Elvin 1973: 121), which could produce two to three crops per year (Merson 1989:23). The spread 
of rice cultivation combined with a spread of hydraulic techniques resulted in agriculture productivity 
significantly higher than we would find in the west. Its output could support a population twice the size of 
Europe's. Even, as late as the eighteenth century, a Chinese hectare of rice field produced 7,350,000 
calories compared to only 1,500,000 for a wheat field in Europe (Braudel 1984: 151). 
The Government was the key agent in diffusing the new technologies. Officials opened and operated large 
polders, taught hydraulic techniques and introduced pumping equipment in areas unfamiliar with them. 
They encouraged farmers to take up the new rice crops and provided tax relief and credit systems for its 
adoption. 
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The development of a market economy was also a consequence of (and contributor to) improvements in 
trmlspOli and communications systems (Elvin 1973: 131). During this period, the natural barriers that 
prevented use of natural waterways were overcome by hauling, poling, canals, locks and the development of 
specialised craft. It now became possible to transpOli large quantities of goods across the nation. 
Transportation improvements opened up distant markets to fmmers who soon realised they would earn more 
growing produce for those markets instead of trying to be self sufficient. They now devoted their energies 
to those crops which grew best given their local climate and soils. As farmers across the nation specialised 
in crops that made· the most of local conditions, there was a quantum leap in productivity. The Chinese 
peasantry became adaptable, profit-Olientated, petty entrepreneurs and, a wide range of new occupations 
appeared (Ibid: 167). 
Markets were established as alliances between local clan chiefs and the merchants who maintained the 
markets and the local government officers who sanctioned them in return for consideration (Shiba 
1970: 154). A relationship of symbiosis grew between state and commerce. Consequently, in China the 
commercial rationality was not just the normal merchant thoughts such as getting the light mix of inventory. 
Commercial success also depended to a large degree on a merchant's bureaucratic connections (Murphey 
1970: 13), so a merchant would devote significant resources and energy to cultivating such connections. 
DUling the Sung dynasty, a change in government policy accelerated the use of the market. At that time, the 
country came under threat of invasion so, to increase their economic resources, the government lifted 
restrictions on market activity. Taxation policies were changed so that the govemment only took a fixed 
share of a falmer's output after which the fmmer could keep or sen anything else produced (Jones et al. 
1993:25). This served as an incentive to raise output and promote market activity. 
As the economy grew, the structure of business organisation increased in complexity (Elvin 1973:172). 
This was a result of increased specialisation and the development of innovations that improved the flow of 
finance and resources, and protected business-men from abusive opportunistic behaviour. These changes 
reduced the cost of doing business in the market economy and increased the efficiency of resource 
allocation in China. These changes include the increased use of credit among merchants and the appearance 
of specialist brokers and wholesalers as institutions to facilitate commercial exchange. Brokers were a 
pmiicularly important feature in reducing transaction costs and raising the efficiency of the market. T'ang 
and Sung law gave only a small amount of commercial protection so, to ensure fairness in business 
transactions, the govemment promoted the use of commercial brokers to mediate between buyers and sellers 
of major items and draw up a deed of sale. For the govemment, using brokers had the additional 
advantages in that they could also repOli transactions and collect tax on their behalf. The collection of 
brokerage tax was pmi of an overall trend by the govemment to move away from taxing agriculture to 
taxing trade (Jones et al. 1993:25). This, in tum, reflected a change in the way in which government 
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perceived commerce. A Confucian paradigm co-existed with a market-merchant mentality but, in all cases, 
the state was in control. 
This high degree of co-operation also existed in the iron and salt trades where a State Monopoly existed. 
The govell1ment granted licenses to private merchants to operate the state monopolies on behalf of the 
government. This organisational structure of 'government supervision-merchant operation' became a long 
lived feature of the economy. These monopolies became a major source of income for the govell1ment 
(Adshead 1995: 117). It reflected the successful palinership being built between merchants and the state. 
The Confucian bureaucracy was not always conducive to business expansion. Balzac (1964: 17-18) claims 
the state had a tendency to clamp down immediately on any fOlm ofplivate enterprise, killing initiative and 
the slightest attempt at innovation. Nor was commerce helped by a secret police atmosphere and the 
arbitrary character of Chinese justice. However, L.S.Y oung (referred to in Murphey 1970: 17n) states that 
even in the relatively conservative Ming and Ching dynasties, there was a genuine concern of the State not 
to ruin or even seriously impede merchant's activitie~. Nevertheless, merchant incentives and modes of 
operation were affected by the pervading Mandmins. The merchant class never dared to fight in order to 
extract the laws and liberties that westem merchants obtained. This created a commercial culture in which 
businessmen preferred to compromise rather than fight, to imitate safe precedents and to invest money 
safely in preference to lisky industrial enterplises. On obtaining wealth, their goal was to finance their 
children or grandchildren's education so that they became elite scholar officials themselves. In this way, 
Confucianism defined the goals of businessmen and restlicted their perception of innovation. 
DLIling the Sung dynasty, govell1ment efficiency took a huge leap with the introduction of the Confucian 
'eight legged' examinations as a requirement for entering the civil service. Power was no longer granted on 
the basis of family connections but on merit (Adshead 1995: 117). Students were educated and 
ideologically conditioned on entering the civil service and the Chinese bureaucracy absorbed the most able 
minds in the country. In the country and prefectural capitals, state sponsored colleges provided students 
with a Confucian-based education in law, mi, poetry, mathematics and engineeling. These provided the 
future elite with a skill base and wisdom with which no other nation in the world compared. 
Ironically, a melit-based system lent itself to cOITuption and an incentive stmcture that encouraged shOli-
term thinking. On being placed in the bureaucracy, a young official established relations with protectors 
and, proceeded to solve and enhance his financial position by extracting principal and interest from the 
people he administered (Balazs 1964: I 0). Tn westem eyes, this system would be seen as corruption with 
officials 'milking' and receiving favours fi'om people who sought their official support. Because the system 
of merit meant the appointee could not hand down his position to his children, he sought to extract what he 
could while the 0ppOliunity existed. The Confucian doctline, which stressed the importance of family over 
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outside forces, actually encouraged this racket of protectionism and nepotism. Consequently, milking and 
short term thinking became a feature of the administrative incentive system. 
Despite these wealmesses, by the Sung dynasty, China possessed the largest and most innovative national 
market that the world had seen. The conflicting values of commercialism versus Confucianism reflect the 
two strongest institutional forces in China at the time; the national market and the bureaucracy. Within this 
institutional framework, other valuable institutions arose to increase the efficiency of the economy. 
Brokers, water transportation, guilds and other merchant networks all appeared as vested interests in a more 
market orientated economy. The mandarins never lost their suspicion of traders and their practice of buying 
cheap and selling dear. They often intervened in the affairs of merchants, confiscating property or banning 
their business. However, while the goals of merchants complemented the goals of the Mandarins the 
commercialisation of the Chinese economy would continue. 
6.2 The Rise of Chinese Shipping 
By the standards of the day, the characteristics just described provided a very fertile environment 'for 
industry to grow. However, growth in the Chinese economy did not automatically give birth to an 
international merchant marine. During the T'ang dynasty(618-907 AD), Chinese shippers travelled to Korea 
and Japan but not the southem seas, where trade was in the hands of South East Asian, Persian and Arab 
ships from the Indian ocean who, at this time, had greater ocean-going capabilities (Elvin 1973:137). We 
would expect it to be difficult for the Chinese to enter a market where existing players have established first 
mover advantages such as experience on the ocean routes and established trading relationships, however the 
foreign competition that existed at the time was not so extensive that it was impossible for new shippers to 
enter the market. Long distance shipping was full of lisks particularly from storms and other unfavourable 
oceanic conditions, so the volume of shipping was not great. A window of opportunity existed for the 
Chinese to enter the market if they could gain the necessary capabilities and overcome the chief problem of 
safety. 
Our theory would suggest that a process of imitation would need to occur before the Chinese could compete 
with these nations. Some level of imitation did occur. The navigation and geographic achievements of the 
Arabs and Hindus were studied by Chinese scholars who eventually created their own star and sea charts, 
studies of tides and CUlTents and navigational manuals (Levathe 1994:43, and Lenz 1997:147). Needham 
(1971:601 & 612) suggests they adopted the canted square sail from the Indonesians, which they then 
evolved into the more effective balanced-lug sail. However, overall, the amount of imitation was not great 
and cannot be considered a significant process consistent with our model. The Chinese developed a 
distinctive maritime capability bom out of the local conditions and environment. 
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....... -........ . 
The Chinese built on the adopted technologies to make ships that were state of the art. The balanced lug 
sail proved such an effective solution to the problems of sailing to windward that Needham (1971:598) 
ranks it as an innovation among the foremost achievements in the use of sea power. As Chu Yu (1119) 
notes: 
At sea they can use not only a wind from abaft, but winds from onshore and offshore can also be used. It is 
only a wind (directly) contrary which can not be used (from Piling-Chou Kilo Than quoted in Needham 
1971 :462). 
The junks themselves were built with iron nails and possessed a strength superior to competitors' boats and, 
in the oil of the t'ung tree, the Chinese had a superb nahlral preservative for water-proofing (Elvin 1973: 137 
and Deng 1997:27). The Chinese introduced wateliight bulkheads, buoyancy chambers and bamboo 
fenders to protect the ship from sinking. Other innovations in navigation included scoops for taking samples 
of the sea floor and sounding lines for determining the depth. During storms, floating anchors were used to 
hold the boats steady. Gunpowder, another invention of the Taoists monks, was introduced to shipping to 
propel small rockets for self defence. A significant advance was in steering where the placement of the 
rudder at the stem dramatically increased control of the ship. Ships might even have two rudders at their 
stem, a large rudder for deep water and a small rudder for the shallows. Other practical advances included 
the use of atmour plating and the protection of hulls with sheathing. 
[n shallow waters, enteling harbours or passing along channels, oars would be used to propel the ships but, 
the main source of power was saiL Europeans at this time used only one mast so Marco Polo (1958:241) 
was naturally impressed to find ships with up to four masts in Ch'uan-chou. The masts were staggered so 
that they were not placed directly behind each other, and no sail would shield the other. Chinese sails 
resembled a Venetian blind or fan. They were comprised of narrow sections of canvas or matting stretched 
between transverse batons of bamboo. Although less efficient than the Arabian or Western sail, they had 
the advantage of being easier to control when close-hauled or damaged. 
By the 10th and 11th century, Chinese technological advance had given birth to the sea-going junk in which 
they could now conduct trans-oceanic trade (Dupoizat 1995:205). The most impressive quality was their 
size. Medium sized merchant junks from Fukien and Liang-Che were over 100 Chinese feet in length, 30 
feet high and 25 feet in the beam. They carried a cargo of approximately 120 tons and a crew of sixty 
(Levathe 1994:43) while their largest ships could calTY 5,000 piculs (300 tons) of cargo and 500 to 600 
persons (Shiba 1970:7). 
By the early thilieenth century, the Chinese had the best ships in the Indian Ocean and had caprured the 
bulk of the sea trade from the Arabs (Levathe 1994:43) and, Ch'uan-chou had become the greatest 
60 
mercantile city in East Asia (Medley 1989: 170). A pan-Asiatic trade ling developed in which Chinese 
traded with Koreans, Japanese, Vietnamese, Siamese, South East Asians, Bengalis, Persians and Arabs. 
6.3 Sources of Competitive Advantage 
The national economic system gave lise to several factors that underpinned this competitive strength. The 
wealth of the economy provided demand conditions and capital resources that helped the development of 
shipping services. In this section, we examine other factors in the economic environment that strengthened 
competitive advantage. These included the nation's superior knowledge resources which led to superior 
shipping technologies including ships, equipment and navigational ability. Second, were the forms of 
organisation that made it easier to channel capital into shipping and facilitated the increased specialisation 
of skills. Third, Chinese shipping drew strength from the supporting industries in the domestic economy. 
These provided the cargoes with which shippers could confidently seek offshore markets. Finally, 
supportive govemment policies which at times financed improvements such as harbours and navigation 
beacons and, offered incentives for R&D in ship design. In this way the domestic economy provided the 
competitive strength on which the industry grew. 
6.3.1 Specialisation, Experience and Learning Curves As they developed their navigation skiIls and 
gained experience of the wind systems, the Chinese greatly reduced the length of time they needed to make 
their voyages. Whereas a trip to Singapore in Han times took some 150 days(202BC-220AD), by the Song 
Yuan peliod(960-1368), a similar trip to Sumatra took only 40 days (Deng 1997 :46). 
As the industry grew, it enjoyed the economies of specialisation that were occuning in other parts of the 
economy at the same time (Shiba 1970:18). The following account, although written in 1618 gives an 
insight into on-board specialisation of duties consistent with our period of inquiry: 
In each junk, command is in the hands of a Junk Master (po-elm). The merchants are all his dependants, like 
ants who have appointed a leader and move together from one nest to another. In subordinate positions are the 
Accountant (ts'ia-fu), who is responsible for the financial records, and the General Manager (tsung-kuan), who 
controls affairs on board and transmits orders on behalf of the Junk Master. There is an Arsenal Comptroller 
(chih-k'u).in charge of military weapons, Mast Watch Mates (a-pan) in charge of the masts, a first and Second 
Anchor-man ... in charge of anchors, a First and Second Sail-rope Mate ... in charge of the sail ropes, and two 
Helmsmen (t'o-kung) who take charge of the helm in alternation. A Chief Mate (huo-chang) watches over the 
compass needle, and when the route lies across a wide expanse of ocean, all obey his indications ... (Chang 
Hsieh written in 1618 quoted in Shiba 1970: 16) 
Specialisation also improved quality and reduced costs for the industry on-shore. Specialist Managelial 
agents came into being who could be hired by wealthy merchants to conduct their maritime trade under a 
61 
contract for carriage. There was a lise in the practice of hiling and chartering ships and crews, and labour 
hirers arose to provide men to unload sacks. Others provided caniers and porters. 
The linchpin of the shipping industry were the brokers who greatly reduced transaction costs while raising 
the level of efficiency. A number of brokers would be located in every port acting as intermediaries 
between customers and transpOliers. They found cargoes for ships leaving port and had warehouse facilities 
to store goods waiting to be sold. They were extremely valuable to captains of Junks who arriving at a port 
would not necessarily be familiar with local market cOllditions and customs formalities. Entrusting the 
cargo to a broker enabled the captains to set sail after only a short time in port and spend more time in the 
business of caniage. Brokers were of value to merchants seeking transport as they could not always be 
fully conversant with the intricacies of shipping or, be aware of the abilities and reputations of captains and 
crews. Brokers were also responsible for making good any losses suffered by a merchant who hired a ship 
(Shiba 1970:40) and this would have placed a restraint on opportunism and contributed to the maintainance 
of high standards. As a consequence of their function, the shipping industry became more efficient and 
flexible and, a more confident place for investors to place their resources. 
6.3.2 Knowledge Resources As the economy grew, more people could take up non-agricultural based 
jobs and this included the priesthood (Shiba 1970:207). Buddhist and Taoist monks were an active source 
of innovation with spin-offs for shipping. During the T'ang dynasty, Buddhist monks invented wood-block 
printing for the purpose of religiolls propaganda. By the Song dynasty, China achieved the highest rates of 
literacy in the world and, built up huge librmies of books on astronomy, medicine, mathematics, botany, 
political and economic theory. Printing became the foundation on which a nation-wide community of 
scientific discourse arose. 
Taoist Monks were another valuable source of knowledge capital. Taoists sought to understand the harmony 
of the cosmos and included, among their pursuits, the search for immortality. One of their medicinal 
mixtures (a mixture of sulphur, saltpetre and charcoal) which was originally used to treat skin diseases and 
as a fumigant against insects, was eventually discovered to have other properties important for the defense 
of ships, as gunpowder. This could reduce costs associated with piracy. 
From geomancy (the mi of siting graves and buildings in hmmony with supposed occult terrestrial forces) 
Taoist monks developed the magnetic compass. The introduction of the compass, first mentioned in a 
nautical context in 1119, solved a major navigational problem and greatly reduced shipping costs (Elvin 
1973: 138). Astronomical observation was only possible when the skies were clear enough to see the stars. 
This meant safety and speed could not be assured on cloudy days. The compass revolutionised navigation, 
making voyages possible in all but the worst weather. Ships could now be more economically utilised, 
carrying cargoes on cloudy days that previously would have kept them confined to port. 
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But the most consistent contributor to the technological advance of the industry came from the official 
education system. Official science was plimarily devoted to those areas that would help maintain order in 
society and hence, concentrated on agIicuItural development, large scale public works and, the reading of 
stars to foresee future events. Consequently, the nation developed a strength in astrology, mathematics, 
physics, and hydraulic engineering (Needham 1963: I 31-2). Maritime navigation in China had a strong 
advantage given that astrology was a subject given gI·eat attention by the officials, as it led to a deep 
knowledge base on the positioning of the stars. As early as the Zhou dynasty( I 111-255BC), astronomical 
observation had become a profession with records made (Deng 1997:36). From Han times(202BC-
220AD), Chinese histOIies contained a section entitled Records of Astronomical Observation which 
repOIted all new important discoveries. Some members of the literati attempted to popularise this 
knowledge, the best Imown treatise being Ballad of Stars by Wang Ximing which contained 1,464 stars and 
their positions (Deng 1997:36). Before long, Chinese astrologers had records showing that a star's height 
above the hOIizon varied depending on how far north or south you were taking your record. This meant that 
they could find their latitude by observing the height of a star above the horizon. Although this research 
was perfolllled on land, sailors eventually began to use it to find their locations at sea and, by the Tang 
dynasty a "star measuring ruler" and "handy ruler" had been invented which made astronomical navigation 
possible. 
The polar star became an important feature by which ocean sailors could identify how far north or south 
they were in relation to their destination, and they could make changes in their route accordingly. However, 
the stars gave little information on how far east or west a ship had travelled (longitude). The Chinese 
solution to this problem was to measure the ship's speed (by dropping a piece of wood at the front of the 
ship and measUIing how long it took to reach the stem). Once the speed was known, sailors could consult a 
specially constructed log (geng) that gave time-distance coordinates from which they could determine how 
far they had travelled. 
With increased Imowledge of sea routes and astronomical knowledge, it became possible to create 
navigation charts. The earliest of these include A Chart to Overseas Countries which was presented to the 
throne in 1003 AD, and the Comprehensive Charts of Islands on the way to Korea produced in 1123AD by 
Xu ling (Deng 1997:38). 
6.3.3 Organisation and Industry Structure Two forms of trade existed between China and its 
Asian neighbours; trade conducted by private operators and uibute trade conducted by the government. 
Both these trade fOIms had to contend with key organisational issues of raising capital, co-ordinating 
activities over long distances and reducing govemance and transaction costs. 
63 
Tributary trade, conducted by the state, was an aIm of diplomacy in which surrounding nations would send 
tribute to China. Asian kingdoms, such as Srivijaya played the tIibute game as a means of gaining Chinese 
support and legitimising their regional power. The tribute system provided China with supplies of foreign 
luxuries while cementing its position of supeliOlity over the subordinate kingdoms. As part of the tIibute 
trade, the Chinese expOlted products as a kind of gift or reward for paying respect to the Imperial order of 
China (Lee Chor Lin 1995: 175). 
The state had many advantages in organising long distance tI·ade given its wide range of resources and 
techniques of enforcement at its disposal. The state through its well organised bureaucracy and nation-wide 
resource base could mobilise large amounts of resources and capital into shipping. The absolute nature of 
control and climate of fear also helped overcome problems of opportunism. However, a level of 
opportunism would be accepted under the Confucian system. We have already noted that the Confucian 
system encouraged a level of milking and nepotism. However, only a fool would forget his obligations to 
his emperor. 
To give an idea of quantities of the tribute trade, in 1394 AD, ZenIa (Cambodia) sent 60,000 jin of incense 
to China as tIibute (35.8 metIic tons) and in 1475, Japanese envoys sent as many as 38,610 swords to 
China, enough to equip all Ming commanding officers down to the company level (Deng 1997:86). 
The bulk of the intemational trade was in private hands where profit was the prime motive (Deng 
1997:87&98). The earliest organisation of shipping was one in which a merchant would arrange transport 
of goods in his own ships. By Sung times, owners of ships had grown to include members of the impelial 
household, civil and military officials, Buddhist and Taoist monastelies and temples, owners of manors, 
powelful families, peasants and fishelmen. However, the small family business held the pivotal place in the 
shipping industry, particularly on inland and coastal routes. 
Problems of opportunism were solved by the predominant organisational structure, the extended family 
firm. The finTI was usually headed by a mature male while decision making often involved older generation 
members of the family. The small decentralised structure gave the finn a flexibility in responding to 
changes in the marketplace. It also solved problems of control and monitOling of workers. Families 
embued their members with identity, loyalty and commitment. Consequently, relationships built on family 
linkages had an underlying trust which served to reduce transaction costs in a society with no laws to 
enforce employment and contractual obligations. However, a major problem was its growth was limited by 
the extent of the family. These constraints were imp0l1ant in the industry given the high cost of ships, the 
high risk and the length of a voyage that tied up capital for long periods of time. 
64 
The structure of the family finn should not be solely attrilmted to economic rationale. To be sure, patemal-
biological motives played a role. The Confucian value system also placed a high importance on family and 
approved of the structure. 
With the increase in trade, new f01ms of organisation came into being which made it easier to raise the 
capital for larger scale shipping ventures. Frequently, small businesses would fonn commercial networks 
with others in the same business. In such cases, each business would retain its independence but operate 
under the umbrella' of these joint concems to enhance their competitive power and to provide protection 
against shipwrecks and robbery. While individuals in these groups kept their business separate from others 
in the network, partnerships also became common in which groups of merchants shared ownership of ships 
and goods. Many pmtnerships were for only one voyage and were dissolved after each venture with profits 
shared. Without the enforcement effects that repeated transactions provide, these partnerships clearly 
would seem more vulnerable to 0pp01iunistic action by either of the pmtners however, reputational effects 
were at work. Other partnerships were more pennanent however, the scope of activity of these partnerships 
were clearly limited to the skills and resources that each pmtner brought. One-venture partnerships enabled 
capabilities to be combined as necessitated but at the cost of repeated needs to make new transactions. 
Acquiling capital was made easier through the rise of commenda and commercial money lending. The 
commenda is a structure in which a wealthy person or merchant entrusted money or goods to another 
merchant who makes use of them and shares out the profits at the end. In contrast, commercial money-
lending involved lending to entrepreneurs in retum for a fixed rate of interest. Hsu Meng-hsin, writing in 
1137, suggests that investment in shipping and commerce was commonplace: 
There are numerous commercial transactions at the capital conducted by merchants from every part of the 
country, and the city is therefore reputed for its wealth and popUlation. Most of those who possess capital 
engage in stockpiling or storage ... , pawnbroking .... , or trading in ships. How could they permit their 
accumulated wealth to lie idle, or buy gold for hoarding at home? (Quoted in Shiba 1970:32). 
Pao Hui, writing during the Southem Sung dynasty speaks of the willingness of even relatively poor people 
to invest in the sea going ventures of others: 
They invest from 10 to 100 strings of cash and regularly make profits of several hundred percent. (Quoted in 
Shiba 1970:33) 
The lise of these activities show increasing instances where the ownership of ships and capital became 
separated from their management. This fmiher complicates the problem of govemance. But underlying 
many Chinese commercial relationships is the notion ofreciprocity, giving in the expectation that sooner or 
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later you will receive something in retum (Hodder 1996). This leads to the development of obligation and 
trust. When combined with the notion of losing face (reputation), opportunism occurs at great cost. The 
open nature of these relationships allows great flexibility and openness of information. Relationship 
contracting of this kind works best when parties realise they are bound to a repeating activity, therefore it is 
in no one's interest to engage in opportunistic behaviour (Kay 1995:54). Alternatively, with family 
members left in China, a seaman would think twice before reneging on his obligations. It is a form of 
'taking hostages' as in Chinese society, families were held responsible for their members' actions. 
With official SUppOlt, wealthy families in POlt towns could invest freely in ocean-going ships and cargo. 
Their success had a demonstration effect on lesser trading families and skilled artisans and, the merchant 
classes in smaller POltS who also began investing in ships for the overseas trade. A geographical spread in 
investment created a chain of minor ports radiating out of the main port cities which eventually grew into 
major trading centres in their own light (Gungwu 1990:403). Being some distance from the officials at the 
main POlt towns, traders in these satellite ports had even greater freedom to expand their trading activities. 
Ships would pmt for foreign ports where merchants fi'equently established off-shore agencies. As trade 
grew, small Chinese merchant communities grew in places as distant as Champa, Cambodia, Sumatra and 
Java. 
The placement of agents in foreign ports performed a key economic role that lends much to Pagano's 
(1991 b) suggestion that institutions exist to deal with disequilibirum. When a ship anives in port, it creates 
a huge increase in demand for cargoes and pushing up plices. Depending on the timing of the arrival, a ship 
might anive in port and find there is insufficient supply to fill the hulls. An organisation that used agents 
overcame this problem. An agent could buy stock over a longer peliod of time at lower prices and ensure 
that the ship on anival would have a cargo to fully utilise the capital invested in the ship. Similarly, if a 
ship anives and unloads a warehouse full of cargo into the market at one time it dramatically decreased the 
plices for the goods it sold. An agent overcame this problem by storing goods in a warehouse and releasing 
stock gradually over time, thereby gaining a higher price. 
With the use of agents, Chinese merchants were moving from free markets to organised markets, the cost of 
additional organisation being justified by the higher costs and lower prices it would otherwise have endured. 
Agents also provided a key role in providing infOlmation on market conditions in foreign ports. 
Communication provided by the agent indicated what types of goods should be brought to the port and what 
SOlt of plices they could expect. Given the time involved between shipments, this information could 
quickly become out of date. However, it was a huge advantage to have what ever information on market 
conditions was available. 
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Some shipping fleets could reach substantial size. Shiba (1970:28) records one ship owner had a fleet of 80 
ships and clearly had to use a managelial agent or hire ships out. However, most investors preferred not to 
concentrate their investments but, to disperse their investments in order to overcome "hazards of both a 
natural and a social kind". This meant not just the risks of storms and wrecks, but antagonistic government 
officials and a society that still did not fully welcome the seeking of profit. Merchants would endeavour to 
conceal their investments through the use of others. Land was perennially regarded as the safest place to 
invest wealth. 
6.3.4 Supporting Industries We can probably assume that the initial development of Chinese shipping 
was a consequence of perceived demand for foreign goods and a search for outlets for domestic 
manufactures. To that extent, we could see Chinese shipping, at least in part, as a form of forward linkage 
recognised by Hirschman (1958). Once established, the linkage between the industries acted as the kind of 
mutually reinforcing cluster of the kind discussed by Porter (1990). The manufacturing industries provided 
key cargoes whi Ie shipping expanded the range of markets for Chinese producers. A flow of information 
between the two ensured that cargoes were prepared to maximise competitiveness in the foreign market. 
Trade was conducted on the basis of balier under which the Chinese gained a strong advantage from the 
technological supeliOlity of the their goods. Deng (1997: 113) notes that the Chinese exports were 
plincipally manufactured goods, whi Ie impOlis were dominated by raw materials. Confidence in the 
products of sale made it easier for Chinese traders to venture off-shore in search of foreign markets, 
knowing they would receive a ready market for their goods. These included mineral extraction (eg: gold, 
silver, etc) and products made from those minerals, ceramics, textiles, t'ung oil, bamboo baskets, wooden 
combs, straw mats, paper, refined sugar, woods and books. These industries had been growing and 
improving as a consequence of the expanding domestic market. 
Silk production had a long history in China and, by the T'ang dynasty, it had become the mainstay of the 
provincial economies of Zhejiang and Jiangsu (Lin 1995: 173). Silk exports reached South East Asia as 
cargoes in both the tJibute and private export trade. However, from the Southern Song dynasty onwards, 
plivate traders took a dominant role in this trade, a reflection of the gradual commercialisation resulting 
from the more market orientated economy (Ibid). 
The process of making silk involved the rearing of silk wonns, cultivation of mulberry trees, the reeling of 
silk, dyeing and weaving. By the Song dynasty, the industry enjoyed growing specialisation as dyers and 
weavers became increasingly separated from those involved in sericulture. Most of the raw silk came from 
rural areas and sold to middlemen who re-sold it to weavers on the open market. Weaving and dyeing 
became prominent economic activities in urban areas. Weavers and dyers were among the growing pools of 
artisans living in cities, working for wages in ateliers. Many of the ateliers were originally retail shops 
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selling silks woven in nearby villages (Lin 1995:174). This backward integration of the shops would have 
given them greater control over supplies and allowed them to be more flexible in responding to the needs of 
customers. By the 15th and 16th centlllies, large factOlies with more than twenty looms were operating in 
cities such as Hangzhou, Jiaxing and Suzhou. These factories had integrated even further backward, buying 
silk yams directly from silk farmers, by-passing the middleman. Lin (1995:174) states 'The result of this 
vigorous growth in silk production and new marketing power was a tremendous variety of silk products, 
accelerated by technological innovations and improvements in the looms, as well as dyeing techniques'. 
Another industry III which China led the world was ceramics. The Chinese industry was blessed by 
geographic good fOliune which meant that porcelain clays were highly accessible. Initially, ceramic 
products were made by farming families who would make pots when they were not working in the field. By 
Song times, market expansion allowed some families to specialise in the creation of ceramics. 
Large quantities of Chinese glazed-ware were expOlied to Southeast Asia as early as the ninth century 
where they were used for culinary and litual purposes (Ro Chuimei 1995: 118). Initially, these cargoes went 
in foreign ships until the Chinese developed their own maritime capabilities. Chinese manufacturers leamt 
to make specific products and shapes specifically for the export market to take account of the ritual and 
cultural requirements in their target market (Beamish 1995:234). 
The rise of expOli trade stimulated development in the industry and market growth contributed to the 
industry becoming even more specialised. Different kilns worked for different markets. Inside the kilns, a 
division of labour had occlllTed as different workers would design, throw and finish. Eventually the 
demands on output created by the growing expOli market put pressure on the industry to obtain a level of 
industIialisation unheard of in the West, reaping the benefits of economies of scale and specialisation. In 
the late thilieenth and early fourteenth centuries, family owned craftsmen kilns gave way to industrial 
complexes controlled by commercial syndicates who contI·olled the distribution and financed the 
constI·uction of kilns, ultimately owning the kilns (Medley 1989:171). As demands on individual kilns 
increased, more and more gave in to the increased sennity of a well organised industI·y. 
The tI·end towards industrialisation became more pronounced under the reIgn of Khubilai Khan who 
established a 'Porcelain Bureau' which issued regulations on the capacity and production of kilns which 
were taxed accordingly. The Mongols were keen to encourage the industry for the export revenue that it 
eamed. The govemment also played an impOliant role in the industry as a sophisticated consumer. 
Representatives of the imperial comi would visit the kilns and select the products they liked. The high 
standard of demand helped to raise the technical standards of the kilns. In Yuan times, imperial kilns were 
created to serve the cOUli. 
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The development of the Sung-Ming ceramics industry is consistent with Abernathy and Utterback's (1975) 
observations of twentieth century industry in which a productive technology reaches a point which allows 
economies of scale and specialisation; and the new capital requirements result in an industry of fewer but 
larger players. With a high division of labour and large scale dragon kilns which could produce as many as 
35,000 pieces at a time, the Chinese created the first industry based on mass production. By 1712 when the 
Jesuit missionary, Pere d'Entrecolles visited the kilns at Ching-te Chen, the city housed 1 million people, 
and had 3,000 furnaces. The industry had achieved an exceptionally high division oflabour: 
One workman does nothing but draw the first colour line beneath the rims of the pieces; another traces flowers, 
while a third one paints ... The men who sketch outlines learn sketching, but not painting; those who paint (that 
is, apply the colour) study only painting, but not sketching (Pere d'Entrecolle quoted in Sullivan 1973:225). 
Pere's description shows strong parallels with Adam Smith's description of a pin factory utilising the 
benefits of division oflabour. However, this might not be a coincidence. Adshead (1995:296) suggests that 
Adam Smith was actually influenced by these descliptions of Ching-te-Chen when advocating specialisation 
and division of labour. 
The transfOlmation to a mass production industry was made possible by the large demand and advances in 
the technology of production (Medley 1989:171). As the Chinese moved down the experience curve they 
built an extensive Imowledge of clays, fluxes and glaze chemistry, controllable high temperatures, and 
expelience with large-scale industlial production methods. This experience provided a competitive 
advantage that was protected through secrecy and the tacit nature of much of the lmowledge. These 
industlies meant that Chinese merchants could sail with a hull full of marketable cargoes and be quite 
confident of making a profit from a sailing voyage. It clearly illustrates that a process of imitation requires 
the existence of supporting indusnies that mayor may not be going through a process of imitation 
themselves. 
The other vital supporting industry was shipbuilding as it provided the industry's major capital item, the 
ships. Clearly, the industry was dependent on availability of resources and growth increased production of 
the matelials needed for boat building. This included great quantities of bamboo for sails, nails, lime, silk 
rags for caulking and oil from T'ung tree nuts (which was used as a wood preservative and caulking 
material). Resource endowment in these matelial helped to dictate the location of the industry, as Lu I-hao, 
writing in the twelfth century, notes: 
[n the South, the nature of the wood and the water are suited to each other. For this reason Fukien holds the 
first place for sea going junks, being followed by Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and then by Wen-chou and 
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Mingchou. In the North, the nature of the wood and water are not suited to each other. The sea is bitterly salt 
and capable of damaging the wood" (quoted in Shiba 1970:6). 
6.3.5 Compatibility with Religious and Military Institutions and Consequences for Government 
Policy The dominant philosophy-paradigm underlying the economic system was Confucianism. This 
philosophy was embodied by the Mandarins who became the system's most powerful stake holders. 
Confucianism placed a low value on trade and merchants so government support for trade and shipping was 
not always fOlihcoming. Policy changed with the circumstances. 
DUling the Tang dynasty, the state had restIicted international trade to one port, Guangzhou, where trade 
with foreigners could be controlled (Merson 1989:60). However, over time, government policy became 
more conducive to foreign trade and shipping with commercial and state goals becoming more closely 
aligned. 
DUling the Southern Sung dynasty, an external military threat created a policy of strong government suppOli 
for shipping. At that time, the country was under constant attack from hi-chen invaders in the north, who 
eventually succeeded in captming the Song capital of Kaifeng in 1127. The government fled south creating 
a new capital at Hang-chou, just south of the Yangsi River. The invasion meant that the government now 
had only half the agricultural land to tax. To compensate for the loss of income, trade was liberalised. A 
Maritime Trade Commission was established and seven more ports were opened to foreign trade along the 
Guangdong and Fukien coasts. Revenue from overseas trade jumped from half a million stIings of coins at 
the end of the eleventh century to one million in the early twelfth century and two million by the middle of 
the twelfth century (Levathe 1994:41) while, the contlibution of foreign trade to total government revenues 
grew from 0.82% in 1098 to 20% in 1131 (Merson 1989:61). 
The change of policy did not reflect the existing value system, so a process of legitirnisation was required. 
Given that merchants and the seeking of profit were traditionally seen as lowly occupations in China, there 
was need for a new attitude towards tl·ade and profit. Emperor Gao Zong(1127 -1162) exclaimed: 
Profits from maritime commerce are velY great. If properly managed, they can amount to millions (of strings 
of coins). Is this not better than taxing people? (quoted in Levathe 1994:41) 
The policy changed incentives and created a congruence in merchant and government goals. Official rank 
was given to any merchant whose annual overseas trade exceeded 50,000 strings of cash and, any 
government official supervising commercial activity greater than one million strings of cash would be 
promoted one grade. While merchant activities increased imperial coffers, it also allowed merchants to 
increase their wealth and status beyond that normally allowed in the Confucian society. 
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Ceramic processes. A key to Chinese success in shipping was the superior technology 
of the cargoes they carried. These water colour prints illustrate processes in the 
production of ceramics including painting the t.mglazed ware, applying the glaze, 
h'ansport froin the factory, and packing in cases for export (The British Museum Book of 
Chirtese Art, plate 156). 
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The government targeted the shipping industry with a number of forms of assistance. It provided financial 
assistance to aid the lising competitiveness of the Chinese merchant fleet. Government funds were 
allocated to improve harbours, widen canals to accommodate ocean going junks, build warehouses for 
merchants, and construct a costly system of navigation beacons every thirty Ii (about ten miles) along the 
coast (Levathe 1994:41). 
In contrast to Porter (1990:675) who suggested that direct targeting is not conducive to the development of 
innovation-driven advantages, the Chinese policy created significant innovations. The key conduit for 
advances in maritime technology came from govemment investment in naval technology, with spin-offs for 
the merchant marine. The navy became a source of research and development with the emperor offeling 
cash-rewards to spur innovation in ship design (Levathe 1994:43). Needham (1971:476) notes that the age 
was one of continual innovation and inventions included ships steered by paddle wheels invented by the 
engineer Kao Hsuan, and iron plated mmour designed by Chin Shih-Fu. 
In 1279, the Sung dynasty was overthrown by the Mongol leader Khubilai Khan who established the Yuan 
dynasty. Industry and Commerce probably received their biggest state support under Khubilai who being a 
Mongol, was not influenced by Confucian attitudes to merchants (Rossabi 1994:47-50). Khubilai actively 
supported merchant communities, placing them on a higher social scale, much to the resentment of the 
Mandminsi. The new regime continued with targeted government assistance. A joint venture system was 
introduced called "Govemment-Invested Ships" in which the govemment provided ships to merchants with 
expeliise to undertake malitime trade. Profits from ventures were split in a seven to three ratio (Deng 
1995:18). In 1285, the government allocated 100,000 ding, about 19 tons of silver, to build ships for the 
scheme. Merchants were also given the 0ppOliunity to acquire finance at interest rates of three to four 
percent per month (Deng 1995: 18). 
The Mandarins, as key stake-holders, were seeing their position devalued. Khubilai utilised the full range 
of abilities in the empire that stretched from China to the Caspian and promoted skilled foreigners to high 
positions in the Chinese Civil Service, despite the fact they had not completed the civil-service 
examinations (Rossabi 1994:450-1). This led to an anti-foreigner mentality among the Confucians who 
found their status in decline. This would eventually work against the shipping industry. 
Of all merchant activity, foreign trade was pmiicularly deserving of suspicion given its off-shore component 
which was beyond the Mandarins control. Nor did they approve of private merchants profiting at the 
expense of official trade mission. The years that followed gave birth to policy decisions that reflected the 
changing power of stake-holders and coalitions at the court and extemal circumstances which could affect 
the balance of the debate. 
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In 1368, the Mongols were ovelihrown by the Ming dynasty. The new Ming dynasty brought with it 
traditional Confucian attitudes to trade and a change in policy. The government banned all private trade 
and overseas travel for Chinese. Foreign malitime trade was restricted to official tributary trade from 
nations acknowledging Chinese suzerainty. FOliunately, the Confucian trained civil servants were not the 
only stake-holders at the Chinese cOLlli. Much power rested in the hands of eunuchs who were strongly 
involved in foreign trade. The Mandarins might restrict private trade but the eunuchs were going to 
increase the scale of tributary trade. 
The eunuchs had enough clout to gain suppOli for the great voyages of Cheng Ho, himself a eunuch. In 
1405, the Admiral Cheng Ho was sent on the first of seven great maritime expeditions into the Indian 
Ocean. The Chinese had previously travelled this far on a number of occasions; Marco Polo had returned to 
Europe taking such a journey on a diplomatic mission for China in 1298. However, the fifteenth century 
missions reached a new scale of maritime activity. 
The voyages of Cheng Ho illustrated that Chinese shipping could move more tonnage more kilometres than 
any other nation could dream of. For example, the fleet of the fourth voyage (1413-15) consisted of sixty 
three large vessels and a crew of 22,670 men, while the fifth fleet sailed as far as East Africa (Chang 
1989:52). The fleets were composed of trading ships, warships and support vessels. The treasure ships 
represented a peak in naval engineeling and were the biggest vessels afloat. There has been some 
unceliainty over their size but even conservative estimates of 1,500 tons show they were at least five times 
the size of the ships used by Vasco de Gama at the end of the century (Needham 1971 :509). 
The treasure fleets were the most powerful example of the tribute system, encouraging trade and impressing 
upon other nations that China was the leading cultural and political power. With their powerful armies, 
these fleets sailed as far away as Ceylon and Zanzibar where, they used their power to force the rulers of 
these lands to acknowledge the supremacy of the Chinese "Son of Heaven". In Africa, they reached the 
Swahili towns of Mogadishu and Mombasa. In Jidda and Dhufar, they exchanged their silks and porcelains 
for aloe, mynh, and other medicinal drugs. 
The prestige of Cheng Ho's voyages shed a lustre on the eunuchs which irritated the Confucian bureaucrats 
who would have loved to put an end to the voyaging. Having political motives, the voyages were not driven 
by economic considerations alone. In fact, they were expensive and the benefits they brought from trade 
did not wanant the vast expenditure on fitting a fleet and financing the aImy they canied (Lenz 1997: 153). 
In a battle between opposing stake-holders, extemal threats could play an important role in detennining 
outcomes. During the first half of the fifteenth century, circumstances changed in a way which strengthened 
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the conservative forces at the COUlt. An increased threat of invasion by the Mongols meant the government's 
limited military resources had to be drawn away from the coasts to guard the trouble spots in the notth 
(Levathe 1994: 177 -9). This included building the Great Wall of China. The nation could no longer afford 
expensive luxuries like the voyages (Lenz 1997: 153). The government was also concerned about attacks on 
the Chinese coast by Japanese pirates (Chang 1989:54, Meilink-Roelofsz 1962:74). Many Chinese had 
joined these Japanese and, to prevent this from happening the Chinese government restricted navigation as 
much as possible. 
Economic forces also contIibuted to a change in policy. Paper money had been used in the tribute trade but, 
severe inflation reduced the value of the money to one percent of its face value. The Ming dynasty's 
favourable exchange rate with foreign countIies evaporated (due in part to the loss of prestige following the 
emperor's capture by the Mongols and the hoarding of goods for private trade). Foreign countries were no 
longer prepared to accept the paper cUlTency and the Ming government was forced to pay more expensive 
market value for the goods. This undermined the profitability and rationale of tribute trade (Levmthe 
1994: 177). A factor of equal impOltance was the desire to prevent precious metals leaving the country. 
Merchants were exporting these on a large scale (Meilink Roelofsz 1962:74). 
As a result of these changing circumstances, the Confucians gained the upper hand and imperial edicts 
banning overseas trade and travel were issued in 1433, 1449 and 1452. Any merchant caught engaging in 
foreign trade was defined as a pirate and executed (Merson 1989:77). The contribution of foreign trade to 
govemment revenue plummeted from 20% dming the Southern Song to 0.77% in the Ming (Merson 
1989:75). However, with a reunited China, the government had access to the agricultural production 
capacity of the whole empire, and trade revenue was less important. In fact sea-trading was seen as a means 
of avoiding internal levies. Herein lies the big difference between Europe and China. The Ming could 
afford to withdraw fi-om maritime trade because of the extent of their agricultural revenues. 
A ban on foreign trade would have a devastating effect on the economy of Fukien and port of Ch'uan-chou. 
Given its impottance to the livelihoods of so many people, an illegal mmitime trade continued to operate on 
a large scale. The illegal trade had the SUpp01t of local officials many of whom participated in it. For 
example, the family of Lin Xi yuan (c1480-1560), a high court judge from Fukien, owned a large 
commercial fleet with a business network spreading to southeast Asia. Such was the influence of the traders 
that Zhu Wan, the commanding officer responsible for suppressing shipping was put in jail because of the 
pressure from the smugglers and their official lobbyists in the imperial court. Zhu had made the mistake of 
stmting a crusade to enforce the anti-malitime legislation. He was dismissed from his position and placed 
in plison where he eventually committed suicide (Deng 1997:93). Eventually, in 1567 the government 
repealed the maritime prohibition. Chinese were now free to travel and trade overseas; however, foreigners 
movement in China were still limited. 
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Chinese merchants were now free to trade. However, they received no government support, previously a 
key source of competitive advantage. Neveliheless, Chinese private traders continued to dominate the Pan 
Asian trade, given a position of superiOlity from the technologically superior products they carried. 
However, they took far shorter journeys than that of Cheng Ho. Chinese traders restricted themselves to the 
China Sea which they were to dominate. In this way, they were the pre-eminent shipping nation in one of 
the world's two major sea-lanes. The junk trade followed the rhythms of the monsoons in the South China 
Sea, trading nOlihw~rds in June or July, Southwards from China in January or February and southward from 
Japan a little earlier (Ishii 1998:4). Along the way, speculative calls might be made at minor ports in the 
hope of striking some business. Communities of Chinese traders spread themselves out around the key 
trading centres in east Asia, forming networks which co-ordinated the flow of goods and information. 
After the voyages of Cheng Ro, the Chinese withdrew from the Indian Ocean preferring to meet Indian 
traders at midway points. We could say that at that point, China lost its status as a global industry leader, 
choosing to become a regional industry leader. Rowevyr, we must be careful not to apply modem precepts 
to the fifteenth century. There was much economic logic in this decision. Firstly, the earlier tribute trade 
was not driven by pure economic motives but included political and prestige goals. Secondly, the wind 
conditions of the Indian Ocean were very different from those in the China Sea. Regional specialisation 
would allow shippers to maximise environmental conditions and concentrate their expertise. Chinese junks 
were specifically designed for the wind conditions of East Asia and, they could concentrate their 
IJavigational skills and energies on the routes and wind systems with which they had the most experience. 
Expelience no doubt lead to faster hips and reduced losses. Finally, shipping is a service that operates as 
pali of a system that is equally reliant on the development of foreign ports. The decision of private shippers 
to restlict their activities to the China Sea also coincided with the rise of Malacca. 
With the lise of Malacca as a transhipment point, Chinese shipping grew, exploiting their competitiveness 
in East Asian conditions. The establishment of Malacca also contributed to growth in Indian Ocean 
shipping and a number of shipping nations also enjoyed the benefits of the growing trade but, none more so 
than Gujarat which we look at in the next section. 
6.4 Conclusion: 
The growth of Chinese international shipping is not consistent with the analysis in chapter 3. While some 
imitation celiainly did occur, it was not of a level that could be defined as the dominant process in the early 
stages of the industry. Initial development was shaped by indigenous developments. For example, the 
strong junk with its bamboo sails and nailed planks were born from local environmental factors such as 
available resources and sea conditions. The development of Chinese maritime trade was part of a broader 
process of commercialisation in the economy. The prospelity of this new system had spin-offs in terms of 
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knowledge resources, supporting industries, capital and demand that under-pinned the industry's success. 
fn that way, it is impossible to isolate the success of shipping from the economic system to which it was 
pmi. 
Although this transition contributed to a rise in the status of the merchant and values that conflicted with the 
old institution base, conflict was contained by a process of amalgamation. Mandarins learnt that they could 
benefit by supervising and milking merchant activity. However, this was not a consistent process and 
government policy ebbed and waned depending on extemal forces, in particular the threat of invasion or 
existence of pirates. 
While the development of the Chinese shipping industry was a function of opportunities in the environment, 
the maintenance of that competitive advantage was also a function of the domestic environment, consistent 
with the writings of Porter (1990). The strength of Chinese shipping relied heavily on factors such as 
supporting indushies, lmowledge resources, and domestic demand. To exploit these strengths, a number of 
heuristics, beliefs and nOIms were leamed that could bt:: considered rational behaviour in that commercial 
environment (as outlined in table 6.1). At its core was the primacy of the Confucian belief system. It 
created the world's most prosperous economy, driven by a paradigm that we might describe as Market 
Confucianism. 
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Table 6.1 Competitive Strengths and Related Heuristics of Chinese Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveuess Paradigm Heuristics 
Shipping Industry 
- Organisation, experience and - Restrict sailing activities to East 
expertise in East Asian trade and Asia and meet Indian Ocean Traders 
waters at middle points like Malice. 
- Manage sailing activities in line 
with the Trade Winds 
- Place agents in foreign ports 
- Ship Technology (Junks) - Use high quality locally built ships 
- Reputation - Chinese provide best service for 
transporting goods in East Asian 
waters. 
Supporting Areas of Economy 
- Technology/Education (knowledge - Aspire to provide Confucian 
resources) education for family. 
- China and the Chinese are at the 
centre of the universe 
- Internal Peace and Government - Build relationships with officials. 
Infrastructure (and support at times) - Milking and nepotism are consistent 
with Confucian values. 
- Government supervision! merchant 
operation is an effective practice for 
many industries. 
- Market of high quality specialised - attempt to acquire market power 
produces of supporting industries/ - attempt to anticipate consumer 
- High quantity of domestic demand preference and meet through 
and sophisticated consumers. purchases. 
Productivity of Agriculture - Peasants and agriculture are 
accorded high value (over merchants) 
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Five mastered Pei-chi-Ii freighter gives some indication of the build of the much 
larger h'easure ships which traveled as far as Africa at the end of the fourteenth 
century (from Needham: fig 986). 
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Chapter 7 
Gujarat Shipping and the Indian Ocean 
7.1 A Brief Note on the Development ofIndian Ocean Trade 
In many ways, this thesis creates a false impression by beginning with Sung China as, the first true 
transoceanic traders were found in the Indian Ocean. The major breakthrough occurred when the regular 
patte1l1s of the monsoons were understood. Understanding these wind pattems were the key to sailing long 
distances safely (McPherson 1993:38). 
Indian Ocean trade reached new heights with the lise of the Islamic empire in the eighth and ninth centuries. 
The empire created a vast political and trading entity in which merchants developed their skills in a 
prosperolls environment, which mirrored developments occurring at the same time in T'ang China and, as in 
China, it was part of a process that included an agricultural revolution. In this instance, the revolution 
occllrred as farmers adopted plants that could grow in the hot summer, such as lice, cotton, sugar cane, egg 
plants;watelmelons and hard wheat and, they introduced a number of innovations in irrigation (Hassan and 
Hills 1986:206). 
The agricultural revolution was accompanied by an increase in market and indusuial activity. The Islamic 
world contributed a number of manufactures to the world of trade. Their improvements in textile 
production resulted in Damasks fi'om Damascus, Muslims from Mosul, and fustians from Fustat (a Cairo 
suburb). They also advanced technologies in ceramic and glass production, perfumes, sugar refining and 
confectionery (Mokyr 1990:41). Such was the sophistication of their commercial infrasu'ucture, it was 
possible to draw a cheque in Baghdad and cash it in Morocco (Hassan and Hi111986:18). 
It was an era of maritime mastery made popular in the tales of Sinbad the Sailor. The regular pattems of the 
Monsoons allowed sailors to link regional economies of great diversity, creating a 'merchants paradise'. 
Surplus spices from the islands of Indonesia could be traded with surplus cotton and textile products from 
the Indian mainland or the minerals and manufactured products of the Middle East. Arab merchants 
ventured across the oceans creating Islamic communities in foreign ports made up of permanently based 
agents and, seamen temporarily sitting out the Monsoons. In this way Muslim merchant communities 
integrated the region's economies into an Indian Ocean trading world while, at the same time diffusing the 
Islamic culture. 
The great Islamic empire came to and end with the advance of the Mongols and the sack of Baghdad in 
1258. The Islamic empire degenerated into a 'collection of squabbling principalities' with devastating 
effects for production and trade (McPherson 1993:101). As it is at this point of history that I began my 
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thesis, the conuibution of the early Islamic peoples to maritime achievement IS dramatically under-
represented. 
7.2 GujaratShipping in the 15th and 16th Centuries 
DUling the fifteenth cenuny, a new wave of economic development appeared in the Indian Ocean based 
upon the expansion of maritime u'ade (see McPherson 1993:137-143). There is no doubt that the most 
impOliant development during this peliod was the rise of Malacca as an entrepot, where merchants from 
China, the Indian dcean and Java could met to exchange their wares (Das Gupta 1994: I, 409). Ships 
dliven by the monsoon winds linked the major civilisations of the region in all expanding and changing 
network of trade routes and ports. This new economic wave gave bilih to a highly developed and flexible 
merchant capitalist system. The volume and direction of trade was detennined by human political and 
economic activities on land including the rise and fall of states, contraction and expansion of economies, 
periods of famine and plenty. It gave birth to a merchant capitalist system in which flexible merchants 
responded to changing conditions through their buying and selling decisions. 
Gujarat was the region that dominated this new economic wave. Our model would lead us to expect a 
process of imitation and advance in the early stages of Gltiarat growth; however this is not supported. 
Gujarat rose on the back of the technologies that had been widely available in the Indian Ocean for 
centuries which it already possessed. Gujarat's rise is associated with a wider diffusion of technologies it 
already possessed but, there was no process where new technologies were acquired. Gujaratis clearly had 
access to Indian Ocean shipping technologies in earlier periods, although perhaps not always as traders. 
Marco Polo (1958:29) describes them as 'the most arrant corsairs in the world'. Nor did the rise of 
malitime Gujarat occur as result of advances in technology. There were no significant changes in the major 
maritime routes, products exchanged, nor the skills used by ship captains in the Indian Ocean (Lewis 
1973:241). 
Although Muslim observers were celiainly impressed by the ships of the Chinese treasure fleet, 
environmental features limited any imitation process. Sentence (1979: 8-10) goes as far as saying that 
studies do not indicate any specific Chinese influences on the evolution of Indian Ocean ship designs 
(though he qualifies the statement by saying fUliher linguistic research of maritime technology is needed). 
Meilink-Roelofsz (1962: 74-5) suggests that Chinese junks, so suitable for the turbulent stonns of the China 
Sea, were too slow and unwieldy in the lighter winds of the Indian Ocean. Certainly, Indian ships did not 
reach the size of Chinese ships nor, did they have the same strength. The compass was one obvious item of 
transfer while the stem post rudder might have been another. The earliest recorded western observation of a 
stem post rudder was by Marco Polo dUling his stay at H01muz. However, we cannot be sure if it was an 
innovation bon-owed from the Chinese or developed independently (Sentence 1979: 9). 
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The Structure of Emporia trade in the Indian Ocean before 1500. Cambay, the 
chief port of Gujarat lay in the centre of the Indian Ocean trade. Its trade with 
Malacca was carried in Gujarat ships while, the trade with Aden was shared with 
the Arabs (From Chaudhuri - Trade and Civilisation in the India Ocean). 
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The ships used by the Gujaratis and others of the Western Indian Ocean evolved from the Arabo-Indian 
mmitime tradition. This was the broad class of vessels commonly refelTed to as the dhow. The typical 
ocean going dhow was a two masted vessel of about 125 tons with uiangular lateen sails. Although wooden 
and iron nails were used in India at the time, dhows were built by stitching planks together with coiro The 
resulting ships were not as strong as nail-built ships but, it was easy to replace damaged and perished planks 
with new pieces. Waterproofing was done with a mixture of fish oil, burnt lime and pounded vegetable 
fibre. The result was a light fast ship well suited to the conditions in the Indian Ocean. 
Manguin (1986: 9) notes that the Gujaratis had developed a regional variation on the dhow. They were 
larger, averaging between 300 and 600 tons and, could go as high as 800 tons. With rounded hulls, as 
opposed to the V shape normally found on the dhow, they no doubt provided greater carrying capacity. A 
variation in their construction was the process of 'rabetting', in which a groove is made in one plank so that 
another plank can easily fit in it, similar to the tongue and groove principle. 
The technologies used by Gujarat pilots were also based on an earlier u'adition and were no different from 
those used by others in the region. They used the compass and maritime charts and, by the late fifteenth 
century, elaborate sailing directions were available for most of the Indian Ocean and Indonesian area. They 
utilised celestial navigation in which the southem cross or South polar star was used as a point of reference. 
Clearly, the history of Gujarat's take off does not support a process of imitation as expected by the 
hypothesis. The question then becomes what were the sources of Gujarat's competitive strength? As with 
China, the rise of Gujarat shipping can only be understood in light of the domestic Gujarat economic 
environment on which many of the industry'S competitive strengths were based. 
Gujarat's rise to prosperity began at the turn of the fifteenth century, when it gained its independence from 
the Delhi Sultanate that had ruled northem India to that time. The new government played a role in 
developing the productive capabilities and lmowledge of the region. Gujarat was fortunate to be ruled by 
Sultans who recognised the imp01iance of encouraging domestic craft production as a key to a flourishing 
exp01i u·ade. In pmiicular, we should note Sultan Mahmud Begada (1459-1511) who pursued a policy of 
developing infant industry. As Muhammad ibn Akbar records: 
Most of elegant handicrafts and ingenious arts now practised in Gujarat were introduced under Mahmud. 
Clever men frolll various distant cities were settled there; and people of Gujarat were thus, by Sultan's 
exertions, instructed in knowledge and practice of the conveniences and elegancies of civilised life. (quoted in 
GopaI197S:186). 
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In this case, we have an imitation process not of shipping technologies but of supporting industries. It 
should be noted this was a regional imitation process. There is no evidence or reason to suggest craftsmen 
were brought from as far away as China. 
This could be interpreted as government action in creating Porter's diamond. Crafts flourished under an 
atmosphere of state care and patronage, the result being a lively industrial base. By the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, the Portuguese traveller Barbosa found a wide alTay of craftsmen with a wide reputation. 
This included stone' and goldsmiths and craftsmen producing ivory bracelets, handles for swords, chess-
pawns and chess boards. In this city, Barbosa claimed "the best workmel1 in every kind of work are found" 
(Barbosa 1918:142). 
A favourable endowment of natural resources also created a healthy local environment on which a 
transp01iation industry could build. Gujarat was blessed with four rivers which ilTigated the region enabling 
it to produce a lich range of agricultural products. On this foundation, the region produced a rich range of 
agricultural products including indigo, shellac, opium, honey, wax, wheat, barley, minet, rice, sesame oil, 
meat, butter, soap, raw-hide and manufactured leather goods along with some variety of medicines (Gopal 
1975: 188). However, the product by which Gujarat's trade would most be identified was cotton textiles. 
The river valleys flowing through Gujarat were endowed with a black soil well suited to the requirements 
of cotton growing (Das Gupta 1979:2), a commodity with strong demand from those that like to be dressed. 
As with China, Gujarat shipping provides another example of Hirschman's forward linkages from this 
industrial base and natural resource endowment. Having marketable export products gave the incentive for 
merchants to buy ships and look for markets across the ocean. In times without telephone, or telegraph, a 
good indusuial base was a key advantage in the development of a shipping industry. It would have been 
highly risky for a ship to sail around the oceans in the hope of finding a cargo. Gujarat ships avoided this 
risk because the cargo was at their doorstep. It meant that a least the very first leg of the trip was cargo 
carrying and productive. Finally, a shipper could develop closer relations with suppliers which could 
reduce u·ansaction costs, speed up delivery and improve the reliability of supply. 
Nature handed the sultanate one last bounty for the development of its shipping industry, a strategic position 
in the Indian Ocean. Located midway between Aden and Malacca, Gujarat had a central situation on the 
major trade routes from which it could serve as the natural gateway to the sea for nmih west India (Gopal 
1975: 121). The highly productive Gujarat hinterland and easy communication to the outer regions gave the 
industry a film basis on which to grow. As trade expanded, the area selved grew to include the Gangetic 
plains to the north-east and the Indus valley in the north-west (Arasaramam 1994:13-4). The port and 
manufactllling town of Cambay was the initial cenu·e of mmitime trade. Unfortuantely, silting in the upper 
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reaches of the liver made it dangerous for large ships and resulted in a shift of trade to Surat (Arasaratnam 
1994: 19). Together, these two pOlis held all ascendancy over India's overseas trade for about four centuries. 
From the ports of Gujarat, the products of nOlihem India were taken across the Indian Ocean. To the East 
coast of Aflica, Cambay ships carried cotton cloths where they were exchanged for gold and ivory. At 
HOlmuz in the Persian Gulf, Indian products were transhipped to Persia and Iraq and overland to Central 
Asia, West Asia and Europe. In tum, Gujarat ships were loaded with horses, gold, silver, alum, copper, 
vittiol, pearls and silk which they took back east. At Aden, the chief port in the Red Sea, Gujarati ships 
were met by merchants from nearby pOliS such as Jidda, Zeila and Berbera bolstered by traders from as far 
away as Cairo and the Mediterranean world. Here, Gujarati merchants bought opium, copper, mercury, 
velmilion, gold (coins and ingots), woollen textiles, rose water and madder (Gopal 1975: 3) which they 
carried back to the India and the other regions with which they traded. In the east, Gujarat traded with the 
Maldive Islands, Ceylon (impOliing elephants and cinnamon), Pegu in Burma, Siam, the Malay peninsula 
and Indonesian archipelago. 
Most impOliant of all the routes was the Gujarat-Malacca trade which was the linchpin of the industry. As 
Tome Pires (1512-15: ii 270) observed 'The Cambay merchants make Malacca their chief trading centre ..... 
Malacca cannot live without Cambay, nor Cambay without Malacca, if they are to be very lich and 
prosperous'. The trade in this key oceanic route was handled almost entirely in Gujarati ships (Pearson 
1976: 11). 
While Gujaratis held the dominant position in Indian Ocean trade, this should not be interpreted as saying 
they were fl·ee of competition. Shipping between Gujarat and Aden was conducted by both Arabs and 
Gujarati (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962:55). Arabs were particularly active in the trans-shipment of Malabar 
spices fl·om Calicut, the old centre of Islamic trade. Indians from Coromandel were particularly strong in 
the Eastem Indian Ocean. The routes that these other nations dominated reflect the localised nature of 
shipping at the time. Although they were engaged in intemational shipping, these nations surpassed Gujarat 
on those routes to which their home region was an end port. Clearly, local knowledge is an advantage in 
gaining first mover advantages in establishing relations and secming cargoes. Consequently, we should not 
be too surprised that seamen fl·om Malabar surpassed Gujaratis carrying Malabar pepper from their home 
base in Malabar. Larger ports like Calicut (the chief pOli of Malabar) also benefited from economies of 
scale in that a steady supply of cargo and custom made it more likely that a seamen could fill a ship. This 
would allow them to dominant cross-trades with smaller pOliS. However these explanations ofperfOlmance 
only go so far, for on any given route we would expect at least two major ports to have equal home 
advantages, unless the ports have different strategic locations with connections to other routes. This is one 
advantage both Gujarat and Malacca possessed. 
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The predominance on the Gujarat-Malacca route raises the question why shippers from Malacca did not 
enter the trade and eat into Gujarat's market share? At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Malacca had 
a shipping industry and the Sultan himself owned and chartered ships. However, the bulk of the port's trade 
was in the hands of foreigners (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962:39 and 51-2). The histOlic literature is very useful 
in pin-pointing why Gujarat rose but, it is not so useful in explaining the limited growth of any industry, in 
this case Malaccan shipping. We can only surmise why an indigenous shipping industry did not develop to 
a large size. One obvious answer would appear to be the lack of a domestic population from which 
domestic entrepreneill"s would appear. At the time of its establishment, Malacca was nothing more than a 
fishing village. The port initially grew on the basis of forcing ships to stop there, not by having an 
indigenous industry. Clearly those ships stopping there were in a position to develop first mover advantages 
and Pires (1944:45) stresses the role experience played in Gujarat's success. 
Another answer to this question might stem from the nature of early shipping at the time. Most ship 
operators were merchants who bought and operated ships in order to get their produce to market. While 
the Gujarat shipper had strong relationships and infOlmation on his domestic market and production base, 
the Malacca merchant was very distant from both sources of supply and eventual demand. Without these 
infOlmational advantages, there was less opportunity for the Kirzner (1973) type entrepreneur to appear and 
take advantage of price differentials. That is not to say that Malacca was not a hive of information. We can 
safely assume that every ship brought information on its home base, and exposed this information with 
every purchase made. However, this information was secondary and left the Malacca merchant highly 
exposed to the problem of anticipating the appropriate level of supply through the actions of others. It 
invmiably could lead to a Richardson-type problem of over-supply situation. In theory, this infOlmation 
problem could be overcome ifMalaccan seamen placed agents in Gujarat and established relationships with 
suppliers (as Gujarati's did in Malacca). We can only guess that the reason this did not occur to an extent 
that supplanted the Gujarati's lead, was the difficulty and time involved in establishing these relationships 
was much harder once the Guajartis had established first mover advantages. 
Ships traveled to and from Gujarat whose pOlis began to earn a reputation as an entrepot for the 
redistribution of products from all corners of the Indian Ocean. Once Gujarat had established its position as 
a key entrepot, it also benefited from reputation and expanding economies of scale. Merchants from around 
the world came to Gujarat as they hew they could obtain reliable supplies and shipping services there. As 
more merchants went there, the variety of products continued to grow and contributed to the attractiveness 
of the region as a trading centre. Merchants could hold stock howing that this region attracted buyers, a 
reflection of Andrew's (J 964) observation that holding stock was not merely a way of satisfying customers 
but is also a way of generating demand. At the same time, they hew other merchants were doing the same 
and they could more reliably find stock at Gujarat than from other centres. In the words of Jean Audin, 
Gujarat had become 'the keystone of the commercial structures of the Indian Ocean' (quoted in Alpers 
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1976:24). So great was the mal;time trade of the country that the country's customs revenue alone in the 
early 1570's was nearly three times the total revenue of the whole Porhlguese empire in Asia at its height in 
1586-87 (Pearson 1976: I 09). A POltuguese visitor claimed 'if in any land it can be said that gold and silver 
flow, it is Cambay' (quoted in Pearson 1976: 108). 
7.3 Sources of Competitive Advantage 
The competitive strength of the Gujarat economy was initially based on natural resources which gave birth 
to supporting industries which aI10wed them to utilise the shipping technology available to them. The 
reputation it developed as a reliable entrepot contributed to its ability to attract merchants from around the 
world, while its shippers also developed a reputation and provided the international transportation services 
on which the entrepot turned. 
The Mughal empire became another source of competitive strength. It provides another example of Ibn 
Khaldun's observation that commercial prosperity is a function of the size of the civilisation. The political 
stability of the Mughal empire provided access to a larger market and resource base which could now be 
developed. With that growth came increased oppOltunities for specialisation and the development of 
experience. Organisation relations were developed that reduced transaction costs and increased expertise. 
Gujarat shippers gained much advantage from an environment that provided low cost and high value 
products to conquer the world. In this section, we examine in depth some of the features that buttressed the 
competitive advantage of Gujarat's shippers. 
7.3.1 Specialisation, Skills and Experience The natural resource endowment, supporting industries 
and key strategic location of the domestic environment gave local merchants better opportunities to invest in 
shipping than otller regions. With this initial advantage, Gujarat seamen learned by doing the requirements 
of shipping and navigation in the Indian Ocean. As they moved down the learning curve, this experience 
gave them another commercial advantage, their navigation skills probably becoming the best in the world. 
As Pires (1944:45) states 'The Gujaratees were better seamen and did more navigating than the other 
peop Ie of these parts, and so they have larger ships and more men to man them. They have great pilots and 
do a great deal of navigation'. We can assume that this early experience provided early mover advantages 
that acted as a barrier to new entrants. A merchant wantillg to transport goods safely across the ocean 
would naturally prefer to use a reputable, experienced operator rather than risk a new entrant or develop his 
own services. 
The profitability of a voyage was strongly dependent on the skills of an experienced mu'allim (or captain) 
who was in charge of navigation and safety (ChaudhUl; 1985: 125). The ocean trade was driven by the 
winds of the monsoons and the size of profit or loss was strongly dependent on catching the monsoons. A 
captain with a half full ship might be tempted to wait until he could assemble more cargo. However, if he 
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missed a change in the winds, the ship could be stuck in port for the year until the winds changed again. 
The Gujarats developed strong skills in these areas, Pires noting that the quality of their navigators and 
pilots was a factor in their success in mmitime trade (Although Abu'l Fazl Allami thought that the best 
seamen came from Malabar - referred to in Chaudhmi 1985 124). It speaks for the quality of Gujarat 
seamanship that when the Portuguese anived, having just had a revolution in navigation, the Indians were 
not highly impressed by their navigational equipment (Mathews 1997:28). Indian ships were of equal size 
and equally manoeuvrable. 
The seamanship of the Guajmiis was complimented by the high level of commercial skills that existed in the 
Indian Ocean, although these were not restlicted to Gujarat. The level of commercial expertise was of the 
highest standard that the world at that time could provide. The business talents displayed by the Indian 
were greatly admired by the Europeans who came in contact with tllem. Pires (1944:1, 41-2) compared the 
Hindus with the Italians who were the top Europeans of the day, in their Imowledge and the way they 
handled their merchandise. He praised their bookkeeping and commercial tactics and advised young 
P01iuguese who wish to become clerks to apprentice themselves to the Hindu merchants of Gujarat. The 
Dutchman Jan van Linschoten claimed that the vanias of Gujarat.. . 
... are the subtilist and politiquest Marchauntes of all India .... They are most subtil and expert in casting 
accounts and writing, so that they do not only sUllJasse and goe beyond all other Indians and other nations 
thereabouts, but also the Portingales: and in this respect they have much advantage, for (that) they are velY 
perfect in the trade of merchandise and very ready to deceive men. (Bumell 1,60,2523). 
7.3.2 The MughaJ Empire Prior to Gujarat's incorporation into the Mughal empire, political factors 
placed a limit on the nation's growth. A number of wars with bordering nations created a barrier to 
overland trade (Gopal 1975:122). The constraints continued until 1573 when Gujarat was conquered by the 
Mughals. Defeat in war was not welcomed by the rulers of Gujarat, but it removed many of the obstacles 
with trade to the hinterland. There were no longer political barriers or conflicts to limit the movement of 
merchants trading with Northern India. The new administration heralded a dramatic fall in organised 
violence which stimulated a rise in commercial activity. An expanding market fmiher increased the level of 
specialisation with highly skilled individuals operating in a highly competitive environment. Francisco 
Pelsaert(1972:60), who travelled to India with the Dutch East India Company, noted that 'ajob which one 
man would do in Holland here passes through four men's hands before it is finished'. Such a high level of 
specialisation must have contributed to the efficiency of output. 
Gujarat's location as the gateway to the Mughal empire was a strategic asset that other budding shipping 
regions could not replicate. It placed Gujarat oceanic transportation in the context of a broader transport 
and economic system which buffeted the shippers competitive strength. Within the empire, a great flow of 
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resources was unleashed. This was not just a consequence of peace and stability, for the policies of the 
Mughal Emperor Akbar further contributed to the regions prosperity. A road-building programme 
improved transport and communication across the empire. Akbar rationalised the collection of internal 
customs duty by establishing a rate of 2.5% for goods moving within the empire and, in 1590-1 he 
abolished a number of duties completely. 
The emperor Akbar created a centralised bureaucracy to administer the empire (Richards 1994:58). Below 
the emperor, four ministries were created with responsibilities for finance and revenue, army and 
intelligence, judiciary and religious patronage and the royal household. As well as this bureaucracy, 
another government institution was the system of amirs (nobles) and highly ranking mensabdars that created 
a walTior-aristocracy class across the nation. Under the mensabdar system, noblemen were assigned their 
respective personal ranks (zat) and an area of land ii-om which they would collect revenue Gagir). They 
were expected to use the jagir to maintain a required number of troops (Das Gupta 1994:Vl 185-6). 
Consequently, they perfOlmed twin roles of tax collectors and military commanders, contributing greatly to 
the secmity of the region. Strict rules issued by the financial ministry determined the methods and levels of 
taxation, thereby preventing the mensabdars from abusing the system (Richards 1994:67). 
As with China, the political stability created by a unified empire accelerated the development of a market 
economy, a trend aided by government policy. Akbar's decision to accept land tax payments in cash 
accelerated the move towards a market economy as people engaged in market activity to raise cash (Gopal 
1975: 124-5). Nobles frequently invested in facilities to develop local markets (Richards 1994:62). The 
motive was both selfish and public spilited. An empOlia helped the local people thereby earning the noble 
religious merit. It also increased tax revenues while the produce of the emporia could meet the needs of the 
nobleman's own entourage. Some less scrupulous nobles on occasion ignored imperial regulations and 
imposed their power on the local markets, buying goods at low prices and onward selling as a monopolist. 
More entreprenemial nobles might even use their position to earn a profit and invest in long distance trade, 
even buying ocean going ships. However, Das Gupta (1994:1 422) notes that a nobleman would be 
reluctant to 'earn the odium of being a Baniya' (or village trader). If aristocrats did invest in trade (which 
the royal family itself did) they would nOlmally distance themselves from the activity and hand it to a 
merchant to manage. 
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Sail and Rigging Plan 
I Shroud 
2 Mai~ Halyard 
3 Mizzen Halyard 
4 lib Halyard 
5 Jib Talk Outhaul 
6 Choke Tackle 
7 Peak Vang 
8 Brailing Line 
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Reconstruction of an Arab trading Vessel of elOOO AD. The principle oceanic 
vessel of the Indo-Arab trading tradition was the dhow with its two triangular 
lateen masts. The Gujaratis developed a variation of this vessel with flatter hulls 
reaching a size of up to 800 tons (from The Sin bad Voyage by Tim Severin). 
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The administration at times helped the development of the textile trade which was the key commodity of 
trade in the empire. While raising compliance costs, the government conducted activities that increased the 
confidence of market based transactions and reduced the lisks and costs associated with default and non-
performance. For example, Naqvi (1968:209-10) 110tes that cloth once produced appeared to have been 
collected at a market, where state officers stamped their seals on each piece and collected a duty from the 
cloth dealers on each transaction. The stamping of goods by state officers acted as a security which 
prevented the weavers being cheated by the merchants. The merchants were also required to fill in a bond 
pledging that they would report all business deals. The merchants then either gave the cloth further finishing 
or retailed the goods as they were to the wholesale dealers through which they would eventually make their 
way to local dealers, peddlers and foreign merchants. 
7.3.3 Complementary with Religious and Military Institutions and Values Incorporation into the 
Mughal Empire meant that Gujarat was now pmi of a larger economic system which included a number of 
competing belief systems and paradigms. The empire's origins were strongly driven in an Islamic crusading 
spilit but over time, the empire lost its stlict Islamic basis and the emperor Akbar began recruiting nobility 
from a range of social backgrounds. Hindus, Rajpats, Afghans and Arabs were just some of the ethnic 
groups that provided the empire with dynamism and energy. 
As in China, the Mughal military system and incentive base was intrinsically linked with land and land 
based values. As with all land based empires at the time, the Mughal empire was predominantly agricultural 
(Moreland 1962: 103). It was on agriculture that the Mughal government concentrated its revenue 
collecting, taking a hefty one-third of gross production. The productive importance of agriculture was high-
lighted by the fact that status was determined by control over land. Land was the crucial resource, for 
contl·ol over land gave control over men. A wealthy man with status was a man with a large well populated 
land area under his control and a large contingent of cavalry (Pearson 1976: 90-1). This is reflected in the 
fact that Gujarat maintained a large mmy but viliually no navy. Glory was not won at sea as Bahaudar said, 
'Wars by sea are merchants' affairs, and of 110 concern to the prestige of kings' (quoted in Pearson 1976: 
91). 
The land-based ethos and the vast aglicultural tenitories available to tax meant the state took little interest 
in sea trade. The government seldom interfered in the affairs of the merchants and this was particularly so 
for ocean-going commerce. As long as trade operated smoothly and contributed to the states revenues, the 
Muslim rulers of Gujarat were content to provide merchants with protection but otherwise, leave them alone 
(Alpers 1976:25). This is reflected in the nation's taxation policies. Sea trade was taxed at only 5% 
compared to 20% in Lisbon and 30% in Mamluk Egypt (Pearson 1976:86). Customs duties constituted 
only 6% of Gujarat's income compared to 60% for POliuguese India (Pearson 1976:33). 
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The development of shipping was also complementary with the nation's religious beliefs, particularly 
Muslims who dominated merchant shipping at Surat. The Prophet Mohammed had himself been a 
merchant, so trade (and shipping) were fully complementary with Islamic values. In Islamic Society the 
occupation of merchant was open to all whereas, other social groups had caste restrictions placed on them at 
birth (Chaudhuri 1985:211). However, Islamic doctline was against excessive profiteering and usury and 
this stopped Muslims entering areas of finance. Consequently, the business of providing loans and other 
financial services fell to non-Muslims. Hindus were especially active as suppliers of financial and 
brokering services however, they would not themselves embark on Moslem ships for fear of coming into 
contact with unclean persons (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 63-4). Consequently, maritime commerce exhibited 
social divisions. 
However, at Diu and other ports along the coast, Hindus were involved in shipping; the merchant capitalist 
paradigm overcoming even religious prescliptions not to cross the sea (Ravichandar 1989:167). While 
travelling, they would try to their best to avoid offending their faith, for example by eating contaminated 
food at sea and no doubt, some tried to compensate for any bad karma by living devout lives on shore 
(Pearson 1981:138). An interesting description showing how religious beliefs modified Indian business 
operation is provided by Jan van Linschoten who observed Konkan Hindus: 
When they will make a voyage to Sea, they use at least fourteene days before they enter into their ships, to 
make so great a noyse with sounding of Trumpets, and to beat pots, that it may be heard and seene both by day 
and night" the ships being hanged about with flagges, wherewith (they say) they feast their Pagode, that they 
may have a good Voyage (quoted in Pearson 1981: 136) 
Religious beliefs also affected commercial practices on shore. Dale (1994:74) notes how the money lending 
and banking practices of Jains and Hindus were reinforced. by a life-style of commercial devotionalism. 
'The tools of their trade, account books, pens and ink, came to symbolise deities in the expansive 
Hindu/Jain pantheon'. Jains were very pious and would not kill any bird, animal or living being and 
dedicated a large pOltion of their wealth towards charity. It has been suggested this is the reason they 
became merchants and not warriors (Ravichander 1989:168). 
7.3.4 Organisation Shipping was an extension of a merchant's task in distributing goods to foreign 
markets. Consequently, the success of a shipper was tied to his ability in reading consumer preferences in 
his domestic and foreign market, negotiating favourable prices, maintaining appropriate inventory levels of 
the possible range of goods, reducing losses and maintaining relationships with distributors. Consequently, 
efficient institutions and methods of co-ordination were developed to facilitate the flow of goods, and 
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reduce the costs and dangers of trade. This included solving disputes, avoiding irreputable dealings and 
overcoming the negative effects of competition. 
Although the state generally gave merchants freedom to engage in economic activity without interference, 
the other side of this coin meant the state gave them little SUppOlt in this area. The state had no financial or 
ideological need to build an infrastructure or pass the sorts of legislation, that later supported the merchants 
in the Netherlands and England (Pearson 1991: 97). Govemance and the administration of justice could be 
arbitrary and personal in its application (see Gokhale 1979). This suggests that political alliances and costs 
could at times be a legitimate business expense. Arasaratnam (1994: 175) believes the closeness of the 
relationship between ruler and merchant was dependent on the political and administrative situations in 
which the merchant operated. In almost all regions, merchants were found to have had access to political 
power, and they frequently employed vakils and retainers in the courts of emperors and princes to represent 
them should they have a gIievance. 
With no strong system of commercial law, disputes were solved through consensus. Dispute resolution and 
commercial practice was guided by custom and tradition. Under such conditions it made sense to restrict 
business activity to the same social gI'oup (Hindus, Jains, Muslims) which had similar values and a stronger 
sense of community. This was particularly so for intemational trade where distance and problems of 
communication made it difficult to control activities in foreign ports. Solving disputes within social groups 
reduced costs and saved interference from govemment officials, thereby retaining a degree of autonomy. 
Trade guilds (mahajan) were formed similar to those that exited in Europe in the Middle Ages. The guilds 
(mahajan) looked after all the economic interests of the city, ruled the city traders and organised economic 
life of the merchants. Their authority included the power to fix prices and productivity, thereby avoiding 
any unhealthy competition (Ravichandar 1989: 170, Alpers 1975:28). 
At major foreign ports such as Malacca, the Gujaratis appointed one of their number to be a Shahbander 
(Alpers 1976:30). The Shahbander would look after the interests of the traders, managing the markets and 
warehouses, ensuting standards and measurements were observed and adjudicating disputes within the ex-
patriot community. He also represented Gujaratis when dealing with the Sultan of Malacca. Alpers 
(1976:31) suggests a similar organisational anangement occurred at other major ports where the Gujaratis 
traded such as Mombas and Malindi. 
This organisational structure was not limited to Gujaratis. Three other major merchant communities based 
at Malacca also had Shahbanders to represent them. However, the Gujarat was the most senior of the four 
officials, a reflection of their economic impOltance (Alpers 1975:30). It is hard to imagine that this 
seniority did not provide Gujaratis with quick redress and rapid response, an efficiency gained from 
economies of scale. It celtainly provided greater protection than those shippers without a Shahbander. 
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Indian custom provided both freedom and protection and a value system that underpinned individuality. In 
analysing the commercial structure of the time, one is instantly struck by the importance placed on the 
individual. Individual freedom was a chelished value of society and state. In contrast to China, maritime 
India was remarkably open, granting freedom of access to indigenous inhabitants and aliens alike with no 
attempt to regulate their subjects' coastal movements (Arasaratnam 1994:267). The unwritten law (qanun) 
of Indian society was that every individual was allowed to work at the post to which he had been born and 
to the profits of which he was entitled (Das Gupta 1994: I, 421). 
The individualistic basis of Indian commerce was reflected in the structure of business. Autonomous self 
employed individuals decided what they produced, with what materials, on the basis of market forces. This 
decentralised structure provided flexibility to prevailing conditions. There was little representing the 
employer-employee relationship of today. The basic business unit was the individual merchant and the 
family finn, with an occasional trading partner from the same social group. The family business was the 
predominate structure just as was in China, and for the ,same economic reasons. Clearly, both the Chinese 
and Gujarat (and as we will read in chapter 5) merchants adopted similar structures in response to the 
endllling economic problems of reducing 0pp01iunism and ensuring trust and co-ordination. However, 
these economic reasons should not be stressed to strongly. Clearly, the male heads of these family groups 
had paternal instincts and a desire to provide for their off-spling. 
Merchants would frequently place family members they could trust in foreign ports to act as agents. If their 
level of business activity was not very high, they would use an agent of the same social group based in that 
port. The agent would be paid a commission and the merchant would not have to endure the pennanent 
expense of paying wages even when no commercial activity was being employed. Merchants maintained 
regular cOlTespondence with their off-shore agents, interchanging commercial intelligence on the state of the 
markets, what products were in demand or in fear of being over-supplied. The organisational structure 
based on agents was clearly not restricted to Gujaratis. However, the extensive nature of some of the 
Gujarati networks clearly provided an advantage over periphery nations. 
The family film acted as a store of ktlOwledge and was also the source by which businessmen acquired their 
commercial skills, as the European traveller Tavemier explained in 1676: 
They accustom their children of an early age to shun slothfulness, and instead of letting them go into the 
streets, teach them arithmetic which they learn perfectly, using for it neither pens nor counters, but the memory 
alone, so that in a moment they will do a sum 110 matter how difficult it may be. They are always with their 
fathers who instruct them in trade, and do nothing without at the same time explaining it to them. (Travels in 
India II 43-4, trans. V. Ball, revised by W. Cooke, London 1925 quoted in Habib 1990: 384). 
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Some of these family finns could reach great size with outlying branches in other towns or countries. Das 
Gupta (1994: I, 418-9) describes the range of Indian merchants involved in oceanic trade as including 
'substantial merchants' who traveled in style with their cargo and establishment of domestics, merchants 
who traveled as agents of plincipals who were either managing business at home or traveling elsewhere, and 
small merchants who provided a ship with the majOlity of its passengers. Foreign trade was 
overwhelmingly characterised by small merchants, but each Indian port was dominated by a few wealthy 
traders. 
Investing in ships was not popular among Indian merchants as it tied up a lot of capital in an area of high 
risk. Consequently, ship owning was a bi-product of a merchant's particular trade and, as mentioned in 
chapter five, this was most probably due to the complementalities of the two functions. Ship-owning 
merchants carried their own goods, and those of other merchants, across the sea. Ship-owning had not yet 
become a separate specialised fonn of business. As certain trade routes became established we might 
expect an increase in specialisation however, investing ~olely in shipping was highly risky. A ship was a 
very expensive capital item exposed to the vagmies of the sea. Consequently, only those merchants in need 
of ships to meet their transportation needs made the investment. 
To reduce lisle, merchants might spread their product range over a number of commodities. Merchant 
insurance would have helped to reduce the lisks of ship-owning but, while cargoes could be insured, no 
insurance had evolved to insure ships. As with most aspects of Indian business, insurers were mainly small 
merchants working individually without the financial backing to insure large capital items like ships (Das 
Gupta 1994: I 418). 
In Europe, this problem of risk had been overcome when merchants spread lisk by sharing investment in 
ships. In India, the value system which stressed individuality did not make this possible. Commenda 
contracts, whereby a stay at home party lends money to a traveling party to utilise in business, were 
common to Islamic merchants (Chaudhuri 1985: 210). However, the commenda used in Indian maritime 
trade did not reach the point where the funds of the individual investors were pooled into a common fund 
with common lisks. The spirit of individualism ensured that the investments and cargoes of individuals 
were kept separate from others (Arasaratnam 1995: I 10). 
This was a highly competitive world of small producers. Das Gupta (1994: I, 419) describes it as "a 
merciless world of almost unrestrained competition which often degenerated into feuding". Competition 
did not stop the richest merchants from gaining market power. The powerful merchant Abdul Ghafur 
ruined several small merchants in an attempt to get a monopoly on the Red Sea trade but, with few barriers 
to entry into the trade, his monopoly could not be sustained. Small merchants could enter the trade with 
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little investment and there was little that could be done to remove them as a force in Indian trade. (Das 
Gupta 1994: III, 14) 
7.3.5 Infrastructure and Supporting Industries The Gujarat economic system represented a 'merchant 
capitalist system of the highest order' and was far in advance of areas like East Africa on the edge of the 
Indian Ocean(Alpers 1975:29). This was an economy increasingly driven by market co-ordination 
characterised by vertical specialisation, fragmented industJies and reliance on external economies. 
A very impOliant source of competitive advantage was the level of specialisation that occurred in the 
economy. As the economy expanded, individuals specialised in particular trades and crafts. As they 
became more skilful, their costs decreased and their quality rose, giving Gujarat traders a high value low 
cost advantage. 
A ship-owning merchant was just one pmt of a long chain of highly specialised individuals, a reflection of 
the economics of specialisation the economy was now enjoying. Autonomous, self-employed merchants 
and producers perfOlmed specialised functions on which others in the chain relied. Ocean-going 
transp01tation was part of a chain that linked the markets and producers of the NOlih Indian hinterland with 
foreign pOlis. Consequently, a close relationship between ships and the organisation of road transpOlt 
developed throughout pre-modem Asia linking the main producing areas and the commercial emporiums. 
From the POltS of Gujarat, a series of camels, horses, donkeys, oxen and wheeled vehicles would link the 
hinterland with the sea. 
In the pOlis, the chief link in the chain were the general brokers who supplied the shipowner-merchants with 
specific commodities. As in China, the general broker obtained and distJibuted goods for the merchant-
shipper through a network of middle men and sub-brokers in the regions small towns. They reduced risks 
by testing and weighing products while also providing warehousing facilities. These formed the links with 
the weavers and cultivators in the hinterland. The brokers greatly reduced the costs of acquiring products 
and resources as Thevenot (1666) states, they were: 
so expert in their business, that hardly any body can be without them. They give them commissions of all 
kinds; though it be known that they make their profit of everything, yet Men chuse rather to make use of them, 
than to do their business themselves; and I found often by experience, that I had what they bought for me much 
cheaper than what 1 bought myself or made Illy servants buy. They are of pleasing humour, for they reject no 
service, whether honourable or base, and are always readie to satisfie those who employ them. (Indian Travels 
o(TltevellOl and Careri, Trans. S.N.Sen, New Delhi, 1949 pp77-8, quoted in Habib 1990:391) 
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The salTafs (or shroffs) of the mint f01med a vital link in the chain. Any importer of bullion had to take his 
bullion to the mint to get Mughal rupees coined. They would ensure coinage was the cOlTect weight, purity 
and age. Hindus dominated this function. They were the money merchants of the empire, changing foreign 
cUlTency into Mughal rupees, buying and selling bills of exchange, supplying marine insurance (for goods 
not ships) and respondentia loans. They also developed an early f01m of deposit banking and were an 
imp01iant factor in the efficient flow and utilisation of financial capital. 
Even the richest merchants were dependent on the links down the chain and had little control over the 
processes that brought the product to port. The idea of investing fmiher down the chain would not have 
been attractive to a merchant given the uncertainty of the markets abroad (Das Gupta (1994: III l3). It 
would be "folly to make pelmanent alTangements with weavers". 
While the competition between individual suppliers was fierce, a high degree of co-operation and mutual 
benefit existed between those people a merchant traded and built relationships with. Shipping was a 
forward linkage of the productive industies and led to the creation of a mutually reinforcing cluster. With 
high quality cargoes on board, shippers could travel to distant markets confident of a sale. A growing 
shipping industry was also good for the craftsmen. In return, artisans and craftsmen flocked to the urban 
areas of Gujarat, attracted by the better transp01iation facilities and markets (Ravichander 1989: 172). 
Payment in the cities was in cash and immediate, a huge improvement over payment in the villages. In the 
cities, they organised themselves into craft-guilds which grew out of relations based on ethnic groups. 
The key supporting industry which made it possible for Gujarat to dominate Indian Ocean trade was 
textiles. Pyrard wrote that 'every one from the Cape of Good Hope to China, man and woman, is clothed 
from head to foot' with cotton stuffs made in Gujarat. Though an exaggeration, this comment reflects the 
extent of Gujarat cotton cloth exports. Cotton textiles were probably the most important manufactured item 
in the world at the time (Steensgaard 1990: 123) and India was the greatest producer (Habib 1990: 371). 
Northern India possessed a natural competitive advantage in that it possessed favourable growing 
conditions for the plant. Naqvi (1968: 136), who surveyed industry in Northern India of the Mughal era 
states that 'the cotton textiles industry was universal, ..... No city, town, paraganah, casbah or village seems 
to have been devoid ofthis industry'. 
The process of manufacturing cotton textiles began with the collection of the cotton from the fields after 
which it is cleaned and spun into yam. The yam was then weaved into cloth which is bleached and dyed. 
The cloth could then be used to produce what ever the market demanded. This included quilts, mattresses, 
pillows, cotton sheets and bed covers, draperies, cushions, carpets, tents and most important clothing. 
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With the spread of the market economy dllling this period came structural adjustments which increased the 
efficiency of the textile sector. This included an increased market orientation with a consequent rise in 
specialisation and division of labour among producers. In the rural districts, growers who previously shared 
their productive activity between their own food and cotton requirements began to concentrate on cash 
crops. More agricultural peasants gave up the land to become full time weavers and spinners. As the 
volume of production increased a division of labour became more apparent. Spinners, weavers, bleachers 
and dyers became specialist professions. An accompanying result of the increased scale of production was 
the development of a' market for the sale and purchase of weaver's tools (Gopal 1975:199-203). 
Govemment policy also contributed to the growth of the industry which they considered of priority given its 
direct impact on the economy of the region. Mughal emperors introduced measures to assist the industry, 
including the granting of concessions to cultivators of cotton crops (Naqvi 1968: 137 & 147). 
Shipbuilding was another key suppOliing industJiy as it provided the major capital item for shippers. A 
tlolllishing shipbuilding industry existed around the gulf of Cambay. Ports at Surat, Goa, Broach, Diu, 
Nosali, Khambayat and Gandevi were also homes to busy shipbuilding industries. Geography blessed the 
region with deep rivers for the construction and repair of ships and an abundance of timber in the interior 
hills which could be transported by liver to the place of construction. 
What is noticeably absent from this descliption of the institutional infrastructure is the lack of any body 
involved in what the National System ofInnovation school would define as 'exploring' (LundvaIl1992:11). 
This would go a long way in explaining why Gujarat's success was based on the diffusion of existing 
technologies not innovation. While China's monks and official scholarship contributed a range of 
innovations, Gujarat does not illustrate the same process even though its economy could support a number 
of monks and scholars. In earlier centuries, the Islamic-Hindu world had produced a number of innovations 
and technological prowess far above Europe, but by the time Gujarat rose to eminence, innovation seems to 
have stopped. Latourette(1960:555) points to the difference in the nature of their scholarship. While the 
Chinese were 'this-worldly' and materialistically minded, the great majority of Hindus were engrossed in 
their struggle to free themselves from physical existence and saw the visible world as an illusion. The effect 
of this might not be so strong on the day to day life of the average peasant but it certainly affected the most 
educated members of the Hindu community from which we might expect innovations to come. The Islamic 
community was not bound by these issues so given that Gujarat contained impOliant centres of Islamic 
leaming we might expect a higher level of innovation. However, Islamic learning seems to have incurred its 
own process of institutionalisation by this time, Pines (1963:205) examined the stagnation of Arabic 
science to which Indian Islamic scholarship was intimately connected and noted how debates on 
Alistotelian physics lost the urgency of their early years and had been transformed of mere topics of 
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scholarly tradition. It was no longer exciting and innovative and had become a closed world of strictly 
bookish scholarship. 
Table 7.1 Competitive Strengths and Related Heuristics of Gujarat Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness 
Shipping Industry 
- Organisation, expertise and 
experience in Indian Ocean. 
- Light ships with few annaments 
that are fast and cheap to run. 
- Reputation 
SUPPOlting Areas of Economy 
- Well developed market of 
specialised experts 
- Flexible organisational structure of 
family finns 
- Quality family based education 
- Peaceful empire which allowed 
trade to grow 
- Productive hinterland 
Paradigm Heuristics 
- trade to midpoints like Malacca but 
do not sail into foreign oceans where 
capabilities are not so developed. 
- Manage sailing activities in line 
with the Monsoon winds 
- Place agents in foreign ports 
- Trade peacefully 
- Don't integrate but rely on market. 
-Try to anticipate consumer 
preference and meet with supplies. 
- Try to· obtain market power. 
- Individualism 
-Teach what has brought success in 
the past 
Mughal-Iand linkage 
The competitiveness of Gujarat shipping industry was a function of features of the domestic environment, 
such as supporting industlies, lmowledge resources, and domestic demand. To exploit these strengths, a 
number of heuristics, beliefs and nonns were leamed that could be considered rational behaviour in 
Gujarat's commercial environment (as outlined in table 7.1). At its core was the primacy of the peaceful 
market transactions. 
Although this chapter is principally concemed with the rise of Gujarat in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centmies, the career of Abdul Ghafur who lived in the seventeenth century, usefully illustrates some of the 
characteristics of trade at the time (see Das Gupta 1979 and 1994). His success had turned him into the 
wealthiest merchant in Surat by the end of the seventeenth century. It is believed Abdul Ghafur came to 
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Surat in the late 1660s from the nOlihem town of Patan where he had been a teacher at a mosque. He was 
very poor on anival but his background suggests he was educated and literate, therefore giving him some 
skills needed to succeed in commerce. He soon made a fortune from trade, most probably on the Red Sea 
trade. The Red Sea was the destination of many Indian Muslims going on pilgrimage to Mecca and an 
active trade grew around the shipping that made this route. Expelience on the route was of great 
competitive value as the first ship to the market (and first to return) found a pent up demand and received 
the highest prices. The earliest ships to retulll were also the first in transmitting valuable commercial 
intelligence used at Surat when planning what to order. Ghafur also knew there was some virtue in being 
the last ship and picking up the late freight. The size of his fleet allowed him to cover an array of strategies. 
In the hinterland of Glljarat, Ghafur depended on brokers and sub-brokers who dealt with the headmen of 
the weavers in long tOliuous chains which kept him some distance from the production process. 
Consequently, he had little interest or control over production and would not be likely to have had any 
interest in investing downstream, given unceliainty of off-shore markets. 
Abdul was inclined to be thrifty. By the middle of the 1680s he was among the lichest shipowner-
merchants of Surat and by 1700, he was fabulously wealthy. However, his meteOlic lise in fortune had not 
happened without making many enemies on the way. If Abdul saw an advantage, he would make his own 
rules and crush smaller competitors. He once attempted to obtain a monopoly on the Red Sea run, ruining 
several small fry in the process but, the market was too open too limit new competitors. 
The scale of his operations was without peer. Of the city's fleet of 112 ships, at the end of the seventeenth 
century, he owned seventeen. The ships would be used on the full range of Asian trade routes from Manila 
to Mocha. In 1701, he provided eight of the 19 ships which made the Red sea run to Mocha where he 
owned warehouses and one of the largest mansions in town. His nakhudas (or captains) would stay in the 
house dming their stopover and, sometimes around the year to supervise the sale of merchandise. The 
nakhudas in command of each venture were either his relatives or important businessmen in the city with 
whom he had connections. Decision making was centralised around Ghafur himself, with strict instructions 
gi ven to each nakhuda. With the total tonnage of his fleet at 5,000 dwt, his operations were comparable to 
the European companies operating in Asia at the time. However, he never received the social and political 
suppOli that a company like the Dutch East India Company received from its state. 
7.4 The Decline of Javanese Shipping 
Probably the region to most feel the impact of the fOlmidable Chinese and Gujarati competition was South 
East Asia which had a strong maritime helitage. Up until the end of the fifteenth century, South East Asia 
possessed trading fleets of ocean going vessels which sailed chiefly to southern China, Malaku and the 
Coromandel and, at times sailed as far as the Maldives, Calicut and the Red Sea. Their vessel, the jong, 
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averaged 350-500 dwt (Manguin 1993:198). These ships were built on the northern Javanese coast, the 
southern coast of Borneo and Pegu which had access to teak forests. 
The jong developed from their earlier high seas tradition but seemed to incur some modification under the 
influence of the Chinese, an imitation process aided by the Ming's ban on shipping which forced Chinese 
merchants to make their ships off-shore (Manguin 1986: 17). However, this hybrid ship did not have the 
same range of technical features of their Chinese connterpal1 which reflected a technological supremacy in 
ship design and construction (Deng 1999: 164). 
Although South East Asian trade underwent a considerable boom in the sixteenth century, Javanese 
shipping did not share in it. Long distance trade changed hands with Gujaratis taking the market in the 
West, Chinese in the East (Manguin 1993:203). The competitive strength of the Gujaratis and Chinese was 
too strong and the long distance Asian wide trade of the jong stopped. The Javanese now operated 
exclusively on regional networks. Gujarat trade from the p0l1 of Aceh doubled in the sixteenth century 
(Manguin 1993:201), while East Asiall waters became a Chinese Lake (Deng 1999:1). The great ocean 
going j ong fleets disappeared. 
7.5 China and Gujarat Compared 
This thesis expected to reveal a process of imitation and advance. Unfortunately, it has not been borne out 
in these first two studies. In the peliod under question, the industry was too reliant on local conditions and 
resources. Consequently, the strong and heavy junk and its bamboo sails plied the seas in the far East while 
the dhow and its cotton sails enjoyed the lighter conditions of the Indian Ocean. 
Nevertheless, some imitation did occuI'. The Chinese studied Hindu navigational charts, and Kubilai Kahn 
introduced many foreigners to the Chinese co1ll1. Indians used Chinese inventions of paper and the 
compass, while even the Mughal empire was built on the early adoption of gunpowder. 
Organisational structures were very similar, with the family being the basis of all shipping organisations 
with the exception of the Chinese tribute trade. However, this is more likely to be an independent evolution 
as entrepreneurs in both countries deal with similar problems. 
In the supporting industries, there was more organisational variation. Chinese ceramics evolved into a more 
concentrated mass production industry while Indian textiles remained fragmented and widely dispersed. 
Nevertheless, both achieved a high degree of specialisation. The region for the variances in structure 
possibly relates to the geographic diffusion of the raw materials and also the production technology. With 
the technologies of the day, it was easier to build a large dragon kiln than mechanised textile machinery. 
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What this chapter has revealed is the strong similarities between the rise of Chinese and Gujarat shipping. 
Both provided an environment that was advantageous to shipping entrepreneurs. In particular, political 
stability and unity gave them access to large markets and productive bases that increased the profitability of 
ocean going shipping as long as competition did not get too tight. Shippers in both nations were buttressed 
by supporting industlies that exhibited the best of productive technologies of the day and prosperous local 
demand conditions .. These advantages eventually lead them to gain experience and skills that attracted 
custom from other nations. Clearly, being a gateway to a mighty empire was a strategic asset of value to the 
industry. 
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Chapter 8 
The Rise of European Shipping 
8.1 Evolution of the European Commercial Environment 
A feature of the previous two chapters is the importance of the domestic environment in buttressing 
competitive advantage. It raises the issue that imitation in the domestic environment is just as important as 
imitation in the industry itself. 
In the prevlOUS chapter, we discovered that having a domestic base associated with a mighty empire 
provided advantages for shipping and the development of a market based economy. The Chinese empire 
was born at the same time as Europe's Roman empire but China retained its unity while Europe fragmented 
into disjoint economic units. For centuries after the fall of Rome, Europe was the economic tunt on the 
Eurasian continent. Divided by geographical baniers, Europe was a political patchwork of kingdoms and 
principalities lacking the strength, stability and economic vitality of its eastern neighbours. The 
governments of Europe were small and uneducated. Market activity was practically non-existent. The 
dominant institutional fonn for utilising resources was the feudal manor in which agricultural peasants 
provided for their own requirements and contributed a share of their labour to the Lord of the Manor who 
provided them with law and protection in return (North and Thomas 1973:27). 
Europe did not provide a favourable environment for the development of a shipping industry. The poor 
manufacturing base provided few marketable cargoes, a situation not helped by low levels of education. 
The poverty of the region meant that demand conditions could support little trade while few merchants, if 
any, had the capital to embark on major oceanic voyages. This environment would need to change before 
any shipping industry would be viable. 
DUling the Middle Ages, Europe underwent a process of agticulhlral, commercial and technological change. 
The process was long and gradual and involved both indigenous developments and imitation of Eastern 
technology and commercial methods. 
As in China and the Islamic nations, Europe evolved from feudal structures towards markets on the back of 
an agricultural-commercial revolution. There was a steady increase in land reclamation, as drainage, 
inigation and land clearance increased the amount of land available for agriculture. Production increases 
contlibuted to population gt'owth and provided surpluses which could be taxed or traded. More people 
could be employed in non-agricultural pursuits with a lise in the number of people involved in government, 
religion and crafts. Craftsmen who previously provided a handful of luxuries to the lich and a small number 
of essentials to the peasants could expand their range of activities. The market became a more common 
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medium for allocating resources, at first through temporary fairs which eventually grew into more 
permanent market towns. 
The expanding market created an environment conducive to the introduction of mechanical labour saving 
devices (North and Thomas 1973 :43). Witl, the introduction of the waterwheel and windmiII, Europeans 
were no longer reliant on human or animal power. Educated Christian monks played a key role in 
upgrading productivity. For example, the Cistelian order of Monks, created in 1098, promoted a number of 
new technologies including water-powered grain mills, cloth fulling mills, wine presses, iron forges and 
fumaces (Gies and Gies 1994:114). 
The dominant institution at the time was the Church and Christian values were not totally conducive to a 
merchant based economy. Christians gave merchants low social status, seeing them as gold-hungry and 
non-productive (Lopez 1971 :60). Usury, the practice of lending money and charging interest, was 
considered unethical. With different values, Jews filled the vacuum and became successful traders and 
bankers. Many Jews spread out across the impOliant por~s and cities of Europe either to escape persecution 
or in search of trade. Jews were particularly important in providing a neutral trade link between Catholic 
Europe and the more advanced countries of the Islamic world, providing a valuable linkage in lands that 
otherwise might be divided by war or creed (Lopez 1971 :62). 
The relationship between the Mediaeval church and business was close, complex and uneasy (Hunt and 
Murray 1999:69). For example, in the twelfth century, the clergy contested the establishment of schools 
providing a basic merchant education as they felt their monopoly on education threatened. On the other 
hand, the clergy relied on business for many of their provisions. Like the Hindus, Jains and Muslims in 
India, religious beliefs affected day-to-day business activity and values of European merchants (Hunt and 
Murray 1999:69-70). In Italy, a company's books normally opened with a prayer for the success of the 
business and the health and safety of the personnel. In the north, the Flemish introduced their financial 
statement "to the Glory of God". Of particular relevance to daily business activity was the concept of the 
"just price" sanctioned by the church. A price that was just provided an underlying fairness to daily business 
transactions that recognised utility and demand as well as costs. 
Islamic nations were an important source for imitation, a process that greatly improved Europe's productive 
capabilities and knowledge base. Europeans adopted techniques of linen production from Islamic peoples 
who also introduced cotton production to Spain. The spinning wheel first arrived in Europe from the East 
in the 13th century (Ibid: 180-5). Venice acquired its famous capabilities in glass making from Syria while 
sugar production was leamt by the crusaders who brought it back to Europe (Ibid: 153&222). Islamic 
influence was also felt on mining, a subject on which the only publications available until the mid -fifteenth 
century were Arabic translations (Ibid: 236). 
104 
i."_-· 
k;-",c'c.c; .• :.;.;. 
DUling the twelfth century, the imitation process took a huge leap when the crusades increased interaction 
with the Islamic world. It opened up a vast pool of technological wealth. This included the rediscovery of 
ancient Greek classics and more recent Islamic scientific texts which became available to Europeans in 
increasing numbers. They included AI-Khwarismi's texts on mathematics, medical works of Galen and 
Hippocrates, and Ptolemy's Geography which strongly influenced European shippers and explorers. 
Universities were established based on the Islamic style of learning. First was Bologna in about 1100 
followed by the University of Paris in about 1150. The Islamic system of'madrassas' became the model, 
where the emphasis was on debate and exploring the issue from both sides (in contrast to the memory based 
examination of China). 
The imitative nature of early European commerce can be traced in the language we use today. The word 
'cheque' is derived from the Arabic word 'sakk'. The word 'ream' comes from the word 'rismah'meaning 
bundle of paper (Hissan and Hill 1986:18&192). The word 'fund' comes from the Arabic 'funduq' 
(Chaudhuri 1991 :436) while 'risk' comes from the Arabic 'rizq' (Hunt and Murray 1999:61). 
It was in the sea ports of the Mediterranean that the process of imitation and revitalisation was the strongest, 
in paliicular, the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa. These tOWllS benefited from the crusades which had 
introduced Europeans to exotic products from the Middle East and beyond. Galleys from the Italian cities 
regularly visited Islamic trading pOlis blinging back products and technologies from the East. The Italians 
were the first Europeans to introduce the compass and borrowed other innovations such as lateen sails and 
navigational chmis. They most probably adopted the 'commenda' form of business organisation from their 
Islamic trading palmers, a vital ingredient in the rapid growth of European maritime trade (Lopez 1971 :76). 
The introduction of double entry bookkeeping, probably from the Hindus, helped merchants to keep track 
of their operations and the activities of their palmers and agents. It also gave them a record by which they 
could learn from the past how to plan for the future. Bills of exchange were in common use and by the late 
fourteenth century, Italians had derived fOlmulas for marine insurance contracts. With a spread of literacy, 
the customs associated with business became codified, Italy developing the first written law for enforcement 
of trade agreements. All these factors reduced the cost of using the market, which became an increasingly 
effective method of allocating resources (NOlih and Thomas 1973 :56). 
Through the Italians, Europeans leamed the value of mmitime trade. With no agricultural base, the Italian 
cities became dependent on ocean trade. Consequently, the interests of merchants became so important that 
the state took charge of their protection and merchants became very active in municipal government (Mauro 
1990:259). Although these pOliS were not great by world standards, the wealth they created through 
lTImitime trade was envied by other Europeans. It did not go unnoticed that such wealth could finance 
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strong navies and annies and Europe developed a strong awareness of the economic and strategic value of 
sea power. As Sir Walter Raleigh would later state, 'Whosoever commands the sea commands trade, 
whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world 
itself (quoted in Mollat du lourdin 1993: 117). 
Italian success served as a model for other European states to imitate. Throughout Europe, a symbiotic 
relationship developed where merchants were free to build their wealth while contributing to the tax base 
and strength of the state. Governments passed laws to enforce contracts and protect private property, the 
Italians once again providing the template. The maritime law of Pisa served as the model for Barcelona, 
then England and the Netherlands (NOlih and Thomas 1973:56). Monopolies might be granted to traders, 
and letters of introduction given to help the merchants establish themselves in foreign courts. They might 
be given the status of ambassador for similar reasons. 
High level state support was a consequence of Europe's fragmented political landscape. The divided nature 
of Europe's political map also provided some advant~ges for technical and commercial advancement. 
Smaller political units meant rulers had less agricultural land to tax and were more likely to suppOli 
merchants in an attempt to raise income (Pearson 1991 :69). Rulers were closer to merchants and the other 
people under their rule. This reduced infonnation asymmetries creating a governance system in which 
rulers were more likely to be in tune with their subjects' needs. 
To some extent, the divided landscape provided a political market where the consumer was left with a 
degree of choice. The existence of many divided kingdoms meant there was no central power to suppress 
commercial activity or original thought. If a govemment uied to stop u·ade as they did in Ming China, the 
merchants could move to another state. There was always a lord or prince somewhere who would tolerate 
merchants and if oppression came, the merchants moved on. Europe certainly had its share of incompetent 
rulers but they could only resuict advance in their limited region. For example, though the Pope did 
suppress the discoveries of Galileo, Galileo's discovelies could be taken up by Protestant thinkers in 
Holland, England or Geneva. 
Decenu·alisation also meant one other vital factor - competition. The rivalry for resources so valued by 
Klein and POlter at the film level was played out in Europe at the State level and consequently, producing a 
high level of innovation. The states of Europe were constantly fighting among themselves. Although wars 
could destroy economies, a competitive anns race needed to be financed. Consequently, despite China and 
Europe sharing a low view of merchants, European rulers became dependent on their merchants as a source 
of income. It was in the interests of European states to suppOli their merchants. Before long, political and 
military competition would become commercial competition. 
106 
8.2 European Technological Advance 
Many of the eastem technologies imitated by the Europeans underwent further development in their new 
environment. The introduction of the blast fumace, a Chinese invention, meant that iron could be cast at 
higher temperatures. Church bells had provided an early demand for the blast fumace technology but it was 
in conjunction with another Chinese invention, gunpowder, that the political competitive environment of 
Europe encouraged advancement. Blast fumaces were first used in Europe for casting cannon in 1380. A 
rising demand from competitive national armies and navies (and later geographic explorers) caused 
European metal workers to create the smallest, most mobile and accurate artillery pieces in the world. 
Greater quantities and qualities of iron had spill-over effects for other industlies, including ship building 
tools and printing. Guttenberg, who had leamt about metallurgy from his father, a goldsmith, adopted the 
new metallurgical possibilities to another Chinese innovation, printing. He invented the printing press with 
movable type, which made books cheaper and more available to a wider audience. By 1480, there were 
over 380 working presses in Europe (Mokyr I 990a:49). Printing greatly expanded the possibilities for 
recording and distributing ideas and was a vital factor in the European technological revolution. As Molcyr 
(1990a: 65) notes 'a technical I iterature emerged, written by engineers for engineers, and technical 
knowledge became increasingly communicable and thus cumulative'. 
Europeans developed a respect for machines and the people who made them. The greatest minds concemed 
themselves with production technology (Mokyr 1990a:64). However, progress was not systematic. There 
was much duplication and time wasted 011 alchemy. Yet, by 1500, Europe had achieved a position of 
teclmological parity with the rest of the world (Mokyr 1990a:55). 
These processes of imitation and advance strengthened the European economic system providing surpluses 
for trade, education, demand and capital for investment. It provided the conditions on which a domestic 
shipping industry could grow. 
8.3 Early European Shipping technology 
In the early middle ages, as in many other areas of technology, European shippers were well behind the 
Chinese and Arabs. The high point had been the crossing of the Atlantic by the Vikings but, this was more 
of an island hopping venture leaping from Europe to Iceland to Greenland before touching the North 
American coast. Most impOliantly, it did not lead to an emerging trade or expansion oflmowledge. In fact, 
to many Europeans this success was relegated to myth. 
European ships were neither capable of facing severe stOlms at sea, nor of driving effectively against 
contrary winds. Limitations in ship strength and navigation technique meant voyages were made by sailing 
close to the coast, rather than across open seas. Pilots worked on the basis of experience and lmowledge of 
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land marks (Menard 1991 :238). However, hugging the coasts brought with it dangers of piracy and the risk 
of destruction against rocks at the hand of a south-westerly wind. Consequently, mariners spent a great deal 
of time waiting for favourable winds and, at the first sign of bad weather, would duck into the closest safe 
harbour. Voyages that could have taken only a few days could often take many months. Long voyages 
pushed up the cost of transport, forcing up wage bills, victualling costs, and port charges. Variations in 
voyage length made it difficult to estimate freight costs and respond quickly to market opportunities 
(Menard 1991: 239). European shipping was a high-costilow-quality service limited to regional routes. 
Our hypothesis leads us to expect a process of imitation to overcome these problems. Certainly, a process 
of imitation in European shipping is more evident than in the previous two regions. However, it was a very 
limited process. There are several reasons for this. The ships in the Indian Ocean which could have 
provided inspiration were too light for the Atlantic winds, although they influenced Mediterranean 
shipbuilding. The Chinese junk might have served as a better model but the only Europeans that might have 
seen them were travellers like Marco Polo and while his tales provided information (eg: ships size, use of 
multiple masts) that was certainly absorbed by the EUropeans, distance created a barrier to the rate of 
imitation. Consequently, with some imitation, European shipping evolved along a path of development that 
reflected local resources and conditions. 
Improved navigation could greatly reduce the cost of transpOliation and a series of tools and methods were 
introduced to achieve this end. The Chinese compass, which was a primitive pointer, was introduced and 
improved by placing the needle on a dry pivot, and a card was placed undemeath indicating the wind 
directions. By the end of the thirteenth century, this improved compass was being used in conjunction with 
pOIiolan chmis (charts with sailing directions). In the north, where there was greater tidal variation, 
mminers were using tide-tables by the late fourteenth century (Unger 1980: 175). These improved 
navigational methods made sailing safer and more productive. Voyages became more predictable, the 
llumber of shipwrecks was reduced and, it now became possible to sail in winter, extending the sailing 
system. Seamen were still wary of winter storms but, with the new methods, they lmew the distance to the 
llearest safe harbour (Ibid). Sailing in winter meant more voyages could be made per year and earn more 
fOlm the capital invested in the ship. Safer voyages also lowered insurance premiums. These advances 
reduced the cost of shipping which further fuelled the expansion of trade. 
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Mediterranean Merchantman of the thirteenth century with lateen sails 
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In many ways, development was an environmental selection process as market expansion opened 
possibilities for experiment by shipbuilders. However, the innovative process was limited by past 
investments in Imowledge of what was technologically possible, a reflection of the path driven development 
suggested by Dosi (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982). The slow and gradual process of technical 
advance reflected the fact that an innovation that failed could result in loss oflife at sea. An example of that 
slowness is the hinged axle rudder, initially introduced in the late twelfth century but not in general use until 
the middle of the fourteenth century. 
The process of environmental selection is evident in that development occurred along several paths 
depending on the needs and circumstances a ship was intended to solve (Phillips 1994:99). In this way, the 
environment a ship sailed in shaped the selection of design options. Skippers would, for example, have 
their own preferred style of ligging. Hulls and rigs did not follow rigid definitions. Such overlap makes it 
difficult to date the adoption of new technologies as old and new technologies co-existed. A new ship-type 
did not just arrive. In contrast to Salter's(l966) position that new technology could only be introduced with 
the creation of fresh capital, some new technologies COl!ld be added piecemeal depending on the extent of 
the change. Clearly, hull shapes could not be changed but adjustments in rigging were made to suit the 
demands of the route and the desired use of the ship. 
For centuries, European shipping had been evolving in two distinct spheres (see Unger 1980 for the 
definitive work on the development of Medeaval European shipping). In the north, the roughness of the 
Baltic Sea and North Sea created a demand for a heavier ship, the 'cog' became the dominant vessel. The 
cog's design was also determined by economic conditions. Falling grain prices associated with the Black 
Death meant Gelman exporters needed to improve shipping to become competitive. The cog was the 
solution. Its hull had a rounded shape with a broad flat bottom creating greater carrying capacity. The 
ship's shallow draught reduced its vulnerability to tidal change. It had one mast setting one square sail 
making. This made it easy to handle with low labour requirements, labour being expensive after the Black 
Death. However, the single mast meant it suffered in telms of speed and manoeuvrability. Its high sides 
were good for defence and positioning archers. A descendent of Viking and Celtic traditions, the cog was 
clinker built which meant the sides were built up by placing wooden stakes on top of another, slightly over 
lapping the one below it. There was no internal skeleton. 
Southern ships from the Mediterranean area were more exposed to Arab shipping influences and developed 
very differently. They adopted the lateen sail with which sailors tacking a zig-zag course could make 
progress against the wind that a square sail could not achieve. In contrast to northern construction, southern 
ships were built first by constructing a skeleton frame on which planks would be added to the outside. The 
internal skeleton added greater strength. The planks would not overlap but were placed edge to edge in a 
process known as 'carvel' construction, saving wood in the Mediterranean area, which had smaller wood 
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supplies. Southern shipping also differed in the rigging, keel, and the method of supporting the mast. 
While n011hern ships needed flatter bottoms so as not to run aground, the Mediterranean Sea experienced 
less tidal vmiation so, the keels of the southern ships were curved. 
As trade grew between north and southern Europe in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, it opened 
interaction between shippers from each region and provided an introduction to each other's ship types. 
Over the next century, the best features of the two shipping traditions were combined and by the closing 
years of the fOllrteenth century, the 'Carrack' had evolved. The earliest carracks were two masted, a square 
mast as per the n011h, a lateen sail as per the south. Eventually, captains and shipbuilders realised that 
adding a third mast allowed captains to balance the wind forces on different sails, giving greater control of 
the ship (Unger 1996:43). With the addition of the third mast in the early fifteenth century, Europe had its 
first ocean trader capable of long ocean passages. 
What became known as the 'full rigged ship' enjoyed improvements that were not restricted to rigging. The 
ships hulls were carvel-built in the Mediterranean tradition, but contained several northern features, 
pm1icularly a tall stem, marked sheer, and straight keel. A higher length-to breadth ratio meant the ship 
could travel faster than the old round ships. From the cog (and before that China), a stem-post rudder was 
used for steeling. The process of imitation and intemal evolution resulted in a fast, strong, seaworthy ship 
that could sail close to the wind, and be more easily manoeuvred than its predecessors (Menard 1991:239-
40). With more masts and sails, ships could capture more wind-power so bigger ships could be built with a 
large cargo-carrying capacity. 
Unger refers to full-rigged ships as the 'great invention'. However, this was no technological leap or 
Gersick-type punctuated equilibrium. As the previous discllssion states, this was a slow and gradual process 
of improvement in which designers responded to environmental opportunity and constraint but, at the same 
time were limited by previous knowledge. Eventually, a threshold was reached in which they could venture 
out until the great oceans. However, advance did not stop once this threshold was crossed. 
The external environment shaped the development of technological change, in particular demand conditions 
and factor plices (Unger 1980:277). As trade grew, a more established demand for cargoes allowed 
shipbuilders the luxury of building larger ships. For example, traders in Genoa, with their high priced 
cargo, were more able to accommodate the expense of experimentation in ship design and were early 
movers of the calTack which, by 1500, constituted 90% of Genoa's merchant fleet (Friel 1994:86). There 
was a constant desire to improve handling capabilities as this reduced manning requirements. 
Supply side changes also improved shipping technology. Advances in metallurgy resulted in better quality 
tools. It was now possible to produce saws that could effectively cut hardwood (Bill 1994: 154), while the 
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introduction of the brace made it possible to bore holes for nails (Unger 1980:226). Stronger ships could be 
built more quickly. Unger (1980:277) also notes that the government intermittently contributed to technical 
advance and greater efficiency, although some of the directions that governments took led to extreme waste, 
particularly when monarchs wanted to build big ships as a sign of prestige. The result was ships of poor 
manoeuvrability and sea-worthiness that did nothing but sit in pOli all day. 
The last important transformation of European shipping was the placement of artillery on board. The 
competitive structure' of the European state system had resulted in reliable guns that although small had a 
force equal to monster iron siege guns. Their placement on ships changed naval defence as their ability to 
cripple or even sink an enemy vessel dispensed with the need for the assailants to board ships (Kennedy 
1976: 16). This would give Europeans a strong advantage when they ventured in foreign and hostile waters. 
It reduced the risks of shipping and the costs bome from losses. 
8.4 The Rise of Spanish and Portuguese Shipping 
By the fifteenth century, Europeans had not mastered trans-oceanic sailing, despite the improvements in 
maritime capabilities. In this section we examine how these nations acquired the capabilities which 
propelled them into global leaders in the shipping industry. 
The countries of the Ibelian peninsula possessed one vital difference from the states of northern Europe. 
Both nations had previously been occupied by Islamic rulers, an experience that filled these Christian 
nations with a crusading zeal against Muslims. Initially, Spain and Portugal fought the Muslims on their 
own territory, but eventually the 'reconquista' mentality evolved into a Christian imperialism that would 
lead them on to the high seas. The reconquista mentality can be characterised as a militant Christianity, in a 
society which placed high value on defeating the forces of Islamism. The knights who exhibited valour in 
such exchanges deserved the high status and the title of 'gentleman' or nobleman'. 
POliugal and Spain also benefited from a geographic position which overlooked the Atlantic but backed on 
to the Meditenanean, a handy position to tap into the commercial and maritime expertise of the nearby 
Italians (Verlinden 1953). The Genoese were especially valuable in the Iberian imitation process, providing 
both capital and maritime expertise. From the time of King Dinis (1279-1325), Genoese had dominated 
officer corps of the Portugal navy (Verlinden 1996:54) and, Portugal's first colonial possession, the Canary 
Islands (later claimed by Spain), was a discovery of Genoese seamen in the service of the Portuguese 
government (Ibid:55). 
Advance onto oceanic routes was a State-driven research and development project steered by Prince Henry 
of Portugal. In 1414, the Portuguese Prince fought in the siege of Ceuta in Morocco where he had the 
opportunity to talk to Muslim merchants about the countries crossed in the inland caravan routes. 
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Inf01mation on the gold supplies in the Upper Niger and Senegal river and looted spices and riches helped 
confilm the impression that greater wealth could be obtained from trade and shipping. When in 1419, he 
became govemor of Algarve in sOllthem P01iugal, he began to put his dream in to action. 
Henry's pursuit of gold at the famed Rio D'ora (and Colombus's desire to reach the East) might imply 
some support of the Austrian notion that these entrpreneurs were attempting to benefit from arbitrage, the 
implication being that prices of a good are cheaper at its source. However, there is only limited support for 
this. Henry's motives for exploration were not just the pursuit of gold and were consistent with the incentive 
structure of the day (Russell 2000: 120-8). Henry saw himself as a crusader and his caravels were sent to do 
as much damage as possible to the Moors along the Afiican coast. His missions were led not by merchants 
but by squires from his household, while his ships sails were adorned with the cross of the Order of Christ. 
At the time, Henry was Irnown to be rash and a poor military planner. Many around him questioned his 
judgement (Russell 2000:146). Ifwe accept Casson's (1982) statement that an entrepreneur has judgement 
that differs from the nOlm, these statements open up the possibility that two characteristics of a succesful 
entrepreneur might be stupidity and luck, 110t the generally accepted trait of superior insight. However, 
after Henry's success, chroniclers and historians would describe him as being astute and full of foresight, 
the evidence being in his achievements. As a decision making entrepreneur, Henry may have been 
innovative but, it was innovation within the realms of reconquista paradigm with emphasis on Christian-
military values and the defeat of Muslims. 
Most of Henry's initial shipping was directed towards colonising the islands off the African coast, the 
Azores and Madeiras, where sugar plantations were established (Ibid:64). These islands gave the 
Portuguese expelience of the Atlantic wind system and ocean going sailing. From here, Henry sponsored a 
series of expeditions down the Aflican coast. Developing new routes was fraught with danger so advance 
was gradual, each voyage going further than the one before it. It was a case of leaming by doing and the 
gradual accumulation of new lmowledge. Leaming was systemised by the use of logs in which the captain 
recorded his observations and experiences. These were used in later voyages. 
The existing rationality at the time recognised that psychological and physical barriers existed. It was 
reported that if a ship went past Cape Bojador they would be overcome by a number of possible disasters, 
for beyond it lay boiling seas in which tenifying monsters lurked and, if the tropical sun didn't bum the 
sailors black, Satan himself lay awaiting (Russell 1995 XI:lI, Boxer 1969:26). The tales of dread were 
suppOlied by cunents and northerly winds that made retuming difficult. These tales presented a huge 
banier to entry into the Aflican trade and Russell (2000) suggests it may have been invented by Muslims to 
protect their trade. 
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In 1434, Prince Henry's sailors passed the Cape without being burnt, boiled or dined on by sub-terrainean 
monsters. Despite breaching this bind on rationality and market entry, Henry's success was not immediately 
applauded. He faced all the criticism of an entrepreneur-dreamer spending resources on an untried project, 
as his chronicler records: 
during the first years, seeing the great number of ships that the Prince fitted out for the purpose at such 
expense ... they gave themselves up to criticising something of which they had little understanding. The longer 
it took for the enterprise to produce results, the more their criticisms grew. The worst of it was that not only 
the plebian people but also those of higher rank spoke about the issue in a contemptuous way, believing that no 
profit would come from so much expense and effort. (Quoted in Russell 2000: 110) 
The early advance absorbed huge costs with little return so, government patronage was vital for this R&D in 
oceanic routes to continue. The State was instrumental in overseeing systematic changes needed for the 
industry to progress. The monopoly the State granted itself brought out many of the advantages for R&D 
suggested by Schumpeter( 1942) in that it reduced the risks of competition and encouraged investment in 
what would otherwise be a very high risk venture. 
Advance was assisted by the high levels of knowledge resources and human capital that Europe had attained 
after its earlier process of imitation. It opens an interesting example where the technology itself might not 
have been imitated but other aspects in the commercial environment that have been imitated gave 
Europeans the capabilities to develop the technology themselves. The voyages down the Atlantic opened 
up new problems about establishing position at sea. At a time when the rediscovery of classical books on 
geography had given the study of navigation more importance and respect, Henry brought together leading 
mathematicians, cartographers and astrologers (McNeill 1976:572). It was a key example of a centralised 
ruler creating systematic change, blinging together peoples who if left to their own devices might not have 
come to the same arrangement. 
Henry's experts developed the 'altura' system of navigation, in which the latitude of the ship was 
detelmined by examining the height of the sun at midday (not the pole star). This was made easier by the 
use of more reliable instruments (in particular the quadrant) and tables which related the height of the sun to 
degrees of latitude. By the sixteenth century, published guides and tables for pilots were available. Such 
changes placed new demands on captains who now had to have a grasp of theory of astronomical 
observations for finding positions and be able to do some mathematics.(NB: Arab and Chinesepilots of the 
Indian Ocean Imew how to take the position of the sun or stars to derive their own position and had 
developed a fonTI of quantitative navigation well before the Pmtuguese.) 
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The expansion of knowledge was cumulative, anotller case of the path-like development suggested by Dosi 
(1982). While new navigation techniques allowed ships to travel further, the resulting discoveries allowed 
cartographers, the 0PPOliunity to make more reliable c11alis. This in tum gave captains greater confidence 
to sail out of sight of land. In this way the POliuguese built up capabilities and confidence in long oceanic 
ventures. 
This building of capabilities was clearly indigenous not imitative, although it did have imitative aspects. 
The initial ships chosen for the exploration were single masted barks and barrinet but both proved 
inadequate, and by 1440 the caravel became the basis of Iberian exploration. The caravel was initially a 
small vessel used for fishing and coastal trades (Elbe 1994:91) and probably had Arabic origins (Unger 
1980:212). Being light, fast and manoeuvrable it was highly desirable for venturing in unknown waters. 
With low sides, sharp ends and two lateen sails, it could sail closer to the wind than any other type of 
European vessel. Although Elbe (1994:92) says there is no evidence that Henry the Navigator improved the 
caravel, it under went much modification during this period. A third mast was added, and the ship grew 
from 50 tons to 150-200 tons. A stem post rudder and square rig was added, becoming another variant of 
the fully rigged ship. 
Henry's team was developing capabilities not only in mmitime technologies but, they were also contributing 
to the growth of knowledge in geography which was a leading science of the day much as micro-biology is 
today. It involved a process of tJial and error which was amalgamated with existing knowledge and 
resulted in a growth of lmowledge of routes, winds, currents, coastlines, civilisations and markets. As with 
modem R&D projects, it involved a high degree of risk and clearly not all voyages were profitable as Henry 
had to draw on the reserves of the Military orders which he led to fund them. 
In 1447, the military nature of the voyages came to an end when they reached black Africa. Here, they 
encountered poisoned arrows and lances which created a level of discomfort that suggested they resort to 
more peaceful methods of increasing their wealth (Russell 2000:213). From this point on, the voyages 
became solely trade missions, initially trading horses for slaves. As they went further down the African 
coast new markets were opened, in particular, gold and pepper. They provided the earnings and incentive 
on which further voyages could be based. 
Trading in slaves opened up a new economic path inconsistent with the current instihltional structure and it 
called for a process of legitimisation. A new spin was given to the trade, saving souls, as the fifteenth 
century chronicler Zurara records: 
The only thing that concerned your generous heart was not the thought of the small material gain ... Instead of 
that, you were moved only by your pious intention to seek salvation for those lost souls ... That is why, when 
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you saw the captives displayed before you, so great was the pleasure the sight of them gave you that you 
reckoned as nothing the expenses you had to layout (on this enterprise). (Quoted in Russell 2000:256). 
State sponsored research continued after the death of Plince Henry. King John II, who took the Portuguese 
throne in 1481, financed a number of exploratory voyages and in 1487, Bartolomeu Dias became the first 
European sea captain to round the Cape of Good Hope. Finally, in 1497 Vasco de Gama, went completely 
round the Cape into the Indian Ocean and, with the aid of a Gujarati navigator that he picked up in Africa, 
reached as far as Calicut, India (Verlinden 1996:79). Another Gujarati, Malemo Cana showed De Gama 
nautical instruments and a chart of the Indian Oceml, and explained the winds and currents that detelmined 
navigation in the ocean (Ibid:79). The lesson did not stop the Portuguese from making mistakes on their 
retum trip but provided an introduction to Indian Ocean navigation that tlial and error would enhance. 
A vital piece of Imowledge gained through trial and error was that of the Atlantic wind system. The 
POliuguese leamed that the quickest route between two points was not a straight line down the coast, but to 
sail far west towards Brazil where they could catch the westward winds that would carry them into the 
Indian Ocean. Such Imowledge was kept secret and provided a huge competitive advantage over would-be 
competitors. 
King Jolm II had also received a proposal from Chlistopher Columbus to finance a trip to India by 
travelling west across the Atlantic. After some consideration, he decided not to finance the project and 
Christopher Columbus, tUllled to Spain where the advantages of the decentralised political environment 
once more assisted teclmological advance. Ferdinand and Isabella were won over on the basis that if they 
didn't suppOli Columbus, he would go to a foreign power. They did not want to lose the possible benefits to 
a lival (Philips and Philips 1996: 160). 
At this point, we become aware of the impOliance of changes in the supporting economic environment and 
the earlier imitations from the East which had raised the level of knowledge resources in Europe. Columbus 
was very much a product of this environment. He came from Genoa, the cradle of European seamanship 
and had lived in Portugal for some years where he had travelled to the Madeiras and the African Gold 
Coast. In Portuguese caravels, he had gained knowledge of currents and winds, islands and shorelines that 
was not available to an earlier generation (Ibid: 152). He was also the product of the new age of printing. 
He had read Marco Polo and had used the wealth of Asia as a selling point in his proposal to the King. He 
would have knoWll of a work by Silvio Piccolomani (later Pope Pius II) which summarised the rediscovered 
Ptolemy'S geography but rejected the idea that the Indian Ocean was closed off from other seas (Ibid: 155). 
He had also read Imago Mundi by Pien d'Ailly, which suggested a westward voyage from Europe to Asia 
was possible and it was on this that he based his calculations (by this time, everybody was aware the world 
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was round). Finally, Columbus's ships embodied the latest European technology (two modified caravels 
and one carrack). 
Columbus was not the only European to venture out into the Atlantic during this time. Femandez-Armesto 
(1996:146) notes that between 1452 and 1487, at least eight commissions were issued in Portugal, and at 
Bristol, English seafarers were searching the Atlantic for the mythical island of Brazil. Luck played a key 
part in the eventual Spanish success. Spain had already developed the Canary Islands as its first maritime 
colony, with the financial backing of Genoese merchants. By good fortune, the Canary Islands were close 
to the prevailing northeast winds. Columbus reached Amelica because, in having a starting point at the 
Canary Islands, he was closest to the trade winds that could power him across the Atlantic (Femandez-
Armesto 1996:145/6). However, Columbus's R&D venture had failed to find a route to Asia, and the wealth 
he found in the Indies was not enough to compensate for his failure (Lundahl 1998: 102). It would take 
thiliy years before the New World would yield substantial returns (ibid: 118). 
Spain did not stop its maritime research with Columbus. Most prominent was the sponsorship of Magellan, 
an excellent Portuguese navigator who had travelled to the East Indies in his youth and had widely read the 
geographical theories of the day. He was convinced that the only reason Columbus and Cabot had failed to 
find a route to the east was because they had yet to discover a way through the Americas (Milton 199:25). 
Discharged from Portuguese service after being accused of treachery, he travelled to the Spanish cOUli and 
obtained sponsorship for what was to become the first circum-navigation of the world, with the consequent 
addition of the Philippines to the Spanish trading empire. Once experience taught the Spanish the nature of 
the wind system in the Pacific, this led to the development of a new commercial system not imagined by any 
of the visionaries, the Manila Galleon trading between the Philippines and Americas. 
The opening of the routes to Asia and Amelica heralded a commercial revolution which reshaped the world 
of global commerce and shipping. But the voyages of Columbus did not over night cross a threshold and 
create a situation of punctuated equiliblium, for it took decades for the potential of South America to be 
realised. Opening of the Asian trade more readily fits the description of punctuated equilibrium but it was 
achieved only after a century of R&D down the African coast. 
The Spanish and Portuguese had now achieved more than any seafming nation before them. However, 
aware of the possibilities of destructive livalry, Pope Alexander VI had earlier drawn a line which divided 
the world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence. Unfortunately, sixteenth century maps were 
very inaccurate and left open potential areas of conflict. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Tordesillas (as it was 
signed) became the basis of a power-sharing document. The implication for shipping was routes could be 
divided into a quasi market-share agreement. The agreement gave Spain most of the Americas and took 
them as far East as the Philippines. Portugal had Brazil and Asia. 
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8.5 Sources ofIberian Competitive Advantage 
With the opening of the trade routes, the Ibelian nations had revolutionised commerce, creating a new 
development path, which for the sixteenth century became their exclusive monopoly. The Spanish and 
POliuguese completely dominated the Atlantic. The Portuguese were the only traders regularly linking Asia 
and Europe while Spain's Manila Galleon was the only regular route across the Pacific. Portugal sent about 
seven ships to India every year in the period 1500-1635, averaging about 600 tons at the end of the century, 
as well as building ships in the Indies (Phillips 1990:49). In the Atlantic, about 100 Spanish ships with 
combined tonnage of 9,000 tonnelados (aprox 7,200 tons) traded across the Atlantic each year during the 
1520s (Phillips] 990:78). In the latter half of the century, this had grown to 150-200 ships, and as the ships 
had doubled in size carrying on average 200 tonnelados (aprox 160 tons), to provide a total of 30,000-
40,000 tonnelados (aprox 24-32,000 tons). In 1584, the Brazil trade occupied some 40 ships on the Recife 
and Lisbon route, growing to 130 in 1618 (Boxer 1969:105). 
The competitive strength of Iberian shipping rested on supportive government policies, organisations that 
maximised the dissemination and utilisation of the latest technologies, superior shipping skills and 
reputation. 
8.5.1 Skills, Experience and Reputation Vasco da Gama's first journey to India had been very expensive. 
This paliy lost 65% of their tonnage and 63% of their personnel. The pepper they returned home with only 
amounted to six tons (Duncan 1986:6). However, the Portuguese soon learned from experience and 
dramatically reduced these costs. By 1500, they had learnt the need to schedule sailings to fit with the 
monsoons. While da Gama's ships took between 733 and 804 days, the next fleet led by Pedro Alvares 
Cabral took only between 471 and 505 days. 
The Iberians had acquired their knowledge over a century of trial and error. Knowledge of trade routes was 
vital for success in the industry. A particular advantage was their Imowledge of the Atlantic wind systems, 
the energy source for their trade. On voyage, pilots were required to keep daily logs and make records of 
the position of the sun, wind and weather patterns, the course they sailed and any noteworthy signs 
(Zandvliet 1998:17). On return the pilots gave the logbooks to the authorities who would upgrade their 
chmis and sailing instructions. In this way, the government organisation acted as a store-house of 
knowledge. Before departing, it issued instructions to ships that included the sea route, geographic and 
technical instructions as well as rules to ensure on-board cleanliness, order and discipline (de Jesus Teodoro 
Dos Martires Lopes 1997: 132). With this knowledge they possessed first mover advantages of which other 
nations had no Imowledge. 
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Both Spain and Portugal capitalised on the early acquisition of knowledge with the creation of schools for 
navigation in the early sixteenth century. At Lisbon, the Almazen de Guine e India (Storehouse of Guinea 
and India) was created, and at Spain a school was attached to the Casa de Contracion in Seville. From the 
early sixteenth century, Portuguese pilots were required to read and write. AImed with astrolabe, quadrant 
and the navigation advances developed at Sagres, they crossed the globe. With the added benefit of 
expelience and interaction with locals in the various regions they travelled, Portuguese became navigators 
par excellence. It is significant that the percent of tonnage lost on the route to Asia declined from da 
Gama's 63% to a average of 5.4 % in the 1570's (Duncan 1986:23). Such was their reputation, that other 
European governments did all they could to tempt Portuguese into their service (Magelhaes Godinho 
1993:36). 
The POIiuguese reaped the returns from a large investment in technology with which they developed skills 
that other European nations could not compete. Their 1mowledge of wind systems and routes was vastly 
ahead of any other European nation who might think of challenging them. The Portuguese complemented 
their position with investments throughout Asia, fOlis and trading posts. Hence Portuguese success rested on 
superior skills, infrastructure and reputation. That reputation developed into an aura of supremacy that 
fUliher protected them from any challenges. 
8.5.2 Compatibility with Religious and Military Institutions The prevailing belief system in the 
Iberian nations was the' reconquista', a consequence of centuries of fighting Islamic armies. This belief 
system was embodied in the key institutions at the time; the crown, church and military orders. It was no 
coincidence that, in the year Columbus sailed, the Moors were defeated in Granada and Jews were expelled 
from Spain. King Ferdinand in 1481 had stated previously his aim 'to expel from all Spain the enemies of 
the Catholic faith and dedicate Spain to the service of God' (quoted in Kamen 1983:33). 
The adoption of the fully Iigged ship was fully congruent with this institutional set up. The great Spanish 
nobles had owned ships for centuries, providing ships for expeditions against Moors in Granada and the 
African coast (Pike 1972:31). For the POIiuguese 'Trade and religion were two sides of the same coin; to 
deprive the Arabs of trade profits and to kill them as enemies of Christianity became the passion of the 
POIiuguese for the next several decades' (Sar Desai 1981 :84). The reconquista spirit more than made up for 
a weak capitalist spi!it and small industrial base. 
Of course, not all entrepreneurs were driven by the same incentives. Bernal Diaz del Castillo, who 
pmiicipated in the conquest of Mexico stated 'We have come here to serve God and also to get rich' 
(quoted in Lundvahl 1998:108). On the other hand, when a Pliest reprimanded Francisco Pizario for 
maltreatment of Indians and failure to teach them the gospel, he was told 'I have not come here for any such 
reasons. I have come here to take away their gold' (ibid: 107). Christopher Columbus had been driven by 
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both incentives but, he was very clear on what was most important 'Gold' he said 'is a wonderful thing! 
Whoever possesses it is a master of all he desires. With gold one can even get souls into paradise' (quoted 
in Galbraith 1987:35). One clear incentive for all the entrepreneurs across the Iberian peninsula was the 
desire to become a gentlemen (or hidalgo). 
The new economic system provided commercial and bureaucratic entrepreneurs an increased level of social 
mobility and revolutionised social values (Kamen 1983: I 04). Migration to the Indies made it possible for 
artisans to become merchants, upward mobility through geographic change. A good example of this can be 
seen in the career of Francisco de Esquivel Castaneda (Hoberman 1991: 130). Francisco was the son of a 
guild certified silk-master and trader in Granada. His family circle was composed of silk-weavers, dyers 
and merchants. He immigrated to New Spain and established himself at Mexico City where he began 
exp01ting cochineal and indigo, products used as dyes in the textile industry. He also exported Chinese silk, 
brought to Mexico on the Manila Galleon, back to Spain. His textile background, his knowledge of dyes 
and family contacts were obviously an advantage. South Ame11can resources allowed him to become more 
entrepreneurial and embark on a new path of development. 
The rise in commercial values was not always welcomed. Cervantes, author of Don Quixote, noted that 'Ya 
no se estima el valor porquese estima el dinero' (money is prized rather than worth). Nor did the 
aristocracy approve of rewarding melit ahead of noble blood and proven lineage. Lope de Vega believed 
that 'states are destroyed through men wishing to change their status' (Ia perdicion de las republicas causa el 
querer hacer los hombres de sus estados mudanza - Quoted in Kamen 1983:104-5). As much as status 
could now be gained through non-military means, the l1sing nobles were still likely to emphasise the old 
values of virtue, service to the crown, and the exclusive power of the prince to create nobility (Kamen 
1983: 1 06). Nevertheless, trade and Chl1stianity travelled hand in hand. Jesuit missions and the Council of 
the Inquisition accompanied the trading stations around the world, and while they imposed an added cost, 
Jesuits did at times play an important diplomatic role in getting preferential treatment from local rulers. 
8.5.3 Supportive Government Policies and Organisation The commercial revolution that occurred with 
the opening of the trade routes simply would not have OCCUlTed without government patronage. Private 
investors shied away from such high-risk projects (Hunt and Murray 1999:219). Columbus had much 
difficulty getting finance and although his first voyage was financed by a royal official and Genoese 
backers, the second voyage was very much a royal project. Vasco da Gama had sought private funding 
including the wealthy Jacob Fugers who turned him down in 1493. However, private backers would lend to 
the crown who would then bear the risk. Consequently the State played a key role in mobilising finance and 
the officers on Portuguese ships were not merchants but aristocrats. 
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POliugal's early Aflican trade had been a monopoly since the time of Prince Henry. The monopoly 
encouraged the Prince to invest in a risky trade as it increased his chances of obtaining a return. However, 
the monopoly did create opporhmities for plivate entrepreneurs, including non-Portuguese. Contracting 
expanded the resource base the crown had access to and reduced the lisk for the crown. For example, in 
1469 Fernao Gomes was given a five year contract in which he was required to 'discover' a minimum of 
leagues of coast each year and pay the crown 200 milreis per annum in return for a five-year monopoly to 
trade in those areas (Pearson 1991 :78). 
When Prince Henry died, the monopoly revelied to the crown, coming under the control of the Cas a da 
Mina. The Casa consisted of an office and warehouse situated on the ground floor of the royal palace 'by 
the waterfront of the liver Targus, where the king could personally watch the loading and unloading of the 
ships' (Boxer 1969:30). Once the Asian trade was opened it also became the site of the Casa da India, the 
controlling mechanism for the crowns h·ade with Asia. It administered two enterprises; the Carreira da 
India which served the Cape route to India and, the Estado da India which handled the trade within Asia. 
Each year, the Casa organised and sent a fleet to India. 
In Asia, the King entrusted his capital to a network of factors (or trading posts). Each factor consisted of 
clerks, a treasurer and a superintendent of weights. Factors were located across the Indian Ocean and were 
responsible for buying and selling the cargoes on behalf of the crown. The King forbade any individuals 
other than his representatives or licensees from dealing in pepper, cloves, nutmeg and mace. At a latter 
date, the monopoly was extended to include cinnamon, pearls and elephants from Ceylon. 
When the fleets returned to Lisbon, the spices and other cargoes were stored and registered by the Casa da 
India, after which, their distribution throughout Europe was handled by private traders (including Jews 
recently expelled from Portugal). 
Once the trade had become established, private investors became interested in investing in the Asian trade 
and there were fewer advantages in having a state monopoly. However, the crown had become an 
entrenched stake-holder in the route and jealously guarded its revenue flow, even though its removal might 
in fact increase income through tax on an increased plivate trade. But this would require the admission that 
others could do better. 
Despite the Royal monopoly, private traders did become quite significant features of Portuguese trade. 
Aristocrats, captains, pilots and crew were all awarded some cargo space to transport their own goods. 
Some conducted their own trade but more often they sold these lights to merchants. For example, the new 
Chlistian Dualie Gomes Solis loaded cinnamon and cloves on carreira vessels under the Duke of 
Braganza's trading concessions (Boyajian 1993:39). Many of these merchants also traded in areas beyond 
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the reach of the Estado. On these routes, private P01tuguese traders competed in extended family groups 
very similar to the locals. 
Consistent with this thesis, the private trade developed into a structure that reduced competition. Initially, 
a number of official, soldiers and other Portuguese citizens based in Asia invested small sums in these 
plivate trades but eventually the bulk of the trade came to the hands of a half dozen Lisbon based families. 
While the royalty clung to the tried and true cargoes, in palticular pepper, these merchants expanded into 
more diverse products such as diamonds and textiles. The cartel-like structure they developed reduced 
some of the risks of trade. 
Manuel Lobato (1997) iIlustrates the organisational problems incuned by the Portuguese on the India-
Mocambique route. The key task was to secure revenue for the crown and the route was initially operated 
as a crown monopoly. However principle-agent problems undelmined operations; the system being riddled 
with smuggling conducted by state officers, soldiers, priests and Muslims. Resource shortages then lead to 
the creation of a contract system. In an eff01i to reduce royal expenses in providing the "trade ship" 
(involving several boats), a lease was given to the govemor of Mocambique in 1585. However the 
govemor lacked the financial means to fulfil the duties stipulated in the contract and the experimental phase 
came to an end. In 1593, the Zambesi gold trade was thrown open to free trade. Encouraged by the new 
freedom, impOliers brought cheap cloths to the region only to find the hide skin clad residents had low 
income and limited demand for the clothes. Problems of market transparency meant free trade did not 
produce the desired results and the amount of gold and ivory expOlied from Africa to India actually 
decreased. In 1596, the monopoly system was re-established and hired out to governors for a three year 
telm which could be sold on to another fidalgo (nobleman chosen from a small list) for 70,000 cruzados. 
This system saw the interests of the fidalgoes uiumph over those of the state and privateers, and lead to 
some abuse. To counter this abuse, judges wielding exceptional powers were appointed to Mocambique. 
Some judges dismissed local governors and made personal fortunes for themselves. The Portuguese never 
successfully solved these problems of accumulating and co-ordinating sufficient resources, a consequence 
of information asymmetries and governance issues when a year's travel separates the business units. 
The POliuguese crown's participation in the Asian trade declined from the mid sixteenth century. The 
King's fortresses, fleets and trading voyages were sold or delegated to prominent fidalgoes. Subrahmanyam 
and Thomaz (1991:312) suggest this was in response to declining trade resulting from an agrarian crisis in 
India. The new system certainly did not solve the organisation problems. Voyages were now organised 
under contract by a Fidalgo who paid the King a fixed slim for organising a voyage between 2 or more 
pOliS. However, once again the Captains and Fidalgoes responsible for the Valious routes increased their 
share of the income at the expense of the crown. The King could do little to conu'ol the conuption as 
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Lisbon was simply too far away and the administration at Goa found it was more in their interests to take 
what revenue was available to them while they had the option. 
The decline of crown involvement in Asia also reflected a rise in importance of Brazil. In the early 
sixteenth century, little attention was given to Brazil which did not have the same developed products and 
markets as the east. However, the route to Brazil was shorter, less dangerous and less dependent on wind 
patterns, and the sparsely inhabited tribes of Brazil could not offer the levels of resistance of the mighty 
civilisations of Asia (Phillips 1990:55). The POliuguese colonised their South American possession, 
establishing an agro-maritime economy with export industries based on the region's rich forest products and 
coerced Indian labour. In the late sixteenth century, sugar plantations were established becoming the most 
valuable of Brazil's exports. In the seventeenth century, tobacco was also cultivated. 
In contrast to the state-driven Asian empire, the Brazilian empire was characterised by private enterprise. 
The trade between Portugal and Brazil included many 'small men', merchants and ship-owners running 
small caravels from a number of pOliS in POliugal. There were few baniers to entry to this trade and the 
small ships were fast and flexible. Needing only a small load to fill their ships they could load and return, 
conducting two round voyages in a year (Boxer 1969:221). Private enterprise was also important in 
developing the plantations and sugar refineries which fUl11ished the ships with their cargoes. The Brazilian 
trade fumished the govemment with a 20% tax on impOlis and exports. 
Spain's South American trade was also conducted by private shippers. The Spanish crown had hoped to 
impose a monopoly on trade to Amelica similar to the POliuguese monopoly to India. However, it soon 
found that the colonies needed supplies that govel11ment resources alone could not satisfy. The trade was 
thrown open to private traders from Castile and Hispaniola and the govel11ment's role was as a regulating, 
not a trading body. 
Pearson (1991:81) describes the Spanish empire as 'a vast contracting out system'. The Crown contracted 
out the extraction of minerals and other key activities, taking a one fifth return on all profits. The four-fifths 
that remained was the incentive to the investor. To the crown, this system meant less risk as it did not need 
to invest any of the initial capital nor was it in danger of incurring any losses. The openness of the contracts 
also gave much discretion to the investors to make impOliant decisions when they needed to be made 
without having to refer back to Spain. Consequently, decision-making could be flexible and quick. The 
only drawback was that the crown would be giving away four-fifths of its income. However, if we consider 
the problems of govel11ance that the Portuguese crown was experiencing with its staff in Asia, it is 
questionable whether this system did lead to greater loss. 
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Even the conquistadors were organised on a paltnership basis in which they would pay a royal fifth. Diego 
Velasquez and Fernado Cortes established a pattnership contract with the object of conquering Mexico, in 
which each were to furnish half what was necessary and take half of any gains (with the King getting an 
obligatory fifth) (Sayous 1928:288). Similarly Francisco PizalTo, Diego de Almagro and Fernando Luque 
fOlmed a company to explore Peru. Luque acted as a stay at home partner, providing the money while the 
other two conquered an empire (Sayous 1928:289-90). The story of how the conquistadors took control of 
the South American continent need not be repeated here but is worth noting for the reinforcing effect it had 
on the reconquista mentality of the Spanish (for fllliher reading The Conquistadors by Descola is a 
recommended source). 
To govern the Spanish empire, a council of the Indies was created through which university-trained lawyers 
govemed. It was a change that recognised that maintenance of the empire required different skills from 
those which ,constructed it. As (Parry 1966: 169) states 'The battle scarred conquistador had been replaced 
by the official and the lawyer in the administration of the Indies' and, an immense body of secretary 
officials (esclibanos) came into being. Althollgh retaining the old value system, Spain was creating its own 
Mandatins. 
The Casa de Contracion de las Indies (Hollse of Trade) was created in 1503 to regulate and encourage 
commerce with the new regions. The Casa was a revenue-collecting agent for the crown so checked ships 
cargoes and collected the appropriate customs duties, especially those cauying precious metals. It 
registered all cargoes and passengers going to the Indies, activities that not only kept the crown in touch 
with trade developments but also provided 'clarity and precision in freight contracts between shipowners 
and merchants' (Haring 1964:59). Although these activities were introduced to protect crown revenues, they 
had the effect of reducing transaction costs for plivate shippers, although imposing compliance costs. 
The Casa exercised a considerable degree of technical control (Pany 1966:56) ensuring the full benefits of 
the new technological and navigational Imowledge was exploited. It was responsible for fitting out fleets 
sailing on behalf of the crown and inspected plivately owned vessels to ensure their seaworthiness. To 
ensure safety, it enforced upper and lower limits on ship size and detelmined the number of armaments for 
defence, requirements to calTY bilge pumps, spare parts and tools, and established strict use of fire on board. 
The Casa licensed navigators and its technicians kept a systematic record of all discoveries in the Indies 
which they charted on a standard chart, the 'padron real'. Charts of ships sailing to the Indies were 
inspected to ensure that they conformed to the most recent knowledge (PalTY 1966:57). The Casa appointed 
a chief pilot under whom a navigation school developed, the first of its kind in Europe. In time a 
Hydrographic bureau, school of Cosmography and a nautical school were added. As PalTY (1966:57) notes, 
although criticised for their resnictiveness, in the early years of development, the Casa performed essential 
services for the deVelopment of the trade. 
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Under the Casa, trade was restticted to Seville (later extended to Cadiz). The logic ofrestticting trade to 
one port was the greater ease in maintaining control. However, it had the added benefit of providing 
economies of scale through the facilities based there. Seville could serve all the needs of the trade including 
the machinery of dockyard services, financial and commercial organisation. Seville had a strong 
commercial endowment in terms of size, wealth, and availability of commercial experience. The port was 
safe and had easy communication with the hinterland. These forces combined to make the Seville 
monopo Iy both legal and effective (PaITY 1966: 125) 
Initially, merchants preferred to arrange their own transport between Spain and the Americas. After 1526, 
merchants ships were forbidden to sai I alone to Amelica (Harring 1963 :304) and a convoy system was 
intt·oduced. The policy was to protect ships from privateers and pirates as well as assisting to enforce the 
limited port policy. By the 1540s, the fleet sailed once a year in a convoy to the Caribbean where it would 
divide into two; one half sailing to New Spain (Mexico), the other to Tierra Finne (Northern South 
America) and Panama. As time progressed two separate fleets served the two destinations (Phillips 
1990:77-8). A guard squadron was provided to accompany the fleet, six to eight galleons for the TielTa 
filme fleet, two for the fleet to New Spain. The convoy system was not all-inclusive, accounting for about 
85% of the trade but its usefulness was such, that when the convoy was eventually abolished in the late 
eighteenth century, 85-90% of the trade still sailed at the same time and routes which were based on the 
ideal sailing conditions for the route. 
The Casa provided protection to the trading fleets with an Almada paid for by a tax on shippers (the averia). 
On later occasions, the task of collecting the averia aJld organisation of convoys was let out by contract to 
private individuals. In the three hundred years of its existence, only once was a fleet lost to foreign attack. 
When merchants started trading to the Amelicas, they initially sent goods on a speculative basis, to be sold 
at fairs in the principal ports of Amelica. As merchants established themselves in America on a more Iong-
telm basis, connections were fOImed between the American contact and the house at Seville in which the 
Amelican contact undertook to sell merchandise sent from Spain and purchase metals or products for the 
retU1l1 voyage. 
Sayous (1928:283) notes that both the old Italian commenda and societas fonns of partnerships were very 
common in the Spanish-American trade. The heads of houses in Seville could not leave their businesses for 
any length of time so would send confidential agents with whom they fonned company contracts. Such 
contracts allowed people with capital to expand their range of commercial activities. At the same time, it 
provided bold entrepreneurs access to capital and participate in entrepreneurial activity otherwise 
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inaccessible. In the commenda, travelling partner contributed only services but with societas contributed 
both capital and services. 
Although South America was closer than Asia, it still gave birth to problems of information asymmetries. 
Sayous (1928:296) notes how in the Seville-America trade, European capitalists might offer the travelling 
partner a quarter of the profits made on 2,000 ducats of goods but providing him with goods to dispose of 
far in excess of that value. On the other hand, European houses complained of agents not sending in 
accounts or misbehaviour in the dealing with funds. As in the East, this principal-agent problem was a 
prime reason for choosing family members as partners and agents and the family was the basis of business 
organisation. 
The film of Alvaro Jorge, an ex-silk mercer provides a useful example. They were active in the Afro-
American slave trade and owned several of their own vessels. They maintained a network of agents in the 
new world and these llormally were staffed by younger family members (sons or nephews). If it was 
necessary to employ someone from outside the family, someone with similar origins would be sought. 
Being conversos, this meant other converted Jews. Similarly, many of their business associates were related 
through maniage (Pike 1972:106-7). This reliance on family trust for commercial control also reflects the 
limits of the Spanish legal system. 
Shipowning could take a number of guises. Great Lords might own a ship outright which they might 
combine with investments in the wholesale trade of merchandise and slaves (Pike 1972:31-2). However, 
the typical shipowning structure was of three individuals, two merchants or lower nobles and a ship's master 
(Pike 1972:31). These lower classes would be involved in a larger range of commercial activity which as 
well as shipowning, slave and merchandise trading might include extending loans and credit, and New 
World enterprises such as cattle raising, sugar production and Pearl fishing (Pike 1972:33-4). Small 
merchants built shipping enterprises which by the mid-century had become large merchant dynasties. 
Many of the merchants were 'conversos', Jews who converted to Christianity to escape persecution. An 
example of the liclIest Sevillian businessmen was Ruy Diaz de Segura who learnt his business skills as an 
old clothes dealer (trapero). He owned three ships involved in the calTeira de Indias, the caravel Santa 
Maria del Cabo, the Santa Maria de la Consolacion, and the Santa Maria de la Regla which he owned with 
his cousin (Pike 1972:50-51). 
Increased concentration consistent with the thesis OCCUlTed in 1543, when the Sevillian merchants who at 
that time dominated the trade, succeeded in secming exclusive rights to the trade. This monopoly status 
occmTed, when after repeated petitions, the merchant houses were legally incorporated in a 'Consulado' or 
merchant guild. For the crown, this involved an increase in efficiency in its commercial jurisdiction. As 
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trade with the Indies expanded, the number of commercial lawsuits increased and the Casa de Contracion 
"was choked with business". The new guild took over these legal aspects and simplified and shortened 
legal proceedings (Haling 1964:44). The merchant houses developed an extensive agency and commission 
business impOlting and exporting throughout Europe and the new world. The guild became a lich and 
powerful distributional coalition 'well able to defend its privileged position by litigation and to pay for them 
through the loans made it made to an impecunious government' (Parry 1966: 125). 
8.5.4 Supporting Industries With the exception of shipbuilding, supporting industries based in the 
home country were never a key ingredient to Ibelian success. Ships for the Portuguese-Asian trade were 
built in the king's arsenal (armazen da India) on Lisbon's wharves. The Armazen by itself was one of the 
largest commercial enterplises of the day, employing 1500 men (Boyajian 1993:4). The Armazen also 
contracted with private traders to provide the biscuits, wine and other stores for the voyage. Another 
mmazen was established at Goa to serve the fleets for the return voyage, employing as many men as in 
Lisbon. 
Spanish shipyards were privately operated but occasionally given naval or crown contracts. Shipbuilding 
was an industry that had received subsidies in both Spain and Portugal for a very long time given the 
impOliance of ships to defense (Clayton 1976:239). Merchant ships would be used in time of war. During 
the sixteenth century, shipbuilders prospered with the expanding Indies trades and protectionist laws that 
since 1540, balTed foreign built vessels to be used in the can-era. 
The government was a key factor in providing innovation in shipbuilding. The Spanish government kept a 
close control of its shipbuilders so that the plivate ships built would also be suitable for public defensive 
needs (Phillips 1994: 1 07-8). While the government dictated a number of requirements it was forced to 
consult shipbuilders about those regulations. The state showed a willingness to experiment (Phillips 
1994: 108) and shipbuilders had a considerable freedom of action (Clayton 1976:239). It was a period of 
expelimentation with some bizalTe results and some great successes, such as the work of Menendez de 
A viles and Alvaro de Bazan who developed the 'vesselei', a narrower and faster ship than previously 
existed in the Spanish fleet (Clayton 1976). In the 1550s strenuous efforts were made to develop the 
galleon, also under the admiral Alvaro de Bazan (Parry 1966:134). As John Fincham stated 'as the science 
of naval architecture was formally encouraged more in Spain than elsewhere, the ships were better than 
those of the northern nations' (quoted in Phillips 1994: 107). 
The other key supporting industries were those that filled the hulls with cargoes. From Spanish America, 
cargoes included hides and tallow, sugar, indigo (a blue dye made from vegetables), cochineal (a red dye 
made from small insects), exotic woods and medicinal plants. However, the most valuable of the exports 
from the Indies were the gold, silver, pearls and precious stones. An estimated 164,000 kilograms of gold 
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was exported from the Indies to Spain in the 150 years until 1660 (Hamilton quoted in Phillips 1990:85) 
providing the Spanish empire with a comparative advantage to complement its shipping. 
In the 1540s and 1550s, silver mining leapt in impOliance with the discovery of the Potosi mine in Upper 
Peru (present-day Bolivia) and a number of mines in New Spain (Mexico). The industry was aided by the 
introduction of the mercury amalgamation process which made possible the refining of low grade ores. The 
mining industry presented yet another example of increasing concentration consistent with the work of 
Abemathy and Utterbuck (1975). Initially, there were a relatively large number of mines in Amelica 
however, as the more accessible beds were exploited, the number of owners declined. The remaining mines 
had high capital costs to cover drainage and excavation. By the 1570s silver mining had become a 
technologically complex, capital intensive enterplise owned by a small number of Creoles and Spaniards 
(Hobennan 1991 :73). From the mines, a small number of merchants refined the silver, before it made its 
way to the Royal Mint which supervised the final manufacture and standardised output. 
As the resources of the American hinterland were exploited more industries came to have an impact on 
trade. Sugar cultivation spread in the last decades of the sixteenth century with merchants investing in sugar 
mills and plantations (Hobelman 1991 :95). Cochineal and cocoa were grown by native Indians who 
possessed the required expeliise. Local agents and even priests would act as middle men on the products 
way to port. Indigo mills appeared while haciendos tapped the agricultural output of the continent. 
Brazilwood and other woods were key exports from the POliuguese Atlantic colony, but the most important 
expOli was sugar whose importance grew with the spread of plantation production (Phillips 1990:57-8). A 
labour shortage on Brazil's plantations was solved by importing slaves from its African colonies. Having a 
source of slaves from its African trading posts also helped it gain the contract (asiento) to supply slaves to 
the Spanish colonies which it held between 1573-1676. 
The complementary demand pattems for these cargoes enabled the Iberians to carve out a global economic 
system. From Africa slaves would be transpOlied to South America where they worked the mines and 
plantations. Bullion and other produce from South America would be shipped to Asia and exchanged for 
goods which would then be shipped to South America and Europe. At the same time bullion, sugar and 
other produce from South America would be shipped directly across the Atlantic to Europe. 
While this new economic system unleashed prevIOus undeveloped resources, this was no free market. 
Celiainly in China and the Indian Ocean, the Ibelians had to accept the market price but, the key cargoes of 
bullion was extracted from mines by using slaves which had been taken from Africa by force. Conquest and 
force were key features of the Atlantic system (Lundahl 1998: 11). At the same time, the main source of 
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income in Asia was the enforced sale of passes to local shippers. The Iberians gained no competitive 
strength from the products they personally made apart from ships and mining. 
8.5.5 Knowledge Resources It has already been mentioned how the Iberians built up, stored and 
passed on maritime lmowledge but, other areas of knowledge resources are worth noting. The Jesuit order 
of priests had initially been created in response to the Protestant attacks which exposed many weaknesses of 
Catholicism. There was a clear need for more qualified pliests and a number of higher educational 
institutions were created, in particular, Jesuit Colleges. 
The Jesuit education system was built on the latest knowledge and had obvious benefits for the economy. It 
led to an increase in the quality of administrators and facilitated scientific advance. It combined with a 
growing appreciation of the benefits of higher education. Merchants sent their children to the colleges in an 
attempt to raise their status. At the same time, growing bureaucratic needs of the state increased acceptance 
of higher education. It resulted in the founding of a number of new universities. While there had been four 
estudios generales in 1450, twenty were founded in the sixteenth century (Kamen 1983: 114). 
When combined with the stimulation that the Amelican discovery provided, education improvements 
propelled Spaniards into the forefront of scientific adventure. They stimulated research into all aspects of 
natural science including geography, navigation, engineering and medicine (Kamen 1983: 192). The first 
shipbuilding treatise was published at Mexico in 1587. Advances in metallurgy lead to the mercury 
amalgam program which was introduced in 1556 to the silver mining industry, the most valuable cargo for 
Ibelian ships. This was a peliod of scientific and technological leadership in Spain 
The most extensive trading empire the world had seen was built on a reconquista paradigm. But once 
established, maritime and organisational efficiencies helped to create an enduring monopoly. From this 
belief system, heuristics were spawned that supported the use of weaponry, resource development in Latin 
Amelica and the central role of the crown. These are summarised in table 8.1. For a century, these nations 
faced no serious competition on the trade routes they had built. 
129 
Table 8.1 Competitive Strengths and Related Heuristics ofIberian Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Paradigm Heuristics 
Shipping industry 
- Use of artillary before ramming and - Use artillery before ramming and 
boarding (military strength). boarding. 
- Crown support and mobilisation of - Crown as ultimate source of trade 
resources. revenue and control. 
- Crown organisations act as a store 
oflmowledge and reduce transaction 
costs. 
- Ship technology. - Craftsmen build by experience and 
rule of eye. 
- Improve naval technology to 
compete with foreign navies. 
- Skill and Experience. - A number of rules of thumb, for 
example sail with the Atlantic wind 
system. 
- Reputation. 
Supporting Areas of Economy 
- Expansionary reconquista - Reconquista paradigm with 
Mentality. emphasis on Christian/military. 
- merchants aspire to status of 
nobility or clergy. 
- industry seen as low status with 
connections to Jews and Muslims 
- Natural resources of South America - Exploit natural wealth of south 
America 
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The Structure of Emporia trade in the Indian Ocean after 1600. Due to silting in 
Cambay's port, Sur at became the principle port in Gujarat and, increased its pre-
eminence in the Indian Ocean trade despite the arrival of the Portuguese. Mocha 
replaced Aden as the chief port in the Red Sea while Malacca lost its earlier status (From 
Chaudhuri - Trade and Civilisation in the India Ocean). 
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8.6 The Portuguese and Spanish arrive in Asia 
When the Portuguese first entered the Indian Ocean, they received a welcome from the merchants of 
Gujarat who saw them as a source of new business. The Portuguese could have traded peacefully in the 
Indian Ocean obtaining spices for the European market at reasonable rates. However, this was not their 
goal. The captains and viceroys of the Estado sought to exclude Arabs, Gujartis and Venetians from the 
spice trade. Their goal was monopoly backed by the force of arms. The result was half a century of 
violence between Portugal, Gujarat and the other states of the Indian Ocean. 
The violence eventually ended with Portugal gaining naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The Asians, 
with their age-old methods of ramming and boarding, were no match for the powerful artillery of the 
Europeans. However, maintaining such a monopoly was an expensive enterprise. The cost of maintaining a 
chain of fOliifications and large fleets to intercept trade cut deeply into profits. The Indian Ocean was 
simply too large for a small country like Portugal to control. Time and again, the west had to be supported 
at expese of the east, or vice versa (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 125). Undermining Portuguese operations were 
resource limitations and the recuning Plincipal-agency problem. As Meilink-Roelofsz (1962:125) states, 
'The vast distances ...... made effective control of the governing apparatus impossible, and this led to 
corruption and insubordination'. The puppet rulers in places such as Hormuz, Cochin and Cannanore 'did 
not always dance in step to the Portuguese tune' (Pearson 1976:48). Nor did the Portuguese officials 
themselves, who might accommodate Gujaratis concems if bribed. 
While the monopoly could not be upheld, the POliuguese did achieve some measure of trade control by 
imposing a system of passes. If Indian ships wanted to sail unmolested by the Portuguese, they would have 
to buy the passes (caliazes) or face having their ship and cargo seized (Pearson 1976: 40). Under the 
Portuguese system, the more the Gujaratis traded, the more passes were sold. Consequently, it was in the 
interests of the Portuguese to encourage Guj arat shipping so, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
POliuguese became more liberal in allowing Indian ships to cross the ocean. To do otherwise would kill the 
goose that laid the egg. 
Gujarati sea trade prospered under the Portuguse system. While the pass system raised the price of shipping 
and diverted some trade to Portuguese pOliS, Gujarat traders prefered it to violent resistance which also 
raised the price and in many cases put an end to trade. Steensgaard (1973) suggests that the benefit of 
organised violence-protection, such as that offered by Portugal, is that it removed the less organised pirates, 
in effect introducing predictability to the world of trade. All traders had to make an assessment of 
protection costs and loss of stock resulting from attack by robbers (or pirates). By making these costs more 
predictable under the caIiaz system, the Portuguese made business more predictable and easier for the trader 
to detelmine his costs in advance. Arasaratnam (1994: 45) states that the Portuguese control of sailing and 
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system of passes actually 'proved advantageous to Gujarati trade which was now able to operate under 
POliuguese protection'. In the same way that the Mughals provided protection on land for tax, the 
Portuguese, had in effect gained sovereignty of the sea. 
One vital change in Gujarati shipping was a decline in the importance of Malacca. The Portuguese captured 
Malacca early in the sixteenth century, gaining control of what had been the greatest trading emporium in 
the world. They had intended to gain control of the trade Malacca had handled. However, the Gujaratis 
responded by deflecting their trade to a wider area, and pOliS such as Acheh and Bantam rose in importance. 
Gujaratis might have to travel a bit fUliher, but they still collected their Chinese and South East Asian 
cargoes (Pearson 1976:102). 
Some Asian shippers suffered at the hands of POIiuguese competition, in particular, the Arab shippers who 
had previously carried spices that reached Europe via Venice. However, the Gujaratis retained their pre-
eminence in merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean. While much trade was diverted to the Portuguese 
centre at Goa, the Gujaratis were not going to go out of business while they produced the cargoes to be 
shipped. The POliuguese played a secondary role to the Gujaratis in the Indian Ocean who were secure in 
their competitive strengths based on their cargoes, strategic location and superior exxperience in the Indian 
ocean. 
Nor did the Iberians displace Chinese shipping in the Far East. In fact, they provided a new sense of 
dynanism to Chinese trade in the East. When the POIiuguese arrived in China in the 1540s, the Ming ban on 
private shipping was still in force. Although trading illegally, they were welcomed by local merchants, and 
eventually established an authorised merchant colony on the island of Macao. 
Luck favoured the Portuguese who benefitted from timing. When the Chinese lifted their trade bans in 
1567, they maintained a ban on trade with Japan, a source of pirates. Consequently, the Portuguese became 
key intennediatries in the China-Japan trade, establishing a pelmanent colony in Nagasaki in 1571. The 
Chinese-Japanese trade link became one of the most profitable for the Portuguese. 
Spanish activity also contributed to growth in Chinese shipping. At the time of their arrival, the Philipines 
were an undeveloped chain of islands offering little to the world of trade. The Spanish changed this with 
the commencement of the 'Manilla Galleons' which brought large amounts of silver to Asia across the 
Pacific from America. The Spanish wanted to develop Manilla as a trade centre but lacked the resources to 
do so. The Phillipines were very far from Spain whose resources were being used to develop the South 
American continent so, the Spanish welcomed Chinese ships, traders and skilled artisans (Gungwu 
1990:409). Many Chinese traders went to the Philipines to take advantage of the trade. In many ways, this 
133 
attempt to develop markets in the face of resource constraints resembles modem corporate strategic 
alliances, albeit in a far less structured manner. 
Chinese shipping grew rapidly after the lifting of the trade bans. In 1567, 50 Chinese ships were given 
licenses to conduct foreign trade. Over time, the number of permits increased to 88 in 1589, 110 in 1592 
and 137 in 1597 (Reid 1993: 15). The Chinese still dominated the far Eastern oceans. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the oceans of the world could be characterised as a series of regional 
markets dominated by regional shipping leaders. The Chinese dominated the Chinese Sea, the Gujaratis in 
the Indian Ocean, and the Iberians mastered the Atlantic and the ocean routes linking these areas of 
activety. It is hard to say which of these nations produced the greatest output given statistics of the time. 
HistOlical figures of this age are liddled with inaccuracies and can only be taken as indicative. In telms of 
value, Gujarat's oceanic trade is by far the greatest. On the basis of customs receipts Micheal Pearson 
estimates the value of Gujarat sea-bome trade at 40 million cruzados. By comparison, Spanish trade across 
the Atlantic was valued at 7 -10 million cruzados and the Manilla Galleon 3-4 million. At the same time, the 
Portuguese carreira trade was valued at 5 million cruzados (Boyajian 1993: 42, 65&70). 
Unfortunately, we have no values for Chinese trade and no numbers for Gujarat shipping in this period. We 
do know that 137 ships legally traded from China in 1597 (Reid 1993:15) and this compares to a peak of 
200 westbound ships of similar size (aprox 200 tons) visiting the Amelicas (Parry 1966:240). Therefore, 
records suggest Spain and POlfugal had a greater trans-oceanic fleet in terms of numbers. But in terms of 
value, Gujarat was by far the greatest oceanic trader. It should be stressed however, that China had a 
phenomenal coastal trade. So long was the length of China's coast that some voyages considered 
intemational by Gujarat (and Europeans) would only be considered domestic in China. Finally, in terms of 
ocean-miles travelled, the Portuguese and Spaniards were clear leaders. 
Despite this relative equality, Europe was producing mmitime and related innovations at a faster rate than 
their eastem neighbours. The combination of changing political, economic and technological forces led to 
an increased pace of technical advance in European shipping. By contrast, Eastem technology now 
appeared to be going through what Klein would call "slow history" while Europe was going through "fast 
history". Klein relates these differences in speeds to changes in the level of competition. High levels of 
competiton, low barriers to entry and high degress should generate progress and the East scored well on 
these points but did not generate superior technological advance. The East provided a very competitive 
commercial environment, particularly in Gujarat. Klein's theory is not supported. In the early days, 
competition might have helped in the development of the junk and the dhow but, by the end of the fifteenth 
century, both technologies had stabilised despite the competition. In fact the most innovative period in 
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shipping technology was the government financed and organised innovation during Sung China, a period 
more representative of Schumpeter's innovation by decree exploiting the resources of a larger organisation. 
In Europe, governments were embarking in much competitive rivalry and were more inclined to invest in 
testR&D than shippers. Many of the latter technical developments that would occur in Europe would be 
consequences of spin-offs from naval technology. This would suggest that competition per se is not a 
sufficient cause of innovation for competitors must have sufficient resources to undertake R&D, a reflection 
of Schumpeter's (1942) preference for large finns over the highly competitive market of small firms. 
Another possible explanation may be bounded rationality. Experience taught the Chinese and Indians to 
accept the limitations of the monsoons and trade winds. They did not seem to experiment in sails and 
rigging as much as Europeans. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Europeans changed from having 
a few large sails to having many smaller sails, an improvement that was associated with changes in rigging. 
This gave huge improvements in manoeuvrability. Once stalted, the process became self-reinforcing as 
success lead to greater experimentation (Unger I 980:277). 
Stagnation in technology can be attJibuted to lisk aversion and the conservative nature of the industry. A 
risky innovation could result in loss of both life and expensive cargoes. Certainly, the junk and the dhow 
were faithful workhorses that seem to have reached a technological frontier. For many years, they remained 
fastest and safest ships in their respective conditions. But this does not preclude the fact that something 
safer and faster could be built. Merchants seem happy to use the tried and tested; however, I have found no 
evidence to link this to saisficing. This phenomenon seems best explained by a commercial rationality and 
heLllistics where merchants sought profits not through technical innovation but through commercial strategy; 
getting the best blend of cargoes for their respective destinations. This is consistent with the economic 
rationality's of merchant capitalism. Chinese commercial strategy was driven by market-based solutions 
and the need to have good relationships with Mandarins. In the Indian Ocean, Gujaratis had the most 
market driven economy of the lot. Their commercial rationality was dliven by the need to anticipate and 
best link the supply of goods with those in demand. By contrast, European traders and shippers seem to be 
the most open to the possibility that technological changes could advance their profitability. 
All merchants had to make political, tec1mical and commercial decisions. However, the merchants in each 
nation seemed to have differences in the level of emphasis. The Eastern merchant rationality reflected the 
neo-classical allocative efficiency in which goods were distributed within a given technology. While 
Europeans still operated with large technological restraints marginal differences were apparent, particularly 
in sails, rigging and mmaments. Marginal differences might not be so important on a daily basis but, over a 
century, major differences become extrapolated. It would take another century or two before this benefit 
would become apparent. However, it should be noted that even in Europe, change after the sixteenth 
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century was hardly revolutionary. As Boscher (1995a:7) states 'if a seaman from Admiral de Ruyter's De 
Zeven Provincien was transfered by a time machine, for instance to Admiral Nelson's Victory he would not 
need much time to become conversant with the construction, rigging and armament of the latter vessel'. 
Celiainly, in the early sixteenth century, the Europeans gained no advantage in trade from their shipping 
technology. European maritime technology did not change dramatically between the early seventeenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. The most significant changes came in politics and related technologies (ibid:8). 
It is clear from the above discussion that the market paradigm and rationality of the East were more 
important than low levels of competition in explaining low rates of innovation. However, probably the most 
impOliant explanation is the continued success of Eastem shipping. Europeans might be able to handle a 
broader range of conditions but, in the Indian Ocean and China Sea, they did not threaten the commercial 
leadership of the Chinese and Gujarati's who had ships specially designed for the international markets in 
which they paliook. If Europeans were catching up with technology, other aspects of the local's operation 
such as local knowledge gave them a competitive buffer which meant they did not have to consider 
European technological advances. 
136 
Increasing Divisibility of Sail 1430-1600. Europeans son learned that by 
replacil1g large sails with more numerous smaller ones, they could create a 
greater number of sail patterns to exploit various wind conditions. This picture 
shows ships from (1) 1430 (2) 1450 (3) 1500 (4) 1530 (5) 1560 and (6) 1600. 
(Source Unger 1980) 
Chapter 9 
The Rise of Northern European Shipping 
9.1 The English Imitation Process 
In 1580, Spain annexed Portuga1. The Spanish King Philip II now ruled two of the most powerful seafaring 
nations in the world with a trading network that stretched from China to Peru. This malitime achievement 
provided impetus for nOlihern European nations to embark on an imitation process. There were two reasons 
for this. Firstly, Spain's success provided a demonstration effect and secondly Spain posed a significant 
external threat. The external threat was particularly pOlient in that the northern nations were Protestant. By 
contrast, Spain linked military and Catholic values in its reconquista philosophical base, and it had a trading 
base with which it could finance considerable military and naval action. 
Throughout the sixteenth century, England looked upon the strength and wealth of its southern neighbours 
with a mixture offear and envy. England was a backward nation. It possessed only one significant industry 
and only one significant enterprise involved in international trade. That industry was wool1en cloth, and that 
enterprise was the 'Company of the Merchant Adventurers' who exported the cloth to Antwerp (Hope 
1990:68). 
Although sun-ounded by sea, Britain had nothing to compare to the fleets of the Spanish and Portuguese. 
The English had earlier made a number of exploratory voyages at the end of the fifteenth century, in an 
attempt to find a westward route to Asia and the mythical isle ofBrasylle (Ryan 1996:246, Hope 1990:75). 
Eventually, a voyage lead by the Genoese sea captain John Cabot discovered a 'newe founde launde'. 
UnfOliunately, New Foundland did not have the gold and silver deposits that were so accessible in the south 
and the only gain from this were the cod fishelies off the New Foundland coast. It illustrates the role of 
luck in economic development for the nature of sixteenth century economic and matitime development 
would have been very different ifit possessed the same wealth that Spain found in the South. 
The weak state of England and the possibility of external attack provided the impetus for a state led 
imitation process during the sixteenth century. Merchant shipping was a plime target of infant industry 
protection, not only for the potential wealth it could generate but, with little difference between merchant 
and naval ships, merchant ships played a key pmi in warfare. The Tudor monarchs actively encouraged the 
development of a merchant class and shipping industry. Henry VII introduced protective legislation that 
reserved celiain cargoes for British ships (Hope 1990:61). In an effort to build up a navy, Henry VIII 
recruited shipwrights from mainland Europe, gaining the latest capabilities in fully-rigged ship technology. 
He also established Trinity House for the Advancement of Navigation and Training in Pilotage. 
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The Iberians provided the model for the maritime industries. Books on sailing and navigation were 
translated, such as Arte del marear by the Portuguese Ruy Faliero and Arte de navegar by the Spaniard 
Pedro de Medinas (Cummins 1995:14). To advance navigation technique, Queen Elizabeth established a 
position of 'chief pilot' in imitation of the chief pilot established at the Spanish Casa (Haring 1963:299). 
The poor state of English industry meant that all the country's shipping supplies had to be imported, a huge 
weakness in time of war, so the infant industry programme was extended to naval supplies French and 
Italian expetis were lmported to teach gun founding while the State encouraged research in the use of 
domestic iron to replace imported bronze. 
Outside of state support, two growing industries helped to spread basic seaman skills. Once the potential of 
the New Foundland fisheries were realised, fishillg boats helped to train many seamen in the skills required 
for ocean going voyaging, while the fish provided the basis of an export trade to Spain and Mediterranean 
(Davis 1962:4). The domestic coal industry also stimulated maritime progress. Coal, carried south by sea,· 
was responsible for turning many landlubbers into seamen. 
A key influence in the advancement of capabilities was Sebastian Cabot son of the Genoese captain who 
discovered New Foundland. With his Mediterranean connections, Cabot was a key agent of technology 
transfer and introduced an array of maritime and commercial techniques. He advised the first venture in 
long distance trading which occurred when a group of businessmen pooled resources in hope of finding a 
nOlihem route to the ticl1es of the East (Hope 1990:97-8). The venture was entitled 'The Mysterie And 
Companie Of The Merchant Adventurers For The Discoveries Of Regions, Dominions, Islands And Places 
Unknown'. Unfortunately, the company's ships did not make it past the Bay of Archangel in Russia. 
Although they failed to make it to China, the Russian Tsar, Ivan the Terrible, had a soft spot for lowly men 
such as merchants and granted the Englishmen pennission to trade. 
About the same time, English trade to North Africa was developed. The Moroccan trade was claimed to 
have been invented by James Alday, one-time servant of Sebastian Cabot. Together with Henry Ostrich 
(who married one of Cabot's daughters) and, two naval commanders (Thomas Wyndham and Sir John 
Luttrell) they established the trade using Jewish intetmediaties who arranged the exchange of English cloth, 
iron mongery and other goods for high Iy valued Islamic sugar (Hope 1990:93). Thomas Wyndham also led 
a syndicate that opened up trade to the Guinea coast, using a Portuguese Jew for a pilot. As in the East, 
these developments in shipping were integrated with the activities of merchants expanding their activety. It 
reflects the impOliance of complementary activities leading to integrated activities. 
Resource limitations lead to the development of new organisational fonus. Shipping to these far distant 
lands required more capital and sophisticated organisation than that required for a 200 mile trip to Antwerp. 
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They required more ships, bigger ships and investment in stock levels large enough to cover the long time 
periods involved. Being new and more distant, these these trades were also much riskier. Not being rich in 
capital, the joint stock organisation was used in which a number of investors pooled together. This also 
spread risk among investors. Risk was further reduced when the state gave these companies monopolies in 
their respected trades, increasing the chance that a profit would be retumed. 
The monopolies were not popular with the smaller private shipper and interloping was common on the 
Russian and Baltic trades (Hope 1990:125) When six interlopers tried to break the Russian Company's 
monopoly in the 1560's, the English govemment confirmed and extended the Company's power. The 
company included in its defence a statement that it retained a number of skilled pilots and masters in its 
employ and paid a man 'learned in cosmography' twenty pounds a year to teach its mariners (Hope 
1990:104). The company was investing in a pelmanent knowledge base of the routes by which they could 
increase speed, reduce costs and losses and bling new captains into the trade with efficient instructions that 
a single shipper would otherwise have to learn by himself. 
In the meantime, chance political events helped to shape the industry'S development. In the last quarter of 
the century, the Protestants in the Netherlands revolted against their Catholic rulers in Spain. The conflict 
brought an end to Antwerp's role as a commercial centre and the biggest market for English woollens. With 
the fall of Antwerp, English merchants were forced to find new markets and establish a new distribution 
system. This meant longer distance trading. With the success of the Russia Company behind them, a 
number of new chartered companies were created. The Eastland Company was created in 1579 to seek 
trade in the Baltic, followed by the Turkey Company (1581) and the Levant Company. These early 
companies were all export orientated in an attempt to find markets for English woollens (Keay 1991 :52), 
another example of intemational shipping developing as a forward linkage from domestic manufactures .. 
Refugees from the war in Flanders aided development of suppOlting industries, bringing skills which 
allowed the English to create new woollen products. These 'new draperies' helped English merchants enter 
markets where there was little demand for the old product (Davis 1967:7). Consequently, the loss of 
Flanders had been a blessing in disguise, delivering a window of opportunity. With the Dutch preoccupied 
with their war with Spain, the English gained a foothold in the Baltic and Mediterranean trades, and English 
ships now brought back goods which had previously come through Antwerp. 
The cold war atmosphere between Spain and England gave birth to another activity which contributed to the 
growth of English shipping: 'commerce raiding'. Pirate raids (and the officially sponsored 'privateering') 
expanded the skill of many seamen and could be highly profitable. Hope (1990: 144) states that privateering 
was as significant to the economy of Elizabeth I as automobile production was to Elizabeth II. Capital 
eamed from privateering was used in the founding of the East India Company and the first American 
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colonies (Hope 1990: 150). Commerce raiding also expaned the market and growth of capbilities in those 
onshore industries that fitted out ships including carpenters, ships chandlers, rope-makers, sail makers, and 
suppliers of victuals, stores and armaments (Starkey 1988). 
This branch of maritime industries is best represented by Sir Francis Drake. Drake's father had been a 
Protestant vicar and the young Drake grew up with a fervent hatred of Catholics. After an apprenticeship 
sailing in a bark to France and the Low lands, Drake joined his relative John Hawkins who in 1562 
established a trade shipping slaves between Aflica and the Caribbean, a market dominated by the 
Portuguese. This provided Drake with the navigational knowledge he would put to good use when he 
diversified into pirating, a career made possible by the political climate existing between Spain and 
England. 
In 1577, Drake diversified his activities once more and set off on a venture which would greatly assist the 
English effort at 'catch up' with the Spanish and Portuguese. With financial backing from Queen Elizabeth 
he commenced what would be the first hip around the world by an Englishman, including a trip to the Spice 
Islands. Drake was very aware of the need for foreign input for success. His crew included foreigners with 
specialised navigational skill (Cummins 1995:73), while Magellan'S route was used as the blue print for the 
voyage and Drake revictualised in many of the same bays and harbours (Milton 1999:30). When he 
captured Spanish ships, he sought their nautical chm1s with as much fervour as he did their gold as these 
were valuable in teaching the ocean routes. 
The voyage did much to break down baniers of entry to the trades established by the Iberians. It revealed 
both the wealth and the vulnerability of the Spall ish empire in the East, and provided England with 
navigational skills and lmowledge to enter the East Indies market. Most important, Drake had shattered the 
reputation which had left many northemers in fear of their Iberian competition. It seemed the market was 
now open for competition. Unfortunately, the English were about to leam the hard way the difficulties of 
long range oceanic trading. 
The first problem was organisational, in particular the principal-agent problem. The next voyage was led by 
Edward Fenton who was to take the fleet to the East Indies (Milton 1999:35). Unfortunately, on route he 
decided not to go the Indies but to stop at the island of St Helena on which he intended to make himself 
king. However, his crew did not support his regal dreams and the fleet retumed to London without having 
left the Atlantic. 
Catch up also involved the acquisition of tacit knowledge through experience. This was a costly process. 
In 1591, another voyage left under the competent leadership of James Lancaster. However, nothing 
Lancaster had ever experienced could prepare him for the long time periods in unknown seas without fresh 
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food and water. Sailing to Ceylon, the ship got lost in the Indian Ocean and with many of the crew sick 
and dying, the voyage was brought to an end. Of the 198 men who rounded the Cape only 25 returned and 
two of the three ships that left were lost (Ibid:52). London merchants learnt that the spice trade was a high 
risk investment which, with their cunent level of experience, they could not afford to enter. They would not 
re-enter the spice trades until they learned that the Dutch had entered and succeeded in the trade. 
English expansion also incuned problems in the Atlantic. In the same period, an attempt had been made to 
settle North America with the establishment of a colony at Virginia. However, within three years, the 
colony disappeared without trace. It would be another three decades before the English would develop an 
ocean-going trade with NOlih America. Other failures included a number of exploratory trips to find a route 
to the East via the Arctic. 
Despite these failures, the English had gained some vital capabilities. They had companies regularly trading 
to the Levant and Russia and, now possessed scores of seamen with technical expertise, nautical ability and 
experience (Andrews 1982:260). Nevertheless, Spanish and Portuguese merchant shipping stood secure in 
its competitive sh·engths. However, a more aggressive challenge was about to come. 
9.2 The Rise of the Dutch 
In the Netherlands a process of imitation is evident. However, it occured in conjuction with an independent 
growth path which was distinctive to the Dutch environment, in particular geographic conditions which 
provided a strategic location in regional shipping routes and access to lich fishelies. Another distinction is 
that much of the imitation that occurred was not of the leading nation in shipping as our thesis would 
suggest but, of the leading nations in what became supporting industries. 
The development path travelled by the Dutch was based around the fishing industry. The inland rivers, 
lakes and canals of the Netherlands provided plenty of opportunity for fresh water fishing. Eventually, the 
Dutch took their boats on to the Zuider Zee and the NOlth Sea where the herring fisheries could be 
exploited (van Zanden 1993:33). However, once the nearest fisheries were depleted, the Dutch were forced 
to go deeper out to sea to search for fish. This required their sailors to develop deep sea sailing skills and 
strong boats. 
Gaining the capabilities for deep sea sailing involved imitation of southern navigation and shipbuilding 
methods. Initially, northerners had trouble adopting skeleton construction and men were brought from 
Meditenanean to help teach the new requirements (Unger 1994: 123). Southern ships arriving in port also 
served as models for the locals. By 1500, Dutch ship carpenters were producing fully ligged ships to the 
same standards as other European builders (Unger 1978:33). However, the process of imitation was 
selective. For example, Dutch ship-builders showed a preference for clinker built boats and resisted the 
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trend to carvel construction. This selectivity was at least partly based on local geographic and weather 
demands (Ibid:28). The clinker built ship was sh·onger than the lighter carvel-built boat. 
Fishing was a seasonal activity and dU1ing the off-season, Dutch ships entered the carrying trade. With 
fully-rigged ship teclmology, the Dutch wrestled the Baltic trade from the Hanseatic nations who had 
previously dominated shipping in the region (Israel 1989: 18). Dutch competitiveness benefited from the 
more southerly geographic location of their pOlis which became free of ice earlier. This meant they could 
use the faster ships to pick up cargoes in France, take them to the Baltic and be back home before the winter 
set in. However, the main factor behind Dutch competitiveness was their low cost. The Dutch use of out-
of-season fishing boats and low cost labour gave them a competitive advantage with which the Hanseatic 
nations could not compare. By 1532, the Dutch had some 400 ships entering the Baltic on an annual basis 
(de Vries and van der Woude 1997 :356-8). 
In the sixteenth century, Dutch ship designs began to deviate from the European pattern and develop an 
independent evolution responding to the demands and geographic conditions of the time. To some extent, 
change was pre-detelmined by past investments in shipping lmowledge, creating yet another example of 
path dependent evolution. Gradual changes were made to what was ImoWll to work in the past giving bilih 
to a number of valiations. The first successful independent design was the buss, a fifteenth century vessel 
designed to meet the needs of Dutch fishelmen. hI the off-season fishing boats looked for cargoes, for 
which the buss was paIiicularly good as it could weather northern storms. Eventually, boats were designed 
exclusively with cargo in mind. Modifications and improvements led to the evolution of the boyer, a flat 
bottomed boat of shallow draught which enabled it to travel with ease in the internal waterways of the 
Netherlands. In the sixteenth century it was taken onto the sea and, as a consequence, shipbuilders had to 
make a larger boat, building up its sides and expanding the rigging (Unger 1978:35). The vlieboot (or 
flyboat) was designed even more specifically for bulk carriage (rather than speed). It had a square stem and 
a broad beam which enhanced carrying capacity. Expelience with the flyboat led to the evolution of the 
cargo boat par excellence, the fluyt. 
First constructed at Hoom in 1595, the fluyt's hull design had a low centre of gravity which was excellent 
for liding out bad weather (Unger 1978:37). The vessel had an initial length to breath ratio of 4:1 but 
improvements soon saw fluyts with ratios of 5:1 and even 6:1. The ship's sail area was kept small and its 
masts were short relative to its canying capacity. This meant it did not need a large crew to handle the 
rigging. However, it also meant a slower ship but, as long as the ships were fast enough to conduct the 
Baltic run before winter came, extra speed was not an advantage. Although longer voyages increased crew 
wages and victualling costs, they were more than off-set by the reductions in crew size achieved through the 
use of labour saving devices such as pulleys and blocks for controlling the yards and sails (Unger 1978:37). 
Ease of handling, small crews and large cargo space gave the fluyt a huge competitive advantage in ocean-
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going trade. It enabled the Dutch to undercut the French and British carrying trade by 30-50 percent 
(Mokyr 1990:69). As Sir Walter Raleigh explained, the Dutch built vessels 'to hold great bulk of 
merchandise, and to sail with few men for profit' (quoted in Unger 1978:44). 
Increased inter-European trade was the conduit by which northerners could observe and learn southern 
business methods. Maline insurance, partnerships, use of factors, agents and correspondents were all 
practices that anived in the northern Netherlands. With growth and diversification came increased 
specialisation and the anival of the merchant maline, sailors and skippers as full time occupations (van 
Zanden 1993:39). 
This carrying h'ade was strengthened by developments in other parts of the economy, in particular, the 
growth of the dairy industry which provided products to expOli to France, Germany and the Baltic (Israel 
1989:25). The Dutch also developed a number of innovations which helped exploit domestic resources. 
Key among these were developments in windmill technology, an old power source introduced from the East 
many centuries earlier. The Dutch needed efficient windmills to help drain lands and remove water 
management problems for falmers (vall Zanden 1993:39). They developed large windmills that were very 
effective in captllling the wind. 
Despite achieving significant growth, by the 1570s, the Netherlands possessed no industrialists or merchants 
of international stahlre (De Vries and van der W oude 1997 :667). However, political changes were about to 
spark a new stage of economic growth when the Protestants in the Netherlands revolted against their 
Catholic rulers in Spain. The war provided many prompts for technology transfer. In 1585, the Spanish 
captured Antwerp causing a flood of refugees to the north. Textile workers from Flanders and Brabant 
arrived in Leiden and Haarlem. The war with Spain and naval blockade also provided protection from 
competitive textile producers in Flanders. The consequent growth in textile production, provided the 
shipping industry with another cargo and reinforced the Dutch position in the Baltic carrying trade, where 
they gained supremacy in 1594 (Israel 1989: 50). 
rt is impOliant to note that much of this technology transfer was not imitation of the leading shipping 
nations. The new technologies came from nations weaker in shipping than Spain but stronger in industry. It 
provided the Netherlands with an industlial base that the Iberians lacked. 
9.3 Dutch Advance 
In the late sixteenth century, the Dutch economy produced many advances consistent with the "advance" 
stage of the industry life cycle. The low labour-tonnage ratio achieved in the fluyt was just one of many 
similar improvements that occured. Across the economy, productivity improving investments were applied 
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in industry, fishing and trade achieving capital/labour ratios of unprecedented heights (De Vries and Van 
der Woude 1997:694) 
The extemal threat of war was a great stimulus for productivity improvements. As Unger (1978 :40) states 
'Only more money for warships and mercenary soldiers could keep the Spanish enemy on the other side of 
the great rivers just to the south'. Consequently, the economy was receptive to advance in production 
technologies. Technology advanced on a broad front, from animal husbandry to textiles, where the 'Dutch 
loom' was invented in 1604. In the process, the Dutch were building an indusuial base with the most 
advanced practices. With it came increased domestic demand, capital and competitive cargoes available for 
shipping. 
DUling this time, the new large windmill was applied to Dutch industry as an efficient energy source. The 
windmill eventually solved a bottleneck caused by the increased growth in shipping and the economy. 
Increased demand for wooden ships led to a very high demand for wood sawyers. Wage rates for this skill 
underwent the highest rate of growth in the economy. In 1592, Comelis Comeliszoon van Uitgeest found a 
way to overcome this bottleneck when he took out a patent for a wind powered sawmill. At first resisted by 
the guilds, the indusu'Y located itself in the Zaan region n01ih of Amsterdam where no guilds existed and 
there were no buildings and few trees to impede the wind. Once wind powered industrial production began, 
other producers grew in the region, taking advantage of the close proximity to related manufacturers (Unger 
1978:6). A modem industrial city grew with a compounding competitive advantage of economies of scale 
and concentration. Over time, windmill technology was applied to various industrial uses including fulling 
cloth and hulling rice (Bosscher 1978:218). 
With the expansion of shipping, more wood needed to be imported from the Baltic. This in tum increased 
the demand for ships going to the Baltic. This supp01ied the cumulative and reinforcing growth pattem that 
had already begun. The Netherlands was too small to enjoy the benefits of large markets size as stated by 
Ibn Khaldun (although it's market was not limited to its borders). However, it could benefit from the nature 
of demand. As suggested by P01ier (1990), nations are more likely to gain competitive advantage in those 
industlies which represent a disproportionately high share of local economic activity. This was the case of 
shipping in the Netherlands. 
As the shipbuilding industry grew, it benefited from external economies of scale with which other nations 
could not compete. The scale of output allowed the industry to build up a huge pool of experience among 
its workers and allowed producers to standardise production. The large number of wharves, workmen and 
wood supplies meant that ships could be produced at Sh01i order. The industry benefited from an efficient 
wind-powered wood sawing industry, and other producers which contributed to the development of an 
industrial cluster. From 1600, the Zaan industrial belt included sailcloth weaving and cutting which 
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employed as many as 1000 people, whale fisheries (employing 2000 to 2700), the baking of ship's bread, 
compass making, block and mast making, rope making and certain metal trades such as nail and anchor 
making (Unger 1978:7&8). 
The level of demand from the shipping industry also allowed shipbuilders to benefit from internal 
economies of scale. They could spread their fixed costs across a larger number of vessels and exploit the 
advantages of division of labour and contracting of specialised work such as mast-making and block-
making. As a result, 'the shipbuilding wharf changed from a workshop to something more like a modem 
factory. The introduction of labour saving devices further encouraged the trend to factory-style building 
techniques. But most importantly, factory style production was the consequence of a standardised design. 
A relatively standard ship design with some standardised parts reduced the cost of ships and repairs, giving 
Dutch merchant shippers an even stronger competitive advantage. With 10,000 workers, the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry of the seventeen century had grown larger than any shipbuilding industry that 
preceded it. 
Energy endowment was a key factor in the high use of macllines and wind was not the only power source 
exploited by Dutch industry. While the rest of Europe relied on wood as its primary source of heating, 
geography had blessed the Dutch with a unique abundance of peat. It provided a source of competitive 
advantage in energy intensive industries that other regions could not duplicate (De Vries and Van der 
Woude 1997:339). The abundant peat supplies fuelled a myriad of industries including brick makers, 
madder producers, kiln operators, salt refiners, bakers, bleachers, tile makers and many others (Mokyr 
1990:62). 
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The Fluyt was the cargo ship par excellence. Evolving from fishing boats, the 
fluyt appeared at the end of the sixteenth centUly. Its flat bottom and round 
stern gave it cargo-carrying advantages over its competitors and was a major 
feature of Dutch success in the northern seas (Landsh"om Bjorn: 1961, plate 
no.362). 
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Plancius combining his roles of vicar and teacher of navigation. Like Linschoten, 
Plancius copied and hoanslated Spanish and Portuguese works on navigation and, was 
responsible for hoaining the early Dutch fleets to the East (from the frontispiece of 'De 
Vyerighe Colom', the Fierie Sea columne) . 
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Another source of technological transfer were Jews expelled from Portugal who fled north to Amsterdam. 
They brought with them productive and commercial talent, wealth and international financial connections. 
These immigrants had knowledge and contacts by which the Dutch could now consider longer sea voyages. 
In the early 1590s, trade with West Africa and the Cmibbean was launched with a handful of ships by men 
with a range of commercial connections ill Westelll and Southelll Europe (Israel 1989:62). At first 
expansion was slow, but this changed in 1598 when Spain placed an embargo on Dutch ships visiting 
Spanish and POliuguese ports. Philip II of Spain was concellled that commercial expansion was 
strengthening the abiilty of the rebel provinces to keep fighting against them. Given the aitelllative of 
bankruptcy, the Dutch were forced to enter the long distance trades and obtain colonial products at source. 
The political war that had been going on for three decades now became a commercial war. The Dutch 
aimed straight for the Spanish and POliuguese off-shore bases, with the intention of usurping their trade and 
destroying them (Parker 1991: 179). 
Diving into long haul ocean shipping was not an easy task, even for a nation that possessed a large number 
of sailors and strong ships. Dutch experience was limited to trades close to Europe. They knew little about 
the routes to Asia, the Atlantic and monsoon wind systems. Nor did they understand trading behaviour in 
the East. To make matters worse, the nOl·them noviCes faced formidable competition in the capabilities and 
expelience of the Iberian sailors. However, technology transfer was aided by the fact that a number of 
Dutchmen had sailed in the Iberian fleets. Jan Hughen van Linschoten was the most important of these. 
Linschoten was born in Enkhuizen, a town closely connected with the herring industry. At the age of 
seventeen, he went to live in Sevi11e where he had two half-brothers. As an apprentice to his brothers who 
were merchants, he leallled Spanish and the rules of business. After eight months, he went to Portugal 
where he learnt the art of merchandising. In 1583, he acquired a post as clerk to the arch-bishop of Goa and 
sailed on the Sam Salvador to the Indies where he gained a great insight into the POliuguese maritime 
tradition. Most important were his observations of how disorganised and poorly equipped Portuguese 
seamanship was. For example, when a French enemy ship was sighted, the Portuguese crew went into 
panic, a revelation which did much to dispel the reputation ofPOliuguese invincibility at sea (Parr 1964:61). 
Linschoten spent five years at Goa where he wrote about his experience and incorporated extracts from 
POliuguese historical, geographic and ethical works that he had access to. When he returned home, the 
book was published, complete with sailing directions to the East. The book became a compulsory 
companion for all captains sailing to the east. Linschoten also advised the first Dutch fleet to the Indies 
including nautical secrets of the Portuguese. However, he suggested that when going to the spice islands, 
not to sail nmih up to Goa as the Portuguese did, but to sail straight East. AltllOugh this meant a long time 
at sea, they could use the prevailing westerly winds to get to the islands much without having to rely on the 
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pattems of the monsoons. In this way, the Dutch had a shOlter and less costly route which provided them 
with a dramatic strategic advantage over the POltuguese. 
Despite the advice, the first fleet to the Indies suffered from inexperience and poor management. Of the 
four ships and 289 men that left, only 3 ships and 89 men retumed in 1597 (Boxer 1965:22). However, the 
modest cargo of pepper they brought with them more than covered their costs and inspired others to follow 
in their wake and move down the learning curve. The following year, five companies were created sending 
out twenty-two ships. ' Within only six years of the creation of the first company, Dutch trade to Asia had 
already outstripped that of Portugal's (Israel 1989:68). 
Another who aided in the imitation process was Plancius, an immigrant from the southern Netherlands who 
translated and published Spanish and Portuguese rutters, sailing directions and maps. For the fleet that left 
in 1600, Plancius was paid 500 guilders to provide pilot navigation methods. He was also responsible for 
the quality of chmts and navigation instruments used by the fleet (Zandvliet 1998:40). 
This fOlmal instruction provided by Plancius still left the Dutch with much tacit Imowledge to acquire and 
the first Dutch voyages to the Indian Ocean proceeded by uial and enor gradually building up a store of 
knowledge and expertise. Ship logs from these early voyages were studied and, in 1617, the company 
issued its first sailing orders. By 1627, they had more than mastered the trades and the Amsterdam charter 
of the company published extensive instructions. With some modification and improvement, these 
insu-uctions steered Dutch navigators for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Gaastra and Bruin 
1993: 189). 
After the first Dutch voyage to the Indies, a large number of Kirzner-type entrepreneurs appeared to take 
advantage of the price differential between spices in Asia and Europe. However, they instantly encountered 
the problem envisioned by Richardson of over-supply_ It is questionable whether this was a result oflack of 
infOlmation on other people's activities as planning for knowledge of each other's expeditions would have 
been hard to keep quiet. It was more likely to be ignorance of their impact on the market. The large 
number of Dutch companies that initially appeared trading to the East Indies created an unhealthy 
competition_ Bidding against each other at Indonesian ports rose the plices of their supplies and 
dramatically reduced profits. In 1602, after the political intervention of the States General and Prince 
Maurice, a merger was agreed upon to create the Vereeigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) with 
seventeen directors (Beren XVII) representing the vmious regions contributing to the original trade_ The 
government gave the company a charter which included the power to attack the power, prestige and 
revenues of Spain and Portugal reflecting the close connection between state and commercial goals_ 
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The various routes that the Dutch developed over this peliod brough in a range of commodities that 
complemented each other. For example, spices brought from Asia would be exchanged at Amsterdam with 
ships who would be sailing to the Mediterranean or South America (Israel 1989:258). In return silver from 
the America's could make a return trip. In that way, the nations ships returning from Africa, South 
America, Asia and the Baltic developed into a world trade system based on Amsterdam. 
9.4 Gujarat, China and the Northern Europeans 
When the Gujaratis first encountered the Dutch and English, in the first years of the seventeenth century, 
they were unsure how to respond. Having obtained a workable balance with the Portuguese, they were 
reluctant to upset them by trading with the new arrivals. Nor did they want to lose any of their own trade to 
the n011hem ships. The early period was therefore characterised by animosity. However, by the 1630s the 
Mughal Court was convinced that if kept within their bounds, the trade of the Dutch and English companies 
was beneficial to Surat. Although they migllt provide some competition for local shippers, they also 
provided local merchants custom for credit and other trade facilities and provided access to European 
markets. 
The northerners did not offer anything new in terms of commercial expertise. In fact, in the Indian Ocean, 
Europeans were poor relations as borne out in the amount of capital invested. To give a comparison, 
Pearson (1976:4/5) notes that while the average capital on the 165 ships sent by the East India Company 
between 1601-1640 was only approximately Rs2,00,000 and, in the 1620s the Dutch had Rs5,00,000 
invested in all of India. Some Gujarati ships trading to the Red Sea in the late sixteenth century were worth 
more than RsIO,OO,OOO each. 
No one illustrates this more than Vilji Vora. With an estate ofRs80,00,000 (US$30,240,000 in 1976 telms, 
see Pearson 1976:125), Vora in the seventeenth century was the richest man in Asia and possibly the world. 
ViIji Vora is believed to have been born to a well established Jain family around 1594-5 (see Gokhale 
1979). At the age of 25, he had become a prominent merchant in Surat, and by 1625, the English were 
calling him the 'prime merchant of this towne'. He had agents throughout northern India and international 
interests stretching from Malay and Sumatra in the south to Gombroom and Mocha in the North. He 
dominated the pepper trade with Malabar, traded with South East Asia and was a maj or ship owner 
(ArasaratrIam 1994: 194) 
Vora frequently used his enormous financial clout in the age old strategy of cornering the market. For 
example, in 1625 the English tried to buy pepper from Vora but balked at the outrageous price he charged. 
To circumvent the monopoly Vora had established, the English sent their broker to the Deccan to buy 
pepper, only to find that Vora had outbid him for the available pepper. The English had no choice but to 
deal with him (see Gokhale 1979). 
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Vora freely played the Dutch and English East India Companies off against each other and both learned that 
they could not afford to offend him. The English found they were dependent on the agents ofVhji Vora for 
goods and were frequently in debt to him. This dependence was such that he could force the English to 
carry his goods on their ships(Gopal 1975: 111). 
One Indian Ocean trade where the 110lihemers did make a substantial impact was the spice trade. The 
Dutch, like the POliuguese before them, sought a monopoly in the spice trade, but were far more successful 
(Van Zanden: 1993:72-7). Through a combination of ruthlessness and superior military strength they seized 
key strategic assets; the Spice Islands. In 1605, the VOC conquered the Portuguese fort on Ambon, thereby 
gaining control of clove production on the nearby islands. They then imposed treaties on the ruler of 
Ternate, Tidore and Bican by which they were allowed to periodically destroy the young clove trees in the 
their area in order to reduce the supply and maintain their monopoly. Similar treaties were enforced on the 
Banda Islands, the only areas in the world where nutmeg and mace were produced. When enforcement of 
the treaty led to conflict in 1621, the VOC under the local leadership of Jan Pietersz Coen, reduced the 
population of approximately 15,000, to several hundred. In this way, the Dutch gained control of the spice 
trade. Although, it took time to plug all the holes il; the monopoly, by the 1630s and 1640s the Dutch could 
claim predominance in the waters around the Spice Islands (Boyajian 1993:146). 
As valuable as spices were to the Europeans, they were only one of many commodities exchanged in the 
Indian Ocean and Dutch power did not extend outside Indonesia for many years. In 1621, the long list of 
factmies that the VOC could produce belied the fact that most were unmanned and all but a few operated at 
a loss (Boyajian 1993: 148). 
In the 1640s, the Dutch attempted to impose their naval power over Gujarat by stopping ships leaving their 
pOliS from sailing to South East Asia. The Mughals retaliated on land against the Dutch factories who were 
forced to respect the rights of Mughal seamen (Arasaratnam 1994). Europeans learned as they increased 
their investments on land that they became more exposed to Mughal rule and the possibility of having their 
assets seized if they harmed local shippers. The molesting stopped and Indian shipping grew significantly 
from the middle of the century (Das Gupta 1994: I, 495). 
Gujarat trade did suffer some major set-backs in this peliod, in particular a famine of epic proportions that 
hit the region between 1630 and 1632. Many people involved in the production of textiles and other expOli 
cargoes perished. This dramatically reduced the region's productive base and set back Gujarat's trade and 
shipping for decades. 
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In the second half of the century, the region regained its fOlmer glory and Europeans were having trouble 
competing with local shippers. In the 1680s, 'both the English and Dutch were complaining bitterly that 
they could not compete against indigenous Asian traders who were flooding markets, underselling and 
moving about everywhere' (Arasaratnam 1995: 1,9). 
The organisational structure of the VOC did provide some advantages over Indian Ocean traders. The 
scope and planning of VOC transactions provided a level of integration and transparency which the small 
Indian merchant could not compete. VOC ships canied precious metals from the Middle East, East Africa 
and Japan were exchanged on the Indian subcontinent for textiles, which in tum were exchanged for 
Indonesian spices (Steensgaard 1973:409). This co-ordination contrasted strongly with the lot of the Indian 
merchant who did not enjoy such market transparency and were exposed to the vagaries of the market. For 
example, if too much pepper anived at the pOlis of Shihr and Aden, a merchant might experience a loss of 
up to 40-50% during one monsoon. Similarly, if the big ship from Suez to Mocha failed to anive, India 
merchants would have to return home with their goods unsold. The visible hand of the VOC overcame 
these problems, reducing risks and increasing profitability .. 
Although the organisation of the European companies provided much to admire, they could not compete 
with the Indians who were thriftier and knew the ins and outs of the markets. Indians dealt with traders with 
similar customs and languages whereas, differences with the Europeans often led to complications (Das 
Gupta 1994: I 417). And their crews, fed on lice, were far cheaper. The Europeans were simply not 
competitive. The institutional framework provided by the social groups, coupled with greater local 
knowledge and experience, was more effective than that provided by the joint stock companies. 
The focus of Gujarat maritime trade changed dming the seventeenth century. Gujarati merchants cut down 
on the long distance trading to South East Asia and they abandoned their settlements in South East Asian 
pOlis. This no doubt was contributed to by the Dutch seizure of Malacca and the spice islands. However, 
opportunities for growth were occurring in the West, a reflection of the development of Mughal power in 
the West and the economic directions of the empire (Arasaratnam 1994: 197-8). This included the growing 
Red Sea trade and the political stability in the Ottoman and Safavid empires which was contributing to an 
increase in trade (Das Gupta 1994:II 40). 
While, Gujaratis basked in the increased trading opportunities provided by shmier journeys to the west, the 
cutting down of long tetID trade was occulTing at a time when outside the Indian Ocean, long distance ocean 
routes provided the fastest growth potential and, these were being seized by the Europeans. But even here, 
Gujarat merchants were benefiting, if not through shipping. Where Europeans had stronger trade links (in 
China, Japan, Manila and Europe) they opened up new markets for Gujarat (and other Indian) textiles. 
English and Dutch business created opportunities for commodity brokerage and supply agencies, into which 
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a number of Guj arati merchants moved. All in all, European trade strengthened the Indian economies 
(Arasaratnam (1995: III, 45-6). Their custom provided Indians with more options and better deals. They 
offered competitive prices, prompt payment, and options on a variety of impOlied goods. While the 
companies brought capital into the region, individual Europeans were great borrowers generating more 
custom for the local money market. They also bought ships locally, boosting the Surat shipbuilding 
industry which was by now considered the most impOliant branch of manufactures in the city in the second 
half of the century. 
From time to time, Europeans dominated particular markets but, as Das Gupta (1994: 1,417) notes 'Upon 
the whole the trade in the Indian Ocean remained firmly in the hands of the Indian ship-owning merchants 
with only an occasional flutter, especially in the early sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the 
Europeans threatened to cut in'. Gujarat shipping was still firmly based on key sources of competitive 
advantage: flexible organisation, excellent skills, light mobile ships and close relationships with the markets 
and produce of the Mughal empire. These gave Gujarat shippers the competitiveness with which they could 
repel competitors in the Indian Ocean. Das Gupta (1994:432) goes as far as calling it a golden period for 
Indian maritime trade and textiles. 
In the China Sea, the arrival of the Dutch did not dramatically change the nature of trade. However, one 
key contribution was the deVelopment of Batavia as a base for South East Asian trade. The Dutch 
deliberately pursued a policy of encouraging Chinese vessels to visit the port (Gungwu 1990:409). This was 
a deliberate strategy to exploit the Chinese trading networks in the China Sea. The Dutch hoped to gain a 
monopoly in the southeast, not through its shipping but through the port, and to exploit Chinese shipping. 
In Japan, the POliuguese had been ousted for their Cll1istian evangelising and replaced by the Dutch who 
took a more secular approach to trade. However, even in this trade, it was the Chinese who dominated, 
pmiicularly after the 1630s when the Japanese government restricted all Japanese from sailing overseas. 
From that point, the Chinese came to handle the vast majority of Japan's foreign trade. However, it would 
be eighty years before Chinese traders could fully exploit the possibilities of this trade because of domestic 
political problems. From the early 1680s, Chinese shipping was freed of its restrictions and enjoyed a new 
period of prosperity. Chinese trade to Japan sky-rocketed reaching a disorderly peak of 192 vessels in 1688 
when the Japanese government decided to impose a stJict quota of 70 vessels a year, including Chinese 
junks Oliginating from south-east Asian ports (Reid 1993 :23). In 1708, the quota was further reduced to 59 
and in 1715 down to 30 as Japanese authOlities sought to 'Control the outflow of precious metals~ However, 
these official figures disguise the fact that smuggling certainly occurred. 
Despite these figures, some warning signs were beginning to appear. Chinese shipping was losing its 
advantage in shipping technology. Ishii (l988:220n) notes that Dutch vessels sailing from Batavia to 
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Nagasaki routinely took less time than the Chinese. European fully rigged ships could complete three 
voyages between Canton and Batavia per year in comparison with only one for the junks (Reid 1993:28). 
The junks were unwieldy and could sail in a smaller range of conditions than their competitors. They did 
not attempt to tack against the wind or sail at unseasonable times but, simply sailed with reliable monsoon 
winds (ibid:21). This put a limit on the growth prospects of Chinese shipping so, we might expect the 
Chinese to adopt European construction methods. Their failure to do so might be a combination of 
satisficing in which merchants are satisfied by a less than maximum profit or bounded rationality in which 
cognitive limitations' prevent merchants from maximizing their potential but, it is worth noting that 
Europeans did not establish ship-building yards in China as they did in India. When Europeans wanted to 
exploit the cheap quality teak wood ill India they established ship-yards by which the locals could observe 
western building methods. Chinese do not appear to have benefited from such technology transfer born 
from resource advantages. Secondly, the Chinese still provided formidable competition based on their 
experience and lmowledge of the regional trade and handling of products. 
The Dutch had one other key advantage - govemment support. In contrast to the Fukien merchants who 
were 'barely tolerated' by their own governments, the Dutch were representatives of their state. Gungwu 
(1990:240-1) states Europeans trading with Japan: 
dealt with the shogun's officials as representatives of a foreign state. Whether the shoguns were impressed or 
not, the Dutch were able to continually remind them that their company had state recognition and that they 
negotiated on behalf of their "king". The Hokkiens (Fukienese) could make no such claims. They could only 
seek the best possible arrangement that they could get, and they could get only what their hosts thought they 
deserved ... 
Neveliheless, the Chinese still held two key advantages in the sea-borne trade of the China Sea (Reid 1993). 
The first was their foothold on trade in China. European ships could only trade at Canton under much 
difficulty and with the burden of very high taJiffs. The second factor was the peaceful record of Chinese 
shipping, which stood in sharp contrast to the aggressive record of the Europeans. Reid notes that as a 
consequence, Asian rulers raised tariffs and other obstacles against European shipping while the Chinese 
were freed of snch constraints. 
The following century would throw up more difficulties including a government ban between 1717 and 
1727, and a massacre of the Chinese community in Batavia. However, Chinese merchants proved 
themselves to be flexible to the changing fOliunes thrust upon them and continued to dominate East Asian 
trade. Up until 1842, they were principal caniers not just for Japan and their own country but, also 
Vietnam, Siam and Cambodia as well as a substantial proportion of the remainder (Reid 1993:13). 
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From this discussion, it can seen that global shipping during the seventeenth century can still be seen, not as 
a global industry but, as a series of regional intemational markets. Gujarat still dominated the Indian 
Ocean. Dutch had gained leadership on the routes once ruled by the Iberians while the Chinese ruled the 
Far Eastem waves well into the nineteenth century. 
9.5 Crisis in Spain and a Dutch Golden Age 
When the Dutch and English first entered the overseas trades, Spain and Portugal stood supreme. However, 
The Dutch and English were slowly acquiring the capabilities to compete. By 1609, the Dutch had well 
established trading links in Asia and the Atlantic. This thesis would suggest that at some point of time, a 
newcomer would wrest its mantle of leadership using innovations that the Iberians have trouble adopting 
due to the persistence of institutional rules, values and other binds of entrapment. As the following 
discussion reveals, this did indeed happen in the seventeenth century. 
The Spanish and Portuguese had built a competitive advantage based on their superior knowledge of wind 
systems and routes they had built up over time. They complemented their position with investments 
throughout Asia and America, supportive govemment policies and efficient organisation. The combined 
superiority in skills, infrastructure and reputation led to the creation of an aura of supremacy that further 
protected them from any challenges. However, the Dutch and English were undergoing a process of catch-
up. The Ibelians would never be able to maintain a monopoly that spanned the world once other nations 
had caught up with the necessary techno-economic requirements. The superiority in reputation and 
experience that had been barriers to new competitors enteling the industry no longer existed. 
When the Spanish and Dutch signed a peace treaty in 1609 both nations were freed of war-time restrictions 
on their development. The Dutch found, to their delight, that the innovations they had created provided a 
competitive advantage with which they could now overtake the Iberian nations on the Atlantic Ocean and 
routes to Asia. 
9.5.1 Organisation and Institutional Advances The biggest institutional innovation came in the 
organisation of trade. In the early days, there were few Dutch merchants big enough to finance ocean-going 
ventures. This meant that small merchants would have to pool resources and share the ownership of ships 
and trading ventures. As a consequence, ownership of merchant ships was spread between timber dealers, 
shipbuilders, sail makers, brewers, millers etc, in shares of 1116, 1132 or 1/64 (Israel 1989:21). A company 
would be based around a single ship, each ship having its own list of shareholders. Although one person 
would not by himself own a ship, a share-holder might have shares in a number of different ships (Bmijn 
1990:184). This joint activity stands in sharp contrast to Gujarat where a spirit of individualism existed 
which would never see such joint action. Gujarat also had wealthy businessmen who could afford to buy 
ships outright. They didn't need to pool resources. 
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Merchants would hire a ship for a single voyage after which, they would share out the profits. They may 
choose to re-hire the same ship but, once again, it would be for a single voyage. This structure was possible 
give11 the large market for chartering ships. Unless, the merchants intended to continuously use the ship, it 
made no sense to buy one themselves and incur capital costs while the ship was inactive. In this way, the 
large shipping district provided extelllal economies that reduced capital costs consistent with Marshallian 
disuicts. It is interesting that this existence of separate ship owners did not happen in Gujarat either. The 
probable explanation for this is that, although joint ownership of ships in the Netherlands came about 
because of lack of resources, it had the added benefit of spreading and reducing 1isk. This made it safer to 
become a specialised ship owner and, consequently encouraged inveshnent. Another likely explanation of 
this specialisation would appear to be the size of the shipping market, which had grown dramatically. In 
1618, the Dutch sent 1,794 vessels to the Baltic alone (Davis 1962:226). By contrast, a century later when 
Guajarati shipping peaked, the leading port of Surat only possessed 112 ships in total (Das Gupta 
1994:1,433). The larger market provided greater opportunity for specialisation and the lesser likeliness that 
hold up could occur from a small number of chmierers charging excessively high prices. 
There were exceptions to this structure, the most important being the Dutch East India Company (VOC). 
The company trading to the Indies did not use fluyts but larger, stronger vessels for the longer nm. The 
market for these ships was much smaller. If the company was to hire ships, it faced the problem of small 
numbers conu'acting and hold up. It might also find that ships were simply not available of the type or 
number they sought pmiiculariy given their higher building and operating costs. Consequently, non-
replaceability and small numbers contracting led the VOC to integrate backward and build their own ships. 
While the Dutch inu'oduced innovations, Spain experienced entrapment consistent with the thesis. To some 
extent, this lack of commercial aggressiveness would also seem to be a consequence of satisficing. Having 
met a minimum level of wealth, it would appear that merchants became more interested in social values 
(Pike 1972:110). The Spanish Atlantic trade entered the kind of 'slow history' that Klein had anticipated 
occurs when competition declines. However, industrial organisation also appears to have played a large 
part in innovative stagnation. The concentration of trade achieved with the establishment of the Consul ado 
eve11tually generated the decline in innovation expected from reduced rivalry. With high barriers to entry 
and small number of films, risk taking was reduced consistent with Klein (1977:83). The established 
merchant houses exhibited a low degree of openness and innovation. Safe behind their protective status, the 
small group of merchants that made up the Consulado charged high and uncompetitive prices and restricted 
their shipments to goods they could sell without difficulty. They were slow to exploit new products such as 
tobacco, a product that became fashionable under the Dutch and the English. Because the state was 
dependent on credit provided by these lich merchants and because the state itself possessed monopolies in 
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salt, mercury and other products, it felt no need to break up this monopoly, and trade progressed along a 
very nanow path. 
It was in the trade to Asia that the biggest organisational innovation occuned. Although created to deal 
with disequilibrium, the Dutch East India Company became a 'national champion' in the Asian trade and, in 
contrast to Porter's (1990:662) finding that national champions fail 'the test of logic and history', the 
company was highly successful. It eventually grew to become the largest commercial organisation in the 
world, with a payroll that at times included 40,000 employees. The amalgamation of many companies into 
one presented a number of departures from the past. Firstly, it owned not one vessel but a fleet, and 
combined shipping, freighting and shipbuilding under one corporate structure (Bruijn 1990: 184). Secondly, 
the trade with Asia placed special demands on the organisation. The large scale of operations, long 
distances, and the lengthy times required a more permanent commitment to the trade (Neal 1990:195). As a 
consequence, the company which previously committed capital on the basis of each single voyage had by 
1612, changed to providing a permanent capital base committed perpetually to the enterprise. 
The company achieved a level of co-ordination previously unseen in the world of international trade. The 
ani val of ships could be co-ordinated to overcome market transparency problems balancing supply and 
demand in diverse locations. In many ways its activities resembled those of today's multi-national 
companies in the way it utilised information to help plan and co-ordinate activities in various nations. From 
the company's regional HQ at Batavia, in modem day Indonesia, the company's international activities were 
monitored as if by 'an enormous radar screen' (Steensgaard 1973:409). From Japan to Arabia, trading 
posts and factories sent reports on the political situation and market trends. The information was assessed, 
along with the perfOlmances of the valious trading posts, and was used to help prepare plans for the 
following year. Finance, shipping and other resources were allocated to the various company activities 
depending on the potential growth suggested by the information received. This was vastly superior to the 
POliuguese system where individual contracts for specific routes did not obtain the same degree of co-
ordination. 
Vetiical integration of the Dutch company provided another advantage over the Portuguese. Portuguese 
traders had to make a large payment to the Estado da India for protection; a payment which included a 
tribute to the POliuguese king. By contrast, the VOC supplied their own protection at cost (Steensgaard 
1973: 151). This meant protection costs could be determined in advance, allowing the VOC officials to 
create tighter plans and budgets, while giving them increased power to co-ordinate their political and 
economic activities. 
The Portuguese Estado had continuously been plagued by ptincipal-agent problems and information 
asymmetries, a problem contributed to by a lack of a decent financial reporting system (Boyajian 
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1993:122). The Portuguese had not adopted the double entry accounting system introduced into Europe by 
the Italians. The Dutch did not make this mistake. Jan Pietsz Coen had himself studied double entry 
accounting in Italy as a youth. The Dutch system was not complete and contained errors, yet it provided 
information for decision making and pricing far supeJior to their rivals. 
The corporate structure of the VOC allowed management to make decisions at different organisation levels, 
providing flexibility on which a vast network of trading operations could be built. At the various factOlies 
around Asia, staff would deal with local merchants, order stock, maintain the warehoused stock, inspect 
quality of stock, and maintain accounting records. During the busy season, ships would be occupied with 
loading and dispatching of ships however, during the off-season there would not be so much to do (Boxer 
1965:206). 
The company was also instrumental in changing consumption patterns in Europe with its imports 
(Chaudhuri 1985:82). However, it would take into account European stock levels and sales before making 
purchases in Asia. This avoided situations of over or. under supply, something only a company with 
integrated facilities and information networks that spanned the world could do. 
The Portuguese suffered from a classical transaction cost problem. The contractors who supplied the king's 
shipping wanted to reduce costs while the merchants who used the shipping wanted better quality shipping. 
The crown and its military advisors stuck faithfully to the carracks while the Dutch sent out smaller, faster 
and more manoeuvrable vessels. Faced with a monopoly, they had no choice but to accept space on the 
carracks while the Dutch who internalised this conflict, improved quality at the same time as reducing costs 
(Boyajian 1993: 125-6). 
However, the viceroy in Goa was closer to the problem and showed more flexibility. In 1616, the viceroy 
sanctioned the private use of galliots, smaller vessels that could outrun the Dutch (Boyajian 1993:157). 
This announcement also conceded that the Crown no longer had a monopoly within Asia. Private shipping 
floLllished while customs revenue declined with an increase in customs evasion. However, the crown still 
provided the ships on the route between Asia and Europe. 
Although Dutch organisational changes were clearly supenor to the state-organised Estado, it is 
questionable whether these organisation developments gave any advantage over the private Portuguese 
traders operating in the Indian Ocean. For these traders based on kinship groups, human capital was the 
most important asset (Boyajian 1993: 122). Skills and knowledge passed from generation to generation and 
a network of trusted agents more than compellsated for these organisational innovations. In the early days 
at least, the extended killship networks were also capable of controlling superior sums of capital than the 
new company. Similarly, these merchants were well aware of the problems of market transparency and 
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overcame the problem by forming a caIie1 which reduced the lisk of loss due to unforseeab1e shifts in 
market prices (ibid: 119-20). 
The creation of a caliel would lead us to expect a decline in competitiveness. Celiain1y, aspects of this 
concentration were shaping as a distlibutional coalition. These contractors were the only ones who could 
afford to purchase the contracts which were passed among a group of privileged elite (Subrahmanyam and 
Thomaz 1991 :303). Nevertheless, within Asia, they competed with locals and appeared to maximise their 
trading oppOliunities (see Boyajian 1993). However, as efficient as the private traders were, they were to 
lose out to the Dutch simply because they were reliant on the King's shipping and protection and the 
P01iuguese lost the naval struggle against the Dutch and English. 
In the Atlantic, the organisation of Dutch trade had been velY different from the VOc. It had been small 
private shippers that established trading links with West Afiica, Brazil, Venezuela and parts of N01ih 
America. However, these trading centres were vulnerable to aggressive political and military action from 
Spain and Portugal (de Vries and Van der Woude 1997:398-401). This vulnerability gave rise to the 
suggestion that a single chartered company be created, like the VOC, with sufficient military strength to 
defend their trade. However, when a twelve year truce was signed with Spain in 1609, the concept was 
shelved. When the truce expired in 1621, the idea was raised again and the West India Company (WIC) 
was created, amalgamating smaller companies into a monopoly. Many experienced investors stayed away 
from this new company out of fear that its military expenses would undermine its profitability. Battling 
both Spain and Portugal in the near Atlantic would be a harder task than that faced by the VOC. However, 
many Jews invested in the company to counter the loss of trading links to Brazil with the recommencement 
of hostilities in 1621 (Israel 1990:377). 
The West India Company was not as successful as its eastern counterpart. Its creation in 1621 was not 
welcomed by those independent merchant houses trading in the Atlantic and it would be thirty years before 
the company offered anything new (Emmer 1998 :70). Much of its time was devoted to military activities 
which undennined its profitability. By the time peace came it had been forced to sell of many of its 
monopoly privileges. 
It is questionable whether the monopoly structure that was so valuable in the riskier Asian trade would be so 
useful in the Atlantic. The defensive abilities of the WIC were only important during the war with Spain 
after which smaller shipping companies could operate in a lower risk environment but with greater 
flexibility. It was also more difficult for the WIC to maintain its monopoly in the Atlantic which was more 
accessible and contained less lisks than the more distant Asian trades. 
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Apart from the trading companies, the Dutch introduced a number of other institutions which reduced the 
costs of transacting and facilitate the growth in trade. In 1609, the Wisselbank (Exchange Bank) was 
founded in imitation of the Giro Bank at Venice. Its function was to control money changing and settle bills 
of exchange. (Schama 1987 :345). The Chamber of hlsurance was set up by the Amsterdam City Council to 
resolve disputes and increase confidence by registering and processing policies (Israel 1989:76). In 1614, 
the Amsterdam Loan Bank was created to help finance trade. Israel (1989:78) states that these Amsterdam 
financial institutions undeniably helped bolster Dutch trade primacy by providing a resource base and 
degree of specialisation that none of their livals possessed. In lowering the costs of obtaining finance, the 
institutiolls gave the Dutch lower costs than their rivals. 
A vital institution was the bourse, the forerunner of the modem stock exchange. It was a natural evolution 
from the waterfront markets that all ports possessed. The bourse brought under one roof a place where 
deals could be negotiated, finance arranged, and shipping and commodity news gathered. The Amsterdam 
bourse, built in 1611, was arguably the nerve centTe of the whole economy (De Vries and van der Woude 
1997:147). It was a building of arcades around a ce]1tral courtyard in which merchants and brokers 
gathered and traded' literally everything known to that society'. The scope of Dutch commerce enabled the 
bourse to provide more investment options than any exchange in other nations. FTom commodities like 
pepper to shares in companies like the Dutch East India Company, all could be found. The ease with which 
commodities could be found and exchanged dramatically reduced the costs of doing business compared to 
other centres and added another factor to the efficiency of the Dutch economy. 
Vital to the operation of the market was illfonnation, and here again, by the standards of the day, 
Amsterdam overflowed with infonnation (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997:149). Ships brought in 
repOlis of produce availability and demand from around the world. Early news papers were established, the 
Amsterdamsche Courant in 1618, the Tydinghen in 1619 and the Oprechte HalTlemsche Courant in 1667. 
Publications were complemented by intelligence networks of merchants and companies that sought to give 
the earliest advice on market conditions. 
9.5.2 Government Policy Ibelian trade had always benefited from the support given to it by the 
govemment. However, the Dutch govemment represented a depaJiure from the countries we have 
researched to date, in that representatives were elected. This was not a democracy as we know it today for, 
members were elected for life. However, it presented a huge advance on an inherited monarchy or empire. 
An example of this can be seen in the Asian trades in which both the Dutch and the Portuguese had 
monopoly organisations operating. However, the Dutch company was nm by merchants while the 
POliuguese company was a preserve of the crown. The royal monopoly increased the costs of trade and 
ulldelmined its competitive strength. At times, it would force local merchants to buy pepper at inflated 
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plices while continuously divelting profits to finance the religious-based wars in Europe instead of 
reinvesting it into the fleet. Consequently there were never enough Portuguese ships on the main route that 
linked Asia to Europe (Boyajian 1993:8). Ships left Asia dangerously loaded to the brim, contributing to a 
very high loss rate. 
By contrast, the government was a key factor in the efficiency of the Dutch state. The Dutch Councils of 
State were composed of trading merchants who had lived overseas and were conversant with commercial 
matters (Chaudhmi 1978:5). Most town councillors were either ship owners themselves or had some interest 
in overseas trade or industry. Consequently, the government played a strong and informed role in the 
economy. Public authorities supervised a broad range of economic activity, from banking and insurance to 
manufacturing. The State controlled the unloading of hening at every stage from curing, packaging, stOling 
to marketing to ensure quality control. Dutch textiles were similarly monitored (Israel 1989:413). Laws 
and foreign policy were designed to benefit trade while, a strong diplomatic and military presence kept 
Dutch shipping from being overwhelmed by aggressive forces (Israel 1989:411). Dutch governments did 
not make the mistake of defaulting kings. They paid their debts on schedule, and did not tamper with 
savings or with the cUlTency. The resulting stable fiscal environment contributed to low interest rates that 
assisted producers and shippers throughout the economy. 
9.5.3 Supporting industries As in all the counuies we have looked at so far, leadership in shipping 
has been associated with an industry cluster which includes a cargo for the ships to cany. The markets for 
the cargoes of Spain and Portugal were getting saturated and this placed limits on these countries' ability to 
grow within their specific growth paths. 
Much of this saturation was associated with the increase of competition which worked against everyone. 
The rapid increase in the number of suppliers had its inevitable effect with saturated markets. By 1618, the 
expansion ofu'ade in both Asia and the Atlantic came to an end (Boyajian 1993:144). Merchants in Lisbon, 
Amsterdam and London had caught themselves in a cost-price squeeze. Their competing had pushed up the 
plices they paid for goods in Asia but reduced the prices they could resell them in Europe. To make matters 
worse, Europe then entrenched itself in the Thirty Years war which depressed their markets. For the 
following decades, traders struggled for a share of a market that in the best of years would only grow 
slowly. 
The main cargo on which Iberian trade was based was bullion. The influx of bullion had created an 
inflation which reduced the value of silver (Phillips 1990:86). Consequently it became less profitable to 
operate the new world mines and production was cut back. From the decade 1641 to 1671-80, the mining 
districts of New Mexico experienced a 21% decline (Hoberman 1991:14). With less cargo, Spanish 
shipping declined. The drop off in registered ships crossing the Atlantic was from 1,363 to 971 in 1630-9 
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to 722 in 1640-49, a fan so great that contraband shipping could not account for the fall (Hobennan 
1991: IS). Other exports also declined, for example hides falling from a peak of 134,000 in the early 1580's 
to 8,000 in the late 1660's (Phillips 1990:88). This over-investment was not a result of lack of co-ordination 
due to information weaknesses, although no doubt coordination would have solved the problem. It was a 
result of intense competition in fulllmowledge of the status oftheir competitors. Nations competed in order 
to increase market share and emerge the victor in a trade war. This period of over-supply had to be endured 
until a victor or some kind of equilibrium emerged. 
Pepper was a key commodity for the Portuguese in Asia, filling 65-89 percent of the cargo space in carracks 
retuming from the East (Steensgaard 1990: 118). When the Dutch and English East India companies entered 
the Indian Ocean with their lower cost organisational structures, they provided further competition that 
helped fuel a declining price trend. Prices on the Amsterdam exchange show that prices for pepper declined 
from an index of 145.5 early in the seventeenth century to 57.3 in 1680-4 (ibid). 
The main income eamer for Portugal in Asia was the sale of protection to Indian shippers. But even this 
protection racket suffered from saturation as the Dutch and English became competing suppliers in the 
seventeenth century. 
With the saturation of key markets, further growth would only come by the opening of new paths and the 
Dutch were doing this via their industlial advances. Industrial advance was accompanied by technical 
innovation and an increased use of machinery across the economy. It included textile machinery, copper 
stills, presses, multiple blade timber saws, and gIinding machines for processing coffee. In the Zaan 
indusuial zone, new style paper mills appeared around 1670 using much heavier and more expensive 
equipment that produced a smooth, white, high quality paper. The Netherlands became 'the technical 
research laboratory of the western world' (Israel 1989). The new technologies created exportable products 
whose competitive advantage was not quantity but, quality. This technical advance was a result of a number 
of factors. Scarcity of labour and the resulting high wages encouraged development of labour saving 
machinery, while windmills and peat provided the nation with abundant cheap energy sources. 
In conu'ast to the availability of Dutch industrial cargoes, exports from Spain had never been a vital factor 
in their competitive success. In the early years, Spanish ships had carried some manufactured goods from 
Spain in retU1l1 for raw materials however, Spanish Americans eventually established their own production 
of manufactured goods, decreasing their need for Spanish imports. The imports now wanted by the 
immigI'ants were high quality foreign goods (Kamen 1983:161). Some of the foreign goods would be 
smuggled to America in Dutch and English ships while others would come via Spain, imported through the 
connections of the Consulado. 
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The Dutch were pa11icularly well placed to benefit from the situation as the improvements they made in 
shipping were complemented by improvements in their indusuial base. They could provide the products 
that South Americans so eagerly sought. Access to manufactured products gave an important competitive 
advantage to Dutch shipping. 
The rules that the Spanish had introduced to reduce costs also provided a window of opportunity for the 
Dutch and English. Foreign smuggling was made easier by the system of shipping conducted by the 
Spanish. The fleet system might ensure that bullion got to Spain but it totally ignored colonial desires for 
supplies. The fleet system meant ships arrived very infrequently. Consequently, colonial Americans were 
very receptive to foreign boats alTiving at their shores loaded with goods. Smugglers provided South 
Americans with a larger variety of goods at more reasonable prices than those available through the Spanish 
monopoly (Haning 1963:308). After the Dutch established bases in Curacao in 1636 and the British seized 
Jamaica in 1655, Spain was more vulnerable to foreign smugglers. 
Dutch u·ading and industlial activities reinforced each other in a manner representative of the Industlial 
clusters identified by P0l1er. The 50 million guilders worth of riches that the nation's ships brought in 
(Israel 1989:258) also complimented activities in domestic industry, the economy developing mutually 
reinforcing clusters of commerce and industry. Colonial products provided the basis of a number of 
growing industries. Sugar canied in Dutch ships provided the raw material for sugar refineries which 
catered for the lising European demand for sugar. By 1662, half the sugar refinelies in Europe were based 
in Amsterdam (approximately fifty) with another dozen or so located at Rotterdam, Middelburg, Delft and 
Gouda (Ibid:264). In the Zaan industlial belt, numerous plants were turning imported ingredients into 
processed foods including biscuits, spiced cakes, chocolate, mustard and exotic liquors made from tropical 
and sub-tropical fruits (Israel 1989:260). 
Tobacco, also carried in Dutch ships, sourced a tobacco finishing industry in which local and American 
leaves were blended to create a cheap flavour-some product with which other nations had trouble 
competing. By 1700, twenty-three tobacco-spinning and blending establishments were located at 
Amsterdam. An off-shoot of the tobacco industry was the manufacture of clay pipes which became the 
main industry at Gouda. Diamond imports were processed by Sephardi and Ashenazi Jews, with highly 
developed skills that would not be easy to replicate by would be competitors, giving the Dutch a clear 
comparative advantage (Israel 1989:267). Other indusuies related to the growth of shipping and trade 
included delftware, a ceramic product made in imitation of Chinese blue porcelain. A window of 
0pp0l1unity to enter this trade opened in this industry when the VOC had trouble obtaining supplies due to 
political upheaval in China. 
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Landes (1998:173) believes that contempt for manual mis was the principal cause of Spanish economic 
decline, particularly given the dominance of Jews and Muslims in industrial crafts. However, it has to be 
remembered that Spain's success was never based on its industry. It was based on a reconquista mentality 
and the exploitation of its South Amel;can empire. While the Spanish economy was entrapped in these 
values on which it had built its success, the Dutch were creating a new road to riches. 
The one manufacturing industry that both the Iberian nations possessed with some expertise had been 
shipbuilding. However, their industry was suffering from high costs associated with high domestic 
inflation, depletion of domestic forests and an increased reliance on imports from the Baltic. Wages in the 
shipyards increased and the number of skilled workmen declined, possibly a consequence of emmigration to 
the Indies and a general population decline in Spain. Much of the slack was picked up in South America 
where a healthy industry had access to plentiful matel;als. However, the decline of Spanish shipbuilding 
had contributed to the loss of unchallenged supremacy. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spanish 
merchants and shippers started to ignore the protectionist laws and foreign-built ships increasingly began to 
replace native vessels in the carrera as the Spanish indl!stry declined (Clayton 1976:244). In 1613, the 
protectionist laws had to be amended to allow foreign built ships in the carrrera. 
Spanish shipbuilding entered a peliod of slow history consistent with the hypothesis. The Spanish had once 
led the way in ship design, but it was foreigners that were now producing the best ships. During the peliod 
of Spain's rise, the government had shown a willingness to experiment however, Spanish shipwrights 
introduced few improvements in ship design during the years 1590-1630 (Usher 1932:197). Much of this 
entrapment reflects the ligidity of routines identified by Nelson and Winter (1982). The government had 
attempted to upgrade quality in an attempt to produce the types of ships coming out of Dutch shipyards. It 
issued requirements stressing the incorporation of newly discovered scientific knowledge which was 
changing the face of shipbuilding in the north (Clayton 1976:242). For example, Thome Cano, an early 
seventeenth century expert stated that 'it is extremely neccesary that the builder or master be an 
Arithmetician and know how to judge tonnage so that he might apply the rules to construction' (quoted in 
Clayton 1976:242). However, Spanish ship builders did not possess considerable mathematics expertise to 
do this. Incorporating scientific principles was a radical depaliure from the nOlmal basis in which a master 
built on the basis of experience and observati011. Consequently, shipbuilders stuck to construction methods 
in which they had capabilities, and restricted themselves to small refinements in the established type. As a 
contemporary writer noted, Spain was suffering 'from making its ships without rule or reason, but by the 
eye and at the caprice of each builder' (quoted in Usher 1932:197). As late as 1691, naval experts were 
complaining about the lack of scientific thinking in the Spanish industry. Consequently, the Spanish no 
longer had a technological edge and this contributed to the decline of their shipping (Usher 1932:202). 
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By contrast, Dutch shipbuilders were reducing costs and advancing technology at a faster rate. Much Qfthis 
technical advance was a result of shipbuilding's guild-based organisation (Unger 1978). Although guilds 
have a notorious reputation for hindering efficient resource allocation, this did not apply to Dutch 
shipbuilders' guilds, which were relatively young. In Amsterdam, where shipbuilders were part of the 
carpenters' guild, a specialised organisation was not created until 15] 7. Guilds provided stability, and 
played a key role in promoting economic growth and technical advance. They trained artisans, producing 
craftsmen with the highest reputation. They generally had an open policy on labour mobility. This stopped 
wages from inflating imd also allowed men to bling in skills and techniques not locally available. Guilds 
enforced quality control through a court system which handled customers' complaints. Should the industry 
require capital equipment that was beyond the financial resources of individual members (eg jacks for 
hauling wood or bellows), the guilds would acquire the equipment and provide equal access to all members. 
Guilds never regulated against new production methods but, through their regular meetings, offered a forum 
for the exchange of technical infOlmation. 
Guilds benefited from government support, but with the added environmental requirement that POlier 
(1990:674) says is necessary for government assistance to succeed, namely, rivalry. Authorities set aside 
land for use by shipbuilders, helped in the development of docks and bought major capital items such as 
town cranes. As shipbuilding centres were close together, creating a competitive environment, legislators 
were careful not to drive potential customers to another nearby town (Unger 1978 67-85). However, there 
were limits to this livalry. To maintain stability, guilds tried to restrict price competition between their 
members, so success was detelmined by technical progress in response to market conditions, a process 
similar to oligopolistic competition today. Although a technical advance would soon spread to other guild 
members, the innovator could expect a sholi-telm advantage which, given the size of the product and the 
number of orders, might be ten years or more. The overall effect was technical progression throughout the 
industry. 
9.5.4 Human Resources The increase in labour productivity across the Dutch economy was aided 
by investment in human capital. The Refonned church that dominated the Netherlands insisted that its 
followers should be able to read the bible (Boxer 1965:155-7). Church schools provided the Netherlands 
with the highest literacy rate in Europe, if not the world, an accomplishment assisted by the establishment of 
five universities between 1575 and 1636. 
As in the earlier economies we looked at, mmitime expansion increased the quality and quantity of 
knowledge available to the Dutch (Boxer 1965: 161). The literature available on travel and voyages became 
the best available in Europe, a lead expressed in the navigating manuals and atlases emanating from Dutch 
print shops. In all the major seaports a number of teachers taught the science of navigation to aspiring 
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young navigators (Boxer 1965: 166). Some were old sailors drawing on their experience, while others were 
expelis on mathematics and theoretical navigation. 
By contrast, scientific and technical retardation was occurring across the Spanish and Portuguese economy. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the Jesuit education system that had once been the best of its day became 
entrapped by formalism. After the founding of the Jesuit order in 1540, its founders analysed the best 
existing universities, Catholic and Protestant, and built their colleges on the most advanced methods and 
knowledge. They expelimented for fOliy years before finalising their official study plan, the Ratio 
Studiorum. At this point, the education system stopped evolving (Saul 1992: 114). Teachers and pupils 
were discouraged from advancing propositiOllS that were not supported by the established and recognised 
authorities (Boxer 1969:346). The result was a reproductive education system immersed in the values of 
Catholic Orthodoxy. While the rest of Europe was expeliencing an intellectual ferment lead by Galileo, 
Descartes, Newton and others, the Jesuits kept Portugal and Spain from this cumulative advancement of 
science. Scientific stagnation saw the POliuguese, who had been leaders in navigational theory and practice, 
fall behind the pace set by the nOlihemers (Boxer 1969:350). Even some Portuguese manuscripts on 
navigation were more widely diffused in the Netherlands than in their home-land where some of their 
greatest works were not even publislled (Magelhaes Godinho 1993 :36). 
The church provided another institutional brake on tactical and technical development. From the mid-
sixteenth century, increased religious influence of Philip II and the counter-refOlmation, which sought to 
reaffilm Catholic values, resulted in a reaction against novelty in science. Church rules and values enforced 
by the Holy Office of the Inquisition stifled intellectual development. Restrictions were placed on studying 
abroad and publishing of foreign books (Kamen 1983: 120). Local publishing also had to endure 
censorship. Consequently, the propOliion of books dealing with scientific inquiry in Madrid declined from 
14% between 1566 and 1600 to under 6% between 1601 and 1625, while books dealing in religious themes 
rose from 32 to 42% (Kamen 1983:252-3). 
9.5.5 Complementarity with Religious Values Despite the resttictions of the rules and values 
associated with the inquisition, Iberians still gained some stt·ength from the alignment between religious and 
trading institutions. For example both the Dutch and English had trouble establishing trade in Surat because 
of the influence of Jesuits at the Mughal comi (see Boyajian 1993:147-51). However, in time people make 
mistakes and, mistakes provide windows of 0ppOliunities. For example, in 1613, Portuguese officials 
mistakenly seized a Mughal trading fleet on the basis that it had evaded paying customs. The incident led to 
a war between the two nations and Jesuit power at the comi disintegrated. The northerners soon received 
the pelmission they sought. 
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In the Netherlands, the church did not always approve of the over-indulgence associated with the consumer 
society. Calvinists were also against the vanity and matel;alism associated with money-making. They 
succeeded in imposing some acts of petty suppression, for example, in 1607, ginger-bread was banned 
(Schama 1987: 184). However, such resistance was only small-scale. 
While so many were benefiting from the growth, it would be unrealistic to expect powerful institutional 
resistance to the new economic system. The new economic system created a society growing in affluence. 
In 1585, out of the 30,000 inhabitants that lived in Amsterdam, only 65 had taxable wealth greater than 
10,000 guilders. By 1686, the population of the city had grown to 200,000 of which 259 had wealth greater 
than 100,000 guilders. To these people 10,000 guilders did not warrant a mention (North 1997:52-6). 
Even the Labouring classes benefited from the lising wealth. They enjoyed a variety in diet that was 
beyond the reach of their counterparts in other pmis of Europe (Schama 1987:169). 
There were few religious hindrances to economic development in the Netherlands. Even for the Church, the 
trade presented opportunities as Dutch expansion came. at the expense of the Catholic Portuguese and 
Spanish. It provided an opportunity to defeat the anti-Clllist and bring the Gospel to distant lands (Schama 
1987:346). 
9.5.6 Military Strength The Iberian nations had gained much competitive strength from the fact that 
commercial goals were fully aligned with the nation's military goals. Military strength would be used to 
help defend a trading monopoly. However, the ensuing military battles should not be seen as just a battle 
for trade. They were part of a wider political play-offthat once again reflected the 'reconquista' mentality. 
The Spanish king had been elected Holy Roman Emperor responsible for lands in northern and eastern 
Europe. He took to this role a desire to promote Catholicism and defeat the forces of Protestantism. This 
entangled Spain in a sel;es of battles that drained the Spanish treasury. As early as 1598, practically all 
sources of revenue were mortgaged and American revenues pledged in advance (Harring 1963:313). This 
deprived the nation of resources with which it might be able to defend its shipping from up and coming 
imitators, the English and the Dutch. 
Supelior labour resources were a major factor in the Dutch victory over Portugal in Asia. Although the two 
nations had similar populations, the Netherlands could draw on labour from Scandinavia and the Gennan 
states, and place larger military forces in the field. POIiugal, on the other hand, had its labour supply milked 
by Spain before gaining independence in 1640 (Boxer 1969: 114). The problem was aggravated by the high 
death rate on voyages (Boxer 1969:219), a problem shared by the Spanish. 
The reconquista mentality affected the ability to raise seamen in yet another way. One problem that Spain 
and POIiugal shared in raising sufficient numbers of sailors was the low standing that the profession had in 
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both countries (Boxer 1969:213). Sailors who swept the filthy decks of ships could not have the same 
purity of blood as a soldier. The navy possessed nothing like the prestigious military orders and, it was 
common for captaincy of ships to be given, not to people experienced in sailing but to infantry officers. 
This destroyed the attractiveness of a career as a seaman (Goodman 1997:224). 
Low labour and social mobility put a brake on the exploitation of talent. Both Spain and Portugal used 
nobility as naval officers in the belief that noble blood provided courage and 'a talent for facing danger and 
death without fear' (Goodman 1997:221). This was quite normal in Europe at the time; however, there was 
a higher chance of being promoted on the basis of talent in England and the Netherlands. Consequently, the 
P01iuguese Fidalgos (or gentlemen of blood) in the Indian Ocean found they were losing battles to Dutch 
officers with more experience and a better grasp of naval strategy (Boxer 1969:115). 
Table 9.1 Declining Spanish and Iberian Shipping 
Registered Spanish shipping crossing 
the Atlantic 
1621-9 
1630-9 
1640-9 
1650-9 
1660-9 
1670-9 
1680-9 
1690-9 
1,363 
971 
722 
412 
302 
433 
368 
328 
(Source Hoberman 1991: 15-6) 
Outward Bound P01iuguese East Indiamen 
1530-3980 
1550-5951 
1570-7954 
1590-9944 
1610-1956 
1630-4030 
1651-6032 
1671-8025 
(Source: Boxer 1969:379) 
The Iberian nations were entrapped by their own sense of success learned over time. Kamen (1983:193) 
notes the alTogance of the Spanish and contempt for other nations. In Spanish America, PatTY (1966:399) 
notes how the leaders of colonial society regarded themselves as the heirs of the conquistadors, while 
Boxer(l969: 146) notes the Portuguese 'were convinced that as the descendants of Alfonso de 
Albuquerque's conquistadors and as the vassals of their mighty king, they were ipso facto vastly superior to 
the upstart merchants ofthe European trading nations however wealthy they may be'. This sense of identity 
with the past, and resulting cultural alTogance f01med a barrier to internal progression and has much in 
common with the cultural aesthetics identified by Schoenberger(1997). AlTogance and aesthetics masked 
the fact that Spanish tactics and organisation had, by the seventeenth century, become static and out of date 
(Parry 1966:230). The Portuguese were worse 'They practised no tactics other than a disorderly charge to 
the war cry of St James and at them! (Santiago e a elles!), (Boxer 1969: 117). 
The Iberians persisted with routines in a manner supportive of Nelson and Winter's 1982 proposition that 
companies have trouble shifting from routines that they have invested in and built up over time. At this 
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time, the leading naval technology was embodied by the sleek lined and well armed galleon. Although the 
Spanish had taken a strong role in the development of the galleon, it was the northern nations that more 
fully exploited the galleon's capabilities. The Spanish maintained the Mediterranean tradition of using 
artillery to hit and disorganising the enemy just before boarding while the English, limited in manpower, 
relied exclusively on manoeuvring by the wind and delivering an artillery "broadside". While the English 
produced vessels that were very light and very well gunned, the Spanish built galleons with forecastle that 
made it easier to board an enemy ship (Cipolla 1965:86-7). The Dutch defeated the Portuguese for exactly 
the same reason. A contemporary observer recorded that 'The Dutch vessels which are handier to 
manoeuvre by the wind, overcome the Portuguese galleons very easily. The Dutch can take to flight when 
the wind is favourable to the enemy and attack when the enemy is low wind. To the Dutch any small wind 
is enough, while for the Portuguese vessels a half gale is necessary for movement' (Father Vincenzo Maria 
quoted in Cipolla 1965:88-9). 
The P01tuguese lost the naval battle in the 1620s (Boyajian 1993 :241) against the Dutch and their English 
al1ies. By 1623, the Dutch had 90 ships, 2000 regula.r troops and 20 fOIis in the East Indies (Israel 
1989:175). In 1630, the Dutch West India Company obtained a foothold in North East Brazil giving them 
access to sugar, tobacco and brazil-wood. 
The Ibelians were becoming entrapped in their old patterns of behaviour, belief systems and stake-holders. 
These are summalised in table 9.2. Standing out is the role of the Crown and heuristics associated with the 
reconquista paradigm. 
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Table 9.2 Entrapment of Iberian Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Paradigm Heuristics Sources of Entrapment 
Shipping industry 
- Use of artillery before ramming and - Use artillery before ramming and 
- Persistance of routines. Continued 
boarding (military strength). boarding. use oframrning and boarding tactic. 
- Crown support and mobilisation of - Crown as ultimate source of trade 
- Royal restrictions on trade routes in 
resources. revenue and control. Asia. 
- Crown organisations act as a store - Decentralised system of contracts. 
of knowledge and reduce transaction - Consul ado and Fidalgoes become 
costs. distributional coalitions. 
- Ship technology. - Craftsmen build by experience and - Persistence of routines. Failure to 
flIle of eye. adopt mathematical building 
- Improve naval technology to methods. 
compete with foreign navies. - Difficult to retrain to more 
mathematical ship-building 
techniques (persistance of routines) 
- Skill and Experience. - A number of rules of thumb, for 
example sail with the Atlantic wind 
system. 
- Reputation. - Arrogance. 
SU(;lporting Areas of Economy 
- Expansionary reconquista - Reconquista paradigm with - Failure to industrialise. 
Mentality. emphasis on Christian/military. 
- merchants aspire to status of - Reproductive Jesuit Education. 
nobility or clergy. 
- industry seen as low status with - Failure to industrialise. 
connections to Jews and Muslims 
- Natural resources of South America - Exploit natural wealth of south 
America 
9.6 Attempts at Reform 
"The empire in the East is like a ship that is sinking. Everybody shouts' we are foundering, but nobody pumps 
the water out". (Portuguese reformer quoted in G. V.Scammel The World Encompassed 1981 :290). 
As early as the 1620's, Iberians were aware of need for refonn. In the East, the Dutch were taking over 
POIillguese trade routes with supelior organisation, technology, strategies and resources. In the Atlantic, the 
Dutch dominated trade on the strength of their cargoes. However, the refonn program failed against the 
rigidities identified by institutional econorrllcs and posited in this thesis. 
An improvement in the quality and cost of Spain's own manufactures might have improved the situation. 
However, industrial advance was inhibited by the high cost structure of a successful economy. Spain's 
ability to increase its industrial output was aggravated by the high inflation caused by the inflow of silver 
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from the New World. So bad was Spanish inflation that foreigners could import Spanish wool, create 
finished woollen products which they would send back to Spain and still make a profit (Kamen 1983:228). 
In 1619, Sancho de Moncada would write 'the poverty of Spain has resulted from the discovery of the 
Indies' (quoted in Kamen 1983:234). Although caused by monetary inflation, the effect was similar to that 
noted in Vernon's life cycle with high domestic wages leading to a decline in the domestic industrial base 
with foreign locations taking up the reins. 
The only way for Sp~nish producers to combat the rising prices was to offer higher quality, but this was 
undelmined by a feeling of easy money, and a contempt for manual arts (Parry 1966, Hamilton, Landes 
1998). In both Spain and Portugal, the social order was characterised by social values that discouraged 
productive investment. The reconquista mentality did not produce technological advance in domestic 
industry. Money once eamed was not invested in industry. Successful merchants preferred to buy their way 
into the nobility. Wealth went into buildings, jewellery and other expensive accoutrements connected with 
a supelior social status. Altelllatively, it could be invested in unproductive personal loans and govemment 
bonds Guros) that paid higher interest rates than productive investments in agriculture or industry (Elliot 
1970:187). 
Industlialisation would have faced resistance from stakeholders in the existing system. Any attempt to 
industrialise would be made in the face of competition from high quality imports from Asia. In the absence 
of protection, local industries had little chance and traders benefiting from the existing system were unlikely 
to agree to the loss of their income. 
DllIing the sixteenth century, there had been a rising prejudice against trade. Merchants with converso 
(Jewish) backgrounds were pariiculariy keen to distance themselves from their merchant origins. A process 
occured similar to that identified in Marshall's life cycle of the firm in which third and fourth generation 
families lose the vitality that their fathers had. Fewer merchant's sons entered their father's professions 
(Pike 1972: 11 0). Many took the opportunity to raise their stalIls by becoming more closely connected to 
the prevailing reconquista system. For example, the third generation of the Jorge family, mentioned on 
page123, entered the church, the army and became major landowners. 
The path for refOlm was intensified when Philip IV (1621-1663) came to the throne. He appointed the 
Count-Duke of Olivares as first minister, someone who brought with him a mandate for change. Lamenting 
the state of Spanish technology, Olivares embarked on a reform program (Elliot 1970:188). However, 
Olivares soon lealllt the difficulty of introducing innovations into a system whose institutions and values 
were built for a different growth path. His refOlm programme encountered many of the obstacles we 
associate with organisational refOlm today, uncertainty, distrust, and opposition by vested stakeholders. 
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With the intention of tUl11ing Spaniards into merchants, Olivares established a number of Juntas dealing 
with trade and commercial activity (Kamen 1983:210). A number of 'new Christians' (conversos) with 
expelience as successful merchants went to Madrid and put forward their proposals. Unfortunately, while 
there was plenty of consensus on the need for change, agreement on the cure was less hard to come by 
(Boyajian 1993:191). The uncertainty associated with modem organisational change programmes was a 
commOll feature of the day. A number of writers in the 1620s, including the wealthy businessman and 
economist Dumie Gomes (mentioned on page 119), wondered whether the Portuguese lost their empire in 
the East because they had not become proper merchants dliven by commercial logic or, altel11atively, in 
becoming more like merchants they had lost the Imight spirit that eal11ed them the empire in the first place 
(Magelhaes Godinho 1993 :46). 
Gomes comment reflects a common divide at the time. The landed aristocracy asserted the old values 
associated with the land and the nobility. They disliked the growing influence of commercial ideas and 
new-wealth, pmiicularly with their association with New Christians. Fortunately, Madrid appreciated the 
importance of New Chlistians and Olivares actively protected them from the Inquisition (Boyajian 
1993:178). 
Gomes also recommended organisation refOlms. He had experience as a merchant in the Indian Ocean and 
suggested creating a POIillguese India Company in imitation of the Dutch company. His suggestion was 
supported by the Junta de Comercio who advised 'that it would be a good thing to resort to imitation, in so 
far as this is compatible with our temperament and disposition' (quoted in Elliot 1986:155). Olivares 
authOlised a charter for a POIiugllese company in 1628. To overcome fears of royal intervention, he 
attempted to distance the crown from the company, and created a company board consisting of a president 
and six directors chosen from prominent businessmen. However, experience of royal intervention in the 
past had left a legacy of distrust. 
Entrenched stakeholders presented another problem. In contrast to the Dutch East India Company which 
was created when their Asian trade was young, the POlillgllese had built up a century of stakeholders and 
interest groups who would not easily forgo their trading income to a monopoly. In the end, the crown had 
to give in to plivate interests and the company was only given a monopoly on the pepper trade, shipping and 
customs revenue (Boyajian 1993:192). It should be noted that the Dutch West India company encountered 
similar dissatisfaction on its formation. Despite effOlis to placate business interests, the Iberian company 
was launched in a hostile environment in 1628-9 and under-subscribed. Even the directors were reluctant to 
serve and invest in the company. 
Operations did not go well for the company. The company had some bad luck with a loss of a ship and 
timing which coincided with famine in Gujarat. However, company directors failed to change the most 
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crucial aspect of the Cape trade, the quality of shipping. The directors had no choice but to continue using 
the capital equipment they had inhelited or purchased from the royal administration but, even when they 
built new ships they stuck to precedents and ordered canacks. The persistence of routines and learned 
commercial behaviour is consistent with the hypothesis. The company was not successful and the Cape 
trade retumed to royal administration in 1633 after which the trade declined even faster. 
Olivares had intended the East India Company to be part of a 'Great Project' in which a number of 
interlocking trading companies would be created. The various companies would compete with the Dutch in 
trades from the Baltic to the Atlantic and the Illdiml Ocean. However, the scheme failed for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, a poorly designed incentive structure lJ1ldermined the scheme. The bureaucracy created to 
operate the scheme also had the responsibility of confiscating illegally traded goods. Officers of the 
company were paid in part out of any confiscations, an incentive system which at times made them very 
proactive. Their actions aggravated merchants in Antwerp who it was hoped would help fund the scheme, 
with the inevitable lack of co-operation (Israel 1990:221). 
Secondly, the company trading in the Baltic was intended to operate with the assistance of the Hanseatic 
nations but, they were scared to arouse the ire of the Dutch, Danes and Swedes, so gave the scheme a film 
and polite refusal. Only a Portuguese East India Company was created but it was under-capitalised and 
posed no threat to its Dutch rival before finally being liquidated (Boxer 1985:421). It was an experience 
that illustrated the difficulties of refOlm while under the pressure of competition. 
Attempts were also made to refolTll the Consulado and Casa de la Contracion which had become liddled 
with cOlTuption. However institutionalised relations stifled change as the Crown discovered it needed the 
Consulado as much as the Consulado needed the crown. The Crown was dependent on Consulado members 
for wealth and revenue. This relationship of dependence weakened the power of the state to effect change 
and the inquiry into its operations was dropped in return for a fine of 206,000 ducats (Elliot 1986:157). 
Institutionalised relationships and vested interests associated with the old economic system kept Spain on its 
old growth path. 
Finally, refonn was stifled as conflict between stakeholders in the old reconquista value system and the new 
market system became more visible. Antagonism towards new Christians was particularly notable. Much 
of this antagonism stemmed from the privi leges and honours the new Chlistians were receiving in retum for 
loans they made to the govemment. These privileges and honours might have otherwise gone to old 
Chlistians and built resentment between the two (Boyajian 1993:201). When Olivares fell from power in 
1643, New Christians were exposed to the full force of the inquisition (Ibid:183). Between 1640 and 1660, 
many converso merchants were forced to leave Spain to escape religious persecution (Hoberman 1991 :267). 
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The loss of capital, skill and trading networks fell into the hands of Spain's enemy, as many of those leaving 
fled to the Netherlands and bolstered their already growing economy. 
Olivares also attempted to reform the navy but encountered institutional resistance contained in the existing 
value system and vested interests. His naval refOlms included a vigorous shipbuilding programme 
(Goodman 1997: 17) which played some part in the defeat of the Dutch in Brazil. He also tried to break the 
aristocracy's hold on the highest positions of naval command. In 1624 he removed a top aristocrat from the 
position of captain general (Goodman 1997:225-7) and abolished the system of naval training for sons of 
the nobility (the training consisted of little seamanship). However, when Olivares fell from power, the 
system was reintroduced. He attempted to raise the status of seamen by removing the 'purity of blood' 
banier, necessary to gain knighthood of military orders to seaman who had provided 15 years service. The 
measure was defeated by existing conservative values and forces of the nobility. Olivares naval reforms 
were smashed on the rock of Castile's military tradition which had developed over the centuries of the 
reconquista. 'No mere decree by Philip III or Philip IV could change that overnight' (Goodman 1997:252). 
[n 1647, the Portuguese also uied to overcome the same inefficiencies by replacing nobility as officers with 
professional seamen with nautical Imowledge. Both officers and sailors opposed the system. The fidalgos 
(noblemen) refused to take orders from seamen and the new system was discontinued (Boxer 1969:217). It 
was not until the eighteenth century that professional seamen become the rule, not the exception. 
Neveliheless, not all Olivares' projects failed. The defense organised by Olivares in South America was 
highly successful. The POrUlguese recovered NOlihel1l Brazil and the Dutch were left only with Guyana on 
the nOlihel1l coast. In 1648, peace was signed with Spain, the Dutch having failed in their military goals in 
the Atlantic. However, their trading activities prospered pariicularly with the development of the island of 
Curacao as a trading depot. The island's good harbour and close proximity to the South American 
mainland provided a healthy shipping gateway to South America particularly for slaves which the Dutch 
brought from their forts on West Africa. The Spanish govel1lment would have liked to put a complete end 
to Dutch activities but, it became impossible to outlaw them, particularly when their own citizens benefited 
from the u·ade. Eventually, the Dutch trade in the Atlantic became too big to stop and was legitimised by 
Spain. 
The end of the Dutch war with Spain was not good for Portugal's Asian trade. Portugal had gained its 
independence from Spain in 1649. When the Dutch stopped fighting Spain, it freed up troops that could 
now be llsed to help expansion in the East Indies. Between 1648-52, 10,500 were sent to the Indonesian 
Archipelago and Ceylon (Israel 1989:245). With superior resources, the Dutch took over Portuguese forts, 
conquered Ceylon and South India obtaining a monopoly in cinnamon and large control of pepper. In 
Japan, where the POrUlguese were expelled for the religioLls activities of the Jesuits, the Dutch claimed 
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another monopoly. With elephants from Ceylon, Japanese copper and Spanish silver they had the 
commodities by which they captured Bengal trade. 
Then as now, growth fed on growth. Trading profits provided more capital for further investment. For 
example, the capital base of the VOC grew from 6.4 mil1i011 guilders in 1602 to over 40 million in 1660, 
even though it had paid out 62 minion guilders as dividends to shareholders (De Vlies and Van der Woude 
1997:670). 
9.7 Conclusion 
In the early seventeenth century, Europe experienced a crisis of which one feature was a crisis of over-
supply as l1ew competitors entered markets dominated by the Iberians. The Netherlands arose from the 
crisis on the back of new institutional and indusuial techniques. By 1648, tIle Dutch were undisputedly the 
greatest trading nation in the world (Boxer 1965:27). The pillars of growth included a geographic position 
that allowed it to develop its shipping skills free from strong competitive pressure. High invesnnent in 
labour saving technology across the economy reduced costs vis a vis competitors, including shipping where 
the fiuyt created a strong departure from past practice. Immigrants aided a process of catch-up, bringing 
capital and skills that sU'ongly complemented the growing commercial and shipping sector. Linkages were 
made into supporting industlies that provided cargoes and provided efficient shipping capital. The 
industries used wind and peat to produce energy far in advance of anything else in Europe. These energy 
sources were applied to technologies that reduced labour costs and added value of final output. When 
combined with the high investment in human capital, Dutch industry and commerce had higher value and 
lower cost inputs to undermine their economic su·ength. 
The Dutch trading empire sU'etched the globe, the activities in one part of the world providing commodities 
in demand in another. In that way, the different u'ades reinforced each other, becoming a collective system 
based on Amsterdam (Israel 1989:258). The mere size of the Dutch market created economies of scale that 
helped reduce u'ansaction costs. The Dutch economy represented the most efficient commercial system of 
its day. Indusu'ial output reinforced the canying shipping trade creating a high degree of interdependency 
between industry and commerce. 
As predicted by our thesis, the Ibelian nations lost their leadership, unable to adopt the innovations of the 
Dutch due to institutional resistance. There were many reasons why Ibelian merchants did not successfully 
adapt to the changing circumstances. These included the control exhibited by royal stake-holders, the 
persistence of once-successful routines, and an incentive/ value system that did not provide incentives to 
invest in indusuy It is worthwhile contrasting the heuristics of the Ibelians in table 9.2 with those of the 
Dutch in table 9.3. While the Ibelians failed to indusuialise, the Dutch developed a strong industrial base. 
While the Dutch developed standardised innovative ship designs, the Ibelians maintained their old 
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construction methods. While the Iberians never overcame the organisation problems of trading to Asia, the 
Dutch established and maintained tight control of operations and cornered the market in the Spice Islands. 
This was not a crisis of anyone firm but an economy-wide process of entrapment. The Iberian Peninsula 
was entrapped by the reconquista mentality and the institutions that helped propel it to leadership while, it's 
capitalist prospects were roped by distributional coalitions. As Elliot (1970: 187) states 'Castilians, it is 
said, lacked that elusive quality known as the "capitalist spirit". This was a militant society, imbued with 
the crusading ideal, accustomed by the reconquista and the conquest of America to the quest for glory and 
booty, and dominated by a church and an aristocracy which perpetuated those very ideals least propitious 
for the development of capitalism ... '. 
It is notewOlihy that successful institutional changes were made in the trade to the Indies after the War of 
the Spanish succession (170 1-l3) placed the Bourbons on the thrown of Spain, (Phillips 1990:97-8). The 
anival of foreigners on the throne broke the institutional linkages and a number of chartered companies 
were created to develop trade between Spain and the Indies. The Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas 
established in 1728 benefited in a boom in cacao and eventually wrestled the trade to Venezuela back from 
the Dutch. The Barcelona Company successfully penetrated the Indies trade with a consequent expansion 
in agliculture, shipbuilding, distilling and manufactming in Catalonia. Shipping volumes rose from about 
30 ships a year in the late 171 Os to about 100 in the late 1770s (Phillips 1990:98). 
By about 1750, Spain had regained its commercial monopoly over its South American empire (Phillips 
1990:97). However, the world was changing. III the NOlih Atlantic, new paths to growth were being built. 
The English and Dutch with a greater level of industrialisation were creating new products and adding value 
to cargoes that filled the hulls of their ships. So impOliant was this advantage that the Dutch who earlier 
displaced Iberian shipping needed no empire, and the British who later lost their American empire still 
enjoyed rapid growth in NOlih Atlantic shipping on the weight of this new road to wealth. This was a path 
to development that the industrially and technically weak Iberian nations were ill-prepared for. 
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9.3 Competitive Strengths and Related Heuristics of Dutch Shipping 
Source of Competitiveness Paradi2m Heuristics 
Shipping Industry 
- Organisation ofVOC. - Tight control of Asian Trade. 
- Tight control of sailing routes. 
- Possession of Spice Islands. - Corner market and establish strict 
control. 
- Superior Naval Force. - Trade with arms and invest in 
expensive fortifications. 
- Shipping Technology (esp: Fluyts) - Produce standard model as it 
and utilisation of standardised ship reduces costs. 
design. 
Supporting ASl2ects of Economy 
- Industrial Base (with high level of 
competition). 
- Supportive Government 
- Supportive Institutions (bourse, 
banks, etc) 
- Joint stock organisation 
- High level of Education 
- Dutch are best 
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Don Quixote tilts at windmills. In a golden period for Spanish art no work captured 
the changes in society more than the novel ' Don Quixote de la Mancha' by Miquel de 
Cerventes. In a dying age of chivahy, the book tells the story of an ageing Hidalgo who 
embarks on a career of a knight errant. In the end, Don Quixote is defeated by the 
'modern' and wellineaning figure of Sarnpson Carrasco, a student taking his bachelors 
degree at Salamanca. The author himself had no head for business and botched the 
govenunent posts he held, including procuring supplies for the famous Spanish Armada 
of 1588. 
In this scene our ageing hidalgo attacks some windmills that he has lnistaken for giants. 
Windmills had been introduced into Spain from the Netherlands twenty years earlier 
where they were used widely as a source of energy for industry (from Cervantes 1969). 
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Chapter 10 
Britannia Rules the Waves 
10.1 English Imitation of the Dutch 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, English shipping had achieved significant growth, but the 
English fleet was still much smaller than the Dutch and Iberians. However, the process of imitation 
continued, much of it led by the State. 
In imitation of the Dutch who had established a direct trade with the Spice Islands, the English created their 
own East India Company in December 1600. TIle East India Company quickly grew in significance and 
showed great flexibility, expanding into a number of new cargoes and routes. The company initially 
represented a forward linkage of the nation's woollen industry as it attempted to export English textiles. 
However, it found little demand in Asia for woollens so the company became import orientated with out-
going cargo dominated by bullion and the company developed a treasury department, which would obtain 
specie from Portugal. 
Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, the English East India Company suffered at the hands 
of the Dutch who had superior resources and organisation. Superior resources provided a number of 
advantages. Firstly, in times when competition reached a level that required an aggressive response, 
English fleets were always out-numbered. Secondly, the Dutch could provide local merchants with 
consistent demand based on regular ship visits (Milton 1999:252). By contrast, there might be up to four 
years between English visits at an Asian pOlio 
The Dutch also benefited from supetior organisation. Although all English voyages sailed for the same 
company, in reality each voyage was financed by different groups of subscribers. Consequently, each 
voyage paid its profits out to different people and calculated its profit separately. The result was intense 
inter-company tivalry and a lack of co-operation between voyages. This dramatically affected profit levels. 
For example, for some years the company had two groups of factors at Bantam, one representing the 
company's sixth voyage, the other representing the eight voyage (Ibid:251). Not only did this double the 
necessary expenses but the factors would compete for goods, bidding up the price. The separation of 
voyages also made it impossible to co-ordinate routes. While the Dutch could co-ordinate shipping to send 
cargoes to where they were most demanded, each English voyage was a loose cannon. 
In 1657, the English company re-organised in imitation of the Dutch model in which all voyages sailed for a 
permanent company. However, the English company was still less rigidly controlled than the VOc. In 
similar fashion to the POliuguese private trade, the EIC had allowed its crew and citizens based in Asia the 
181 
light to engage in inter-Asian trade as long as its own interests were not affected (Marshall 1987:279). 
Initially, this involved clandestine loading of plivate goods on company ships but eventually led to private 
traders charteling or buying locally owned ships. These shippers eventually started to include on their ships 
cargoes for Asian merchants. English trade in Asia now operated on two levels (i) an over seeing company 
which provided stability, political security mId some degree of co-operation and (ii) a flexible private trade. 
After the reorganisation, English trade grew dramatically. From 1640-1690, sales volumes grew from 
practically nil to 3.4 million pesos while the Dutch company only grew from 3.2 to 3.9 million (Steensgaard 
1990:113). 
While the Dutch company operated in the spice trade secure in its monopoly, the English company was 
forced to flexibly carve out new markets. Most important of these was the textile market. From the 1660's 
onwards, the EIC began to import into Europe cotton textiles from India. This required a change in 
consumer habits in England where wool was the nOlm. The product soon gained popularity as it allowed 
people the chance to wear lighter clothes in summer, and could be more easily modified as a fashion 
statement than the woolen products available at the time. However, growth was not even (Chaudhuri 
1978 :282). By the 1680's, when the trade to India was well established, many private traders began to 
challenge the EIC monopoly by illegally interloping on the trade. The response from the EIC was a strategy 
devised by the director Sir Josiah Child. That strategy was trade war, to dramatically step up imports so 
that the 'unreasonable itch of the interlopers might be put to an end once and for all' (ibid:285). To prevent 
the market from being glutted, Josiah Child also embarked upon a policy of diversification and market 
segmentation. He ordered his factors in India to send a vmiety of products to cater for different markets. 
For seamen and ordinary workmen, he wanted strong blue and white cloth, for citizens he ordered 'white 
middling', and for ladies and gentlewomen he requested fine white cloth. The strategy worked in 
eliminating the interlopers but overstretched the company's resources. The company was left with 
warehouses full of unsold stock As a result the company's credit collapsed and Sir Josiah Child was forced ' . 
to resign (Steensgaard 1990:113). This over-supply stands in contrast to the Richardson-type over supply 
situation which stems from lack of infOlmation on investment decisions of other suppliers. In this instance 
the company was in a strong position to detennine supply given its huge market power. This was a strategic 
consideration that nearly back-fired. 
In the North Atlantic Ocean, the English had been the first to learn, through trial and enol', the workings of 
the wind system (Ryan 1996:254). We could expect this to provide first mover advantages. However, the 
thinly populated North American market offered little in telms of markets or produce. In 1606, the Virginia 
Company (1606) was established to transpOlt a number of immigrants to North America. As the colonies 
grew, they would eventually SUppOlt Ellglish shipping by providing markets for English manufactured 
goods and providing raw materials. However, plior to 1640, the American and Caribbean trades would be 
of little commercial importance (Davis 1967 :9). 
182 
The wars between the Dutch and the Spanish dllling the first half of the seventeenth century, provided a 
degree of protectionism for English shippers to enter trades left under-served. However, when peace came, 
the Dutch reasse11ed themselves. The English could not compete with superior Dutch skill in commerce, 
shipbuilding and shipping management. Even in Britain's own American colonies, Dutch ships deprived 
the English of tobacco cargoes bound for Europe. 
The English response was a range of protectionist measures and an economy-wide process of imitation. 
The government introduced a series of navigation ordinances to restrict English trade to English ships or 
ships from which the cargo originated. Other vital fOlms of assistance included export bounties for wheat 
and other grains paid only if they were exported in English ships. They made it impossible for foreign ships 
to compete in these trades (Davis 1962:311). Most telling was a stinging export duty on coal carried on 
foreign ships, the effect of which was as telling as the Navigation Acts in ending Dutch competition (Davis 
1962:312, Wilson 1965:267). 
Naturally, the Navigation Acts of 1651 were not welcomed by the Dutch and, together with other disputes, 
f01med the grounds on which the two nations went to war. Over the following twenty years, there occuned 
three "Dutch Wars". English motives in the wars were clear. As the Duke of Albermarle stated 'What we 
want is more of the trade the Dutch now have' (quoted in Wilson 1965:165). The wars achieved this end. 
The Dutch colony of New Amsterdam, which had been a notorious loophole in the Navigation Acts, was 
captured by the English and renamed New York. The English captured a number of Dutch ships and in the 
process, expanded the range of ships in the English fleet to include supelior bulk carriers. This provided a 
balance to the strong and defensible English ships which were only superior in the more dangerous trades 
(Davis 1962:12-13). 
The wars illustrated the importance of English naval power in cementing English commercial activity in the 
N011h Atlantic; a protection without which, the English would have had trouble competing with the Dutch 
(Wi Ison 1965: 184). With royal navy protection, the navigation acts gave English shipping a monopoly in 
the N011h Atlantic just as population growth in the colonies created a significant market for outward 
shipping. The colonies also possessed imp011ant raw matelials for the return voyage. Timber came from the 
n011h while the southern and Caribbean colonies developed plantations from which English ships could 
transport tobacco, ginger, cotton, indigo and sugar. English shipping entered a period of rapid growth 
between 1660 until 1689 as England established itself as an entrepot, importing and re-exporting goods 
from its colonies. 
Imitation also occuned in shipbuilding, a process that included protectionism. In the 1660s, the Navigation 
Acts were extended to limit the use of foreign bui It ships (other than prizes captured in war) hence 
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protecting English shipbuilders from impOlis of Dutch-built fluyts. Dutch ships captured during the Dutch 
Wars had provided the English with bulk caniers but, as these ships aged and needed replacement, ship-
owners demanded replacements of a similar quality. Sllipbuilders were forced to respond to these higher 
standards of demand and reproduced something resembling the Dutch ships. It was in the northern ports at 
Whitby and Scarborough where this was most successful, fuelled by a demand for ships to transport coal. 
The lise of new shipbuilding centres reflects the suggestion by Nelson and Winter (1982) that areas strong 
on old routines are more likely to find it difficult to adopt new routines. The new areas of ship-building 
were unrestrained by the traditions of the sOllthem pOlis. 
Davis (1962:65) describes this process of adopting Dutch hull forms as the main technical development in 
English shipbuilding of the early eighteenth century. Under protection of the Navigation Acts, this process 
of 'catch up' was helped by the fact that Dutch technological advance was beginning to slow. 
As a result of the growth of lmowledge and capabilities, and the protection of the Navigation Acts shipping 
became one of England's fastest growing industries between 1560 and 1689 Tonnage mUltiplied nearly 
seven-fold in this time (Davis 1962:388). However, the English were not going to supplant the Dutch 
unless they could replicate the broader commercial-industlial base that underpinned their success. Much of 
the literature of the day promoted a deliberate imitation of the Dutch. Sir Joshua Child, influential director 
of the East India Company, listed several points where the English should follow Dutch economic practice 
including their encouragement of innovation in industry and trade, liberal fiscal regulations, and above all 
their banks and financial institutions which generated low interest rates and reduced the costs for Dutch 
businessmen. In 1693, he wrote: 
the prodigious increase of the Netherlanders in their domestick and foreign trade, riches, and multitude of 
shipping, is the envy of present, and may be the wonder of all future generations. And yet the means whereby 
they have thus advanced themselves are ... imitable by most other nations but more easily by us of this kingdom 
of England (from A New Discourse of Trade quoted in Chaudhuri 1978:5). 
Behind a wall of protectionism, England embarked on a path of industrialization, which was in effect a 
process of imitating the Dutch. From tumip husbandry to ceramics, there was scarcely an area of economic 
activity which did not have its origins across the Nmih Sea (Wilson 1965:361 
At Johnathon's Coffee House in 'Change Alley' a market for financial securities developed along similar 
lines to the Dutch bourse. Investment options included shares in companies such as the East India 
Company or stock issued by the Bank of England and by 1694, there were 50 listings on the exchange 
(Wilsoll 1965:223). The flow of capital was enhanced by a lise in the number of financial institutions. 
When goldsmiths started taking deposits and giving loans, they began to take on a banking function, while 
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their ability to create credit made money more freely available and helped to reduce interest rates. Interest 
rates were also reduced after the govemment introduced more efficient measures of money management. 
The process of imitation was made easier when William of Orange was made King of England in 1689. 
The Bank of England was created in 1694 in imitation of the Bank of Amsterdam and state finances were 
tightened on the Dutch model, providing a new level of stability in the financial environment. However, the 
role of capital and low interest rates should not be overstated. Most businesses at this time were internally 
financed from reinvested profits (Ibid:372-3). 
England also benefited from the influx of skills and technologicallmowledge of Huguenot craftsmen fleeing 
persecution in France. These craftsmen brought with them production lmow-how in precision instmments, 
watches, cutlery, fine textiles, glass and paper (Ibid: 195). 
Difficulties in adopting textile innovations once more illustrated that sometimes it is easier to introduce 
innovations to areas with no or little investments in an industry. In the case of the 'engine loom', 
difficulties of introduction came from stakeholders associated with the old technology. The engine loom (or 
Dutch loom) had been invented in the Dutch town of Leiden. With this machine one man could make 
ribbon equal to that previously made by fOUT. This ability to replace labour did not endear it to organised 
weavers in England who resisted its introduction for decades. In London, these looms were the cause of 
street I;Ots in which they were burnt. However, in Lancashire, where there were no well organised craft 
groups to oppose its introduction, it was in common use by the 1680s (Wilson 1965: 194). 
The successful process of imitation led observers to make comments about the English that we in the 
twentieth century became used to heming about the Japanese during their process of catch up. For example, 
the Swiss calico printer John Rhynier wrote in 1766 'that (the English) cannot boast of many inventions but 
only of having perfected the inventions of others ... ' (quoted in Mokyr 1990:240). 
Within a relatively short peliod, England had developed an industrial base that would fill their ships with a 
vast alTay of cargoes. Throughout the same penod, the popUlation of the North Amencan colonies was 
growing rapidly from 300,000 in 1700 to three million in 1776. Amenca was a welcome market for the 
new industrial goods. Blitish ships took cargoes of cordage, hats, leather, linens and silks to the markets in 
the West (Davis 1962:24). On the retu111 voyages, hulls contained products from American forests and sub-
tropical plantations. 
Shipping's expansion also reflected growing home demand for raw materials and foodstuffs (Davis 
1962:390), a reflection ofthe nation's growing wealth. The West Indies and Far East provided a new range 
of commodities (nce, tea and coffee) to import and re-export, but the fastest growing trade was with 
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America. By the middle of the century, the trans-Atlantic trade accounted for nearly half of all English 
shipping. 
Table 10.1 Tonnage of shipping cleared from British ports for foreign trades 
(000 tons) 
1686 1715-17 1771-3 
Meditenanean 18.8 30.3 29.1 
Spain and Portugal 24.2 44.l 39.9 
Northern Europe 55.2 47.9 89.3 
West Indies 34.0 35.7 104.5 
North America 33.1 40.3 99.0 
East India 8.4 4.3 13.9 
(source Davies (1962» 
10.2 English Advance and Dutch Entrapment 
The superiority of Dutch shipping dUling the seventeenth century was based on low cost and high quality 
cargoes, low cost shipping, a suppOltive government and a number of institutions that increased the 
efficiency of the supporting economy. However, other cOlmtries were successfully adopting components of 
Dutch success. This included French, Swedish, Danish and even ships from Brandenburg set up companies 
in competition of the VOC and WIC. Many of these firms were set up by Dutch merchants attempting to 
side-step the WIC and VOC monopolies. This suggests that with the initial trading risks overcome, the 
monopoly no longer served the nation's best interests. 
The biggest threat came from the English who had acquired skills, experience, organisational structure and 
economies of scale backed by a suppOltive government policy. 
10.2.1 Economies of Scale, Experience, Specialisation and Skills Over time the English developed 
skills, expelience and institutions by which they could more than compete with the Dutch. As trade 
developed on the North Atlantic, a number of improvements in productivity were achieved. (North 1968). 
As markets grew, ships carried more cargo and were less likely to travel in ballast. In other words, with 
growing economies of scale, shipping capacity was more fully utilised allowing shippers to reduce rates to 
compete. The growth of a regular and stable trade increased the flow of information on prices and supplies, 
increased the experience and knowledge of masters and mminers and, as markets became better organised, 
ships could spend less time in POlt and more time canying cargo. Specialist shipbrokers evolved who 
atTanged freight and, shipping agents to organise the loading and discharge of cargoes cut turn around times 
and delays which decreased the costs of transacting. 
Dynamic efficiencies also reduced costs. Changes in Jig design meant that instead of a few large sails, 
smaller sails were used which were both more numerous and more manoeuvrable making it easier to sail 
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against the wind. The development of the jib, head sails and helm wheel made it possible to sail into 
westerly winds opening up shorter routes across the Atlantic. The improvement in rig design also reduced 
labour requirements and costs. At the same time, improvements in packaging dramatically reduced costs of 
some commodities, in particular tobacco (Menard 1991 :263). 
The overall effect of these changes was a dramatic increase in efficiency. For example, the Atlantic tobacco 
b'ade enj oyed a 1.4% average annual decline in freight rates over 150 years during seventeenth and 
eighteenth century (Menard 1991 :256). By comparison, at the end of the sailing era, European shipping 
had reached a man-tonnage ratio of one man per 9-14 tons, a two to threefold gain over the Indian dhow 
system (Austen 1987:82). 
Increased expelience and organisation enabled the English to exploit more fully their shipping technology 
(French 1995:31). With greater expelience of geographic and navigation requirements, ships could make 
faster voyages while traders leamt to time their voyages to maximise buying and selling opportunities and 
reduce time spent in port. As knowledge of the trades was disseminated, it contributed further to expansion. 
Publications assisted this process and included such titles as Lloyd's List (1734), Murray's A Treatise on 
shipbuilding and Navigation (1765) and The Shipmasters Assistant and Owners Manual (1778). 
In the early days of English catch up, some scientific navigation had been acquired by most ship's masters. 
Acquiling skills in the most advanced technologies (cross-staffs, quadrants, etc.) was best done through 
practice at sea. However, as trade expanded, a greater Imowledge of mathematics was required. Some 
plivate teachers began to offer pre-sea training, which they combined with their other business as instrument 
makers or publishers of books on mmitime SUbjects. In 1673, royal interest led to the founding of a 
navigation school at Christ's Hospital, followed by more schools in 1701, 1715 and 1716 (Davis 1962: 125). 
The range of subjects taught can be gauged by 'Cutler & Groom' ofWapping who advertised themselves in 
1711 as: 
Teachers of Writing, Arithmetick, Merchants Acompts, Geometry, Algebra, Trigonometry, Navigation, 
Astronomy, Gunnery, Gauging, Dialling, Perspective, Measuring; the use of Globes, and all other 
Mathematical Instruments, the Projection of the Sphere, 011 any Circle, etc. (quoted in Davis 1962: 125). 
The effect of greater precision in navigation was faster, safer voyages that reduced costs and maximised the 
use of shipping capital at the time. As in earlier economies, institutions and innovations evolved to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs. Ports such as Liverpool, Hull, Bristol and Exeter grew into major cities, each 
with their growing arsenal of docks, shipyards, wharves and warehouses. In 1707, the Act of Union was 
signed and Scottish ships and ports, pmiicularly Glasgow also contIibuted to the growth. 
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10.2.2 Government Policy and Complementarity with Military InstitutionsThe most obvious exercise 
of government policy that benefited shipping was the naval strength that defeated the Dutch and enforced 
the Navigation Acts. With naval protection, not only did the British have a monopoly on the American 
market but, it now had cheap and plentiful supplies of timber and other resources for ship-building at a time 
when tradition Dutch sources in Norway and Poland were showing signs of depletion (Unger 1978:60-1). 
Britain's geography gave it a dramatic competitive advantage in establishing a powerful navy. A large 
natural endowment of Sussex iron meant the Blitish could make guns at quarter the price of bronze. 
English ships were all well-equipped with a "heavy weight of broadside". Perhaps the biggest geographic 
advantage was its physical separation from her European livals by sea. Britain did not need to need a large 
standing almy and could channel most of its defense into shipping. The Dutch could not afford this luxury 
since they shared a border with France and Spanish tenitOlies (Kennedy 1976: 19). 
The Navigation Acts were only one part of a huge wave of protectionism behind which the imitation 
process was conducted in the late seventeenth century. The government provided subsidies to industries, 
bounties for expOlis, prohibitions of imports, protective taliffs, etc (Davis 1962:300). The government also 
introduced an alTay of suppOliive legislation. To protect ship-owners, the death penalty was introduced to 
deter masters from deliberately destroying their ships. In 1730, attempts were made to regulate wages and 
conditions of merchant seamen and put an end to destructive squabbling. In 1735, restrictions were put on 
the liability of ship-owners whose cargoes were embezzled by their crews (if the owners themselves were 
innocent paliies) (Davis 1962:313-4). 
The navy was both a benefactor and contributor to the growth of English shipping. Through naval battles 
with other European powers, Britain acquired and expanded colonies with which its ships could trade. This 
trade in tum gave the English gove1llment further economic activity to tax and finance further naval 
expansion. In this way, the navy and merchant marine propelled each other on a mutually reinforcing path. 
The navy also reduced costs for British shippers by eliminating piracy. In the early Atlantic trade, few 
individual shippers would take action against pirates because of the lisk it entailed and the benefits would 
have gone to others who did not contJibute to the action. If the English had a company like the East India 
Company in the Atlantic, these external economies would be intemalised. However, private shippers were 
unlikely to give away their trading freedoms to a monopoly company, so it fell to the Royal Navy to 
suppress piracy. Merchants organised themselves to pressure govemment to provide protection (Price 
1991 :295). However, it was not in the government's interest to pay for naval intervention unless trade 
reached levels that justified those costs (Walton 1970: 130-7). These levels were reached in the eighteenth 
century and had dramatic effects on the productivity of shipping. Shippers could spend less money on 
almaments, for example, in 1729-30, the average ship operating in the Jamaica trade carried 34 guns per 
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100 men. By 1768, this had fallen to 5. The declining need for defense similarly reduced the manning 
requirements on board. It also allowed shippers to use ships more specifically devoted to carrying cargo. 
Finally, with fewer losses due to piracy, insurance costs fell; the 1770 rate being two-thirds the 1635 rate, 
and they continued to fall throughout the first half ofthe nineteenth century. 
The imp011ance of naval power was confinned during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), when superior 
naval power enabled the British to capture Quebec and other French territories in North America. At the 
same time, French co~petition in India was neutralised (Keay 1991 :339). When Spain entered the war on 
the side of France, Britain took the opportunity to seize the Spanish colonies of Florida, Tobago, Granada, 
Dominica, and St Vincent. However, France and Spain got their chance for revenge when the British 
colony in North America fought its war of independence. French and Spanish forces threw their weight 
behind the Americans. With the loss of the American empire, the British were at first scared they had lost 
access to valuable resources and profitable markets. However, Britain had spent the last century building 
LIp its industrial base and independence did not stop the American desire for British manufactured goods. 
The Atlantic trade continued to grow. 
Several institutions were created to promote the advance of technology. In 1662, the founding of the Royal 
Society of London grouped together scientists with a prime objective of advancing technological prowess. 
Of its eight committees, the 'Mechanical' was the largest, followed by the 'History of Trade' (Wilson 
1965: 186). Industry became the subject of intense scientific investigation. Robert Boyle examined mining 
and metallurgy, while Robert Hooke and William Petty investigated shipbuilding, pumps, and various kinds 
of engines. All three presented papers on textile dyeing. 
Of more direct imp011ance to shipping was the appointment of the Astronomer Royal and the founding of 
the Royal Greenwich Observatory in 1665 to solve problems of navigation and in particular the 
detennination of longitude. Govemment offered rewards for the development of technology to measure 
longitude at sea, eventually leading to the success of Harrison's chronometer in 1759. This invention was 
one which N011h and Thomas (1973:3) suggest would have occurred sooner if the nation had enforceable 
property lights that secured the inventor retum for his income. However, Harrison received funding from 
the admiralty as he progressed which enabled him to resource his research. Secondly, the award of 20,000 
pounds was equal to a million dollars in 1989 telms (Merson 1989), a sufficient incentive for anyone. 
[n 1768, the Royal Society persuaded the crown to finance an expedition to the Pacific from where the 
transit of Venus could be observed providing data which could aid navigation. The resulting voyage of 
James Cook, in his Whitby-built colliers, also opened up commercial possibilities in the Pacific. The sextant 
also came out of the British hot-bed of innovation and helped to more exactly measure latitude (Bosscher: 
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I 995a:9). Equally important were James Lind's efforts to combat scurvy. Once achieved this dramatically 
reduced the costs of labour as fewer men fe11 sick and died. 
10.2.3 Organisation In the Asian trade, British naval might was less important than commercial 
competitiveness. In the Indian Ocean, the Dutch had gained much competitive strength from their 
organisation and capture of the spice islands. However, from the second half of the seventeenth century, the 
VOC faced an increased level of competition, especially from the reorganised English East India Company. 
The Dutch responded to this surge of activity by re-committing itself to the old growth path. It reinforced 
its monopoly by closing down the pepper emporium at Bantam from which these countries were getting 
their supplies and closed other gaps on the Coromandel coast. By 1689, the VOC had achieved substantial 
control of the spice and pepper trade. 
While the Dutch were escalating their commitment to the markets in which they had already invested much, 
markets were changing. These products had dominated early Asian trade but, by 1668-70, they constituted 
only 57% of the company's revenue and only 37% in 1698-1700. The VOC had placed much investment in 
securing products with declining market share. Between 1680 and 1720, the returning tonnage grew by 
125%. However, revenue grew only 78% (de Vries and van der Woude 1997: 437). The growth had not 
contributed to increased profit. 
The English and French, who had less commitment to spices and pepper, diversified quickly into textiles, 
tea, coffee, porcelain, saltpeter and other goods for which an elastic European demand was beginning to 
appear. Dutch commitment to the spice islands represented asset specificity with little potential for 
development. By contrast, the English company, in a more uncertain position, had to try something new 
and made the first bold but risky attempt to market Indian calicoes in Europe. With less sunk capital, the 
EIC could easily adopt new areas of trade with far greater potential. 
Paradigms built on past success burdened the Dutch with extra costs that undennined their profitability. 
Forts and ganisons had always been a vital component of Dutch activities in Asia, an investment nonn that 
had its oligins as trading waniors going to battle the Spanish and Portuguese (Geyl YoU, 1961:184). 
Chaudhuri(l985:87) states the Dutch did 110t trade peacefully because they believed that neither the 
P01iuguese and Asian rulers would allow them to trade without the sanction of anns. It was part of the 
ideology of the day inherited from the days of the Portuguese. It had brought results as they carved out 
their spice monopoly and other tenitories. However, the English, Danish and French companies did not 
attempt to maintain a monopoly and had far lower operating costs. A decision to de-militarise would not 
have been an easy one. Sir Josiah Child had in fact suggested the English company should increase their 
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military presence in Asia on account of the advantages it gave. However, as time proceeded, it became 
more apparent that these military investments restricted flexibility and undermined profitability. 
Declining competitiveness also reflects the increased formalisation that we would expect from the 
hypothesis. The Dutch had always controlled their Asian activities very strictly from their headquarters in 
Batavia. This tight control was vital in the maintenance of the monopoly. It was, however, a barrier to the 
development of new markets. By contrast, the English faced less restrictions and operated a decentralised 
decision-making process which made it easier for traders at the ground level to seize opportunities as they 
arose. This was most important in their successful manoeuvre in the complicated and volatile textile 
market. By contrast, the Dutch rules might have maximised profits during stable periods but, in times of 
changing markets they prevented flexibility. 
A palticular difference between the English and Dutch companies was that the English East India Company 
actively promoted the development of a plivate trade within Asia. This gave the English trade more 
flexibility and promoted the raising of capital from new sources. By contrast, the VOC vigorously fought 
the development of plivate trade, which ironically encouraged corruption among its servants (Mc Pherson 
1993:204). 
VOC rules also affected navigation. Navigators complained that the restrictions placed on them to give 
their ships faster times were too restrictive, even when deviations from the rules resulted in faster voyages 
(Gaastra and Bruijn 1993:196). 
Tight control also characterised ship-building, OWTI1ng and freighting activities of the VOc. In 
shipbuilding, management in both the Dutch East India company and the Admiralty made the final decision 
on the shape and arrangement of the product coming out of the yards, decisions previously made by the 
master builder (Hoving 1995:41). With increased centralisation and rules from above, the opportunities for 
the spontaneous introduction of innovations and experiments were much reduced. By contrast, the English 
East India Company contracted out many activities. This was a result of earlier financial hardship when the 
company was forced to sell of some of its operations. It is uncertain whether this resulted in a more 
efficient structure, as Bruijn notes some of the English contracts became hereditary (quoted in Neal 
1990:222). A self perpetuating group of shippers arose with similar ligidities to that ofintemal control. 
Monopolistic arrogance led to a strategic blunder which opened a window of opportunity for the English. 
The Dutch had always enjoyed a favourable position in the tea trade as Chinese junks brought tea to 
Batavia. In 1718, the VOC attempted to exploit its strong position by offering the Chinese fixed prices 
much lower than normal. The offended Chinese refused to come to Batavia for five years, thus creating an 
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opportunity for the VOC's competitors to buy tea directly from the Chinese. By 1723 when the junks 
retumed to Batavia, competition was well established (Neal 1990:218). 
The Directors at Batavia were not unaware of the deteriating sihIation. In the early years of the eighteenth 
century, they wrote: 
The profits have turned into losses, trade is declining, the competition of the English, French, Portuguese, 
Chinese and Moors, cannot along this extensive coast-line be checked, the spending capacity of the population 
is diminishing, the sale of cloths... is not one fifth of what it used to be (De Jonge, De opkomst van het 
Nederlandsche gezag in Oost-ludie, VIlI pgl16ft) quoted in Geyl Yol.2 196 [:348). 
And profits were declining (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997:447). Although average profit had only 
declined from 2.1 million guilders in the 'Golden Age' to 2 million guilders in the period 1680-1730, that 
profit was eamed on a far larger investment base. Average rehlm on investment had decreased from 
approximately 6% to 3.4% over the same peliod. 
10.2.4 Technology and Supporting Industries This situation was made worse by the fact that Dutch 
naval technology was no longer in the forefront of labour-saving devices. In contrast to the sihlation in the 
late sixteenth century when the fiuyt dramatically reduced manning ratios, c.p Thunberg, a Swedish 
traveller betwen the years 1770 and 1779 observed that 'The Dutch have also occasion for a greater number 
of men to work their ships than other nations, as their ligging is made after the old fashion with large blocks 
and thick cordage, heavy and clumsy in every respect' (Thunberg 1795: Voll ,113). 
The Dutch were entrapped by the production methods and capabilities that had allowed them to gain their 
mantel of leadership. In the early seventeenth century Dutch map makers and publishers had provided their 
captains with the best literahlre in charts in the world. The Dutch continued to reproduce these old masters 
while the French and English began producing globes, maps and charts of greater accuracy (Boxer 
1965: 165-7). While Dutch rivals began applying science to shipbuilding and navigation, spherical 
trigonometry remained a mystery to the average Dutch navigator who as late as 1740 was still reliant on the 
old fashioned manuals. 
In some cases, the Dutch were prevented by geography from keeping up with the English. Their silting 
waterways restricted the use of larger ships, including three decked ships that needed a deeper draught. The 
same geographic conditions (shallow intemal waterways) which once proved an advantage to the Dutch, 
prevented the adoption of technological innovations, an example of factor-specific technological 
advantages. 
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Much of the blame has been attributed to the low level of interest in improvements in navigation shown by 
the company's 17 directors (Heren XVII). Declining ROI and exposure to increased international 
competition should have shaken the VOC out of its complacency but the Heren XVII had become an elite 
group increasingly distant from the operations of the company. Unlike in England, where the Ere's charter 
was regularly renewed and stock-holder's could pressure change, the Dutch charter only came up for 
renewal on an irregular basis (Neal 1990:221-2). Power was firmly in the hands of the 17 directors. The 
structure of the whole Asiatic trade rested on a small privileged group, among whom an even smaller 
number were entrusted with the company's actual direction (Geyl 1961 :354-5). In Hirschman's (1970) 
terminology, there was little chance to exercise 'voice', leaving exit as the only form of complaint for stock-
holders. However, the power of 'exit' as a force for change was restricted by the secrecy surrounding the 
company's accounts and the practice of paying substantial dividends even when trading results did not 
wanant it. 
The pattern of entrapment and isolation of decision makers was repeated throughout the economy and 
affected suppOlting industJies. In the early days, Amsterdam had an active trading ethos kept alive by the 
continuous migration of merchants and the lise of these new men into the cities ruling class (NOlth 
1997:53). However, after 1680, the rentier (gentleman of leisure living on their investment incomes) 
mentality began to gain ground. Members of the Regent class who once relied on monitoring trade to draw 
their revenue could now live off the incomes provided from land, investments and annuities (Boxer 
1965:31). They might still possess ties to trading activity but the close association of the past had gone. 
This was pmticu1arly telling in the VOC, leading industlies and the govemment itself. Whereas once, 
govemment office holders were involved in and understood commerce, over time, the merchant and regent 
class became separated. For example, of the 24 Amsterdam burgomasters between 1718 and 1748, only 
two of them were active merchants (Boxer 1965:47). The practice of electing officials for life meant that 
little could be done to shake the Regents from their entrenched position of political power. 
DUling the period of growth in the late fifteenth century, the Dutch economy had been characterised by 
equality and social mobility as new development paths opened up oppOltunities for advancement. By the 
eighteenth century, society had a static class structure with an urban patriarch entrenched at the top. As 
Schama (1987:597) notes, by the eighteenth century 'the great "family" of Dutch culture was in the course 
of breaking into poor and rich kin'. 
The social petJification in the Netherlands stood in stark contrast to the emerging social and economic 
mobility in England. New industlial technologies and trading opportunities provided a platform by which 
many Englishmen managed to break through social baniers and improve their status. While, the urban 
merchants of the Netherlands had evolved into an urban patriarchy, England was characterised by high 
social mobility. Merchants and bankers such as William Cockayne, Josiah Child and Charles Duncombe 
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bought large estates, acquired titles and married their daughters into the aristocracy. At the same time, the 
younger sons of gentry, who did not receive inhelitances, often entered trade to make their fortunes. The 
result was a 'marriage of town and country, of merchant and landed wealth', a relationship which could 
come to dominate the English economic and social system (Wilson 1965:10). This gentrification of the 
merchant class would later be interpreted in Marshall's life cycle as bad for on-going entrepreneurial drive. 
However, it serves as a reminder that social incentives are equally important as profit in generating 
entreprenelllial activety. 
The Netherlands were entrapped in the production techniques of old. Across the nation, industrial 
technique stagnated. In 1779, an industrialist stated 'One cannot refrain from observing that there are very 
few industries or trades here which are not in need of improvement' (quoted in Boxer 1970:259). In 
Leiden, which once led technological advance in textiles, the industry was now criticised for the lack of 
initiative and aversion to new methods that existed among industrialists and employers. It was a sign of 
entrapment that marked the whole economy. As Boxer (170:259) states, 'What was good enough for their 
ancestors was good enough for them and this appears to have been the marked trait of Dutch society in the 
closing decades of the Periwig period'. 
The stagnation in domestic innovation was OCCUlTing at a time when other nations were also catching up in 
many of shipping's supporting industries. In the 1660s, the French King Louis XIV and his finance 
minister Colbeli introduced a mercantalist program with many components of a modem 'infant industry' 
program. It involved direct state intervention in the economy to encourage commercial and industrial 
expansion (Lee 1984: 166). The state raised impOli duties and attracted skilled Dutch artisans by providing 
loans and premises to launch businesses in France. This spelt bad news for the Dutch, for France had been 
their biggest customer. Eventually, French textiles displaced the Dutch in the Ottoman market, while 
French ships began to dominate the MeditelTanean. The Leiden textile industry, which 'gave Dutch shipping 
a key cargo, went in decline. However, France was just one of many nations to embark on a process of 
'catch up' and gaining the industrial techniques developed by the Dutch. The same process could be seen in 
Prussia, Russia, Ausuia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Britain. The Russian Tsar, Peter the 
Great, even spent time working in a Dutch shipyard before returning home and establishing a Russian 
shipbuilding industry (Israel 1989:383). Govemment intervention combined with the importation of Dutch 
techniques and skilled workers ate into the Dutch competitive lead. 
Once these other nations had leamt the leading indusu'ial techniques, the Dutch found themselves in an 
infelior position due to high wages. Like Spain and POIiugal before them, the Dutch had their hands tied by 
population resu'aints which pushed up wage levels. van Zan den (1993 :40) goes as far as arguing that labour 
supply was the central variable in the growth of the Dutch economy. At the end of the seventeenth century, 
Pieter van Dam complained that in the early days, the VOC could enlist seamen for 8 or 9 florins a month, it 
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now had difficulty attracting staff with rates of 10 or II florins with a month's wages bonus thrown in 
(referred to in Boxer 1965:72). These rising wage rates are consistent with Vernon's cycle in which 
industry was transplanted to new locations to reduce costs (although in this instance we are not driven by 
foreign direct investment. It is worth noting that the Dutch were big investors in the British finan~ial 
markets (see Boxer 1970:260)). 
The high cost of wages had been a key force in developing labour saving technology but now, foreign 
nations were catching tlp faster than labour-saving solutions were being found by the Dutch. Furthermore, 
the declining economic conditions were beginning to discourage investment in new teclmologies. To some 
extent, technical advance in industry can be explained by the limited possibilities. Windmills had reached 
the upper limits of their power generating capabilities (De Vries 1976:94). Peat could not generate the 
intense heat needed in metallurgy or steam power. Consequently, it could not achieve the technological 
break-throughs that the English achieved with their plentiful coal supplies. The development path that took 
the Dutch to riches had in many ways reached a dead end determined by their factor endowment. 
The Dutch now started to incur that loss of momentum identified by Porter (1990) in declining related 
industJles. For example, with fewer ships bringing in sugar from the West Indies, the number of sugar 
refineries in Amsterdam declined to 34 in 1668 to 20 in 1680 (De VIles and van der Woude 1997:466). By 
the 1720s and 1730s the Dutch were expellencing a selious collapse in their industrial sector (Israel 
1989:377). By the second half of the eighteenth century, the industrial decline was widespread, although 
some industJies such as diamond cutting and paper making survived on the basis of the high quality of their 
output (Boxer 1970:255). 
The nation still had a wealth of capital and financial expertise. But, industrial decline did not make it a 
preferred target of investment. Investors were criticised for investing abroad not locally (Boxer 1970:260) 
and, many sought preference in the secmity of public funds (Unger 1978:9). 
Entrenched commercial rationality and social-incentives seems to have contributed to the situation. Boxer 
(1970:261) believes part of the lack of industrial advance can be explained by the merchant values behind 
the nation's commercial tradition. The merchant enjoyed a much higher social prestige than the 
industrialist. If an industrialist or craftsman built up a capital base he would set himself up as a merchant 
and bring up his sons as merchants (ibid). It seems to be yet another example of enduring incentives and 
values from an old successful paradigm. However, De Vries and Van der Woude (1997:692) dispute this, 
as merchants were well aware of the impOliance of industry for their tJ·ade. They believe the biggest barrier 
was 'the structural unviability of most industrial production'. High interest rates, high wages and a strong 
guilder reduced the competitiveness of Dutch Industry while declining markets discouraged investment in 
productivity improving investments. 
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To overcome the high cost structure of the economy, the logical response of the government would have 
been to reduce taxes to help competitiveness. However, an expensive war with France put a halt to any 
chance the government would do this. Furthermore, the war had increased the government's debt. The 
national debt, which stood at 30 million guilders in 1688, had risen to 148 million by the end of the war of 
the Spanish succession (Boxer 1965: I 05). This increased demand for finance increased interest rates. By 
contrast, in 1709, the English Treasury could sti II bonow money at 6% but the Netherlands had to pay 9%. 
The most sel;ous industrial decline occuned in ship-building which suffered from entrapment fully 
anticipated by the thesis. In 1707, there had been 306 vessels under construction in the Zaan region. This 
declined to 25 in 1770 and, in 1793 there was I (Boxer 1970:256). But long before 1793, Dutch 
shipbuilders were failing to provide their shippers with capital goods superior to those built in other 
European nations (Unger 1978:62). Shipbuilding had entered a period of technical stagnation. In his 
definitive work on Dutch shipbuilding, Unger states (1978:59) that some degree of apathy in ship design 
was justified. The leading sailing ship technology had proven to be highly efficient, and improved 
commercial organisation was reducing freight rates without any improvements in design. But, while Dutch 
builders were content to rely on the successful fOllnulas of the past, builders in the rest of Europe had 
acquired many of the skills of the Dutch ship carpenters and were improving those skills at a faster pace 
(ibid: Ill). Outside the Netherlands, more and more shipwrights designed their ships on paper which made 
it easier to introduce innovations (Hoving 1995:38). Dutch failure to adopt these changes at the same rate 
illustrates yet another example of trying to change successful routines built up over time (Nelson and Winter 
1982). The process of 'catch up' by foreign nations meant all European merchant shippers now had similar 
capital goods. 
Much of the decline was associated with the loss of markets as other nations caught up and met their own 
needs. Shipbuilding was an industry that many foreign governments protected and subsidised. They 
imported Dutch craftsmen and technologies such as saw mills (Unger 1978:9). At the same time as export 
markets disappeared, other areas of demand went into decline. The declining market reduced the 
opportunity to experiment and reduced the need and facilities for training. The result was a self-reinforcing 
downturn in production (ibid:94). 
[n France, where schools were established with gove1l1rnent support as a substitute for guild-based training, 
shipbuilding became a subject w0l1hy of scientific investigation. In the Netherlands, by contrast, there was 
no effort to improve training. Dutch joumeymen were not averse to actually decreasing the training 
programme. At a time of declining markets, they were keen to protect their employment from future 
competition. The stagnation was also seen in the equipment used by Dutch shipwrights, there being little 
change in hand tools used (ibid:60). The industry had suffered from entrapment associated with increased 
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centralisation, a consequence of a number of forces. As ships became larger, it increased capital 
requirements of shipbuilders, making it more expensive and more difficult for new entrants to enter the 
industry. Those already in the industry cemented their position through their connections and superior 
organisation skills which gave them superior access to resources and labour, further serving as a barrier to 
newel1trants. By 1750, it was almost impossible for new entrants to enter the industry. Shipbuilding came 
to be controlled by older families with established wealth. The industry became centralised around a small 
number of contractors or managers who integrated their shipbuilding operations with other businesses like 
wood dealing, ship owning and trading (ibid:96). The emphasis of this new organisation stmcture was on 
organisation of the wharf and lower cost production rather than improved design (ibid:86 and 109). It 
reflects another example of the movement from product to process technology identified by Abernathy and 
Utterback (1975). 
As ships became larger and more complex, managerial tasks became more important and the distance 
between the contractor and skilled carpenter increased (Unger 1978:84). The industry which before 1600 
had little in the way of hierarchy was by 1700 charactelised by strict class divisions (ibid:95). There were 
even graduations among the journeymen. As owners became increasingly divorced from the master 
joumeymen, who were now only employees, a vaCUllm emerged with no one responsible for improving the 
technical quality of the ships (ibid: 117). 
As the factory structure replaced the older craft stmcture, guilds became increasingly irrelevant and 
counter-productive. The mayors aJld aldennen of towns took greater control of the guilds while their 
activities became more fonnalised and more regulatory (ibid:89). They became tied down by mles. These 
rules were created over time in response to specific problems as they arose. However, once made, the rules 
were only changed with difficulty. As a consequence, ship carpenters' guilds became more restrictive of the 
activities of members. Meetings became less regular and more concerned with governing duties. Even at 
the VOC yards, standardised ship design had been adopted to reduce the cost of shipbuilding and repair, 
and the company shipbuilder found that rules and regulations took away the master shipwright's opportunity 
to expeliment and introduce innovations (Hoving 1995:41). The industry was losing its capacity to engage 
in what, in National Systems oflnnovation is called, exploring or searching. 
The guilds had a positive effect on shipbuilding technology in times of growth but during stagnation and 
decline, their goals changed. They became more protective of their market, adopting characteristics of a 
distributional coalition. Interest in building facilities took second place to siclmess, accident, and old age 
funds of members (Unger 1978:84). The openness to labour mobility was replaced by a fear of 
unemployment and rules that gave preference to local workers (ibid:91-2). Wage fixing reduced 
competition and flexibility, and removed an opportunity to reward an especially productive or inventive 
worker (ibid:100-3). Guilds also sought protective legislation from their town govemments, obtaining laws 
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which required local shippers to have their ships bu1lt and repaired in the home town. This increased the 
cost to ship-owners and merchants. Although the town governments were controlled by the merchants 
themselves, they passed the acts to ensure their supply of capital goods. 
The Dutch had lost the competitive advantage they had previously acquired from their superior capital. 
Although the admiralty brought in Blitish shipbuilders to introduce new techniques, ambiguity over the 
results meant little changed (Hoving 1995:38). In fact, both Hoving (1995:38) and Bosscher (1995a) claim 
that Dutch building techniques could still compete with the British. This suggests the decline of 
shipbuilding technology played only a secondary role to factors such as the loss of markets. The protection 
that foreign governments imposed acted as a selection mechanism but the Dutch did not respond with a 
Downie-style Innovation mechanism as they were entrapped in past technique. Nor can the initial change of 
leadership be attributed to a significant techno-economic leap or punctuated equilibrium which Perez and 
Freeman suggest might lead to a change of leadership. The British took the lead with a series of small 
improvements across the economy 
10.3 Conclusion on Dutch Decline 
The Dutch decline is consistent with the hypothesis. By 1675, the English and French had overtaken the 
Dutch in the Atlantic Ocean (Emmer 1998: I 07). For a period, the Dutch gained some competitive 
advantage from this position of wealmess. The Spanish would certainly prefer to see a strong Netherlands 
than a strong England that had the resources to pose a greater long-telm threat. The Dutch thus became the 
prefeITed provider of shipping and commercial services to the Spanish colonies. In the 1680s and 1690s the 
island base of Curacao prospered as holder of the asiento, the contract to provide Spanish America with 
slaves. However, after the War of the Spanish succession, even this was lost to England's new South Sea 
Company. 
Although much of this entrapment can be explained in terms of resource endowment and military 
accomplishment, in many ways, the battle with the English was just another form of protectionism during a 
catch Lip process. Dutch decline supports the hypothesis of institutional entrapment. Advance was also 
restticted by rules that restricted flexibility. These rules increased profitability dUling periods of growth but 
prevented Dutchmen from adapting to new opportunities. As Klein (1977) would state, static efficiencies 
were gained at the expense of the dynamic. Rules were also one way increasingly distant decision-makers 
could control activities but, as the distance grew, these decision makers left their underlings with 
inappropriate incentives. The persistence of these rules could be interpreted in a number of ways, from the 
institutionalisation of incentives to the dangers of a tightly controlled mechanistic organisation, but there is 
no denying that the rules and hemistics were based on an earlier successful pattern of competition which 
changed in the eighteenth century. The rules and heuristics that tied Dutch resources to a slow path might 
not have been so damaging if new entrants could aITive with new ideas. Unfommately, across the economy 
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people were protecting themselves staking their claim and fonning distributional coalitions. Like the 
shipbuilding guilds, their concern was protecting their position not advancing technology. Finally, the 
decline is also associated with factor specificity of technology in peat, wood and wind that were not 
applicable to the new technologies that the Blitish were about to unleash. 
As Hoving (1995:41) notes 'The unbridled energy, the over-enthusiastic belief in the endless possibilities 
the world had to offer that seemed to characterise the beginning of the seventeenth century, is painfully 
missing in the eighteenth'. Once decline had set in, it gave birth to mistrust and jealousy (Boxer 1970:262). 
For example, political divisions that had always existed now deepened and undelmined attempts at refonn. 
Inter-provincial jealousies sometimes prevented agreement on improvements of road and canals that crossed 
boundalies while, pro and anti-orange factions blocked each other's sensible suggestions for reform. 
Table 10.2 Entrapment of Dutch Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Paradigm Heuristics Sources of Entrapment 
Shipping Industrv 
- Organisation ofVOC. - Tight control of Asian Trade. - VOC rules creat barrier to entry and 
Heren XVII become Distributional 
coalition. 
- Tight control of sailing routes. - little innovation in routes. 
- Possession of Spice Islands. - Corner market and establish strict - Escalation of Commitment to Spice 
control. Islands during times of changing 
markets. 
- Superior Naval Force. - Trade with am1S and invest in - Persistence of routines with 
expensive fortifications. continued investment in arms which 
raises costs vis a vis competitors. 
- Rules that emphasise costs reduce 
- Shipping Technology (esp: Fluyts) - Produce standard model as it innovation in design 
and utilisation of standardised ship reduces costs. - Owners become more distanced 
design. from production 
Supporting Aspects of Economy - Guilds become a distributional 
- Industrial Base (with high level of coalition. 
competition). - Factor specificity (peat/wind) 
reaches end of technical possibilities. 
-shortage of coal supplies. 
- Urban Oligarch becomes 
distributional coalition. 
- Supportive Government 
- Supportive Institutions (bourse, 
banks, etc) 
- Joint stock organisation - Arrogance 
- High level of Education 
- Dutch are best 
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By the end of the eighteenth century, the Dutch Golden Age had truly ended. James Boswell, who visited the 
Netherlands, described a very different picture from the century before: 'Most of the principal towns are 
sadly decayed, and instead of finding every mortal employed, you meet with multitudes of poor creatures that 
are starving in idleness' (James Boswell quoted in Boxer 1970:238). The causes reflect a recurring pattern of 
economic systems; catch up by imitating nations and Dutch entrapment. 
The English economy and its shipping had advanced along an explicitly stated path of 'catch up', actively 
seeking the leading indusuial and organisational methods of the day. The result was an economic system 
with related commercial and indusuial sectors that strongly represented the Dutch system it had so strongly 
tried to replicate. Ships returned to England with goods from all over the world, many of which were re-
exported. By 1770, England was re-expOliing 30% of those imports to Europe and London had staked its 
claim as the world's leading entrepot(Wilson 1965:161). 
10.4 Gujarat's Decline in the early Eighteenth Century 
During the seventeenth century Gujarat had been the busiest and most active trading region of India. It 
entered the eighteenth century with 'the strongest expoli and import trade, shipping and merchant 
entrepreneurship in the Indian subcontinent' (Arasaratnam 1994: 88). However, the region was about to 
enter a rapid decline. The 112 vessels based in Surat in 1701 declined to about 20 by 1750 (Das Gupta 
1994: I, 433). The total trade of Surat which measured approximately 16 million rupees at the beginning of 
the century was down to 5 million by 1740, and half of this trade was now being carried by the English, 
another tenth by the Dutch (Das Gupta 1994: VI 195). Local ship owners had virtually been wiped out. 
Gujarat's shipping strength was based on three key sources of competitive strength: its strategic location as 
the gateway to the Mughal economy; flexible organisation structure, superior skills and experience in the 
Indian Ocean trade; and a highly competitive textile indusu'y which provided the ships with key cargoes. 
One by one, those sources of competitive advantage fell over. 
,10.4.1 Decline of the Mughal Economy At the end of the seventeenth century, the Mughal empire 
presented a wonderfully successful economy. A century of conquest and territorial expansion provided the 
empire with enormous resources. As the range of land under Mughal rule increased, the tax burden was 
spread over a wider range of people, At the same time, buoyant local and regional markets increased the 
sources of wealth available to local Lords, The economy showed itself open to change with new crops 
introduced from America (maize and tobacco) and, as we shall see, artisans were very capable of adopting 
foreign technologies. 
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The economy possessed many of tIle factors we associate with success: a small government provided 
political stability yet gave businesses high levels of autonomy; a flourishing market economy based on 
competition and individualism; and a number of commercial institutions reduced the costs of performing 
transactions. Natural resources and highly skilled producers gave northern India highly competitive 
producers in the most important industry in the world at that time, textiles. This supporting economic 
system was a key aspect of the success of the shipping industry. 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal empire, which provided Gujarat shippers with access 
to the hinterland markets and produce, fell apart. With that decline, they lost a key determinant of their 
competitive advantage. The decline of the empire actually exhibits many of the patterns outlined in this 
thesis as rigid incentive systems based on outdated technologies. 
Much of the cohesion of the empire was lost during the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), who wanted to 
impose vigorously the Islamic belief system on the empire. Previolls tolerance of the religious diversity 
began to erode as the political culture came to be defined more in Islamic terms. In 1669, it reached the 
point where the Bania and Hindu merchant communities in Surat threatened to leave the city en mass to 
escape the persecution of the local Islamic judge (Richards 1993: 176). Social divisions had become more 
important. 
The Mughal Empire presents a common picture of an empire in decline. An old and feeble dynasty loses its 
earlier vibrancy and buckles in the face of subjects who lise in revolt. Certainly, the emperors were 
becoming more distant from the key technologies that created the empire. While early emperors such as 
Akbar had shown an active interest in military technology, in later years official interest in weaponry was 
'occasional and haphazard at best' (Richards 1994:288). The Mughals seem to have been content with the 
military technologies that brought them success in the past. Consequently, in the seventeenth century, the 
Mughals began to fall behind other contemporary powers. 
With stagnant technology, expansion came to an end and this had implications for the incentive structure of 
the empire. The incentive for the Mughals had always been land and the income it provided. When 
expansion came to an end, there was less new land available to reward the Mensabdars. The pie stopped 
growing so tension now arose over shares of the pie, as Das Gupta states: 
... there was a struggle not only for jagirs but for well placed and remunerative ones ... as the income of the 
noblemen fell steadily they put more and more pressure upon the zamindars, that is the class of gentry who 
actually and permanently held much of the land in the empire. Naturally much of this pressure was passed on 
to the peasant... (1994: VI 185-6) 
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The old technology could not generate expansion but the old paradigm and value system remained in place. 
The Mensabdars were seeking revenues within the system as a distributional coalition, seeking increasing 
returns without increasing the region's productivity. 
The intemal incentive structure of the Mughal system had always provided some opportunity for milking at 
the expense of improvement and maintenance of the principal economic resources. Mensabdars were 
regularly moved about to stop them from consolidating too much local power. The consequence was that 
they felt no long term commitment to their territory. The priOlity for the Mensabdar was to take as much as 
possible from the territory, spending as little as possible on improvements before moving on to the next 
territory (Lmldes 1998: 157). Those areas dependent on ilTigation particularly felt the effect which came in 
the form of famine. 
A giant leap towards instability occUlTed with the death of the emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, which led to a 
series of bitter conflicts over accession to the throne (Richards 1993 :281). All this weakened the central 
authority, undelmining the whole system of revenue collection and security. Regulations preventing abuse 
of revenue collection fell into disuse as regional lords resOlied to open tax farming. Although the 
encroachment of nobles as distlibutionary coalitions is consistent with the hypothesis, the weakening of 
rules was not anticipated. 
To escape the political instability and associated tax fmming many merchants moved to European 
settlements. For a short time, even the grandson of Abdul Ghafur retired to the English settlement at 
Bombay, before returning to Surat (Das Gupta 1994: X,222). Many Gujaratis moved to European ports on 
the Coromandel serving as financiers and brokers in direct competition with the local Chetty sub-castes 
(Arasaratnam 1995 XIV 36-7). As they took more to on-shore positions and left the shipping to the 
English, they lost what naval experience they had and their investment in shipping declined (Arasaratnam 
1995: XIV 31). 
As nobles became increasingly more conupt in their capture of income, merchants were squeezed and 
increasingly unable to raise the business capital of earlier days. At Surat, this squeeze was exercised by the 
Governor Sorab Khan (Das Gupta 1994: IX, 148-162). Attacks from the Marathas in the south had 
deplived him of income. Receiving no support from the disintegrating imperial court, the governor found 
he did not have sufficient revenue to pay for his soldiers and associated retinue. He had become heavily in 
debt to the leading merchant in the city, Mohammad Ali (the son of Abdul Gafur). Eventually, he began the 
squeeze, alTesting merchants on jumped up charges, imposing prohibitive fines and confiscating property. 
Before long, the merchants revolted against the governor, raising their own army with which to defend 
themselves. Mohammed Ali contributed 2,000 troops to the defence while even the English and Dutch East 
India Companies joined in. The governor was eventually replaced but, Mohammed Ali was alTested and 
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died in jail, with much of the family fOliune plundered by the new governor. The fall of the family of Abdul 
Gafur symbolised the fall of a great merchant city. 
The system was imploding and, with a weaker central administration came a rapid decline in law and order 
that hit trade hard. Caravans organised by private merchants could no longer travel from Surat to Agra in 
safety (Richards 1993 :278-9). As conflict liddled the trade routes, the port of Surat was increasingly cut off 
from the markets and production centres ill the hinterland. A key source of competitive strength had fallen 
over. However, this ciisis was not a Perez-type socio-economic crisis where an old technology confronts 
the new. It was a case of a system imploding with incentive systems and the goals of distributional coalition 
being incompatible with a stagnant economic pathway. 
10.4.2 Saturation and Shifting Patterns of Demand In 1701, the number of ships based at Surat 
reached an all-time high of 112 and tonnage of about 20,000 tons (Das Gupta 1994 XII: Ill). That year, 
. the markets were suffeling from saturation (Das Gupta 1979:137-8). 'The entire Indian Ocean was 
suffeling from over-trading and prices were depressed in every market'. In 1701, it seemed the limits of the 
Gujarat growth path had been reached. The economic path it was travelling based on textiles and maritime 
supremacy in the Indian Ocean could not generate future growth. To continue to grow, Gujarat shippers 
would have to enter new markets or find altemative ways to stimulate trade. 
To make matters worse, in subsequent years, key Indian Ocean trading partners became rattled by political 
instability, including instability in the Ottoman Empire, civil war in Yemen, and the collapse of the Safavid 
dynasty. These had been key markets for Gujarat. The old shipping routes on which Gujarat had been so 
competitive were disappeming. 
Under this new environment, the well-defended shipping supplied by English ships became a more 
attractive option to Asian merchants. These were a higher-cost option than that provided by local shippers 
but, they provided greater security from political dangers and, in the political climate of the eighteenth 
century more and more Asian merchants were prepared to pay that price (Marshall 1987:283). It could be 
argued that the English were benefiting from a politically induced selection mechanism. 
Ironically, the political and commercial decay in the western Indian Ocean occurred at a time when the 
eastem Indian Ocean was experiencing a growth of activity bolstered by a growing trade with China. 
However, it was not the Gujarat shippers who would reap the rewards of this growth but the English, who 
were created a new path of economic development. The English were gaining leadership in the Indian 
Ocean on the basis of strong, defensible ships, joint stock companies working in conjunction with private 
traders, territorial enclaves in which they escaped the worst of the Mughal Empire decline, and the 
development of long distant oceanic routes. 
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A distant view of Surat and its river. Sur at was the major port of the Mughal empire 
ath-acting merchants from around the world_ In the foreground can be seen some 
Europeans (from Baldaeus, Naauwkeurige Beschryvinge 1672). 
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English traders were building up expelience and distribution networks on the long sea routes to Europe and 
China. These seas were more dangerous, for both political and environmental reasons, and the Europeans 
had the strongest ships to cope with these conditions. Consequently, it was English ships that took Indian 
textiles to England and China, not those from Gujarat. 
10.4.3 Organisation The English had always had difficulty competing with the low cost and flexible 
family networks in the Indian Ocean. However, organisational improvements were being made in their 
trade. In the 1670s, the English East India Company had made a deliberate decision to concentrate on the 
long trade routes between Europe and Asia, allowing private merchants to participate in the intra-Asia trade 
if they chose to. Many servants of the ErC chose to take the opportunity this trade presented. Using their 
savings and loans from local merchants they started busillesses which initially resembled those of the locals. 
During the eighteenth century, the organisation of English private traders became more sophisticated. They 
established 'Agency houses' in various ports between which representatives (supercargoes) would travel 
with the ship who would take commercial decisions anywhere on a voyage (Arasaratnam 1995:XIV 39). 
This ability to make decisions on the spot gave the decentralised structure of the smaller agency houses 
great flexibility in responding to changing market and environmental forces, something the highly 
centralised English East India Company could not do. The private traders could also travel to Dutch-
controlled areas that the EIC, for diplomatic reasons, would not wish to enter. Private traders did not have a 
diplomatic role to perfOlm so could operate with greater aggression than the large East India Company. 
Consequently, the inherited rules of the ETC placed some limits on company growth but not over-all 
industry growth. Due to the complementary nature of the EIC and Agency house activities, the EIC did not 
impose its weight as the established stakeholder and hamper the growth of the new organisations. 
In telms of flexibility, the English now had an organisational fonn that put them on a par with the Gujaratis 
but, other features would make them even more competitive. English private traders benefited from the 
support of the EIC which had built up territOlial enclaves separated from the declining and corrupt Mughal 
Empire. This meant English traders were in a better position to deal with political pressure. As the trade 
grew, these enclaves grew in significance. Fort St George for example, grew into the prosperous town of 
Madras (Ibid:38). 
A symbiotic relationship existed in the opium trade. The EIC provided protection to the private traders and 
in retum, the private traders distlibuted opium. The EIC managed the opium production in India, but 
because of its contraband nature, played no pmi in the shipping or sale of a drug to China for fear of losing 
its trading rights and tea purchases. To overcome this problem, the EIC sold its opium crop to agency 
houses in India who then forwarded it for resale in China. 
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The English merchant combinations were able to attract capital from a wider variety of sources than the 
local traders. When the ETC paid private traders for delivery of opium, it would be done with a bill of 
exchange that could be cashed in London. This gave investors great confidence to invest money in the 
plivate trade (Marshall 1987:297). In this way, agency houses like Jardine Matheson grew to substantial 
size. 
English private traders and agency houses transf01wed the structure of Indian maritime commerce in the 
eighteenth century (Das Gupta 1994: VII 153). As Indian Opium and textiles were taken to markets in 
Europe and China on an unprecedented scale, the individual Gujarati merchant of the Indian Ocean could 
no longer compete. The Muslim nakhuda and the bania of Surat were replaced by the Agency houses of 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay integrated in a broader global commerce. As Das Gupta(1994: VII 134) 
notes: 
there can be no doubt that by the turn of the nineteenth century not only was the European ship dominant in the 
Indian Ocean but that the Indian ship had sailed into oblivion.... the magnificent Gujarati fleet, particular 
prominent on the Red Sea run, gradually dwindled into iilsignificance, while in the Eastern Ocean the Calcutta 
fleet of the private British merchant won the supremacy of the ocean and at the close of the century had far 
outstripped the achievements of the Gujaratis even at their peak. 
10.5 A Need to Reform 
Under such conditions, it could be expected that the Indians adopt English shipping and commercial 
technology and seek a share in the faster growing trade routes. Indians were not averse to borrowing 
technology from foreign cultures if it was likely to benefit them and were most likely to adopt foreign 
technology in those areas that most threatened Indian interests (Qaisar 1982: 131). They realised early on 
that the secret of European naval supremacy lay in the strength of ships nailed with iron, the effective use of 
artillery, and navigational skills. They lost no time in adopting the new techniques. As early as 1507, a 
Portuguese style galleon was built in Gujarat for an Arab merchant (Qaisar 1968:25). During the sixteenth 
century shipbuilding throughout Asia was subjected to European influence, leading to the gradual adoption 
of sturdier construction and heavier armament. As a consequence, improvements in Asian technologies 
were a factor in defeating Portuguese efforts at imposing a monopoly (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 124). 
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Ahmadabad, one hundred and forty miles north of Surat, was the administrative center 
of Gujarat. It was a major manufacturing town, particularly for textiles (from Baldaeus, 
Naauwlceurige Beschryvinge 1672). 
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Asians were quick to recognise the impOitance of European naval technique, strategy, tactics mId 
mmaments (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 123). European weapons became a highly coveted commodity acquired 
through trade and Indian craftsmen showed they were more than adept at making foreign style weapons. 
Bernier, who visited India in the 1660s, said of their production of muskets and fowling pieces, 'Sometimes 
they imitate so perfectly articles of European manufacture that the difference between the original and copy 
can hardly be discerned' (quoted in Qaisar 1982:53). 
Differences between European and Indian technology levels were not too great in the seventeenth century 
and Indians could quite easily adapt European technology if they saw the need. The transfer of shipping 
technology was aided when Europeans began using Indian shipyards for building and repairs. The Dutch, 
English, and Portuguese were all regular clients of the Gujarati shipyards (Arasaratnam 1994: 248, Gopal 
1975:199). Such was the skill of the ship-carpenters in Surat that the English chaplain Ovington wrote: 
The Indians are in many things of matchless Ingenuity in their severallmp]oyment, and admirable Mimicks of 
whatever they affect to copy after ... the very ship-carpenters at Suratt will take the Model of any English vessel, 
in all the curiosity of its Buildings, and the most artificial Instances of workmanship about it , whether they are 
proper for the conveniance of BUlthen or of quick sailing, as exactly as if they had been the first contrivers ... 
(Ovington (1929: 166-7» 
Indians had the skills necessary to build the capital required for the fast growing long haul voyages that the 
English were exploiting. Consequently, we would expect the technologies to be uptaken and rapidly 
diffused, thereby allowing Gujaratis (and other Indians) to retain their market shares in Indian Ocean trade. 
However, in contrast to classical theory, the technologies were not rapidly adopted. This emphasises the 
point that it is not enough to simply leam how to use a technology, the environment, value system and 
technological endowment must be supportive of that technologies diffusion. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, local ships were the best ships to use in the Indian Ocean. Asian 
vessels could not, by the very nature of their ownership and functions, suddenly be transformed. The light 
dhows that could move so flexibly through the waters did not have the strength to carry a large collection of 
cannon. To carry the cannon required to provide the defensive qualities needed in the new competitive 
environment, a stronger structure was needed. This reflects Salter's (1966) observation that a capital item, 
like a ship, embodies a specific technology. Technology upgrade can only occur with investment in fresh 
capital. Even the large merchant ships of Glum'at that were armed with cannon did not have them laid out 
so that they could be used effectively. It took time for Indians to adapt their ships to incorporate cannon. 
This was a gradual process for although Asian ships may have been armed, their vessels were primarily 
merchant vessels. By contrast, European ships were designed with warfare as palt of their function. It 
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intention of linking Europe to the liches of the East, not canymg goods between foreign countries. 
Europeans were forced to do this when no one in the Indian Ocean was interested in European goods. 
Hence they had to cany foreign goods to foreign markets in order to raise money for the homeward trade. 
For the Gujaratis to become pure 'carriers', it would require a change in viewing the industry and was very 
risky. 
10.6 Entrapment in the Textile Industry 
In the long run, any re~overy would have been handicapped by an eventual decline in the competitiveness of 
Indian textile production. This did not happen until the late eighteenth century, but it is worth noting for it 
undermined the long run ability to revitalise Indian trade and shipping. As discussed in chapter 7, Gujarat 
had gained much competitive strength from its cargoes and in particular, textiles. However, new production 
techniques in England undennined India's POSitiOll in what had been the most central ofindusuies. 
Britain's industrial revolution initially took away the European export market then, to make matters worse, 
Indians found they now had to compete with textiles imports in their own home market (Das Gupta 
1994:VI,202). Although Indian textile production entered 'slow history' This was not a recent phenomenon. 
Apatt from the increased specialisation of the fifteenth century, there had been little change in the 
production technologies for centUlies. Nor can slow history be attributed to a decline in rivalry. It can 
however be linked to by a number of factors consistent with this hypothesis including the enu'enchment of 
distlibutional coalitions, entrapment of industrial technique through specialisation, factor dependency and 
commitment to established markets. 
Factor endowment in the local environment was not as advantageous for new production techniques based 
on mechanisation. The success ofIndian textile production in Mughal days was based on relatively simple 
equipment and favourable factor endowments in cotton and labour. Further advances in the industry were 
likely to come only with the creation of more advanced equipment. However, invesnnents in machinery 
were not compatible with the Indian factor endowment in which money was scarce and labour was plentiful 
(Naqvi 1968: 156). As a consequence, the production technology did not advance as quickly as that in 
England where labour was less plentiful. In fact, the Indian industry experienced very little change, if any, 
either in the apparatus or the operation of the weaving trade (Naqvi 1968:148). 
The rate of technological advancement was also a function of the knowledge resources available in the 
environment. Gopal (1975: 242-4) suggests education was a key factor in limiting advancementin Gujarat. 
Secular education was insigllificant and heavily loaded with religion, ethics and philosophy. It was of little 
value to merchants and artisans who were never exposed to higher education. Merchants and Artisans were 
apprenticed at an early age, receiving their practical education through their social groups. Skills were 
passed on from generation to generation. [n this way, education reproduced the old techniques of 
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production. Apprentices were not taught to innovate and their education required no knowledge ofre~ding 
and Wliting. They were invariably ignorant of the theoretical bases of the technology they used, so lacked 
the skills to devise innovative technology. 
Gopal (1975: 201 & 102) also believes that exploitation by the government and middlemen removed any 
incentive for producers to try to improve quality and increase production. During the seventeenth century, 
Mughalnobles increasingly resolied to milking the textile trade. Gopal also suggests middlemen used their 
market power to become more exploitive. As the key link to the market it put the middleman in a position 
of dominance in the relationship witl1 which he could extract more than his fair share from the exchange. 
However, Arasaratnam (1995: XVI 259) notes that Indian weavers had much more independence than their 
counterparts in Europe who, in the eighteenth century, became wage-workers under the factory system. The 
Indian weaver maintained his independence and was aided by the fact that for most of the seventeenth 
century demand for the weavers product outstripped supply. The Indian weaver and merchant were 
. dependent on each other. 
Although exploitation by middlemen does not look a likely cause, the nature of the relationship did contain 
a barrier to innovation supportive of Langlois'S (1988:420) recognition that a decentralised market of 
specialists can be a barrier to innovation. Langlois observed that the decentralised nature of markets makes 
it very difficult to co-ordinate complex reorganisation of production (and suggested a centralised 
organisation might be able to handle this problem more effectively). The problems of market 
decentralisation in Gujarat seem to go one stage ftniher in that market decentralisation was a barrier to 
innovation per se. As the Gujarat economy became more efficient and merchants and producers became 
more specialised, they concentrated on their own spheres of responsibility. The middlemen separated the 
producer from the market. This meant the weaver had no say in the selection of quality or quantity of 
textiles to be produced. This left the weaver little room for discretion and little room to introduce 
innovations that increase output (Go pal 1975:235). Unfortunately, the merchants who did possess the 
market knowledge showed little interest in the technology and productive process (Arasaratnam 1994: 191). 
In this way, the efficiencies from specialisation restricted innovation. 
Gopal (1975: 243-4) states the situation was made worse by the linkage of profession with caste. Caste 
rules precluded any meaningful dialogue between the trader, the artisan, and the man of learning. No cross 
feliilisation of ideas could take place. It also meant that any productive technology requiring a systematic 
change was unlikely to occur. Olson (1982: (57) specifically identifies the castes as distributional 
coalitions, controlling entry to occupations and lines of business, keeping craft secrets while using group 
power to maintain income share. 
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Finally Gopal also considered the role of religious beliefs that encouraged businessmen, once they had 
attailled success, to plough their money 110t into production but into religious ceremony, buildings, and 
charity. He quotes Vilji Vora as an example who led the life of an ascetic in his old age, spending much of 
his fortune seeking religious merit. 
10.7 Conclusion 
Guj arat shipping rose and fell on the strength of its associated economic system and illustrates many of the 
causes of decline outlined in this hypothesis. Although this thesis applies the life cycle to shipping it seems 
to also fit the decline of the Mughal empire. Expansion in the empire came to an end when its leaders 
became more distanced from the front-line technologies. Military success had provided resource growth 
but Mughal leaders were entrapped in old military technologies and growth came to an end. Intemal 
incentives created under an era of expansion remained and were unsuited to an era of low or non-existent 
growth. They were ShOli term and based on milking of existing resources eventually creating destructive 
disuibutional coalitions. It reached the point wllere merchants had to go to war against their own 
govemment. 
The key cause of decline was the fall of the Mughal empire which deprived shippers of cargoes, markets 
and infrastructure. Political decline presented a huge environmental shift which changed the sources of 
competitive advantage. This should have presented a signal to the merchants to enter the trade routes that 
the English were now exploiting, however, the Gujaratis did not possess the same advantages as they did in 
the Red Sea trade. Under neo-c1assical thinking, as plice signals indicated sU'onger defensible ships were 
preferable to the dhow, we would expect Indians to shift to the Blitish technologies and the longer ocean 
routes. However, Indian shippers were entrapped by path dependency and long-held commercial 
rationalities. The Gujaratis had in the seventeenth centuries developed skills, experience, knowledge of 
routes and contacts in the Red Sea with which the English were hard pressed to match. In the China and 
Atlantic trades, it was the Europeans who held the advantage. Gujarat merchants would have had no 
trouble adopting the shipping technology of the Europeans. However, a commercial mentality of 
individuality and peaceful u'ading made it difficult for them to imitate the changes required for the fast 
growing long haul routes. Leaving these high-risk areas for the Ellglish, Gujarat merchants prefened the 
safer on-land opporumities that growth in these u'ades provided. 
Finally, a favourable factor endowment in labour and a competitive commercial structure tumed out to be 
two-edged swords for the competitiveness of Indian shipping. Indian industry was highly developed with a 
great degree of specialisation and commitment to labour inputs, which prevented the industry from taking a 
more mechanised path of development. Entrapped in a paradigm of labour intensity and the individual 
merchant, the great age of Gujarat shipping came to an end. 
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Table 10.3 Entrapment of Gujarat Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Paradh:(m Heuristics Source of Entrapment 
Shipping Industry 
- Expertise and contacts in Indian - Trade to mid-points like Malacca 
- Little experience in faster growing 
Ocean. but do not sail into foreign oceans routes outside Indian Ocean (Static 
where capabilities are not so economies over dynamic). 
developed. 
- high cost of change as new routes 
- Manage sailing activities in line are risky. 
with the Monsoon winds. 
- Little experience or capital invested 
- Light ships with few ann aments that - Trade peacefully. in defensive ships when market 
are fast and cheap to run. changed. 
- Embedded Technology (ships can 
not easily be modified) 
- Reputation 
SURPorting Areas of Economy - Specialised routines and 
- Well developed market of - Don't integrate but rely on market. decentralised markets inhibit cross-
specialised experts -Try to anticipate consumer fertilisation . -- ~ : . 
preference and meet with supplies. - technological lock in and factor 
- Try to obtain market power. specificity with high skilled labour 
force. 
- Individualism 
-castes as stake holders become 
- Flexible organisational structure of distributive coalitions re holding of 
family fimls -Teach what has brought success in information and inhibiting 
the past technological upgrade 
- Quality family based education - reproductive education 
- Mughal-Iand linkage 
- When new land supplies dried up 
- Peaceful empire which allowed lead to infighting of stakeholder 
trade to grow 
- Access to hinterland lost with 
- Productive hinterland providing imploding empire 
cargoes 
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Chapter 11 
The Industrial Revolution 
11.1 Coal, Iron and Steam Technologies 
As in the previous cases, English shipping grew on the back of the productivity improvements in the 
domestic economy. In fact, dllling the eighteenth century, the most consistent feature was continuous 
improvement. 'The age is running mad after innovation' wrote Dr 10hnson (quoted in Wilson 1965:311). 
Up until 1760 improvement was achieved through imitation, after which point the English developed new 
ways to reduce costs, add value and create new products, a process aided in no small part by the widespread 
acceptance and promotion of innovation in the earlier phase. 
Industrialisation progressed with the normal specialisation that we witnessed in previous chapters except 
that in this instance, it was associated with factory production and a broader range of production 
technologies. Farm workers who previously produced many of their own supplies in their cottages moved 
to the cities and gained specialist jobs in the new factOlies. They now had to buy some of the products they 
previously made at home and, items like soap, became specialised industries benefiting from economies of 
scale of the larger operations. The domestic market grew as productivity grew and this rapidly expanding 
market provided an incentive to introduce new technologies and new products. The result was a cumulative 
industrialisation, producing a new variety and quality of products, and the industrialist became a new social 
and political force. 
This eighteenth century wave of industrial innovation coincided with the foundation of the Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (1754). In the north, the Manchester Literary and 
Philosophical Society and the Bilmingham Lunar Society became institutions by which technical ideas and 
infOlmation were exchanged. There was a high level of interaction between engineers, scientists, and 
businessmen. Thus, industrialists such as Mathew Bouton and Josiah Wedgewood included mathematicians 
and scientists among their friends (ibid). Technical advance gathered apace with the publication of 
joumals, encyclopaedias, dictionaries and year-books which recorded technical and industrial advances 
(Wilson 1965:371). However, it would be wrong to over-emphasise the importance of science. Britain's 
early advances were made by 'tinkerers' with little formal technical schooling. Advances in the cotton, 
iron, and machine tool industries did not require a high level of scientific understanding but a high level of 
aptitude by mechanical amateurs (Moleyr 1990a:244). 
One important group of stakeholders in the old system that would successfully oppose change were those 
associated with the woollen industry. This long-established and powerful group did not appreciate the 
impOlis of cheap cotton textiles that the East India Company was blinging into the country. In 1701 and 
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1721 they persuaded the government to impose baniers on the importation of cotton. This protection had 
unexpected consequences. The resulting gap in the local market for cottons encouraged local people to take 
up cotton production in imitation of the Indian product. Being a new industry, it was not restricted by 
guilds and other vested interests and became one on the most dynamic and technologically responsive 
indusuies in the country. 
The expansion of the British economy inevitably increased pressure on the country's limited resource base. 
Most important was the demand for wood that was used as a domestic and industrial fuel and for 
construction of the country's boats, buildings and machinery. As the country's forests were depleted, 
England became reliant on wood substitutes; coal and iron. However, the coal mining industry was also 
restricted by bottlenecks once the easily accessible surface coal deposits were depleted. The country still 
had plenty of coal at deeper levels but the deeper pits were susceptible to flooding. The most urgent 
technical problem of the time was the need for a machine that would raise water from the pits (Klingender 
1968:5). In the same way that the Dutch solved their bottleneck with technologically advanced windmills, 
the English looked for a technical solution. 
The problem attl'acted the talents of many ingenious inventors, including Thomas Savery who patented a 
pump dliven by a steam engine in 1698 but, it was not until the development of a stronger engine by 
Thomas Newcomen that the problem was solved. The engine was further refined by John Smeaton (1724-
1792) who decreased the fuel requirements ofthe machine and therefore, the cost of extracting coal. When 
James Watt, an instrument maker at Glasgow University, introduced a separate condenser, the machine's 
fuel consumption came down by two thirds. Between 1718 and 1834, improvements in the pumping engine 
meant the amount water raised per weight of coal leapt from 4.3 to 109 million pounds (Klingender 
1968:7). 
Improvements in the steam engine reflect patterns of technical inter-relatedness as advance in one 
technology relied on advances in other technologies and these technologies propelled each other on a 
cumulative path of development. The steam engine made it easier to extract coal for use in the production 
of iron while, improvements in iron production improved the efficiency of the machines extracting coal. 
Key innovations in iron production included the smelting process introduced by Darby and the processes of 
puddling and rolling introduced by Henry COlt in 1783 and 1784. Improvements in coal moved hand in 
hand with improvements in iron production, an advance in one leading to an improvement in the other. 
Throughout the whole process of continuous improvement, English workmen gained a greater awareness of 
the potential of mechanics, developing their skills in the creation of modern mechanical engineering. 
As iron became cheaper, it was utilised in other areas ofthe economy. Its use in waterwheels revolutionised 
English textile production. The use of iron extended the life of wheels, reduced maintenance costs and 
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increased their efficiency. Most impOliant, it made it possible to build bigger wheels generating a dramatic 
increase in horsepower. By 1780, the cost per unit of energy from a wheel had declined perhaps 20-30% 
over its cost tlrilty years earlier (Tylecote 1992:42). British industry now had a power source more 
powerful and cheaper than any it had known. 
That energy source had the potential to revolutionise industry, a reality that came about once Arkwlight 
created his water frame. England could now develop highly mechanised factory production in the textile 
industry. As a result of the increased efficiency from factory production, the plice of cloth declined 85% 
between 1780 and 1850 (Mokyr 1990a: Ill). England was opening a new path of development based on 
coal, iron and steam. 
We might expect some stakeholders in the old economic system to resist changes that displaced their 
expertise, power and livelihood, an examples of this did occur .. In Nottingham, the use of the stocking 
. frame for low quality goods led to a machine wrecking campaign by the Luddites (Von Tunzelmann 
1981: 161). In Manchester, the discipline and squalor of factory life led Engels to suggest that class warfare 
lay ahead. But class warfare did not come. The changing social relationships were too complicated and 
fragmented to result in a general uplising. Different regions developed at different speeds and the pace of 
social change was not dramatic (Rose 1981:275). Finally, the higher classes were prepared to give some 
leeway. In the 1820s, public schools were reformed to provide an education that emphasised higher morals 
and standards. A resulting concern for the broader general welfare combined with a fear of discontents led 
to an atmosphere of conciliation, one result being the Factory Act of 1833 and other social policy that 
sought to improve the lot of the working classes (Rose 1981 :269). 
11.2 Shipping and the New Technologies 
Eventually, the new teclmologies were applied to shipping. The replacement of wood with iron in the 
shipping industry opened up many new possibilities. The most important advantage of iron was its strength. 
Stronger materials meant bigger ships could be built, overcoming the size limitations imposed by wood. 
Strength also meant thinner and lighter hulls leading to increases in dead-weight cargo capacity of up to 
35% (Pollard and Robertson 1979: 14) (the later adoption of steel would decrease hull weights by another 
15%). However, the cost of iron was still not competitive and ship owners were slow to adopt iron ships. 
It took some time for the cost to decline and iron did not become the dominant material until the mid-
nineteenth century, after which the industry underwent many changes. Between 1850 and 1880, the price of 
iron had declined by half and this made it a more competitive matelial for the use in ships. At the same 
time, improved techniques in metal working led to cost improvements in ship-yards. Consequently, 
between 1850 and 1880, both steam and sailing ships under-went a substantial increase in the use of iron 
(Harley 1985: 174). Other factors to include when considering iron were the route traveled, for example, in 
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the Pacific Ocean, there were few areas with the ability to repair and maintain iron so wood would be the 
prefelTed material (MacGregor 1993::26). With continued productivity improvements, the widened 
diffusion of skills needed to repair iron ships and an increased scarcity of wood, iron slowly began to 
dominate the industry. 
It also took some time before the steam-engine was used on ships. The first experiments were not restricted 
to England. In the United States, John Fitch began expeliments with a steamer on the Delaware during the 
mid 1780s. In France, trials were conducted on the Soane near Lyon in 1783. The French, with their 
superior scientific base, could have established a lead in steamship technology, but their industrial and 
scientific advance was stunted by political turmoil associated with the French Revolution (Burton 1994:65). 
It was Blitain that had the skill and Imowledge base that most complimented the new technologies. With its 
lead in coal and iron resources, entrepreneurial engineers and experience of steam technology, it took the 
lead in steamship development and in so doing, developed first mover advantages in productive capabilities 
that other nations lacked. 
The technology (and associated growth of knowledge) developed in three stages. Each stage went through a 
process of development until a plateau was reached in which it seemed the technology could go no further. 
Then a break-through would occur (Greenhill 1993: II). Each technological breakthrough was preceded by 
a period of experimentation and followed by a period of refinement. The first stage was the 'paddle 
steamer' which by the middle of the 1820's was operating on short sea, river and lake services in British, 
European and United States waterways. However, the paddle steamer had limited applications for ocean-
going transpmiation as undulating ocean swells could leave the paddle out of water, rendering it 
momentmily useless (Ibid: 16). The depth of the paddle in the water would vary on the course of a single 
joumey as its load of coal was used on a voyage. A more reliable fmm of propulsion was needed. 
The second stage was the replacement of the paddle with a 'screw propeller'. The concept of screw 
propulsion grew from an idea of Archimedes, two centuries before the Christian era. The Dutch had used a 
similar device to raise water to higher levels as pmi of their water management techniques. There were at 
least five attempts to apply steam technology to the screw before 1836 but, the existing engine and boiler 
technology was not yet up to the job (Lambeli 1993:137). Lambert says the key factor behind the people 
who broke through with the innovation was not any leap in design but, their ability to acquire finance to 
design and exploit the technology. This oeeured on May 1836, when Francis Petit Smith, a tinkeling fanner 
built a 2ft long boat which he tJied on his falm pond (Corbett 1993:85). With financial support of a wealthy 
banker they built the' Archimedes' (In July, of the same year, a Swedish army officer Captain Ericsson, who 
had lived in England for some time, also worked with a 2ft model boat had similar success. Ericsson had 
the backing of US navy Captain Robeli. F. Stockton and together, they sought to capture US naval market). 
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With other backers, Smith formed the Screw Propeller Company to exploit the patent and develop a product 
they could sell to the admiralty. However, the company found that property rights embedded in a patent 
have no guaranteed value when (i) reliant on the government as a major target customer and (ii) there are 
small numbers contracting. With government as a customer the technology became tied to other stake-
holder divisions. While the Whig elite supp011ed the technology, the Torries offered little support, and a 
change of government in 1841 worked against the project. The admiralty delayed purchasing the screw 
until its technical succ'ess could not be denied, but by this stage the company had fallen apart (Lambert 
1993: 145). The admiralty then picked up the technology at a cheap price. They had used their market 
power to break down the value of the patent. Pioneering does not always pay and the company collapsed. 
[t is noteworthy that the great engineer BruneI, who picked up on the technology, saw no point in patenting 
ideas at this time, a reflection of the low value of such property lights at the time (ibid). 
Brunei had earlier suggested starting a trans-Atlantic steam service to the directors of the Great Western 
Railway, thereby providing a transp011ation service that ran from London to New York. However, using 
steam powered shipping to cross oceans was a great departure from the prevailing rationality of the day. 
Even Brunei's father had previously stated his lack of faith in the technology. When asked to work on a 
project to operate steamships between England and the West Indies he replied 'As my opinion is that steam 
cannot do for distant negotiation, I cannot take part in any scheme' (RoIt 1970: 190). Not surprising, when 
Isambard Bnmel put forward his suggestion, it was met with a combination of silence and uneasy laughter. 
The suggestion shared the absurdity of Henry the Navigator's ideas four centuries earlier. The key problem 
was fuel. Until this stage, steam engines used a great deal of coal and were uneconomical for use on long 
voyages. In long distant ocean voyages, the ship would need constant refuelling points or carry large 
quantities of coal. Not only was the large amount of coal required expensive but, storing the coal until it 
was used took up space that would otherwise be used to carry cargo. The obvious answer might seem to 
build a bigger ship but any 'rational' person of the time realised a bigger ship required more fuel. Brunei 
broke the bounds of this rationality. He realised that the calTying capacity of a ship was not determined by 
its volume but by the resistance that a ship encounters from the sea (and hence its fuel requirements) is 
detelmined by its surface area. Mathematically, the calTying capacity of a ship increased as the cube of its 
dimensions but the power required to drive it through the water only increases as the square of those 
dimensions. In other words, as a ship grew bigger it would need proportionally less fuel. It now seemed 
likely that an economic steamship could be built as long as it was built to the correct proportions. 
The first steamship built by Brunei's company was the Great Western, a paddle steamer which was not 
proving a commercial success (Rolt 1970:203). After seeing the earlier success of the Archimedes, Brunei 
decided the next ship must be powered by a screw. He hired the Archimedes for some months and 
conducted tests on it using eight expelimental screws. He also changed the internal gearing. The engine of 
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the Archimedes drove the shaft through straight gears. Bnmel saw this as inefficient preferring to use four 
sets of tooth chains (ibid). The results were incorporated in the building of the Great Britain. Being the 
first screw propelled trans-oceanic ship and the first made out of iron, this 3270 grt giant heralded a new 
age of shippil1g. 
Unfortunately, the Great Westem Steamship Company had limited success' and was wound up in 1852 
(MacKenzie-Kennedy 1993:6-9). The technology was still too limited in its applications. Of the 9934 
vessels listed in Lloyd's register in 1853, only 187 were steam vessels, a mere 2% (Greenhill 1993:26). 
The problem continued to be fuel. More economical engines were provided by the last important 
breakthrough, when the process of compounding which had been used on land was applied to the marine 
steam engine. The process of compounding expands the steam twice, therefore getting more use from the 
coal and reducing coal requirements (and costs). 
Once again this process relied on advances in different technologies. Maritime use of the compound engine 
had been limited by the wealmess of existing boi ler design and materials (Griffiths 1993: I 06). Eventually, 
advances in the making of steel (with the convelier patented by Henry Bessemer and the refinement of the 
open-hearth process by Siemens, Mmiin and Gilchrist Thomas) meant that stronger steel boilers could be 
made to withstand higher pressures. By 1874, the first deep-sea commercial steamer fitted with a triple 
expansion engine was built. It presented a new age of sea power in which steam teclmology could finally 
prove more economical than sail. 
This technical inter-relatedness was just one of many extemal environmental factors in Britain that shaped 
the path of development (Starkey 1993: 127). The increasing world trade centred on London encouraged 
people to invest in the new technology. As more of the nation's industrial output was sold abroad and 
demand for imported resources climbed, shipping grew in volume and competitiveness. This 
competitiveness intensified the pressure to reduce costs and improve quality (Starkey 1993: 132). It created 
a competitive compulsion for innovation C011sistent with Klien (1977) and Porter (1990). 
Britain's early lead in the industry also reflected the coal, iron and engineering development on land. The 
capital goods that would be used in steamships were produced in greater quantities in Britain than in any 
other nation. As marine technology developed, it became a contributing arm to the industrial cluster already 
blossoming on land. The engineers who designed machines for use at sea co-operated and formed leamed 
societies with their railway and general engineering counterparts, providing a cumulatively growing pool of 
knowledge and experience. 
Competitive pressure also played a role as the United States was producing a highly competitive merchant 
navy in the first half of the eighteenth century and later, the age old European national competition once 
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again reared its head in the form of a naval anns race (Starkey 1993:132). Naval support was particularly 
impOliant as the navy was not hindered by a need to show a return on capital so, could be more 
experimental with its engine types and hull fOlms (Greenhill 1993:19). The navy had, for example, 
produced the first British steam and sail vessel to cross the Atlantic, the Rhadamanthus in 1833. However, 
the Jlavy also had its own institutional inertia and heuristics which could frustrate an engineer like BruneI 
who wrote 'they have an unlimited supply of some negative principle which seems to absorb and eliminate 
everything that approaches them ... It is a curious and puzzling phenomenon' (cited in Rolt 1970:223). 
With steam power, shipping was freed from its reliance on winds and ocean CUlTents. Ships could travel 
where they wanted, when they wanted. However, steam was not the most suitable form of power on an 
routes. Because of the need to calTY coal onboard steamships, it limited their economic range. On longer 
voyages, sail was still the most economic fOlm of shipping (Harley 1988:863), unless the route had a 
number of coal bunkers on the way from which the ship could refuel. Competition from steam technology 
and new areas of research associated with the new ships (eg: hull shapes) actually helped to inspire 
technological advance in sailing ships. Over time, steamship technology improved, reducing the costs and 
increasing the range of the new technologies. These improvements came from improved machinery which 
reduced coal consumption and staff required to stoke the engines, the building of larger ships which meant 
bigger loads could be carried without a cOlTesponding increase in labour requirements and, the cost of 
building ships decreased with advances in the iron industry which Teduced the price of iron. 
Table 11.1 illustrates many of the economic advantages stemming from improved technology. Over the 18 
years the cost of the coal used on the London-Bombay route declined from 21 to 13.5, the size of the crew 
was reduced and the ships themselves became cheaper to buy. Many advantages came from the economies 
of scale from being able to build larger ships. Larger ships needed fewer men and less coal per ton of ship. 
When combined with cheaper port rates, it enabled shippers to reduce their costs from 46 to 16 shillings per 
ton. At the same time, sailing ships to California (one of the world's longest routes) halved their price 
(Harley 1988:864-5). Such reductions in the price of transport increased opportunities for manufacturers 
could land their product in foreign pOliS at a cheaper plice and this stimulated the growth of trade and 
shipping. 
The transformed economic system was chamctelised by industrial and commercial activities that reinforced 
each other in much the same way as had happened in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, but at a 
higher technological level. Britain became the leading industrial nation on the basis of a reinfoTcing 
industrial cluster of iron, coal, textiles, and steam power. As the population and industrial production 
increased the demand for impOlis of raw matelials created a derived demand on which shipping rose. 
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Table 11.1 Declining Freight Rates: Steam and Sail 
(Source Harley 1988:864) 
Freight Rates 
(shiIlings per ton) 
Costs: 
I Ship Prices 
Wages 
Port charges 
Coal 
Physical Changes: 
Crew size 
Ship weight 
Coal consumption 
Economies of larger ships: 
Ship Size 
Crew Savings 
Ship Cost Savings 
Coal Savings 
Steamship on run to Bombay 
1873/4 189011 
46 16 
L53,000 L28,000 
(2000 ton ships) 
134 156 
100 71 
21 13.5 
3.9 1.9 
100 90 
2.1 1.5 
1,500 3,000 
24% 
14% 
42% 
Sailing Ship to California 
1873/4 189011 
70.7 33.2 
Ll9.5 LlO.9 
(Price per gross ton) 
127 126 
100 88 
2.5 
100 
1,000 
30% 
6% 
2.0 
93 
2,000 
11.2.1 Organisation During this peliod, technological and legislative changes led to changes in market 
struchlre. In paliicular, the economic system was dramatically freed from legislative restraints and 
privileges. Earlier, Adam Smith among others, had attacked the monopoly position of companies like the 
East India Company who used their position to buy as a monopsonist, sell as a monopolist and, restrict the 
volume of commercial activity in the process (Smith 1921 :73). The EIC had hotly defended its monopoly 
but, political forces were shifting as the new system gave birth to new stake-holders. Industrialists, in 
paliicular the cotton kings of Lancashire were frustrated with the company's inability to sell British goods 
in India and China, the largest markets known to man (Keay 1991 :451-2). Their stance reflected a new 
confidence of the manufachll'ers in the competitiveness of their product (until this time, their attacks on the 
company had actually been the reverse; attacking imports of Indian textiles into Britain posing an 'unfair' 
competition for the domestic product). The power of the industrialists helped to bring the monopoly to an 
end and the Asian trade was thrown open. At this time, the risks of the trade had been long overcome and 
the security of a monopoly could not be justified. The nation possessed a wealth of navigators with 
expelience in these trades. Unleashed, they contributed to a dramatic growth in shipping in the region. 
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Another noteworthy legal change was the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849, which opened the colonial 
shipping routes to competitors from foreign nations. Not only did the repeal do away with the inefficiencies 
of the legislation, it also reflected the confidence of English shipping in its ability to defeat the competition. 
Blital111ia ruled the waves and could comfortably take on all comers. 
Another legal change affecting organisation and ease of raising capital was the limited liability legislation of 
1855. The old companies of many partners that spread risk became a thing of the past. A single ship could 
be launched as a single' company. If the ship made a loss, the new laws meant that liability was limited only 
to that ship (and company) and earnings could not be used to underwrite debts incurred by other single ship 
companies owned by the investors (Green 1985:226). The new law gave birth to scores of one-ship joint 
stock companies, often owned and managed by small groups of investors (Hope 1990:316). Entrepreneurs 
with capital, connections or experience in trades (perhaps from serving in the East India company) seized 
the opportunities the new technologies and legal protection gave. Many investors established family films, 
some with paltners. It was this proplietary capitalism that dominated tramp shipping. 
Tramps were a form of shipping that did not sail to a fixed route or schedule. They sailed to where ever 
there was a cargo. This fOlm of shipping enjoyed an annual growth rate of 7% percent between 1870 and 
World War One (Hope 1990:318). Tramp shipping included both single ship companies which rose and 
fell with each succeeding boom and slump, and others that were more enduring and lasted for over a century 
(Middlemiss 1989:10). Generally, tramp companies were small, financed from the savings of the ship 
owners, friends and reinvested profits (Sturmey 1962:395). 
Tramp ships travelled the world, where and when the cargoes dictated. It was a form of shipping made 
possible by the development of telegraph technology which informed shippers in advance where cargoes 
lay. Telegraph and Cable made communication easier and took a lot of the lisk out of business as goods 
were sent less by speculation and more to order. It also allowed an increase in contact between the buyer 
and seller, with the elimination of the middleman. This led to reduced prices and increased business. 
Brokers had almost complete Imowledge of the rates being paid in the main chartering centres for the 
various trades and the ships receiving those rates. This open information, large number of firms, and 
relatively low costs of entry made the tramp market highly competitive, perhaps the closest thing we have 
seen to perfect competition in the industry. In this fiercely competitive environment, tramp owners were 
characterised as hard-driven businessmen fiercely competing with other ship owners (Sturmey 1962:395). 
By 1914, tramps constituted 60% of the nation's fleet (Hope 1990:338). 
The remainder of the fleet mainly comprised liners. Liners sailed to a regular schedule thereby increasing 
the value they provided to customers with a regular and reliable service. The idea of running at a specific 
time regardless whether the ship had a full load involved considerable lisk but, it was hoped this would be 
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more than offset by attracting better paying cargoes such as cabin passengers and mail which were attracted 
to a fast regular service (Davies 1985:54-55). This situation has strong similarities to the regularity of shop 
hours identified by Alchian (1969). Regular hours reduced search costs and waiting times for customers. 
Although companies must hold a higher inventory of sailings, the greater value provided to customers 
allows them to recoup this through higher prices. The greater number of sailings also allows liners to gain 
greater usage from ships that would otherwise be under-utilised. Steamships were well suited to scheduled 
sailings as they were not restricted by wind conditiOllS. In the early days, steamships involved a substantial 
investment that was beyond the smalI player. For that reason, the principal mail and passenger lines were 
created as chartered companies from the start. 
Liners sit comfortably with Potts connection-based view of the economic world. The liner's regular 
scheduling and endming relationships with the ports to which they sail developed into strong connections. 
On the basis of these enduring connections, capabilities and efficiencies were developed in handling goods 
and mastering the local winds and conditions. FUliher connections were then developed with the local 
hinterland via the regional transportation services. By contrast, tramp connections were less enduring, with 
the exception of their brokers or organisations such as the Baltic exchange which provided information on 
cargo availability. That is not to say that a tramp might not enter on a regular run, for example the route 
from Britain to South America, but their was less rigidity in the tramp trade. 
Probably the most famous of the new liner companies was P&O. The company was started by Brodie 
McGhie Wilcox, a ship-broker, and Arthur Anderson, who had spent time in the Blitish navy before joining 
Wilcox's company. The two formed a patmership and became ship owners in 1825, sailing a schooner to 
POliugal. In 1834, they issued a prospectus for the Peninsula and Orient Steam navigation company and in 
1837, they gained the contract to carry mail to the Ibelian peninsula. The mail contract was vital and saved 
the company from bankruptcy in these early years (Davis 1985:43). The contract was eventually extended 
through the Mediterranean. By 1840, they owned 7 ships, growing to 23 in 1850 and 51 in 1867 (Howarth 
and Howatih 1986:73). P&O grew in the wake of the East India Company's decline and the growth of the 
81itish Empire. Two thirds of its passengers to India were government employees, the company to a large 
extent being an unofficial arm of the Raj (Hope 1990:341). 
However growth was not stable, disequilibrium giving bilih to an organisational response. The negative 
effects of strong competition on the liner trades was often felt and, as early as 1850, some companies felt 
the need to co-operate on minimum freight rates (Hope 1990:318). The movement to inter-company 
agreements gained apace in the difficult years of the 1870's. At this time. the opening of the Suez Canal had 
dramatically reduced the length of voyages to the East and the total number of ships needed. The surplus of 
ships on the world market contributed to some defensive manoeuvres by shipping companies. Competing 
lines frequently amalgamated, either through merger or take-over, giving birth to lines such as Union-
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Castle, Shaw Savill and Albion, and Elders and Fyffe date from this peliod. This process of amalgamation 
increased the merged firm's resource base and market power. 
A second defensive option was to limit the competition between them by forming conferences. A shipping 
conference is a cartel in which shipping lines operating on similar routes agree to regulate competition 
between themselves and restrict new entrants from competing on the route. Many shippers were naturally 
discontented with this situation. However, a Royal Commission on Shipping Rings conducted between 
1906 and 1909 (and other similar inquiries) have found that conferences were necessary to assure stability 
of rates, regularity of service and improved facilities (Davies 1985:60). 
The process of amalgamation and conference building did not hit the tramp industry. Tramp owners were 
the more individualistic side of the industry, conducted by businessmen who held a personal pride in the 
achievements of the ships that bore their family name. They held a personal incentive that the managers of 
. large liner companies lacked. Liner companies were Hill more and more by people with skills in accounting 
and negotiating, whose office work increasingly distanced themselves from the every day running of the 
ships. They welcomed co-operative action with other companies. Consequently, the English shipping 
industry bore two structures; one oligopolistic (liners), one perfectly competitive (tramps). 
11.2.2 Government Policy and Empire The British govemment continued to assist shipping and the 
development of the new steam technology. A major form of assistance were postal subventions which 
subsidised ships carrying mail. To get a mail subsidy, a company had to fit in with the requirements of the 
admiralty who took a strong role in guiding and promoting the new steam technology. These subsidies 
contlibuted 20-40% of operating costs (Hope 1990:272) and were vital in establishing transoceanic 
steamships as a viable commercial prospect. The Great Western Steamship Company found it could not 
operate without a subsidy and was wound up in 1852 (MacKenzie-Kennedy 1993:6-9, Rolt 1970:215). A 
subsidy enabled the Cunard Line to annihilate non-subsidised American competition and dominate the 
Atlantic. Other companies to benefit from the subsidies included Royal Mail, the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company and P&O. 
The diffusion of steamship technology was aided by the development of long distant trades in wheat, wool, 
meat, coal and manufactured goods. Blitish steamships travelled to foreign ports where British-built 
railroads provided another key artery in the commercial system opening up the hinterland of places such as 
Canada and India. From India came jute, indigo, hides, tea, lice and raw cotton. From Canada came 
lumber and grain while, South Aflica gave diamonds and gold. Rubber first found in Brazil and West 
Africa was disnibuted through tropical colonies, paI1icularly Malaya and Ceylon. Sheep were introduced 
il1to Australia and New Zealand, a new source of wool and meat once refrigeration was invented. It was 
through this process, that the world divided into industrial and non-indusnial nations, taking a shape that 
224 
would remain for the next century (Lewis 1978:7). Although not in the empire, Argentina became an 
extension of this structure in that it was a provider of plimary products such as beef, to Britain (Duncan and 
Fogarty 1984: 16). As the colonies became licher from their exports to Britain, they in turn became a ready 
market for Britain's manufactured goods. The resulting commercial system developed reinforcing arms of 
commerce, industry and shipping, the lead in one field reinforcing her strength in the others. 
British rule enhanced the developing country's ability to obtain capital on the London markets, by 
enhancing law, order, and stability, and thereby reducing the risk of investment (although often the benefit 
went to the white elite in those countries). In this way, Cadbury, Lever Brothers, Rowntree, Fry, Liebig's 
Extract of Meat and Bovril all grew, with investments in foreign plantations, agencies and trading 
companies that ensured the supply of necessary resources (Chandler 1990:265). 
Blitish advances in railway, steam ships, and iron hulls provided the technologies by which trade volumes 
. soared. Railways, cold storage works, and other large scale enterprises could not be built without capital. 
Wealth generated by the industrial revolution found itselfon London capital markets where it was lent to 
foreign govemments developing their nations commercial infrastructure. Foreign companies might raise 
money through the London stock exchange, a process that was helped by the introduction of limited 
liability. Much of the Blitish capital that financed railways, cold-stores, plantations and other transportation 
facilities was raised in this way. 
However, it was not necessary to be ruled by Blitain to be part of this process. The infrastructure of the 
United States was developed largely with finance from Britain. Similarity in language, culture and 
institutions also helped to reduce the risk of investment although shipping between the two nations remained 
in the hands of the British. 
11.2.3 Supporting Industries and Technologies British shipping rose on the support of the most 
advanced supporting industries of the day including ship-building and the most advanced cargoes. 
Supporting industries grew into Marshallian distlicts deriving significant economies of scale. On shore 
industries might originally grow at a location because of their access to raw materials, for example steel for 
shipbuilding, clay for ceramics. Industry growth would create a pool of skilled labour in the region that 
would move from employer to employer as demand dictated. The concentration of so many firms in a 
region meant that common standards of worker training and qualification would be available to all 
employers. Pools of specialised labour were constantly available to any employer in the region through the 
local labour market. Trade Unions acted as local labour exchanges. They also helped maintain common 
qualifications of high standing among workers through the apprenticeship system they administered. Senior 
craftsmen would train and organise the workers under their control. 
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Given the high quality oflabour available through the market and the fact that training and organisation was 
pelfOlmed by senior workers, administration costs for the various films were very low. Employers did not 
need to invest in managerial or planning skills. Films remained relatively small and were family owned and 
managed. They concentrated on a narrow range of products in which they specialised. The low capital 
requirements of firms made entrance to the industry relatively easy whi Ie competition between firms helped 
to maintain standards. This industry structure has been labelled 'Proprietary capitalism' (Lazonick 1991) 
and Personal Capitalism (Chandler \990), the key charactetistics being Marshallian districts of industry 
concentration where firms enjoyed extemal economies in which a large number of firms shared 
infrastructural investments in communication, distribution and training. These firms were vertically 
specialised, horizontally fragmented, proprietary films with low overheads and highly skilled craftsmen. 
The anival of steam and iron totally changed the nature of shipbuilding. Previously, shipbuilding had been 
spread over a large geographical area, nearly every POlt having its own repairing and building facilities. In 
. contrast, the industry was now defined by access to key supplies and became concentrated in three areas, the 
Clyde, the north-east coast and Belfast. 
The industry was based on a totally new skill base, and the old timber and sail craftsmen-based industry 
went into obsolescence. People came to the industry, not with a background in shipping, but with new iron-
coal engineeting skills. David and Robert Napier were pioneering entrepreneurs arriving with backgrounds 
as blacksmith and iron founder (Smith 1980:260-2). They built their first marine engine in 1816, which 
they followed with the Rob Roy, the first steamship to cross the channel between Clyde and Belfast. Their 
first shipbuilding yard was on the Thames; however in 1841 they moved to Govan on the Clyde River, 
launching the region's great tradition of iron shipbuilding. 
The Napiers provided their employees with the engineeting capabilities required in the industry and, from 
their works came a new stream of entrepreneurs. David Todd and John MacGregor had been managers in 
David Napier's works before opening their own yard in 1836. John Elder, who patented the marine 
compound engine, had been employed as chief draftsman with Robert Napier before commencing his own 
business (later becoming the Fairfield Shipping and Engineering Company). Also from the Napier yard 
were J and G Thomson who founded their own shipyard at Govan in 1851, later known as the Clydebank 
Shipbuilding and Engineeling Company (Smith 1980:264). William Denny came from a family of 
shipbuilders but it was after working in Napiers that William Denny and Brothers of Dumbarton was 
created. By 1850 the reputation of the Clyde was attracting shipbuilders from other places. By 1876, there 
were more iron ships built on the Clyde than the rest of the world put together (Pollard and Robertson 
1979:62). 
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At Belfast, the first shipyard was estabhshed by Robert Hickson to provide an outlet for the production of 
iron plates for his Belfast Iron Works. The company was later bought by his yard manager, Edward 
Harland, becoming Harland and Wolff. On the east coast, Palmers began building their own iron steam 
coJljers to send coal from their mines to compete with the railways. Also on the east coast, Armstrongs 
began constructing hydraulic machinery before moving on to warships. 
The head start obtained by the Blitish enabled them to build up economies of scale that made it hard for 
foreigners to compete.' The steel industry could make longer production runs, thereby reducing costs 
(Pollard and Robertson 1979:46). The large market made it possible for shipbuilders to specialise in certain 
types of ships, particularly in the building of tramps (Pollard and Robertson 1979:46). This allowed 
shipbuilders to economise on the equipment they needed and allowed them to build before orders had 
arrived . 
. Many of the new steamship companies formed strong associations with sllipbuilders. Shipbuilders gained 
repeat orders and an opportunity to speciahse in certain tYres of ships. In return, the ship owners received 
vessels at lower prices (Pollard and Robertson 1979:92-3). For example, the White Star Line completed an 
agreement to have all their steamers built and designed by Harland & Wolff in Belfast (MacKenzie 
Kennedy 1993:42). In return, the shipbuilder offered not to build ships liable to compete with White Star 
services. The two co-operated with their ideas. The flow of information contributing must have contributed 
to the line's abihty to meet the market with hithelio unknown standards of comfort. For example, their ship 
designs placed first class cabins amidships, clear of machinery and propeller vibration, instead of the usual 
end of the ship. 
Cunard obtained financial backing from the engine builder R.Napier (MacKenzie-Kennedy 1993-10). In 
retu111, Napier gained a guaranteed market, which must have encouraged him to invest further in the new 
technology. The relationship reflects the quasi-integration identified by Richardson (1972) in which both 
firms gain from increased stability and co-ordination. Between 1839 and 1852 all Cunard contracts for 
paddle steamers were given to Napier who built the side-lever engines while sub-contracting the hulls to 
various affiliated C1ydeside builders. The relationship lead to a flow of information including, for example, 
what size ships would be needed given the need to store coal on board. 
However, Cunard was rather conservative in developing new ideas, preferring to let others take the risks 
(MacKenzie-Kennedy 1993:183). While many pioneeling companies went bankrupt, Cunard would only 
adopt an idea once its success had been proven. The failure of many first movers illustrates the dangers of 
being a pioneer.' However, the environment of expanding global trade did much to favour early movers 
adopting the technologies in a growing market. 
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11.3 The Coal and Steam Based Economic System The backbone of the new economic system 
was the coal industry. A huge natural endowment of coal provided the energy source by which many of the 
new indusuies were powered. In 1925, the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry stated: 
The paramount importance of the coal mining industry in the economic and social life of this country is a 
conunon place .... With the exception of agriculture to which it is a close second, the industry employs more 
men than any other; not less than one twelfth of our population is directly dependent on it. It is the foundation 
of our iron and steel, shipbuilding and engineering trades, and, indeed, of our whole industrial life (quoted in 
Fletcher 1975:2) 
Most important, coal was the comerstone of Blitish maritime supremacy (Fletcher 1975:4). It fuelled the 
construction of ships, tIle fuelling of ships, and gave the Blitish an export cargo that allowed it to charge 
lower rates on return joumeys. Once the Blitish had developed first-mover advantages with the new 
technology, they could move into other nations and provide sU'ong competition for shippers based there. 
Other technological developments continued to reduce co'sts and advance the possibilities of trade. The 
opening of the Suez canal reduced the London to Bombay trip from 10,667 miles to 6,274 and reduced the 
coal requirements for steamships on the longer routes. The development of refrigeration meant that meat, 
fruit and dairy products could be transported in a fresh state. Costs were reduced with the introduction of 
mechanical appliances for loading which reduced time in port and enabled ships to make more voyages. 
As British industry rode an increase in world trade that it was doing so much to shape, the profits provided 
capital with which B1itish firms could invest in the latest technological improvements. With the most 
sophisticated ships, and devices such as conferences, the British defeated their foreign competition. British 
tonnage, which stood at 2.77 million tons in 1840, grew four-fold in seventy years, to 11.56 in 1910 (Davies 
1985:69). 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain produced 'about two thirds of the world's coal, about half 
its iron, five sevenths of its steel, two fifths of its hardware and about half its commercial cotton cloth' 
(Kennedy 1988: 152). Its iron and coal dliven merchant fleet, that carried manufacturing goods out and raw 
materials in, was by 1890 larger than the rest of the world put together. It was part of a reinforcing system 
of coal resources, flexible family finns, Marshallian dishicts and practical craft workers. Ships built on the 
Clyde were chartered and insured in London where Lloyds achieved a position of leadership. In London, 
the City'S financial institutions provided the capital by which the system advanced. 
228 
Table 11.2 Competitive Strengthes and Related Heuristics of British Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Paradigm Heuristics 
Shipping Industry 
- Flexible Family Tramp Firnl - Company is a vehicle for family to 
gain prosperity and autonomy 
- Self financing 
- Ship technology - Use all-purpose vehicles (the 
tramp ). 
- Liner Companies! Conferences - maintain stability by reducing price 
competition. 
Supporting Aspects of Economy 
- Iron and coal supply - Use coal powered vessels 
- Skills/experience - Practical man 
- Education/Royal Society, etc 
- Family Firms - Company is a vehicle for family to 
gain prosperity and autonomy 
- Expansion of Empire, government 
policy and naval support. 
- Reputation - British are best by definition 
- Ports and infrastructure - rely on British facilities 
11.4 Early US Shipping 
Before the United States gained its independence, American colonial ships could fly under the British flag. 
This enabled them to receive some benefits of protection under the British navigation acts, as well as 
advantages in being tied to the strongest merchant navy in the world. In particular, as British colonies in the 
Cmibbean became more settled, New England shippers could gain experience by carrying grain to their 
colonial connections in the West Indies (McCusker 1979;12). Complementing this was a process of 
imitation in ship-building where British immigrants transfered their skills to the colony where a vast supply 
of timber enabled quality ships to be built at a low cost. However, the vast bulk of American domestic and 
intemational shipping at the end of the eighteenth century was conducted by foreigners, in particular the 
British (Bates 1892:95). 
United States trading relationships did not change after independence and were still strongly shaped by the 
Blitish impelial trading system. The south still served markets in Europe while northern fish, farming and 
forestry products found their primary market in the British West Indies. However, US ships no longer 
sailed under the Blitish flag and were now treated as foreign in the British West Indies where they had once 
canied their grain (NOlih and Thomas 1968:9). BaITed from routes to which they previously had access, 
229 
merchants from Salem, Boston, New York and Philadelphia expanded their scope of shipping activity. Ship 
owners from Salem took the early lead, Elias Haskett Derby sending his barque Light Horse to St 
Petersburg in 1784 while in the same year, a group of New York and Philadelphia merchants fitted out the 
Empress of China for the Far East. Having opened new markets, US shipping surged forward aided by 
Napoleonic Wars which distracted European competition and, for a time gave American shippers the 
chance to enjoy the benefits of neutrality. So profitable was malitime trade that it was the focus of all the 
nation's risk capital and provided the basis of many American fortunes, such as the Astors who reaped 
reward from calTying fin's to China (Bates 1979: 30-32). 
From 1789, advance in the industry was sUPPOlied with a range of protective measures introduced by the 
govemment. For example, an American ship blinging Hyson tea from the East would pay a duty of 10 cents 
per pound compared to 45 cents in a foreign vessel (Bates 1892:94). They were given a virtual monopoly 
on their coastal trade and dramatically reduced pOli duties. By 1810, approximately 90% of American 
. international trade was carried on US ships (Bates 1892:99) and, although this percentage would fall with 
the return of European ships after the Napoleonic wars and the removal of protectionism, the fleet continued 
to grow. 
This early period of imitation and capability building was followed by a process of advance as Americans 
innovated to meet the particular needs of their industry. For the north Atlantic, heavily built 'packet ships' 
with reasonable speed and good cargo-carrying capacity were designed to handle the ligors of this ocean. 
For the fast developing h'ade to China, a line version of the packet was employed. These were the 
progenitors of the 1840's 'clipper' used in the trade to China, California and Australia where speed was an 
advantage. Chapelle (1935:281) states that the clippers "are unquestionably the most over-advertised ship 
type in maritime history", as writers have painted a false picture of the importance of the ship. They appear 
to have captured the imagination because of the high level of competition in the Far East trade (McGregor 
1993:33) but, they only represented a small propOliion of the ships annually constructed. The bulk of the 
US fleet in the nineteenth century were schooners. These ships, which originated in Europe in the 1700's, 
had gaff sails with 2 or more masts. These were fast ships but had less carrying space than square-ligged 
vessels. DUling the nineteenth century, Americans added more masts that could propel faster, bigger ships. 
On the back of growing h'ade and innovative technology, the nation succeeded in building the second 
largest mercantile fleet in the world by 1850 (Greenhill 1993:10). 
Perez and Soete (1988) would lead us to expect a window of opportunity is created at the beginning of a 
product's life. Consequently, we would expect Americans to match Britain in iron and steamship 
technologies. As early as 1778, John Fitch successfully piloted a paddle wheeled boat on the Delaware. 
Advance in steam was propelled by Robeli Fulton who visited England in 1803 with the intention of 
studying painting but, became more interested in mechanical innovations. He conducted considerable 
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research in Europe on steam propulsion and, as an agent of teclmical transfer, returned to the States where 
he built his first steam boat in 1807. With his partner Robert R Livingston, he acquired monopoly rights to 
steam navigation in New York state (Still, Watts and Rogers 1993:44-5). 
The many broad waters of the United States were ideal for steamboats and paddle boats were soon plying 
other livers. However, diffusion of steam power was inhibited to some extent by the inability of American 
iron foundries to produce some of the shapes required for steam engines. Its use in American coastal waters 
was also slowed by monopolies awarded by some states to steamship companies, such as that given to 
Robeli Fulton in New York. It was not until a Supreme COllli decision outlawed such grants in 1824 that 
coastal steaming spurted (Bauer 1979:45). 
Amelicans also built the first steamship to cross the Atlantic Ocean when a group of prominent Savannah 
entrepreneurs created the Savannah Steamship Company. Their vessel, with the original name Savannah 
. left the United States on the 24th May 1819. Twenty-nine days later it arrived at Liverpool, having used 
steam power for only 85 hours and sail for the remainder (Rolt 1970: 190). However, steam technology was 
in its early days and the cost of fuel and equipment made it an expensive exercise deterring fmiher 
advancement into the area of steam powered ocean trading. The US experience with the Savannah 
illustrates the difficulties of being a first mover in that are still many uncertainties. 
It would be another twenty years before the British made their first steam powered voyages across the 
Atlantic. The British Cunard line began to dominate the steam market aided by subsidies from the British 
govemment for carrying the mail. Shortly after, the US government decided to provide mail subsidies to 
Amelican steam companies, giving birth to the Ocean Steam Navigation Company, the New York and 
Havre Steam Navigation Company, and the New York and Liverpool United Mail Steam ship Company 
(more commonly Imown as the Collins Line). In 1855, Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt also commenced 
a line, attracted by the mail contracts. In the west, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and United States 
Mail Steamship Company were bom. 
These companies became embroiled in 'milking' scandals. Two of the stockholders in the United States 
Mail, Law and Roberts fraudulently appropriated shares in the company eventually owning the bulk of the 
stock (Myers 1907:285n). To make matters worse, both the Pacific Mail and United States Mail Steamship 
Companies were receiving very large subsidies (a total of$900,000 per annum). Cornelius Vanderbilt, who 
ran steamships across the Atlantic, Imew that these lines could do their job with half the subsidy. He 
blackmailed the two companies to a tune of $40,000 a month Gust under half a million a year) not to set 
himself up in competition (Myers 1907:287). 
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In 1865, Congress voted an even bigger increase in mail subsidies for the Pacific Mail Steamship Company 
to calTY mail between San Francisco and Asia via Honolulu. In 1872, another $500,000 per annum was 
added. Eventually, the Ways and Means Committee investigated the subsidy and found that nearly one 
million dollars ill bribes had been paid to get the subsidy voted through (Myers 1907:476-7). Americans 
showed themselves as being just as able as the Chinese Mandarins to put milking ahead of national 
efficiency. However, a democratically elected govemment would not endure such misappropriations in the 
long tenn and no US president would be able to use navy funds to build a summer palace as occurred in 
China (see next chapte~·). 
The growth of the merchant marine came to an end with the Civil War, after which it virtually ceased to 
exist (Still, Watts and Rogers 1993:79). The war disrupted important trades, such as the vital cotton trade. 
It also led to large increases in the plice of insurance as 100,000 tons of shipping were lost to Confederate 
raiders (Safford 1985 :96). At this time many owners abandoned the industry altogether, redirecting their 
investments to coastal or foreign shipping, or transfelTed their ships to foreign flags. Consequently, tonnage 
levels in 1879 were half what they had been in 1857 (ibid). 
The civil war was only one of a number of factors that contributed to the decline of US shipping. American 
success in the industry had largely rested on its cheap wooden ships built from its large timber resources. 
As iron stmied to prove itself superior to timber, the Amelicans lost what had been a competitive advantage. 
At the same time, trade to Europe was hmt by a rise in protectionism in Europe and their colonies (Krooss 
and Gilbeli 1972:84). 
Finally, the changing nature of the Amelican economic system undennined the position of shipping. No 
longer a merchant driven society dependent on foreign imports, the United States was building a strong 
industJial base of its own with an expanding population and frontier moving west. There were more 
profitable avenues for investJnent than shipping. 
The retreat from the sea is no finnly illustrated than in the career of Come Ii us Vanderbilt (see Myers 1907, 
PattersonI989). Cornelius was bom in 1794 to the son of a Staten Island fanner who also ran an ilTegular 
felTY service across New York Bay to Manhattan Island. Cornelius found fenying more attractive than 
fmming and in 1811, with $100 from his mother, he bought a piragua, a shallow boat with which he hauled 
freight and passengers across New York Bay. Cornelius gained a reputation for reliability and in the second 
decade of the nineteenth century he began operating schooners on both the East and North Hudson Rivers. 
It was not possible to operate steamships in those days as the pioneer Robert Fulton had been given a state 
monopoly. Thomas Gibbons was prepared to fight the monopoly and in 1818, he hired Cornelius 
Vanderbilt to pilot a steamship in return for the substantial sum of $1 ,000 a year. Cornelius also took over a 
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dilapidated inn where his passengers rested on route. His wife ran the inn making a healthy profit. 
Eventually, Comelius started building his own steamships and ran lines to Albany, New Haven, Providence 
and Boston. New York at the time was enjoying a rapid population growth providing Cornelius with a 
soaring customer base. By 1835, 11e was worth half a million dollars, ranking him among New York's 
wealthiest. In hibute to his nautical skills, people began to refer to him as "the Commodore". Cornelius 
went on to establish maritime links with the West Coast (through Nicaragua) and, as mentioned above, ran 
steamships across the Atlantic with the aid of mail subsidies. 
Cornelius's son William Henry Vanderbilt became interested in railroads, buying the Staten Island Railroad 
which at the time was having trouble surviving. By cutting expenses and linking the railroad with a line of 
fenies, William Henry turned the railroad around. Cornelius also began to invest in the railroads that linked 
with his ferries. In 1858, he sold 11is shipping link to the West Coast for $20 million, at a time when 
investment opportunities on the New York Stock exchange were dominated by the stocks of railroad 
companies. Comelius invested in railroads, particularly those entering New York. He also stopped trying 
to compete with the Blitish steamships on the Atlantic, ev~ntually divesting of all his maritime activities. In 
1867, he became president of the New York and Hudson Railroad. He then purchased the New York 
Central Railroad which he merged into his previous acquisition. The 'best steamship manager of the time' 
(Bates 1892: 146) was becoming a railroad king. By the time Comelius died, he was the richest man in 
Ame1ica. His fOliune of $90 million was more than twice the size of his nearest lival. Born to the sea, his 
wealth matured on land, a reflection of the changing US economy and a turning from the sea. 
The expelience of the US merchant marine in the nineteenth centUlY is clearly paradoxical. At the end of 
the eighteenth century, the nation gained lmowledge in new markets, new routes and established contacts 
with new buyers and suppliers. Under the protection of high tariffs and the Napoleon Wars, and bolstered 
by a domestic economy that provided strong demand for imported cargoes, commodities for export and 
plentiful wood supplies to build ships, the nation had built the second largest fleet in the world by the 
outbreak of the US Civil War. We would expect these capabilities and endowments to serve the nation well 
in the steam age but a deficiency of iron engineering skills allowed the British to leap further ahead. The 
tuming from the sea personified by Vanderbilt stands in sharp contrast to other chapters where domestic 
economic growth has facilitated the growth of a merchant fleet, but perhaps if more detail was available in 
earlier peliods we might find there were peliods in which domestic growth absorbed capital that might have 
otherwise gone into shipping. If so, the US expelience would not appear so unique and might merely be a 
consequence of timing for, as we wi II see in chapter 13, the expected linkages eventually appeared and 
helped to build a US steamship industry. 
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Chapter 12 
Changes in the East 
12.1 The Decline of Chinese Shipping 
In chapter six, it was revealed that the development of Chinese maritime trade was P31t of a broader process 
of commercialisation in the economy. This prosperous system created spin-offs in terms of knowledge 
resources, supporting industries, capital and demand conditions that under-pinned the industries success. 
Given that the industry's success stemmed fi'om the economic system to which it was part, we would expect 
decline to affect all palts of that system. We would expect Chinese decline to be associated with some 
combination of lock-in to specific technologies, path dependency, entrapment by rules and values (both 
f01mal and info11nal). Attempts to change would initially be hampered by alTogance and uncertainty about 
the need for change, undelmined by the prevailing rationality and paradigm and stake-holders forming 
strong distributional coalitions. The Chinese experience is consistent with the thesis. 
The first elements of this pattern of decline can be revealed in a document of 1793. At that time, the British 
govemment sent a mission led by Lord MacC31tney to visit Peking and obtain increased trading rights and 
establish a representative at the Chinese capital. The resulting edict from the emperor Ch'ien-lung to King 
George read in part: 
We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor, instruct the King of England to take note of our charge ... 
... As to what you have requested in your message, 0 King, namely to be allowed to send one of your subjects 
to reside in the Celestial Empire to take look after your country's trade ... 
... The Celestial Empire, ruling all within the four seas, simply concentrates on carrying out the affairs of 
govemment properly, and does not value rare and precious things. Now you, 0 King, have presented various 
objects to the throne, and mindful of your loyalty in presenting offerings from afar, we have specially ordered 
the Yamen to receive them... Nevertheless we have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the 
slightest need of you country's manufactures..... Hence we have issued these detailed instructions and have 
commanded your tribute envoys to return safely home .... (quoted in Teng and Fairbank 1954: 19). 
The passage reveals an arrogance and ignorance of the changes in the world or any need to change. It is 
consistent with the modeling of the world and information filtering process identified by Simon (1959:272) 
in which 'the decision maker's model of the world encompasses only a minute fraction of all the relevant 
characteristics of the real environment'. Trapped within the Confucian model/paradigm, the Chinese still 
saw themselves as rulers of the four seas while the Westerners were mere barbarians. The prevailing 
rationality and education system entrapped the Chinese in their ancient belief that the Middle Kingdom was 
the centre of civilisation. However, China no longer ruled the waves and was losing its technical supremacy 
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in the cargoes that fil1ed the boats and the knowledge resources that had generated maritime innovation. 
Worse still, no one in the Middle Kingdom had any idea of the developments that Europe was making. 
However, at this time, the Chinese still had some reason for their high sense of self-belief. Throughout the 
eighteenth century Europeans certainly viewed China with enormous respect. Philosophers during the 
enlightenment saw China as a utopian state that they hoped to emulate. As mentioned earlier, even Adam 
Smith, in his avocation of specialisation and division of labour, seems to have been influenced by 
descriptions of porcelain production at Ching-te-chen (Adshead 1995 :296). 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Chinese mode of economic development with its hydraulic projects 
and national network of canals made China a wonderfully productive economy. Agricultural production, 
which accounted for most of a nation's productivity even as late as the eighteenth century, was higher per 
hectare in China than the West (Braude I 1984: 151), albeit a more labour intensive method. The economy 
showed a continual ability to adopt and grow throughout the Ming and Ch'ing (1368-1911) dynasties. The 
amount of land cultivated in that period increased, doubling between 1600 and 1850. New crops were 
introduced and changed the face of agriculture. Fresh strains of early ripening rice and American crops like 
potatoes and peanuts were introduced (Jones et al 1993:28). These crops could be used in dry land areas 
not previously exploited, expanding the nations agricultural frontier. As a consequence, Chinese society 
became more rural and even more market Olientated. There was a rise in the number of goods traded and in 
the number of market towns. Merchants and guilds rose in power and status under the force of this 
commercialisation. Private enterprise expanded with industries coordinated through a network of rapidly 
increasing density. Those industries showed themselves to be highly responsive to the ebbs and flows of 
market forces (Elvin 1973:284-7). 
The Chinese did not exhibit the social ligidity expected from decline. In fact, social relationships in the 
countryside were changing. One cause of this was the recurring peasant rebellions. Sparked by famine, 
flood, drought, rapacious officials or usurers foreclosing on mortgaged land, there were frequent occasions 
when the peasants reached boiling point. The possibility of being murdered caused recurring discomfort to 
landlords who gradually decided owning serfs was not as attractive as it had once been. The institution of 
serfdom came to an end. This, and the practice of dividing land estates on death resulted in a society which 
Elvin (1973:258) describes as 'one of the most fluid in the world, lacking any of the status or caste 
restr'aints which typified late pre-modern Japan or India'. 
This was an economy displaying all the pillars of growth that modem economists seek - a wealthy, socially 
mobile, market-driven economy. According to Murphey(l970:8), per capita income at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was equal to, or greater than, European levels, even though Europe was in the process of 
an industrial revolution. However, this may be overstated, Adshead (1995 :319) states that the per capita 
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income of Europeans was double that of China at the time. Nevertheless, realitive decline had set in. Jones 
(1990:7-8) argues that economic expansion was not accompanied by a per capita increase. There was 
'extensive' growth but not 'intensive'. Similarly, Elvin (1973:204) noted that although vigorous economic 
growth occurred between 1500 and 1800, 'invention was almost entirely absent'. The economy experienced 
growth within the established paradigm with existing pattems of behaviour, relationships and productive 
activity. Change might occur but, it did not significantly alter those established patterns. 
Inevitably, this declin~ hit the shipping industry. The Chinese had gained their initial superiority on the 
experience and skiIls they had developed, organisation sources that helped raise capital and enforce 
transactions, superior technology in ships and cargoes, supportive government policy and, in the China Sea, 
the restJictions it placed on foreign merchants entering China gave it a firm advantage on a key leg of the 
trade. However one by one, those sources of competitive advantage had been eroded. 
. In the early nineteenth century, the Chinese were still the leading shippers in the China Sea. Anthony Reid 
(1993) estimates the Junk trade of the South China Sea to measure 74,190 tons at this time, while Viraphol 
(1977) estimates the combined tonnage of Chinese and South East Asian based junks in the inter-Asian 
trade at 85,000 tons. By contrast, prior to 1833, the English East India Company never had more than 
30,000 tons in the region. However, the China Sea was just one of many markets for the British. As early 
as 1771-3, the English had more than double that tonnage in the Atlantic trade alone (see Davis 1962:298-
9). 
Chinese shipping reflected a path dependency centered on the China Sea. While Chinese shippers had 
developed skills, experience and contacts in the East Asian trade, Europeans were developing new paths to 
riches. Western fleets had access to the world market. They sailed every ocean in the world with markets 
in each, developing economies of scale with which the Chinese family firm could no longer compete. 
British plivate tJ'aders could borrow EIC funds at Canton and repay them in London, while the joint stock 
financial structure meant English films could assemble capital from an array of sources, from civil servants 
to army officers (Das Gupta 1994:155). 
However, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese were still secure in their competitive 
strengths. Even after the opening of the Treaty ports that gave Europeans access to the Chinese market and 
removed a protected source of strength for the Chinese, European merchants were unable to compete. They 
lacked the' intimate knowledge of the markets and the skill in assOlting and laying out cargoes, which the 
Chinese had acquired through centuries of experience' (Wong 1960:122). 
Slowly but surely, the Europeans began eating into the Chinese market share. The Chinese had also lost 
their technological edge in shipping technology. Crawford (referred to in Reid 1993:28) notes European 
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fully ligged ships could complete three voyages between Batavia and Canton each year compared with only 
one for the junks. Chinese merchants began to use European ships instead of those of their compatriots. 
However, this was not well received by their compatriots. In 1844, a Chinese supercargo who accompanied 
his cargo on a European ship was nearly seized by the authorities on his arrival in China for 'patronising a 
Foreign Vessel to the detriment of his own countrymen' and spoiling the junk market (Wong 1960:123). 
This caused the British govemment to claim that all Chinese merchants living in the Straits area (Singapore) 
were British subjects and were given documentation. Chinese merchants now regularly used European 
ships to transport their cargoes. 
In the face of such competition, we might expect Chinese shipbuilders to adopt European construction 
methods. There is little information on why this didn't happen however, it would seem there was little 
opportunity for the Chinese to study European construction methods. At the end of the century, the steam 
ship would make the advantage complete. 
Eventually another competitive strength fell away. Much of the competitive strength of Chinese shippers 
had come from the cargoes they canied. Throughout the nineteenth century, this supremacy was also lost. 
In 1800, China was still producing 33% of the world's manufactured goods. However, by 1860, their share 
was 19.7% and by 1900, it was down to 6.2%. DUling the same period, Europe's share had grown from 
28.1 % to 62% (Kennedy 1987: 149). 
The lack of significant invention in the techniques of production suggests a shortfall in Chinese science. 
Not that science failed to make progress in China but it did fail to advance at a rate achieved in the west 
(Jones 1990: 11). Thinking in tenus of national systems of innovation would suggest that Europeans had a 
developed a system which more rapidly generated innovation and the development of such institutions as 
the Royal Society and the Royal Observatory at Greenwich might support such a case. However, China had 
long had its Imperial Bureau of Astronomy and, as from 1645, a Catholic missionary had always been in 
charge of the bureau (Teng and Fairbank 1954:17), reflecting some openness to Western innovations. 
However, astronomical advances were not widely distributed as they were in the West and Westerners came 
merely to advise the Emperor. 
Chinese thought and education was changing in a way that reflected the economy had solved many material 
problems. From the fourteenth century, neo-Confucianist philosophers moved away from the material 
world and practical thought, and increasingly started to explore the 'mind' and 'spirit' (Elvin 1973:225-
234). As the nation's top intellectual thinkers moved away from exploring the physical world, the growth of 
a modem science based on mechanistic and quantitative approach to phenomena was unlikely to occur, with 
negative consequences for science and technology. To some extent this retreat from the practical-technical 
is consistent with the thesis in that those with power were becoming more distanced from core activities; a 
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variation on Marshall's life cycle or Schumpeter's (1942:160-1) depiction of leading capitalist families 
becoming divorced from those values that placed them in their priviledged position. This could be seen in 
the long finger nails growing on the hands of MandaJins who never saw manual work (Wong Chu-Ming 
1963: 166). It reflected a distance between those who worked and those who had education and power. The 
consequence was a lack of attention to developing new production techniques. This stands in dramatic 
contrast to Europe where knowledge resources were increasingly applied to the problems of industry, and 
institution such as the Society of Arts were created to facilitate this link. 
FOlwalisation had ce11ainly acted as one cause of stagnation in Confucian education. Once a highly rational 
mode of thought, Confucianism had became traditionalist and conservative (Balazs 1964:32). The 
reproduction of past successful thought resulted in examinations becoming formalised with a preoccupation 
with style. Education became repetitive with little in the way of advance. This can be seen in geography. In 
the late eighteen century, when Btitish maJiners had mapped the globe from New Zealand to Greenland, the 
Chinese still thought of the world as flat with China located in the centre (Lenz 1997: 152). 
However, the links between science and technology should not be stressed too strongly. It presupposes that 
industrial technology in the west advanced on the basis of scientific advance and, this was not the case until 
the nineteenth century. Industrialisation in Btitain during the eighteenth century had only a weak 
connection with scientific thought (Jones et al. 1993:31). Most of the industrial advances were made by 
m1isans with little scientific knowledge. They could be described as industrial 'tinkerers' (Landes 1969) 
and held no scientific advantage over Chinese aJ1isans. Chinese artisans were very capable of making the 
products of the early industrial revolution and had already made their own water powered spinning 
machines. A true 'technological gap' did not open up until the second half of the nineteenth century when 
developments occured in the steel, electtical and chemical based industries. We need a better explanation 
for entrapment. 
Another explanation for the slow rate of innovation can be found in the market would where the routine-
based path dependency. Langlois (1988) had noted that markets of decentralised specialists can create co-
ordination problems in implementing complex change. The Chinese example seems to illustrate an even 
greater problem of market-based specialisation in that it can reduce the chances for innovation in general 
(as it had in Gujarat). Market growth had led to increased specialisation. Artisans specialised on producing 
goods with little attention given to the workings of the market. Merchants specialised in distributing goods 
with little thought given to how the goods were produced. The result was a tising gap between producers 
and merchants and in many cases, intetwediaries and contractors increased this gap. The consequence was 
those with capital and the keenest awareness of market forces had no interest in production technology At 
the same time, producers lacked the capital and marketing sense to create any significant leap in production 
technology (Elvin 1973:277). Consequently, no significant leap occurred. As in India, market-based 
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specialisation had stunted domestic innovation. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, young industries were 
beil1g created by men like Josiah Woodward, who had crafts skills and an entrepreneurial eye for the market 
(McKendrick 1982). 
Consistent with this specialisation was the market-based rationality of the time. With little investment in 
facilities and suppliers, the culture was commercially or transaction based, not management orientated. If a 
merchant had problems getting supplies, he never sought a technical or productive solution as he had no 
knowledge in this area. He sought solutions in the market place, where he had developed his skills. 
Solutions to bottlenecks or periods of rising and falling demand could be met through the market, an answer 
made possible by the efficient forward and backward linkages that existed. For example, if demand was 
high for cotton, wages would rise and encourage some of the hundreds of thousands of peasant households 
to divert their labour from agriculture to the cotton industry and, when demand fell the peasant's labour 
would be redirected into fanning. The market was so efficient that it was unnecessary for merchants to 
become directly involved in production. As Elvin (1973 :277) explains 'They could hold almost all their 
capital in relatively liquid form as working capital and avoid tying it up as fixed capital. This gave them 
much greater potential freedom of action, and spared them embezzlement of matelials by spinners and 
weavers. With no benefits to be had from acting otherwise, this alTangement was congenial to the merchant 
temperament' . 
However, indusuies with internalised co-ordination were also suffering. For example, the ceramics indusu'y 
was also suffeling from specialisation which had previously reduced costs and enhanced quality. But 
technical perfection came at the cost of entrapment. Increased centralisation of the industry under the state 
increased efficiency and quality of output, but reduced the chance for individual creativity (Medley 
1989:265). While large scale production reduced expelimentation in China, the small state owned factories 
in Europe were given regional monopolies, government support and freedom to experiment and innovate 
(Atherbury 1982:127). In England, individual potters competing in a proprietary capitalist system 
proceeded on a path of continuous improvement. The industrial revolution was producing new products 
such as bone china and new techniques such as transfer decoration that more than held their own with the 
traditionally produced china-ware. As early as 1791, the English East India Company no longer found it 
profitable to import Chinese porcelain to Europe. 
Although centralisation had reduced the number of kilns in China, I have found no evidence to suggest that 
there were fewer kilns competing in China than Europe where the industry was younger. Consequently, the 
decline cannot be attributed to a relative lack of local rivalry. Nor can state control take the blame, as many 
of the kilns in Europe were state owned. The investment in ligid specialised routines and centralised 
control would seem to be the cause, thereby suppOlting the thesis. The fact that both market- and finn-
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coordinated producers were entrapped provides some support for the importance of historical investment in 
routines, rules, and procedures. 
Another explanation for the lack of technological advance in the Chinese economy might be the resnictive 
nature of its bureaucracy. The long-term investment strategy of businessmen was strongly shaped by their 
environment. And the Confucian govemment who gave merchants a low ranking in society, did not create a 
stable or optimistic environment for investment. When combined with the riots and uprisings which posed 
a constant threat to merchants assets, the long term sn"ategy of successful merchants was to invest wealth 
either in the safety of land or, in education so that there family could obtain a higher social standing and 
perhaps enter the bureaucracy themselves. As Joseph Needham (1963:139) observes 'it was evidently 
impossible for the mercantile classes of Chinese culhlre to acquire anything like the positions of power and 
influence in the State which they attained in Europe'. Consequently, they did not invest in proto-industrial 
development as did the merchants of the west. However, Hao (1970:7) states that the theoretically low 
. ranking of the merchant was misleading. When the gove1l1ment sold degrees to raise money, wealthy 
merchants could buy into the gentry and merchants through guilds experienced a rise in status and power 
over this peliod. The Ch'ing dynasty was a peliod in which markets were growing and businessmen became 
respected and influential citizens. In fact, it appears the state was actually reducing its role in the economy 
during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). Gove1l1ment revenue "figures at the end of the eighteenth cenhlry 
show that the share of the economy in the hands of the gove1l1ment had actually decreased. The 
government's share of GNP in China was 5% of GNP, compared with 10% for the United Kingdom 
(Adshead: 1995 :246). 
Murphey (1970:13) suggests merchants benefited far more from contact with officials than they suffered 
from taxation or periodic special exactions. Officials showed an increasing appreciation of market forces 
and a symbiotic relationship developed between the two (Elvin 1972:292). The role of merchants in the 
economy and its source for revenue were of value to the state who increased their support. However, this 
still diverted merchant energies away from technology. Chinese merchants invested their energies and 
capital into building relationships with scholar officials. Strong relationships overcame the vagaries of 
Mandalin conn'ol and the possibility of legal bans on trading, and increased the chance of official favours. 
So, while political obstacles to economic growth during the Ch'ing dynasty may have been minimal, the 
incentives generated by the scholar officials continued to shape business behaviour within the established 
mode of development. Cultivating relationships was more profitable to merchants and hence a more wOlihy 
area of development than improving techniques of production. 
Perhaps more telling than the size of the state was its changing role. While in the Song dynasty the 
government took a leading role in diffusing innovations, during the Ch'ing dynasty, 'the Chinese 
government ceased almost entirely to provide any kind of public services' (Mokyr 1990:234). This could 
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reflect that the most obvious techno-economic break-throughs under the Confucian paradigm had been 
achieved and, there was little left for the official-scholars to do but sit back and take their share of the 
distribution of wealth. The government began to resemble one of Olson's distributional coalitions, taking 
revenue but offeling little in the way of infrastructure or services. The imperial system had become a sort of 
protection racket, a ritualised arrangement whereby the elite lived off the people (Jones et al 1993:29). A 
consequence of this was a vital part of the economy was no longer involved in 'search' and 'exploring' and 
contributing to the National System ofInnovation. 
The government retreated from economic activity, prefening to let the guilds carry out bureaucratic and 
legal functions of commerce (Jones 1990:18). The guilds were celtainly closer to the activity and in a better 
position to control activity. With decentralisation, we would expect an increase in competitiveness; 
however, the guilds also administered rules and their jmisdiction over their members was absolute (Morse 
1909:27). Through coercion and the practice known as 'cessation of all business' (ie: stop trading) they 
could impose their will on traders both inside and outside their membership. The resulting tyranny 
restricted freedom of enterplise and individual initiative .. Guilds allowed industry to grow but not at the 
expense of another members' income. Their concern with market share and corporate welfare could define 
them as a distributive coalition. By restlicting competition this group had evolved into a distributional 
coalition that restricted innovation. 
However, Jones (1990) does not see guilds as the cause of limited growth, but as a symptom of the way 
Chinese society was organised. Guilds, personal relationships and other networks, through their rules and 
moral standards reduced costs between transacting palties. They increased efficiency within an existing 
mode of development. . But new fonTIs of techno-economic activity involved transactions between people 
outside of existing relationships and networks. By contrast, Europe had developed a legal system which 
made it safer for merchants to do business with strangers. However, the lack of independent law in China 
stopped the entrepreneur from safely going it alone. The rules and controls of guilds allowed an impressive 
degree of market expansion but, they impeded market deepening into new areas. Businessmen were 
entrapped within existing modes of economic development. 
Elvin (1973 :314) describes the Chinese economy of the Ch'ing dynasty as being caught in a 'high level 
equilibrium trap'. The high level of agricultural and water transport techniques, and the near complete 
resource use gave the economy a structure that was almost incapable of change through internally generated 
forces. Its farming and transport technologies were so good that 'no simple improvements could be made' 
(Ibid). Its transportation and commercial system had reached the limits of efficiency from which no further 
reduction in transaction costs could be achieved within the existing paradigm. As agricultural productivity 
per acre approached the limits of what was possible without new industrial-scientific inputs, the nation 
experienced a decline in per capita production. Farmers had less additional output to trade and this reduced 
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their demand for other products, reducing the opportunity for the market to reward innovation. At the same 
time, resources were becoming scarce making it more expensive to produce capital goods while labour, 
fuelled by population growth, was becoming cheaper. This provided no incentive to innovate with labour 
savillg machines or improvements in the manner of the Europeans. 
In summary, the decline of innovation was caused by a number of features: guild rules and restrictions, 
formalisation of education, specialisation in the market and larger organisations, merchants entrapped by a 
market based value system, and the retreat of mandmins from technological enhancers to distributional 
coalition. China was entrapped in what had been a successful economic system. 
12.2 China's Failure to Imitate 
We would expect anextemal threat to wake China up to the new reality and the need for reform. Certainly, 
the first realisation of any European supremacy came with the Opium War (1840-1842) in which bamboo 
canons and crossbows proved no match for modern British weaponry (Merson 1989: 156). The result was a 
humiliation for the Chinese who were at last forced to acl~nowledge the supremacy of western technology. 
The European victory led to the signing of a number of treaties in which treaty-ports were opened where 
foreigners had unrestlicted freedom of residence and trade. China could no longer deny the new reality and 
the lleed to imitate was now apparent. However, this opened up a new range of problems including the 
problems of identifying what aspects to adapt, and of overcoming vested interests and values, insufficient 
skills and infrastructure and, the problems of managing change itself. 
The suggestion that foreigners were in some way supelior involved not only a new way at looking at 
technology for the Chinese but, a need to un-learn many of the things that had been taken for granted in the 
past. They had to re-evaluate their view of the world and their position in it. In palticular, the nation had to 
go through a process of accepting that it was in their best interests to imitate people that they thought were 
inferior. The new policy met with the inevitable resistance. Consistent with Schoenberger (1997), many of 
the problems came because the new requirements confronted old aesthetics. Much of the resistance to 
western models was on ideological grounds. For example, Wo-jen (quoted in Teng & Fairbank 1954:76) 
led the attack against changes in education 'if these brilliant and talented scholars ... change from their 
regular course of study to follow the barbarians, then the correct spirit will not be developed, and 
accordingly the evil spirit will become stronger'. An educational programme placing students in US 
schools came to an end when the students failed to kow-tow in front of a Chinese official in Washington. 
Such attitudes undermined the celiainty with which the new policy would receive on-going support. 
Even though imitation was seen as necessary, another problem was deciding how far to go. Even among the 
proponents of change, there was not universal agreement about how much westem science, technology and 
institutions should be adopted. For example, Li Hung-chang (1823-1901) who was 'probably the least 
242 
" -,-_-.·_-_"o" 
I, 
conservative high official of his day', thought Chinese political and social institutions were superior to those 
in the west (Teng and Fairbank 1954:86-7). Yet Li was a leader in the modernisation programme. 
From the outset, shipping had revealed itself as a key industry. Attempts to adopt modem shipbuilding are 
described in Chen (1968). DUling the Opium War, British steamships had made a deadly impact. They 
travelled with ease and constantly teIT01ised the Chinese people who christened them 'The Demon Ships'. 
No-one was more aware of this fact than the officials ill charge of the military operations. Lin Tse-Hsu, 
who served as Imperiai Commissioner at Canton from 1839-41, took an early lead in promoting technology 
h·ansfer. He wrote to the Emperor seeking funds to build westem style ships and armaments so that China 
could 'learn the superior skills of her enemy and how to control her' (quoted in Chen 1968:30). However, 
consistent with the thesis, key decision makers had become isolated from the country's productive activities. 
The COllli had no idea of the significance of the new technologies and, with the Emperor hearing only 
distOlied reports of Opium War defeats, Lin Tse-Hsu's memorandum came to nothing. 
Without cOUli support, Lin became the first official to persistently to adopt western means of maritime 
technology. From Canton, he actively sought information on western commerce, geography, and shipping 
and, is thought to be the author of Hai Kua Ttl' Chih (IlIush'ated Record of the Maritime Nations). The 
motive in this early phase of imitation was defence, so Lin's focus was not on buying ships but creating 
capabilities for building stronger ships. By the 25th April 1840, they had achieved some success. The 
Chinese Repeliory reported: 
Two or three schooners have just been launched on the river at Canton; they are built after the European 
models, and are, we suppose, to be attached to the imperial navy (quoted in Chen 1968: 19). 
After the battle of Amoy in 1841, the English found a ship-building yard containing a large amount of 
timber and a 300 ton ship in the process of construction along European lines. The English reported that 
the Chinese' had evidently made a great step in advance in the art of shipbuilding-indeed, the longer the war 
lasted, the more the Chinese found themselves led on by the 'impulse of necessity' to attempt great 
changes ... ' (quoted in Chen 1968:32). 
But these were sailing ships. Wooden ship technology was compatible with existing Chinese capabilities. 
Building iron steamships would require skills and investments that China did not possess. Experiments 
building steamships achieved little as they lacked the necessary industrial infrastructure. It is worth recalling 
that the growth of British steamship technology was associated with inter-connections with other 
technologies and environmental conditions. This technical inter-relatedness burdened the Cantonese effort, 
as Yen P'ao Tu Shuo reported 'Unfortunately the craftsmen at Canton possessing no machine to make 
machines, cannot build big ships' (quoted in Chen 1968 :46). 
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HMS Nemesis in action against war junks. During the Opium Wars, these 'Demon 
Ships' opened the Chinese to the realization of superior Western technology and the fact 
that they no longer ruled the four seas(National Maritime Museum). 
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Near the end of the War, the importance of supporting the modernisation efforts at Canton was finally 
recognised by government policy. Over the next two years, the impelial court issued about thirty imperial 
edicts on ships and guns (Ibid:52). The edicts displayed a recognition of English superiority, and phrases 
such as 'it is necessary to change' and 'must not follow old methods' were repeatedly used. Provincial 
governments were given instructions to improve and purchase ships, and continue the work made by Lin's 
men at Canton. UnfOliunately, the edicts received blanket opposition and, once again the opposing 
arguments were couched in very strong rationale, in pmticular environment barriers to adapting the 
technology (Ibid:58-9). The government of Chihli reported that their local waterways were too narrow and 
shallow for the new ships. Kiangsu noted that the ships were not suitable for their local conditions and 
added that with a shortage of strong wood and skilled shipwrights, they would not able to build ships hastily 
that were equal to the foreign ones and, even if they could, they would be useless because nobody knew 
how to operate them. These reasons given by provinces were all valid and eventually, the emperor had to 
give up the idea of introducing the new ships. For a year or so after the war, interest in modernisation at the 
court and provinces continued but eventually, with no war-time pressure to upgrade, became a low priority. 
The pressure to modernise reappeared in the 1850s and 1860s with the Taiping rebellion and, once again, it 
was those in the forefront of battle who pioneered change. The scholar-official Tseng Kuo-Fan was made 
'the captain of war' during the rebellion and developed a keen interest in the modern weaponry, in 
particular steamships. This time the court was quicker to appreciate the need for modernisation and gave 
instructions to proceed with plans for shipbuilding. However, with little experience, this was not going to 
be easy. The Annals describes the results from Tseng's first attempt to make rafts to carry guns: 
Unfortunately the rafts made were useless and no one has ever seen warships or is able to take the initiative. 
They look at one another and are at a loss. Nevertheless Tseng labours day and night asking advice from them 
all (quoted in Chen 1968: IS). 
Although strongly motivated to imitate Westem technology, nothing of his life in China had prepared him 
for the task. Luckily, Tseng came upon two petty officials who know something about ships and presented 
him with plans for several types of ships. Tseng established shipyards at Hengchow and Hsiang-tan where 
expelimentation proceeded but, as this note to the court reveals, they lacked the skills and capabilities to 
achieve their goals: 
several sample boats were built. None of them, on account of the lack of skill on part of the shipwrights, and 
the smallness of size, can SUTIl10unt the waves of the Yangtse, nor can they stand the shock of the cannon 
(ibid). 
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Tseng wanted to build a steamship. We should recall that the British developed their steam-engine and 
steam-ship technology over a century of gradual development. In theory, a follower can catch up rapidly 
without enduring development costs however, early Chinese attempts to make a Steamship had all ended in 
failure because they had no opportunity to closely examine a steam vessel. Tseng Kuo-fan bought a ship 
which allowed his men the chances of further investigation. Unfortunately, Tseng had no way oflmowing if 
he was buying a mechanically sound ship, so unfOliunately bought a reject from the Western sellers 
(fbid:38). 
[n 1861, Tseng moved his headqualters to Anking where his mechanics and engineers worked on all kinds 
of machines including a steam engine that was successfully demonstrated on July 30 1862. The engine was 
followed by the construction of a model steam ship after which, Tseng instructed Hsu Shou to build a full 
sized steam ship. With opposition from local officials and no foreign help, he attempted to build a small 
steam ship with existing Chinese tools and equipment. But, as Tseng's own words to the emperor reveal, 
'Although a small steamer was built its speed was so slow that it showed we had not yet learnt the proper 
technique' (quoted in Chen 1968:40). 
Before they could imitate, they had to leam how to imitate. They eventually realised that to overcome 
technical and capability problems, foreign machines and workers had to be used. This lesson was learnt by 
Tseng Kuo-fan and his technical experts who planned the establishment of a machine shop at Shanghai in 
1864. They recruited Yung Wing (a graduate of Yale and the first Chinese returned student from America) 
to go abroad and buy foreign machinery (Ibid 42-5). A foreign machine shop in Hongkew Shanghai was 
rented and strengthened by the arrival of the new machinery. Unlike at Anking where the Chinese strove by 
themselves, the arsenal at Shanghai included 6 or 7 foreign mechanics (French and English) to help with the 
process of modernisation. The first steamship was completed in 1868 and named by Tseng Tien Chih 
(Calm and prosperous). Four more were completed before Tseng's death in 1872. 
Tseng established a translation bureau (whose first 4 books translated were Treatises on Steam Engines, 
Catechism Oil the Steam Engine, Practical GeometlJ', and Coal and Coal mining) and inaugurated a scheme 
by which 30 Chinese students were sent abroad. At the now named Kiangnan Arsenal, he also established 
the country's first military engineering school where mechanics could learn western techniques with the 
assistance of foreigners. ImpOliing foreign workers and machines still left many problems. Another early 
moderniser was Tso Tsung-T'ang who recognised the following problems in establishing a modem 
shipbuilding yard in the Chinese system: 
first, the difficulty of selecting a place for a shipyard; second, the difficulty of finding and buying steamship 
machinery; third, the difficulty in engaging head mechanics; fourth; the difficulty of raising and accumulating a 
huge amount of funds; fifth, the difficulty that the Chinese are unaccustomed to navigation and that after the 
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completion of the ships we would still have to engage foreigners; sixth, the difficulties of the numerous 
requirements of expenditures for coal, salaries and wages after the ships have been completed, all of which 
would have to be paid every month, in addition to which from time to time the ships would have to be repaired. 
Seventh, in this unusual enterprise it is easy for slander and criticism to arise; one person initiates the plan, 
another carries it out, while a third is a mere bystander; and if the enterprise fails near its completion, then both 
public and private loss will result. With these several difficulties, it is no wonder that there is no man who 
cares to take the responsibility.... At the beginning they will worry about the lack of accomplishment; then 
they will criticise the expenditure as being too much, and will probably also say sarcastically that we have lost 
our national dignity (from Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tsou-kao quoted in Tang and Fairbank 1954:82-3). 
Beyond resource constraints and the problems of acquiling capabilities are a host of other problems 
including the need to compete with the new technology while still in a process of learning. The British 
could benefit from their first mover adVa11tages. The chances for failure are high and expose the moderniser 
to ridicule. It is not surprising that people elTed on the conservative side. FinaIly, it reinforces the fact that 
. no industry is an island. It requires a suppOliing infrastructure that trains staff and supplies the necessary 
supplies. A technology gap was opening between China and the Western nations. However, it should be 
noted that at the same time, US ship-building was also having a slow time adapting British technology, even 
though it had a modem iron industry and could easily recruit immigrants speaking the same language. It 
should also be noted that Britain had developed its expertise over a century and, although some of the 
development costs might be avoided by imitation, the task of catch up involved many complications. 
12.3 Imitation - Steamship Companies 
Steam-ship businesses were the first and for a long time, the only field in which Chinese could view an 
example of modem Westem entrepreneurship (Liu 1959:436). The commercial operation of steamships in 
China took off after 1860 when a number of foreign films began to operate steamships under the 
commercial freedom given them by the treaties. The foreign companies operated in China as joint stock 
companies, and Chinese compradore merchants showed a wiIlingness to invest in the companies 
(Compradores were Chinese who acted as go-between for foreign companies operating in China). For 
example, when the Amelican firm Russell & Co set up the Shanghai Steam Navigation Co., one-third of the 
company's stock was sold to Chinese merchants. Similarly, when Jardine Matheson set up the China Coast 
Steam Navigation Company, it retained less than half of the stock, issuing the rest to Chinese and foreign 
merchants in the Treaty ports. 
Recognising the importance of water transpOliation to the Chinese economy, the government established in 
1872, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company to compete with foreign firms. However, attempts 
to introduce modem technology into an economy with incompatible values and institutions were fraught 
with difficulties. In theory, the company was a joint stock enterplise with shares issued to private 
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individuals. However, the company was founded by a top official, the famous Li Hung-chang, and operated 
within an agency of the government, 'the Bureau for Inviting Merchants to Operate Steamships'. Many of 
the old administrative routines and values were canied over. 
Li Hung Chang's principal advisor for the project was Chu Ch'i-ang, a gentry merchant who personally 
owned junks and was a commissioner of the Chekiang Bureau of Sea Transp01i. He was previously in 
charge of the sea-transportation of government rice, a position for which he received commendation for his 
supervisory, negotiation and dispute resolution skills. His combination of maritime experience at the 
highest levels and respect by captains and helmsmen seemed to make him ideal for the new position. 
Unfortunately, all his Imowledge of Chinese junks was to little avail when confronted with steam ships. The 
first ship he purchased was over-pliced by some 60% (Hao 1970: 139). His second purchase was 0111y 
slightly better, and the first wharf he acquired was for a similaTly inflated price. When dealing with foreign 
sea captains, he found himself in another position of incompetence. When he dismissed Captain 
James.W.Connor for recklessness and putting a 'squeeze on the crew', the subsequent legal activity 
suggested that Chu either did not Imow how to get good men or failed to handle them properly (Hao 
1970:139). 
In 1873, Chu was replaced by Tong King-sing who had previously been employed as a compradore by 
JaTdine Matheson and Co. The Blitish Company had given Tong an intimate knowledge of the steamship 
business. Consequently, Tong was probably the most experienced Chinaman in the field and personally 
owned steamships (Hao 1970: 140). Tong brought to the company other Chinese compradores with 
expelience in the treaty ports. He also employed American and English captains, engineers, and maline 
superintendents to run the ships. Foreigners were even employed as superintendents on the wharves and 
warehouses, this later group employed not so much for their expertise but, for lack of faith in the Chinese 
(Liu 1959:443). He also rallied the support of the Chinese merchant guilds to develop an effective system 
of attracting freight. Tong immediately brought success. One of the British company's observed that the 
expenses for the ship Nanzing had declined from 7,000 taels to 4,000. With loans from the government, the 
company's fleet grew from four ships (totalling 2,435 tons) in 1874, to 17 ships (11,706 tons) by 1876 
(Ibid:440). In January 1877, the company purchased the entire fleet and shore properties of Russell & Co.'s 
Shanghai Steam Navigation Company, the company had become the largest steamship operator in China 
(with 33 ships totalling 23,967 tons). 
Success opened up new problems and requirements of supporting industries and infrastructure. Subsequent 
investment in Hirschman{l958: 1 00) style backward linkages was required to overcome shortages in imports 
needed for productive activity. The company needed a coal supply, so Tong was instrumental in 
establishing the Kaiping coal mine in 1878. To transp01i the coal, a railway was built from the mine (Tang 
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and Fairbank 1954: 1 08). The availability of this new energy supply led to the establishment of a number of 
modem enterprises including cement, blicks and tiles (Hao 1970: 144). 
Even though the company was run by a manager expelienced in Western methods, the Mandarins had 
created an administrative framework with which they were familiar. The Company was operated under the 
traditional 'govemment supervision and merchant operation' system under which, the security of the 
manager's position and the existence of the enterprise was tied to a particular group of bureaucrats (Liu 
1959:437). This made it difficult for managers to take a long term view of their position in the company. 
Even the officials (including Li), were not always sure of the company's permanence, with the consequence 
that managers and officials were not able to link their personal future with that of the company and hence, 
took the opportunity to profit while they could. This short-term thinking accentuated the already bad 'tax 
farmer spirit' typical of Chinese government-business relations and even Li was not above putting personal 
gain ahead of state policy. 
However, the company benefited from govemment financial assistance. These included large loans, tax 
concessions and, when the company was contracted to cany tribute rice, the govemment paid a rate at least 
twice that charged by foreign firms. But these advantages did not offset the negative consequences of 
official interference. The govemment aid only prompted the officials to meddle fiIrther in the affairs of the 
company. Two officials, who negotiated for govemment loans and rice caniage contracts, each received no 
less than TIs 20,000 every year as their share of the govemment payments for the rice transport (Liu 
1959:444). They also recommended proteges for lucrative posts in the company (as did other supervising 
officials). Although foreign companies operating in China also had to deal with nepotism and conuption, 
they were free of this level of govemment interference. By the early 1880's, the Chinese company's offices 
and warehouses employed two or three times the number of men actually needed (Ibid:444). Cheng Kuan-
ying, a manager in the company described the problem: 
The personnel recommended by the officials are neither scholars, nor farmers, nor artisans, nor merchants. 
They are men who have never had any sort of experience. Some of them want to be secretaries and receive a 
salary without doing any work. Others seek posts as pursers on board steamers, the actual work being done by 
assistants while they themselves sit and wait for their share of the spoils. Still others become assistant 
managers at the branches of the company. They frequently entertain the local authorities and wastefully incur 
expenses without contributing anything to the operation of the company. (Cheng, Sheng-shih wei-yen, quoted 
in Liu 1959:444) 
Nevertheless, the Chinese company was able to provide reasonably efficient shipping services and made 
sizeable profits between 1877 and 1893. However, for a number of reasons, the profits were not used to 
expand the size of the enterprise. One was that the preoccupation of the managers with their immediate 
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personal gain. Tong and his colleagues paid themselves very high interests rates for money they lent the 
company and, at other times, Tong borrowed money to finance their private real estate investments. The 
managers' actions reflect an inability to take a long-range view of the company's future and their place in it; 
a consequence of the traditional short time scope of Chinese businesses, the tendency to milk and the 
unceltainty of the business environment (Hao 1970:150). Liu (1959:438) suggests that these same 
environmental factors also acted as a disincentive for Tong to invest time in improving his understanding of 
technical matters. As a consequence, he did not study or adopt 'innovations essential to effective 
entrepreneurship' . 
Another factor limiting reinvestment was the practice of paying shareholders a guaranteed minimum 
dividend of 10 per cent. In contrast, the foreign companies operating in China persuaded their share-
holders that it was sound business practice to reinvest a good portion of their profits. This reduced the need 
to raise loans, in tum reducing their debt repayments. In this manner, the foreign fleets enjoyed long-term 
. growth, lacking in the Chinese company. 
The Chinese industry may have fared better if other private companies were stalted and, in 1877 and 1882, 
two attempts were made to establish plivate steamship companies. However on both occasions the official 
patrons of the government-sponsored company opposed any new competition (Liu 1959:453). The 
companies did not eventuate. Although all saw the need for a domestic steamship company, steamships 
were seen as too important a technology to be in private hands. The institutions, relationships and business 
practices inhelited from the past stunted the growth of the industry. It is notable that in the treaty pOlts 
where compradors were free from Mandmin control, Chinese shipping companies were established by 
compradores who had gained the necessary management capabilities from their experiences working for 
foreign companies (Hao 197098-99, 120-124). For example, the Ningpo Steam Navigation Company was 
established and registered as an Amel;can film in 1877. Many companies were created in partnership with 
foreign merchants. For example, the Greaves and Co (Hung-an kung-ssu) was established by Chinese and 
British merchants with 70% owned by Chinese compradores who had worked for Jardine Matheson & Co, 
Butterfield & Swire, and China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. Such activities were reliant on foreign 
support which it seems they gained due to the mutual benefit to such companies; but one can only wonder 
what the Chinese could have achieved if completely unleashed. 
12.4 Conclusion on Chinese Decline 
When a film or an industry faces decline we might expect the businessmen that comprise that industry to 
respond by innovating or imitating those that are succeeding them. We find such expectations in Downie's 
'innovation mechanism' or in the National System of Innovation school's 'desperate search'. As Downie 
anticipated, not all innovation attempts will succeed and Chinese international merchants did not deliver 
such innovation. In table 12.1, we re-visit the sources of competitive strength and related heuristics that 
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initially delivered Chinese success and find that in many instances, China was entrapped by its past. This is 
more than a Schoenberger-type cultural crisis of the firm for it affected the whole economy. It is also not 
explained by a neutral environmental shift that selected one competitor over another for the environmental 
shift was in fact created by one of the competitors. Nor can it be seen as a technological leap (or 
punctuated equilibrium) suddenly entrapping a competitor in an old technological regime for, the 
competitive advantages of Britain did not rely purely on steam technology but on a number of strengths that 
grew cumulatively and allowed them to gradually catch up and pass their Chinese competitors. In the early 
days, Chinese shippers had no need to adopt superior aspects of European trade because, over all, these 
minor advantages were not enough to threaten their position in the China Sea. By the time, Chinese did 
wake up to the extent of their relative loss, the task of catch up was no longer a small issue, but a situation 
requiring systematic change on a broad front. 
Chinese decline is consistent with the hypothesis in telIDS of its persistence of routines, values and 
stakeholders. It also sheds light on the importance of the environment and the fact that no industry is an 
island. It requires supporting indusuies to provide capital, machinery and demand. It needs educational 
facilities to provide skills, and financial capital for investment. To try to create an industry without these 
ingredients is laden with difficulty as China discovered. It took so long that, in the meantime, the West 
leapt even fmiher ahead. The Chinese expelience also illusu'ates the difficulty of imitating after a period of 
success. Success strengthens the entrenchment of values, methods of business and vested interests. 
China did expelience a socio-institutional cnSlS. The most blatant illustration of this was the Taiping 
rebellion. However, this was not a pure crisis of the Perez-type where an old techno-economic system is 
confronted by the new. Certainly, the old regime had been discredited with the Opium Wars and the leader 
of the rebellion had been educated in a Western, Protestant schooling. However, other factors were at 
work, in paliicular, demographic pressures. The population had grown from 143 million in 1741 to 430 
million in 1840, yet land available for production had only increased 35% (Merson 1989:168). This created 
immense pressure that came to a head at the time of the rebellion. 
Even if the Chinese steamship company had been a success, it is unlikely that China would have regained a 
dominant position in international shipping. The Chinese economy was failing to produce internationally 
competitive cargoes. The economy was in-ward looking. China's share of foreign trade never exceeded 1 
1/2 per cent and, in dollar tenns by the end of the 1920s was in the same league as Chile and New Zealand, 
and far behind Argentina, Ausu'alia, and the Federation of Malaya (Murphey 1970:45-6). In an age where 
Blitish shipping could dominate cross trades, lack of international trade might not seem capable of stunting 
the development of China's ocean-going shipping, paliicularly with the development of communication 
devices such as cable. However, by now this thesis has made apparent that the availability of domestic 
cargoes and markets plays a strong paJi in developing a merchant marine. A domestically-based trade acts 
251 
as an incubator allowing a country to develop capabilities, economies of scale, institutions and 
infrastructure with which they can move on to the cross trades. 
Sources of Competitiveness 
Shipping Industry 
"- Organisation, experience and 
expertise in East Asian trade and 
waters 
- Ship Technology (Junks) 
- Reputation 
SUPPOlting Areas of Economy 
- Technology/Education (knowledge 
resources) 
- Internal Peace and Government 
Infrastructure (and support at times) 
- Market of high quality specialised 
produces of supporting industries/ 
- High quantity of domestic demand 
and sophisticated consumers. 
Productivity of Agriculture 
12.1 Entrapment of Chinese Shipping 
Paradigm Heuristics 
- Restrict sailing activities to East 
Asia and meet Indian Ocean Traders 
at middle points like Malacca. 
- Manage sailing activities in line 
with the Trade Winds 
- Use high quality locally built ships 
- Chinese provide best service for 
transporting goods in East Asian 
waters. 
- Aspire to provide Confucian 
education for family. 
- China and the Chinese are at the 
centre of the universe 
- Build relationships with officials. 
- Milking and nepotism are consistent 
with Confucian values. 
- Government supervision/ merchant 
operation is an effective practice for 
many industries. 
- attempt to acquire market power 
- attempt to anticipate consumer 
preference and meet through 
purchases. 
- Peasants and agricu lture are 
accorded high value (over merchants) 
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Sources of Entrl!]!ment 
- Static economies gained at expense 
of dynamic efficiencies. 
- satisficing and bounded rationality 
- Embodied Technology (but given 
long time frame, could have bought 
new technology when old capital 
needed replacement. 
- Costs of Change (difficulty of 
retraining and acquiring tacit 
knowledge and new capital) 
- Arrogance/parochialism 
- Reproductive education 
- philospophical retreat from practical 
- Little development of geographic 
knowledge 
- Mandarins entrenched as 
distributional coalitions. 
- Mandarins become more distanced 
from productive activtities 
- Persistence of routines (milking, 
nepotism and method of 
organisation) . 
- Guild rules reduce innovation. 
- Guilds arise as distributional 
coalitions 
- Decentralised market restricts 
innovation 
Other Sources 
- Uncertainty over change process 
- Rise of Conflict (eg:Taiping 
Rebellion) 
- .... -.<-_ ..... ,. 
While compradores in the treaty ports showed interest in the new techniques they had been introduced to, 
traditional Chinese merchants showed a strong reluctance to enter new fields (Hao 1970:4). Even when 
they became aware of superior western teclmologies, few traditional merchants invested in industrialisation 
(Hao 1970:147). It would take a brave man to lisk large sums of money and time on production techniques 
he knew little about, so the attitude of the Chinese merchant was 'stick to what you know'. There was some 
good economic reasoning behind the conservatism (Murphey 1970:53). Western-style industrial projects 
took a long time to generate a retum that matched traditional commodity trading and money lending. 
Chinese businessmen were dl;ven by market forces and a system of rationality that told them to stick to their 
existing path of development. 
Change was also limited by uncertainty; uncertainty over what was required and whether support from the 
imperial court would be continued. The balance of power between the proponents and opponents of change 
was determined by the circumstances at the time. War increased the pressure to modernise. With the peace 
. of the 1870s and 1880s, the pressure for refOlID cooled in favour of the conservatives, who preferred to use 
govemment funding for their own use. A policy of self-strengthening of the state was replaced by self-
profiting by individuals. The Empress Dowager providing the worst example when millions of taels of 
silver raised to build a navy were redirected into the rebuilding of her Summer Palace (Tang and Fairbank 
1954:90). 
It would take action either from outside or from the top to shake China off its path of development. Change 
from the outside did occur in the form of foreign investment but the levels were simply too small to have a 
major impact. Change from above was attempted but was hand-tied in a number of ways. Mandarins were 
limited by their own value system and skill base. The policy was placed in the hands of scholar officials 
therefore, any policies or solutions would be interpreted within their pre-existing outlook and would need to 
fit within the Confucian framework, principles and patterns of administration. This system tied the new 
enterplises to a bureaucracy that did not fully understand the motives of a businessman or the importance of 
costs, prices and the market. It also saddled the enterprises with traditional Chinese bureaucratic behaviour 
including nepotism and the fleecing of funds by officials. The young enterprises had a mill-stone around 
their neck. 
12.5 Imitation in Japan 
Not long after the Opium Wars opened China to the realisation that it needed to imitate the West, an 
extemal threat bought Japan to the same realisation, namely, the black ships of the US Navy under 
command of Commodore Perry which, in 1854, forced the nation to drop their policy of seclusion and allow 
the Amelicans to trade (Allen 1981:23). Four years later, the Blitish, French and other nations also gained 
pelmission to trade after the might of western naval prowess had been illustrated. 
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At this time, Japan would appear to have even less chance than China of imitating the West. Japan seemed 
like a land from the Middle Ages with sword wielding knights, subservient peasants, tradition-bound 
merchant guilds and hearty feudal lords (Whestney 1987: I). This backwardness was reflected in its 
international commerce. In 1854, the nation did not possess a single ocean going ship (Miwa 1985:123). 
Yet within sixty five years, it had built the third biggest maritime fleet in the world and, in another fifty it 
had the biggest. To account for the success that Japan had we need first to examine key aspects of the 
economic environment. 
Japanese society was embedded with institutions that strongly resembled those of China. Samurai had come 
to playa similar role as Mandarins. Samurai had been Japan's warrior class. However, during Japan's long 
peliod of peace, they could not perfOlm their traditional function as warriors and, the lords kept them on as 
retainers, paying them an annual allowance of lice. Forbidden by their class to become involved in industry 
. and commerce, they became a ruling intelligentsia, perfonning a similar role in society as the Mandmins in 
China. In so doing, the wliting brush came to replace the sword as the real instrument of power (Burks 
1985:22). 
Like their counterparts in China, the ideas and ethical norms of this intellectual classed were shaped by 
Confucianist philosophy. From the ruling class, Confucian values pelmeated through Japanese society 
which came to reflect that in China with four classes: samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants, in this 
order of ranking (Amioka 1985:324, Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:11-13). 
Another institutional rigidity was the emphasis on loyalty and obedience to supeliors. Japanese followed 
orders from above and had become accustomed to established patterns of conduct. This hierarchical 
obedience was reinforced by powerful peer pressure. All individuals belonged to some group to which they 
contlibuted and by which they were supported Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:47). These included bands of 
samurai, guilds, merchant houses and most commonly, the 'five family' groups responsible for rice 
deliveries. In a society striving for extemal peace and internal hmmony a behavioural discrepancy by a 
member of a village or group could bring shame on the whole group. Consequently, the group forced 
individuals to comply with group interests. Enforcement was achieved in a number of ways but, the most 
powerful tool was fear of expulsion from the group. In a group-based society where 'saving face' and 
etiquette were very powerful forces, individuals found it preferable to suppress their own ideas. Decision-
making came to be based on solidality as opposed to majority. The individual counted for little and this 
could stifle individual initiative. 
Despite these ligidities, Japan in the nineteenth century possessed some key differences from China. 
Firstly, the dominant Confucian paradigm had been imported into Japan. The Japanese had learnt it was 
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possible to imp011 technologies and improve their quality oflife. By contrast, China had few experiences of 
this type. For the Chinese foreign meant inferior and this would make a key difference in their attitude and 
confidence in the process of imitation. 
Secondly, several internal factors were working to undermine the socio-economic structure of the 
Shogunate. They included an increased interest in the ancient history and literature of Japan by many 
scholars who wanted to cast off foreign Chinese and Buddhist influences. The publication of the History of 
Great Japan informed' the literate classes of a time when emperors ruled Japan, not the Shogun (Allen 
1981:24, Fukasakll 1992:17). Scholars espoused nationalistic virtues including a return to beliefs 
associated with the Shinto religion and the divinity of the Emperor. This 'Kogugaku' (national scholarship) 
was particularly popular among the western clans who had been subdued by the Tokugawa during the civil 
war. 
. At the opposite extreme to the nationalists, but shming a strong intellectual ClllTent against the incumbent 
regime, was the school of 'Dutch Studies' (Rungaju) (Fukasaku 1992:17). Western books (with the 
exception of those dealing with Christianity) had been allowed into the country from 1720 (Masao 
1985:371). The channel for this western knowledge was through the Dutch merchants based at Nagasaki. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch Studies had been added to the curriculum in most of the domain 
schools and provided alternative models to the existing regime. It also provided an awareness of the 
superiority of western technology. 
Economic factors were also worked to undelmine stake-holder content with the current regime. In Edo, 
competition among the sojourning lords led to competitions in expenditure as they vied with each other in 
displays of prestige (Allen 1981 :26). This put pressure on them to raise their incomes, and by the second 
half of the eighteenth century, many were feeling financial strain. Some responded by creating industrial 
and trading enterprises in their hans (domains). Others res011ed to raising loans and becoming indebted to 
merchants. At the same time as Lords were increasing their expenditure, a series of natural disasters 
llndelmined agricultural output. These two factors meant that Lords had less money to pay their samurai 
who had to shoulder a cut in income. Many impovelished samurai were forced to pawn their swords, 
atmour or insignia of rank, or altematively, take up occupations below their status. When a series of crop 
failures hit the peasants, these impoverished and dissatisfied Samurai were instrumental in leading peasants 
in revolt. This situation stood in stark contrast to that in China which was still providing a prosperous 
standard of Jiving with far less call for change. In reference to China between the 1830s and 1850s, Robe11 
FOitune stated 'that in no country in the world is there less real misery and want than in China' (quoted in 
Murphey 1974:30). Clearly, there was a big difference in the level of entrenchment of the existing regime 
and as Gersick (1991) notes the depth of a structure determines the extent of resistance to gradual change. 
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An important difference between China and the Japan is a subtle difference between the key stakeholders; 
Mandatins and Samurai, and their related education. While Chinese concentrated on belles lettres, Samurai 
had a more practical approach to leaming (Yoshio 1985:72). Samurai never forgot their role as warriors 
and stillieamt martial alis and still saw their role as protectors of the nation (Amioka 1985:328). There was 
.~ common realisation that industrial power was the basis of westem military strength. To that extent, 
change was more consistent with the values of entrenched stakeholders and therefore less likely to engage 
resistance. The raison d'etre of Samurai was to protect the nation while Mandarins sought social harmony. 
Impoverished Samurai were very aware that the nation's defenses had been run down as they experienced 
the humiliation handed out by Commodore Perry and the US Far Eastern Squadron. Consequently, after 
Perry's visit, the government of the Shogun and some of the domains all seized opportunities to grasp 
Western technology. For example, the domain of Fukui began building small guns, batteries and gun-
powder after the western model and, in 1857, built a two-masted schooner after Dutch and American 
. models (Madoka 1985:57). 
At the national level, the Shogun also realised the need for greater openness and a commitment to catch up 
with the West. He now sought the advice of Lords he had previously snived to keep in a state of weal mess 
(Yoshio 1985:74). He bought weapons from the Dutch and lifted the ban on the construction of ships. 
Samurai advised the Shogun to establish an institute for Western Studies (which later became the nucleus of 
Tokyo Imperial University). The British established an English school at Nagasaki in 1858 and the French 
were encouraged to establish the Yokosuka naval complex in 1865 and a French Language school at 
Nagasaki (Madoka (1985:64). The government sponsored diplomatic missions to the United States in 
1860, Europe in 1862 and France between 1864-7 (Burks 1985: 160). Although their purpose was 
Plincipally foreign relations the visits also served as investigations of institutions and culture. 
Students were sent to Holland in 1862, Russia from 1865 and the United Kingdom from 1866 to study 
navigation, naval affairs, and foreign relations. Between 1862-67, 92 students were sent overseas by the 
national and domain governments (Burks 1985:154). After international travel was liberalised, many 
samurai went overseas to study as private individuals, particularly to America. Between 1868-1902, 11,248 
Japanese went overseas to study (Burks 1985: 152). It is worth noting that the Chinese also sent students 
overseas statiing in 1846. Between 1872-7, 120 Chinese were sent to America and others went to Europe 
(MinorLl 1985: 181). However, when the Japanese retumed they were incorporated into an economic system 
that could incorporate their skills. By contrast, retuming Chinese found there was little connection between 
overseas study and the internal structure. For example, 'Western Studies' had become part ofthe Japanese 
curriculum but not in China and, there was little connection with the political structure. Consequently, 'the 
pipe line for the introduction of western knowledge and technical skill was extremely thin' (Minoru 
1985: 181-2). China was exhibiting a lock-in similar to that recognised by David in 1985, only in this case 
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we are dealing with intellectual values not typewriters. It also reflects the difficulty of imposing 
autonomous change when systematic change is required. 
[mitation involved changes for values and stakeholders in the old regime and the policy of modernisation 
resulted in economic and social dislocation for many groups. The export of silk hurt the silk weaving trade 
as plices for their raw matelial rose. Cheap impOlts led to the decay of old Japanese trades and many went 
into hardship. Merchants enjoyed a rise in status, but this incurred the jealousy of the samurai who felt a 
loss of social and eco;lOmic position. The new pattel11 of resource distlibution strain caused by the was 
undermining the old social order and the legitimacy of the Shogun (Allen 1981 :29). 
These difficulties contributed to revolution of 1868, when the Shogunate was overthrown in a revolution 
lead by by lower Samurai from the clans of the West. The emperor was taken from Kyoto and made the 
figure head of the new regime. Together with the creation of popular slogans, the Emperor was used to gain 
co-operation from the peasants. This symbolised a retUl11 to traditional Japanese virtues at a time when the 
nation was having to come to terms with dramatic change apd westemisation. 
In many ways, the Meiji restoration reflects a socio-institutional crisis identified by Perez when a new 
techno-economic system confronts the old. It should be stressed that the Shogun was not overthrown 
because it was conservative showing die-hard resistance to change (Yoshio 1985 :79). In fact, the new 
govemment was initially more nationalistic than its predecessors. For example, it ordered all students sent 
abroad by the Shogunate to retUl11 home and wanted to expel all foreigners working in Japan. However, the 
govemment soon realised that these activities played an important part in gaining access to technology that 
would strengthen the nation. They expanded the overseas study programme, but their overall modemisation 
programme was far more nationalistic in nature (Jones 1985:224). 
The Japanese government functioned as an 'organisation-creating organisation' (Stinchcombe quoted in 
Whestney 1987: 16) in that it mobilised resources and used them to create new organisations. The whole 
feudal system was dismantled. The hans lost their independent administrations and were replaced by a 
system of prefectures around a stronger centralised government. Centralisation was made easier with the 
introduction of three key Westel11 technologies. Railways, telegraph and postal systems improved 
communication and transportation making it easier to co-ordinate control for a central government 
(Whestney 1987: I 0). Westem organisational models were examined in order to find the most suitable for 
Japan. The navy was modelled on the Blitish navy. The communications system was based on the British; 
the Police on the French; the banking system on the American; and the legal system was based first on the 
French and then the German (Whestney 1987:5). Models were chosen on the basis of their previous 
success, the best fit for Japan, and those nations it had the most contacts with. 
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The government created two key government departments to promote the industrialisation process. These 
were Kobusho (Ministry of Engineering and Public Works) established in 1870 and, Naimusho (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs) which oversaw agIiculture and textiles. Kobusho (sometimes referred to as the Ministry of 
Industry) was given the responsibility of building pilot enterprises, and promoting industrial enterprise by 
the plivate sector (Fukasaku 1992:25). The emphasis of the Ministry ofIndustry was on heavy indush-y: 
mining, shipbuilding, railways, machinery, construction and armament, the over-Ii ding goal being national 
defense and the establishment of a communications system. Many of the Samurai who made up the new 
bureaucracy had gained some experience of adminish'ation and western technology during their time 
administering their domain govel11ments. Many had personal experience of industry and almost all had at 
least some exposure to Westel11 studies. 
The government also realised the need to use foreign workers. It realised that instead of wasting time with 
local expeliments it could pay high salmies to foreign technicians to teach the Japanese foreign 
. technologies. Over 500 foreigners were employed by the Ministry of Industry in its initial years passing on 
their skills through on the job training and fOlmal traini.ng in enterprise schools (Fukasaku 1992: 20). 
However, in areas where foreigners were used for their expeltise, Japanese were to eventually learn their 
skills and assume full operation. 
The financial difficulties in imitation were many faceted and compounded by the fact that foreign loans in 
Japan were seen as shameful. First, was the problem of acquiring foreign exchange to pay for much needed 
imports of machinery and raw matelial. In this area, Japan had luck just when it needed it most. In the 
early years after the Meiji restoration, silk crops in Italy and France failed, leading to a high demand for 
Japanese exports (Allen 1981 :40). Silk became the principal export for Japan (ahead of tea, rice and the 
less impOltmlt, craft-work such as pottery, fans, Japanese-style paper, lacquer and bronze ware). The 
second financial problem was accumulating capital and channeling it into industrial enterprises, a problem 
augmented by the Meiji government's nationalistic character that would not tolerate foreign investment. 
The initial intention of government was to rely on plivate enterprise, but the results were disappointing. 
Outside of govel11ment, four groups existed who had the potential to supply capital for industrialisation 
projects; the traditional merchant houses, the fOlmer feudal classes (higher class samurai and nobles); the 
landlords, and the new rich who were prospering from the newly created export opportunities. Like the 
traditional merchants in China, each of these groups were held back by their lack of experience and 
confidence in the new untried ventures. This reflects the importance of compatibility of capabilities in 
assessing leadership with new techniques. 
The government attempted to induce investors into new areas of production however, the level of capital 
was too weak and technical and managerial difficulties too gI'eat (Fukasaku 1992:21). Market activity was 
clearly not going to creat the desired shift in techno-economic pathes. Given that market incentives would 
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not create the necessary systematic change, the govemment found it had to perfOlm the role of entrepreneur. 
It invested in industry start-ups across the economy. 
The scale of govemment investment in industry was not large and their achievements were modest. As in 
China, many suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency and inexpelience with the result that many were 
managerial and financial failures achieving very limited technical success (Ibid:20-21). Despite these 
failings experience in modem industrial enterplise had been gained, something that would not have 
happened if left to the market. State enterplises became a model that the private sector could imitate. 
Govemment patronage also helped to overcome some of the initial teclmical difficulties and set up costs 
which private enterprises would not have been able to endure. However, these enterprises were at the start 
of their learning curves and their poor profitability placed a heavy financial burden on the government. 
The government, who believed industry should be in the hands of the private sector, sold factories, mines 
and other enterprises in the 1880s. The purchasers included businesses started by ex-officials and old 
merchant houses. The enterprises were sold at low plices which reflected their poor performance but also 
served to give the new owners a good start in the industry. The plices were detelmined by officials who 
would work closely with their 'seisho' (merchants by the grace of political consideration) candidates. 
These close ties saw the seisho industrialists received blatant favoUlitism bordeling on the scandalous yet, 
despite the favouritism, the new owners proved their worth as entrepreneurs (Hirschmeier and Yui 
1981:96). Clearly this system was not too different from the govemment-supervision- merchant operation 
programme in China, however as lavish as these subsidies were, they were used for investment and milking 
did not appear on the same scale as in China. This probably reflects a continuation of routines and 
incentives in China, and also the greater confidence that Japanese entrepreneurs could have in the long telm. 
The Japanese approached Westemisation on a broad scale and this must have helped individuals in Japan 
have greater confidence in the long term. By contrast, the Chinese approach was piecemeaL In Japan, the 
emporer changed into military uniforms in the style of Western monarchs (Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:76), 
something that would never happen in China. If businessmen in each nation needed confidence in the 
change process before they invested, the Japanese were clearly at an advantage. 
Politically favoured companies in Japan gained quasi-monopoly positions in their local markets. However, 
Hirschmeier and Yui (1981 :98) believe that a monopolistic stage was needed by Japan to build up the 
capabilities on its path to modernisation. Given the technological gap vis a vis the Western nations and the 
limited purchasing power in the Japanese market at the time, it was necessary to encourage a small number 
of large enterprises in order to survive. The treaties Japan had signed with the foreign powers did not allow 
it to protect infant industry with tariffs. As an alternative, government showed favouritism to these 
companies through lavish subsidies, plivileges and strong government purchases became a necessary form 
of industry assistance. 
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The imitation process continued to confront the values and stakeholders of the old regime as old values 
were either discarded or remodelled to fit the needs of the time. However, some old values aided the 
process of imitation. The fact that the Restoration was pelformed in the name of Emperor (and thus in the 
name of ancestors) meant that loyalty to Japanese values strengthened this process. The nation's acceptance 
of obedience to above also made it receptive to instructions to modify. As Hirschmeier and Yui (1981 :11) 
notes 'Among the most important assets which modern Japan owes to the Tokugawa period are basic 
attitudes like maintenance of communal discipline, dedication to hard work, desire for learning, respect for 
seniority and hierarchy, loyalty to communal groups, submission to authority and adherence to tradition'. 
Changes in the education system received the inevitable resistance. Conservatives lamented what they saw 
as moral degradation and sought a return to moral education in schools. The Emperor Meiji himself, after a 
tour of schools in 1878, was so alanned that he believed the process of westernisation had gone too far and 
. commissioned The Great Principles of Education (1878) after which, there was an increase in Confucian 
morality in the cuniculum. Many students who had studied overseas had difficulty establishing themselves 
in a society based on seniority. As a consequence, many returned not to the establishment but to teaching, 
research and education administration (Burks 1985:156). 
The materialism associated with western technology and business methods stood in sharp contrast to 
traditional values and led to a call to combine Western technology with Eastern morality. Attitudes to 
business needed redefining and government promotion attempted to create an acceptable face for 
businessmen as the nations new Samurai. Entrepreneurs now did 'business for the nation and not for profit' 
(Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:126). Company officials rose in prestige and were treated as the new gentry. 
Although Samurai were in the forefront of change, transformation on this scale rarely occurs on an even 
front and many Samurai suffered from dislocation dming the process. The break up of the feudal domains 
deplived them of their positions and income, while the creation of a western style conscript deprived them 
of their status as the nations walTiors. Yet, under the old values system and incentive structure, earning 
money from commerce and industry was below their class. A number of Samurai revolts broke out, most 
impOliantly the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion that was eventually crushed. The socio-institutional crisis was not 
bmied with the Meiji restoration and the government had to placate these key stakeholders. From this time 
on, the government recognised the importance of absorbing the Samurai class in the new economy. To 
compensate for their loss of income, the government gave Samurai interest bearing bonds which many into 
some kind of business venture, with loans and guidance from the government. With little business 
expelience some very bad results eventuated. However, Samurai made particularly valuable contributions 
in education and administration which were closer to their previous professions. 
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Although Samurai could present the biggest barrier to economic transformation, they had qualities that 
could be of use in the new regime, in particular, discipline, education and a belief in public service. The 
process of economic transformation required confidence, strength and optimism or, as Hirschmeier and Yui 
(1981: 142) state, 'the early Meiji period favoured the strong men who could operate fast and efficiently 
brandishing their abacus like swords in battle'. These were the samurai. The change in values and 
introduction of new technologies allowed individual aspirations to be achieved. Educated low class 
Samurai, were aware they were entering an era of great possibilities where effort and ability would be 
rewarded. Educational achievement was encouraged by parents who saw the possibilities that could open 
for their children. However, individual success still paid homage to old values. While the graduate could 
now rise 'quickly', he still needed to display 'submission' to the group and the principle of human harmony 
(Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:122). Rules of Merchant Houses might change to reflect the times but 
obedience to the new rules and ancestral line were as important as ever. 
Clearly, the economic transformation did not occur without difficulties. These included the conflicts of 
values and stake-holder associated with the old economic system. Mistakes were also made during 
modernisation. However, a greater systematic effOIi was made to absorb the new than in China, creating a 
more favourable environment to introduce a modem shipping industry. Fukasaku (1992:17) states that 
1860 to 1887 represents a peliod of change with little economic growth. After an initial period of confusion 
and reconstruction, the economy entered on a peliod of expansion where per capita national expenditure 
grew at an average of 2% between 1889-1938 (Fukasaku 1992:22). Not only did this expansion provide 
modem capabilities but economic growth provided demand for imports, products for exports and capital for 
investment; all favourable conditions for growth of a shipping industry. 
12.6 Imitation in Japanese Shipping 
In the 18505, Japan's maritime technology was in a pitiful state. In 1636, the Shogun had banned Japanese 
from going abroad and international trade was forbidden with the exception of Chinese, Korean and Dutch 
merchants who were restricted to the area around Nagasaki. While international shipping was banned, the 
Tokugawa govemment actively encouraged domestic shipping. Public works were built to help develop 
coastal routes which were used on an unprecedented scale (Yui 1985:x). Shipping was particularly active 
on the ocean route between Edo and Osaka which was initially developed to provide sake (Japanese wine) 
to the capital. However, there was a huge difference between the shipping requirements of this domestic 
coastal trade and that required for intemationalnavigation. 
From the 1850s, the shipping industry became an early focus of attention. After all, it was the superiority of 
Commodore Perry's 'black ships' that had so badly humiliated the nation. The ships came to symbolise the 
power of the new scientific age (Masao 1985:370). Japanese officials reacted immediately by endeavouring 
to build western-style vessels. The Mito han was ordered to start construction of a Western-style ship with 
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the result that the Ishikawashima shipyard was stmted in 1853. The following comment from the man who 
drew up the plans exposes the nation's lack of experience and the significance of tacit knowledge: 
On order of the government I translated a book on shipbuilding, and theoretically I know how to construct a 
ship, but of course I have never before built one nor even sailed in one (quoted in Hirschmeier and Yui 1981: 
107). 
The Japanese were clearly expel;encing the same difficulties that the Chinese experienced in trying to 
imitate a technology from a point of complete ignorance. The task was made worse in that the book that the 
Japanese builder translated and on which he based his plans did not describe a modem ship. When the 
builders completed their first western boat, the Asahi Marua, they found they had constructed a seventeenth-
century East India ship, which is what the book had described. Nationalistic hans such as Satsuma also 
embarked on shipbuilding programmes but, they too were stifled when they realised the sailing ships they 
were building were out of date. Realising the technical difficulties in building steamers, the han eventually 
put an end to its shipbuilding programme. 
An opportunity for more direct learning about Western ship construction was provided in 1854, when a 
visiting Russian frigate was shipwrecked and the Japanese were asked to build a replacement (Fukasaku 
1992:28). The offer was eagerly accepted and officials, carpenters and blacksmiths were sent to assist and 
learn modem shipbuilding technology. The Bakufu were eventually to build ten other ships of the type built 
for the Russians. Experience with the Russians introduced the Japanese to the benefits of direct learning 
from foreigners as a method of gaining foreign shipping technology and, a naval school was established at 
Nagasaki using Dutch instructors. A shipyard was attached to the school and in 1857, a small steamer was 
successfully built under Dutch supervision. This growth of Imowledge was augmented in 1862, when the 
bakufu sent naval officials who had studied at the Nagasaki Naval School and other workers to Europe for 
the purpose of studying shipbuilding technology. These experiences were significant in finding methods in 
which foreign technology could be imported and assimilated (Ibid). The Shogunate also imported ships 
from the west (including 59 Steamships and 12 Sailing ships from the UK, 11 steamships and 15 sailing 
vessels from the US). The need to repair and maintain these ships increased the need for shipyards and in 
1864 the Yokosuka shipyard was established. In all cases, the prime motive in early imitation of western 
shipbuilding technology was defense. 
When the Meiji government came to power in 1868, it regarded mm;time industries as key components in 
the policy of industrialisation. The government considered shipping a pivotal industry for the advancement 
of foreign trade, balance of payments and defense. Cautious of the dangers of foreign exploitation, the 
authorities were also well aware that loss of control over domestic waterways had spelt disaster for other 
Asian nations (Chida and Davies 1990:5). But the years of isolation meant the nation was exceptionally 
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weak in these industries. At least China had expelience navigating and sailing in the China Sea. Concern 
for the industry was heightened by the huge technical gap that existed between it and the West. For more 
than two centuries, Japan had no ocean going shipping industry, so had to build up the capabilities for ocean 
going shipping almost from scratch. 
The initial focus of maritime policy was to create a modem shipping business organisation as quickly as 
possible (Miwa 1985:124). However, an 1869 decree allowing Japanese to possess western ships produced 
only one noticeable undertaking (Fukasaku 1992 :21 ). The skills and infrash'ucture required were very 
different from that possessed by its traditional coastal shipping based on tiny wooden wasen. It required 
managelial skills, educational arrangements, physical facilities and a market that just did not yet exist. The 
tiny group of entrepreneurs interested in ship-operating were not capable of introducing such large scale 
systematic and instihltional changes so, it was left to the government to effect a change that the market 
could not generate. 
As in China, the government established the first domestic steamship company. In 1870, the Kaiso Kaisha 
was established to operate coastal routes around Japan. The company used government-owned vessels 
under the supervision of state officials. The Company was reorganised in 1872 and made semi-public, 
under the new name of the Nippon Postal Steamship Company, it attempted to provide a liner service 
between Osaka and Tokyo. Although it had been given very lucrative shipments of tax rice and other 
government privileges, the company suffered through bureaucratic inefficiency. 'Its vessels were 
uneconomical, its seamen and engineers were unskilled and its management was poor'(Chida & Davies 
1990:6). The company did not prove viable and was dissolved in 1875. This early Japanese experience 
was very similar to that in China. 
The Government recognised if it was build the industry's capabilities, it would have to change its policy. It 
decided to let plivate enterprise own and operate the businesses but provide protection and support in an 
attempt at building up a fleet that could compete with the world's best. Government transferred its ships to 
the only company in Japan capable ofrunning a fleet of this size, Mitsubishi Shokai (Yui 1985:xiv, Miwa 
1985:125-6). Property rights were now transferred to entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the government 
remained a major force in assisting catch up by providing very high levels of resources and guidance. 
Mitsubishi was started by Iwasaki Yataro (1834-84), a lower grade samurai of the Tosa han (Chida and 
Davies 1990:6). The Tosa han had been in the forefront of modernisation before the Meiji restoration. 
While working in the han, Iwasaki had been given responsibility for armament procurement (including 
ships) in the han's Nagaski and Osaka offices. In 1870, he used the han's ships to enter the coastal trades. 
The following year, the hans were abolished and the han enterprises were transformed into an independent 
company. Iwasaki became its manager. He eventually took over the company, bringing to it a samurai 
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mentality 'In the whole of the Japanese Empire there shall be no other enterprise surpassing us in 
managerial ability' (quoted in Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:139). 
In these early days, the young Mitsubishi Shokai was only involved in coastal shipping. All Japan's foreign 
trade lay in the hands of foreign ships. However, with government help it quickly expanded. Government 
demand initially pulled the company onto the ocean highways in 1874, when the Japanese embarked on a 
military expedition across the seas in Formosa (Chida and Davies 1990:6). The government bought thirteen 
steamships from abroad and Mitsubishi was given the task of managing them. The military campaign was a 
success and, on its conclusion, Mitsubishi was allowed to retain the ships in return for a nominal fee. 
However, as part of the deal, the Government instructed Mitsubishi to use these vessels between Yokohama 
and Shanghai, thus began Japan's first ocean-going liner service. It brought Mitsubishi into conflict with 
foreign liners, in particular the AmericaJl Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Mitsubishi won this struggle 
when, with the aid of the state, it was able to purchase its rival's ships and shore facilities. In this way, 
Japan built up its experience and expertise of operating ocean-going liners. This Yokohama-Shanghai line 
was the first of a number of government subsidised 'ordered routes'. The government's policy of ordered 
routes gave Mitsubishi experience on ocean liner operations but with the protection of government 
subsidies. 
lmpoliing foreign skills was a key part of techno logy transfer. Most of the senior staff, including engineers 
and navigators were obtained from overseas during this period (Ibid: 19-20). In an effort to build up 
domestic expeliise, the government gave additional payments for the training of seamen, and Mitsubishi 
established a seamen's training school. In 1882, the school was taken over by the state, forming the basis of 
the Tokyo University of Mercantile Marine. The government established a number of educational 
establishments dming the 1880s to meet the needs of the growing industry. As a consequence of this 
training, Japanese seamen gradually took over the posts occupied by foreigners. By 1892, the first Japanese 
Captain was given charge of a ship and by 1897 all deck officers (including coastal vessels) were Japanese. 
[t took longer to gain the necessary expertise in areas such as cargo handling, passenger reception, 
insurance claims and global navigation and, the last foreign captain did not leave until 1920. 
The close relationship between Mitsubishi and the government continued dming the Satsuma Rebellion, 
when it was contracted to carry troops and war supplies (Ibid:8). When peace came, this high level suppOli 
was cultivated, allowing Mitsubishi to diversify its commercial operations into other aspects of foreign trade 
including banking, warehousing, mining, shipbuilding, trading and railways. This growth had occurred with 
the support of the government politician, Okuma Shigenobu. However, political intrigue led to Okuma 
being ousted and his opponents next turned on Mitsubishi (Miwa 1985:126). The company was ordered to 
refrain in any other side business and concentrate only on shipping. It was a judgement based not on 
economic rationality but pure political interest. Not all government intervention was welcome. 
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The govemment had actively supp01ted Mitsubishi in an attempt to create a company strong and 
competitive enough to take on the foreign companies. In the process, the company had built substantial 
market power in the local coastal trades, much to the dissatisfaction of small ship owners and the general 
public. The govemment responded to the complaints by providing half the capital for the creation of a new 
company, the Kyodo Unyu Kaisha (based on a combination of existing smaller firms). The new company 
provided direct competition on all Mitsubishi's domestic routes (Chida and Davies 1990:89). However, 
aggressive competition'in a small market was destructive and both suffered serious losses. Both companies 
drastically reduced their freight rates in a destructive competitive bout (Nakagawa 1985:4). Eventually, the 
govelllment ordered the companies to amalgamate forming a new joint stock company in 1885, Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha (NYK). This was now the only state-aided shipping firm to which the govelllment 
guaranteed an 8% dividend. The company's management was strictly supervised by the Ministry of 
Communication who instructed the company to provide fOUlteen specified services, mainly around Japan 
. but, included short intelllational routes to China, Korea and Asiatic Russia. 
NYK's first attempt to open a long distance ocean service was the Japan-Bombay line. Opened in 1893, 
NYK sought to carry raw cotton at rates cheaper than those provided by the existing shipping conferences 
led by P&O. The entrance of a new competitor was not welcomed by the conference and two years of cut-
throat competition ensued. However, NYK had the SUpp01t of the Japan Cotton Spinners Association, the 
people who bought their chief cargo. NYK survived the competition and was admitted into the conference 
in 1896, hence establishing Japan's first ocean liner service. Trade between India and Japan soared, 
growing four-fold in the ten years prior to 1902 (Nakagawa 1985:4). NYK grew hand in hand with this 
trade, and eventually expanded into other distant routes including Europe, North American (Seattle) and 
Australia. 
The action of the cotton industries serves as a reminder of the importance of the supporting industries and 
underlying economy in indusuial development. The growth of the Japanese economy and increasing 
demand for transport services would eventually lead to the creation of other companies. In the Kansai 
District (Westelll part of Japan) many small companies were engaged on coastal routes using second hand 
steamships. Their numbers increased significantly during the Satsuma Rebellion, creating excessive 
competition once the rebellion was over (Chida and Davies 1990:9). To remedy the situation, the 
govelllment recommended amalgamation and, in 1882, fifty-five small firms agreed to join together to form 
a new joint stock company. Initially, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) as it was to be called, with its small-
scale wooden steamships was no match for NYK and only operated in the coastal trades. However, with 
govemment assistance the company evenulally acquired a number of steel steamships, and in 1890 it 
commenced its first ocean going service to Korea. 
265 
These companies were strongly dependent on the govemment. For example, the gross profit ofNYK in the 
financial year ending September 1983 was only about 930,000 yen. The government subsidies it received 
amounted to 900,000 yen, or 97% of its profit (Miwa 1985:132). Government demand during war was 
another key support, the Sino-Japanese war helping the companies out in the mid 1890's. Despite these 
advances, at the out break of the Sino-Japanese War, domestic shipping still accounted for only 10 per cent 
of the nation's ocean-going services (Chida and Davies 1990: 17). Nevertheless, the country now had two 
companies with experience and capabilities in ocean going steamships, something it had not possessed 
before. 
aSK, and NYK became known as 'shashen' (company) shipping companies. They operated liners 
receiving state aid and protection. Tramp shipping eventually appeared as the domestic economy grew 
from the many small shippers that operated on Japan's coastal routes. In contrast to the government 
supported shasen companies, these 'shagaisen' (non-company) enterprises were unsubsidised. With no 
govemment support, Shagaisen had been reluctant to tum to steamships because of the high cost and 
running expenses, and they lacked the skills needed to operate steamships, and in the early days, Japan did 
not have sufficient demand for cargo at the freight rates required to sustain un-subsidised powered vessels 
(Chida and Davies 1990: 10). However, in 1885, the Government prohibited the construction of large scale 
wasen. Over time, viliually all the large sailing ships were replaced by steamships. Shagaisen eventually 
expanded into international waters, crossing the shOli distance to Korea and China. In the years following 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), they expanded so rapidly in number that they eventually surpassed shasen 
tonnage (Yui 1985:xvii). 
Having created two major companies, the govemment continued to encourage an expansion of capabilities, 
and its attention tumed to developing specific routes (Miwa 1985:130). From this point subsidies were 
awarded not for any particular company but for the route and mileage they covered. This led in 1896, to the 
introduction the Navigation Promotion Law and Shipbuilding Promotion Law. The first of these provided 
subsidies for ships over 1,000gt in prop01iion to the distances covered while, the Shipbuilding Promotion 
Law encouraged local constmction by granting subsidies for ships built over 700 gt (Chida and Davies 
1990: 17). These laws offered a break from past policy in that the assistance was open to all companies, not 
just the chosen shasen (although initially, only those with strong financial backing benefited). The two laws 
were sLlccessful in raising the size and power of Japanese ships and the smaller companies were now 
competing more successfully in the tramp market. However, the same success was not being achieved in 
the long distance scheduled routes. To solve this problem, the Distant Sea Liner Subsidy Law was 
introduced granting subsidies to ships on these routes. 
After the 1896 shipping legislation, a third major company was created by Asano Soichiro, a prominent 
businessman with expelience as an operator on coastal routes (Yui 1985:xvii). His decision to enter ocean-
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going shipping led to the establishment of a thiTd shasen company, Toyo Kisen Kaisha (TKK). In 1898, the 
company began a service across the Pacific Ocean to San Francisco, the direct result of the new legislation 
(Miwa 1985:133). 
Some shipping companies developed as a Tesult of integration from other industries, the most prominent of 
which was Mitsui Bussan. Mitsui was ml old merchant House founded by Hachirobe Takatoshi, a 
masterless Samurai, in the seventeenth century (Hirschmeier and Yui 1981:61). Takatoshi had become a 
key player in the Edo retail textile market, eventually building up a chain of shops and expanding into 
wholesale and banking. In 1872, Mitsui established a general trading company, later known as Mitsui 
Bussan. It traded items such as nce, coal, raw silk and tea among its Japanese branches and for export. One 
of its founders, Inoue KaoTU, went into cabinet forming a valuable contact in government and, during the 
Satsuma rebellion, Mitsui Bussan obtained healthy contacts providing mmy supplies. In 1876, the company 
took up an offer from the government to export coal from the government operated Miike mines. At this 
time, the Blitish company Jardine Matheson had the largest share of the Shanghai coal market. However by 
1880, Mitsui's shipment surpassed their leading competition (Tatsuki 1985:307-8). This introduction to 
foreign trade led to an expansion of its shipping operations and the opening of branch offices in Shanghai, 
Tientsin, Hong Kong and Singapore. By 1890, Mitsui Bussan had emerged as a substantial operator of 
merchant shipping using its own vessels and those of foreigners and other shagaisen owners (Chida and 
Davies 1990: 11). 
Mitsui is one of a number of large diversified 'General Trading Companies'. They are a unique 
organisational fOlm given the extremely diverse range of activities in which they operated. The government 
encouraged these giants as foreign trade was new to the country and small Japanese manufacturers found 
linguistic, cultural and geographical barriers daunting. The GTC's had economies of scale and scope which 
allowed them to carry some risk, diversifY their product range and spearhead the nation's exporting effort. 
Controlling both imports and exports meant their own ships and the ships they contracted could be carrying 
loads on both legs of the journey. Consequently, the dispersed range of their activities increased their 
viability. By 1900, Mitsui Bussan handled about one third of Japan's total foreign trade (Hirschmeier and 
Yui 1981 :191). 
If the GTC's did not have enough shipping capacity, they would operate the ships owned by other 
companies. Many men of fOliune invested in ships, attracted to the profits the industry, even though they 
had no experience or interest in running a ship or collecting cargoes such as coal, lumber, rice and sugar. 
For this they relied on the General Trading Companies who would operate their ships on a charter basis. 
NYK, OSK and foreign merchants might also operate these ships. This arrangement favoured growth in the 
industry as many smaller shippers found the capital requirements of ocean-going shipping restrictive but, 
could enter the industry leaving others to manage their ships. Other advantages of separating the ownership 
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and operating function were (i) the division of lisk. Owners concentrated on capital investment while 
operators sought to maximise chaltering eall1ings (ii) the close relationship between the two strengthened 
operators' resistance to depression in that it could obtain flexible rates (iii) operators were not handicapped 
by capital restrictions and could eventually handle large fleets with very little capital invested (Chida and 
Davies 1990:41-3). Under this flexible anangement, the amount of shagaisen shipping grew rapidly so that 
by the end of World War One, shagaisen tonnage was almost double that of the shasen ships. 
The trading company' Mitsui was palticularly adept at identifying cargoes and available ships given its 
world wide trading network, and grew to be the largest cllalterer of shagaisen ships, operating ships 
totalling 1,280,000 dwt in 1916, far surpassing NYK's 460,000 gt and OSK's 400,000 (Nakagawa 1985: 1 0). 
Many of Mitsui's ships were devoted to the same cargo behind Britain's success, coal. Coal mines run by 
Mitsui provided ships with a full outward cargo which allowed them to charge lower rates on the retUl-iI leg 
and still earn a profit (Nakagawa 1985:8). 
The shipping departments of trading companies such as Mitsui and Suzuki played a key role in developing 
the nation's maritime skills. They acted as 'incubators' for talented shipping operators who later became 
top managers oflines that included Kawasaki, Kohisai and Daido shipping (Nakagawa 1985:16), the latter 
acting as a 'pure operator' without owning one ship of its own. 
Japanese expansion into the long distance liner trades took a leap after the Russo-Japanese war (1903-4) 
when the three shasen companies made a conceIted effOlt to develop their liner services. NYK steamships 
began a service to Calcutta, which increased trade between India and Japan. It also began a monthly service 
to the United States and Australia. In 1905, OSK opened a service to Dairen and TKK began a South 
American service. 
Despite the importance of govell1ment SUppOlt in the growth of the industry, the policies required 
adjustment and were not without inefficiencies. For example, one problem with govell1ment legislation in 
the early 1900's was that it gave subsidies to ships travelling a route regardless of their load. It also only 
covered a small number of enterprises who were attaining some degree of monopolisation and excessive 
plivileges (Miwa 1985:135). At the same time, the govell1ment was endUling significant financial burden. 
This lead to a policy change in 1909 in which tramp and near sea routes were no longer eligible for a 
subsidy. Subsidies no longer increased with the size of the ship and elements of the legislation that lead to 
over-lapping subsidies were also removed. The improved policy had the desired effect. The loading ratio 
(ie: how full the ships were) on ships climbed from only about 10% in 1890 to about 40% following 
enactment of the policy (Miwa 1985: 136). This increase in loading was also a consequence of growth in 
suppOlting industries that provided cargoes to fill the hulls. The rate of industrialisation in Japan rapidly 
quickened with exports tripling in the late 1890's (Nakagawa 1985 :6). Cargoes included exports of cotton 
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and yam to Korea and China, silk and silk cloth to the United States, and coal throughout Asia. Imports 
included raw cotton, sugar and rice from India and America, and ironware, plastics and manufactured goods 
from Europe and the US. Textiles would become Japan's principal export growing from large cotton mills 
established in the 1880s with govemment loans. During the first thiliy years of the twentieth century, the 
textile industry would account for over half of Japan's expOlis (Fukasaku 1992:23). 
The companies also benefited from government investment in education. NYK and OSK were operated as 
joint stock companies using highly skilled salmied managers who had graduated from colleges and 
universities (Nakagawa 1985:320). These managers did not move from one company to another in response 
to movements in the labour market as in the United States but took a long term view of their company's 
position in line with Japanese trade and the world economy. However, seamen in companies other than 
these were employed on a single voyage basis (Wray 1985:317). 
By 1912, NYK owned 280,000 tons of shipping, OSK had 130,000 tons and TKK more than 70,000 tons 
(Yui 1985:xviii). The industry had advanced with strong aid of the government which by 1913 provided a 
14yen subsidy for each ton operated by the Plincipal firms compared to the 3 or 4 yen that some Gennan 
and British liners received (Nakagawa 1985:314). However, Nakagawa states 'it seems that the more 
economically backward a country was, the heavier the subsidy had to be at the start of its industrialisation'. 
Japan may have benefited from the advantages of backwardness compared to China in that it was less 
entrapped by a successful paradigm, but in compalison with the leading shipping nations, there were no 
such advantages. Europeans might accuse the Japanese of cheating with the extra help given by their 
govemment, but the Japanese could equally claim that the Westemers had a head start ie: possessed first 
mover advantages. 
The Govemment led-imitation/industrialisation process had provided the shipping industry with supporting 
indusuies, Imowledge resources, infrasu'ucture and shipping enterprises that had gradually acquired the 
capabilities to compete in intemational u·ade. Japanese shipping was well positioned for the huge 
opportunity that the first world war was about to be presented to it. 
Table 12.1 Growth in the Japanese Mercantile Marine 
Steamships 
(in thousand gross tons) 
Sailing Ships 
(in thousand tons) 
1873 
1894 
1904 
1913 
26 
169 
797 
1,514 
(source Allen 1981 :95) 
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8 
45 
327 
828 
12.7 Conclusion The Japanese experience in the second half of the nineteenth century is consistent 
with the imitation stage of the industry life cycle as posited in this thesis. It is note-worthy that imitation 
occUlTed not just in shipping but, across the economy. As Table 12.1 shows, the Japanese industry had 
made great strides with substantial increase in tonnage from the 1850's when the nation did not possess one 
ocean-going ship. Unfortunately, the source for the table does not provide information on the size of the 
sailing ships so it might be dangerous to assume that they are all ocean-going sailing ships. If they were, we 
could probably assume that the sailing ships were used on routes not served by coal supplies. 
UnfOliunately, little information is given on this point. 
The successful growth of lmowledge and productive capabilities in Japan stands in sharp contrast to the 
experience of China, which seemed to be in a better situation to make the transformation. Given that the two 
nations possessed similar education, value and social systems, and similar commercial and institutional 
environments, it poses the question 'why were their experiences so different?' 
One of the key explanations is the level of openness to foreign technologies. China had little experience of 
imitating. For the Chinese, foreign had always meant inferior. This was no irrational bias. Two thousand 
years of history had taught them that this was fact. The Japanese had no such barriers to imitation. Even 
the dominant Confucian value system that they were replacing was an import from China. 
A second important difference is the economic environment and recent history that set the pre-conditions 
for change. The leading stake-holder in the Japanese economy had endured substantial economic hardship 
and were more amenable to a change process. By contrast, Mandarins experienced no such dislocation. 
A third impOliant factor is the level of leadership of the change process. In Japan, the emperor Set the 
example by wearing a Western-style military unifonn, something no Chinese monarch would ever consider. 
In so doing, uncertainties and ambiguities that can hamper change processes were over-come by more 
definite leadership of the change program. With the Japanese government simultaneously opening a 
number of Western-style enterprises, this gave enterplises more confidence in making long term 
investments in the new technologies. The managers of the Chinese Merchant steamship Company saw no 
broad-spectrum advance. Theirs was a modem branch grafted onto an old tree. The Japanese gained a new 
tree. In this light, it is worth noting the difference between traditional Chinese merchants and those who 
had experience with Westerners in the Treaty ports. The differences in their acquired Imowledge, routines 
and contacts played a great difference in their entreprenelilial activities with the new techniques. However, 
Japanese merchants, who had even less expelience in international trade were given time and outlets by 
which they could gain the necessary knowledge with government assistance. In this light, entrepreneurship 
can be regarded not only as extension of past investments in knowledge and contacts but, it is also 
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something that government can nurture with suppOli, access to knowledge and a requirements to 
continuously improve capabilities. 
It is noticeable that in both countJies, the government started the first sole steamship company after-which 
both companies were privately run with govemment support. It is significant that the Japanese managers 
did not seem to have milked their companies as the Chinese did. The Chinese continued with their old 
routines and hemistics of milking. By contrast, Samurai, who never forgot their job was to protect the 
nation, rallied to slogans such as "Rich country and strong army". Their values were more compatible with 
the requirements of the change process. 
Despite Japan's success, the imitation process was not smooth. The Satsuma rebellion and the Meiji 
Restoration were major backlashes against the change process and one can only wonder what could have 
happened if the military action at the wrong time resulted in less progressive leadership. 
All in all, the biggest difference between the two nations. was the level of commitment to the old regime. 
China's 2000 year old paradigm with its accumulated institutions, stake-holders, routines, relationships an 
values were so entrenched that any significant process of adopting foreign teclmologies was going to be 
fraught with problems. This reflected Gersick's comment that a nation with the strongest commitment to 
the old regime would have most trouble changing. It was in this environment that the Chinese attempted to 
build a modem shipping industry, and failed. 
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Chapter 13 
Towards the Twentieth Century 
13.1 Evolution of the US Economic System 
In the last half of the nineteenth century, the Amelican economic system began to show a new face shaped 
by a large market and the opening of the continent's resources. By 1880, the American population was one 
and a half times that of Britain and by 1900, it was double. From 1870 to 1914, GDP grew five-fold 
compared to a doubling in the UK (Chandler 1990:52). In many ways, growth was a consequence of 
indushialisation which was a process of imitation of European technologies. Before the Civil War, the 
American economy was predominantly agricultural and commercial. By the end of the century, its 
commercial sector was bolstered by a strong industrial sector. In 1860, the four leading industries were 
cotton textiles, lumber, footwear and grain milling. By the turn of the century, the top four were 
machinery, lumber, printing and publishing, and iron and steel (Licht 1995: 129). 
The US economy had successfully imported technologies from Europe and adapted them to their own 
regional requirements. The transfer of industrial technology to the United States OCCUlTed in those places 
with a similar environmental conditions to that of their European production centres. Particularly 
impOliant was access to raw materials. New industrial locations grew up at places such as Trenton, New 
Jersey where innnigrants from Staffordshire found suitable clays to build a ceramics industry and, at 
Waterbury Connecticut, copper and zinc deposits provided a basis of industry which attracted skilled brass 
workers from Binningham England (ibid: 1 08). Albany, Troy and Buffalo became iron producing centres 
but, with 95% of the nation's anthracite coal being located just fifty miles north of Philadelphia, it was here 
the industry would make its name. In Pittsburg, iron mills employing 2-300 competed using the skills of 
iron craftsmen. Ohio developed a number of indush'ies reflecting its broad resource base while at Chicago, 
at the end of the indushial belt, a great trading city developed fanned by water and rail links which 
redistributed agricultural products from the west and industrial products from the east. 
Not all new industries were imitative. Americans also seized commercial opportunities made available by 
the latest developments in science. In the mid-80s, at Rochester, George Eastman perfected a small hand-
held camera (the Kodak) which provided the basis for the world's largest manufacturer of photographic 
equipment. George Westinghouse invented an air brake for trains before founding Westinghouse Electric 
Company to manufacture elech'ical generators and appliances. At the same time, Thomas Edison who 
began as a telegraph operator, began experimenting with telegraph technology before moving on to invent 
the phonograph and build the nations first elech'ical power station in New York. His company Edison 
General Elechic was responsible for commercially developing a number of new technologies (not 
necessarily invented by them). However, the leading business men and finns were rarely the pioneers in 
technology (Gilbert and Krooss 1972: 147). 
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Industrialisation coincided with an increase in government activity in the economy. Until the Civil war 
(1861-5), the govenunent had played only a minor role in advancement. From the moment the war started, 
the NOlth introduced a new political-economic direction. In 1861, the Morrill Tariff gave protection to 
American indushy while the Morrill Land Grant College Act of 1862 granted land for the building of 
colleges devoted to 'agriculture and the mechanical arts'. In 1863, the National Banking act created a 
national banking system and currency. Federal mcome tax was inh·oduced while several bills were 
introduced which gave grants for rail expansion. A number of new federal bureaucracies were created 
including the Deparhnent of Agriculture, the Bureau of Printing and Engraving, the Office of the 
Comptroller of Customs, the Office of Immigration and, the National Academy of Sciences was created to 
boost technological development. Most importantly, the government, particularly the military, became an 
important consumer of industrial products. Indush·ialisation also benefited from a protective tariff policy 
which shielded American producers from foreign competition. Edward John Ray (1991:343) found that 
between 1870 to 1914 the most rapidly expanding industries in the United States were those protected by 
the 1870s tariff shucture. 
Iniitation in the new environment led to a stage of advance consistent with the thesis which, in turn, opened 
up new commercial methodology and paradigms. At this tinie, new transportation systems provided by the 
railways were integrating the North American continent into a large integrated market, the size of which 
was not available to Britain. The result was a reshaping of the economic system. Such changes did not 
occur without pain for existing stake-holders. Schoenberger (1997:222-4) gives an example of John 
Burrows, a leading merchant in Davenport Iowa who underwent economic dislocation with the arrival of 
the railways. Burrows had built a successful business with investments in relationships with wholesalers 
and suppliers, warehousing and transpOltation facilities. The arrival of the Chicago and Rock Island 
Railroads in 1854 offered speedy regular services to Chicago, not St Louis where Burrows had established 
many contacts. Because small quantities could now be transported with ease, Burrow's large warehousing 
facilities, which had been an asset in the pre-rail days, became an expensive liability tying up his money. 
The change in temporal and spatial arrangements brought about by the train de-valued the resources, skills 
and relationships he had invested in. Burrows h·ied to adapt by diversification in flour mills, a saw-mill and 
a reaper factory but nothing worked. The new environment brought by the railroad required business 
methodologies too alien to Burrow's familiar way of doing business. Within five years of the railroads 
arrival he went bankrupt. 
The opening of a national market meant finDS no longer catered for small regional markets but now served 
a large mass market. A new economic paradigm appeared in line with the new economic environment. It 
favoured mass production, large integrated organisations and the gospel of scientific management which 
grew out of the system at the tum of the twentieth century. While the typical firm in 1860 had been family 
owned and operated, highly specialised and labour intensive, the new American economic system was 
increasingly characterised by large multi-functional corporations. Although the objective of integration 
may have been market power (Galambos 1994:246), the resulting corporations evolved other economic 
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advantages. They could invest in large production facilities that created massive economies of scale and 
dramatically reduced unit costs of production. By locating production processes within a single plant, 
vertical integration could provide a smoother flow of production. To ensure that sales kept up with the 
large scale of output, successful organisations also had to invest in a large marketing and distribution 
networks. Finally, they had to invest in management who would plan and co-ordinate these various 
production and distribution activities, (Chandler 1990:8). Managers created sales and organisational 
strategies for the new giants. They organised and administered accounting and production systems, 
company mles and regulations and reported back on results. 
The new organisation form meant that not only could economies of scale be gained but also, economies of 
scope. Companies expanded the scope of their activities and diversified their activities into related 
products and services. Vertical integration also reduced transaction costs, a factor which became more 
important as products increased in technicality and sales staff needed to be more familiar with the product 
to gain a marketing edge. Chandler (1990:9) called this economic system 'managerial capitalism'. The 
new organisational fOlm reflected the peculiarities of the American environment, in particular the large 
national market and resource base, shortages of skilled labour which lead to new technologies and high 
machine usage and, transportation and communication improvements such as the telegraph which allowed 
co-ordination over long distances. 
As organisations became bigger, they needed a steady supply of skilled managers and education institutions 
stal1ed to provide courses in management. It became possible to get academic training in accounting and 
the frrst book on cost accounting was published in the 1880s (Gilbert and Krooss 1972:158). The Wharton 
School of Commerce and Finance, founded in 1881, at the University of Pennsylvania was the frrst 
university to offer courses in business. In the decade after 1899, commerce schools were set up at the 
Universities of Chicago, Califomia, New York and Harvard. Engineering graduates also flowed from the 
universities. In the 1880s, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue, Wisconsin and the Stevens 
Institute of Technology all established mechanical engineering departments (Chandler 1990:82). These 
institutions trained the American Mandarins who would maximise the effrciency of the economic system. 
The philosophy behind greater workplace machinery and division of labour had its own gum in Frederick 
Winslow Taylor who had spent time in the employment of Cramp's shipyard. His experiments at 
Bethlehem steel works showed that by analysing the productive process in high detail, 'Scientific 
Management' increased the output and efficiency of workers, shaping mass production to a mass market. 
By the tum of the century, America was appearing as a land of economic giants with an economic system 
based on mass production and dish'ibution which exploited economies of scale and scope, standardisation, 
and the intensive use of natural resources. The strength of American films lay not in technology but the 
organisational abilities associated with mass production and distribution (Nelson and Wright 1992:1939). 
This system had successfully adopted many European ilmovations and, with its own distinctive system, was 
generating a far higher level of output. 
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13.2 The Rebirth of United States Shipping 
In each chapter of this dissertation to date, industrialisation has normally complemented the growth of 
shipping. It increases the capital available, domestic demand and increases production in supporting 
industries. However, American wealth and population was growing so rapidly during this time, that the 
domestic market provided better oPPOliunities for investment than shipping. Secondly, the country's 
resource base was so vast that it was not very dependent on imports. Despite this domestic orientation, 
books in Europe fearing an American invasion first appeared in 1901 and 1902 (Nelson and Wright 
1992:1938). However, when American producers did finally look off-shore, they increasingly chose not to 
export but to invest in off-shore production facilities, thereby denying American shippers a cargo. 
Such international shipping as did occur was still in the hands of foreigners, in particular the British. Even 
many US companies preferred to sail under the British flag due to high US costs. The local industry was 
burdened with high wage rates. The Scientific American reported in 1872 that the average American 
seaman eamed $40 per month compared to $12 for the British, while the American first class engineer 
e<imed $240, three times that of his English contemporary (Bauer 1988:286). The industry was also 
burdened by the high price of local ships. Britain's iron-steam industrial cluster had also created economies 
whereby British ship owners could buy iron hulled steamers for one third of the American price (Ibid:242). 
Although Ameticans had developed a healthy iron industry, its expertise lay in rails, nails and structural 
shapes for bridges. Ships required shapes and plates that local mills did not have the skills or capabilities 
to produce (Ibid:289). The high price of local ships could not be circumvented by importing because of the 
high tariffs protecting the local industry. 
Growth in the industry was also hampered by government policies (Safford 1985:96). Ship owners who 
had transferred to foreign flags during the war were denied re-entry to their native registry, but the biggest 
government imposed barrier were the h'ade restrictions on ship imports. By the late nineteenth century, 
conmmnication and transpOliation links were regular enough that US ship owners could have easily bought 
British ships. However, US law dictated that American companies buy their ships in Ametica, a reflection 
that American military goals were not in alignment with the development of the industry. The military 
required ships so the local ship building indush'y received protection which pushed up the price for 
shippers. Whereas British shipbuilders enjoyed a similar legislative protection during their process of 
catch up, British shippers were also protected and hence could absorb the higher costs. By contrast, 
American shippers had to compete against the leading shipping nation with one hand tied behind their back. 
A policy of subsidies to ship owners might have offset the handicap of high ship costs however, proponents 
of free h'ade regularly defeated such proposals at Congress. Government policy supported its shipbuilding 
industry at the expense of its ship owners and operators. Ironically, the long term growth of shipbuilding 
depended on the health of its shippers. 
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In much the same way that protective legislation tied ship owners to a protected and costly shipbuilding 
industry, shipbuilders were also tied to protected and costly iron industry. The nation's iron producers 
were could sell iron competitively on the world market, protective tariffs gave them the opportunity to 
charge high plices at home (Allin 1979:77). In this way, protective legislation created a multi-tiered cake 
of inefficiencies that hamstrlmg American ship owners. 
The problems with iron did not stop il1llovation in wooden ship-building. During the 1880's and 1890's 
four and five masted schooners of over 1000 tons were conunon(Starkey 1993:142). One seven master was 
even built. However, this teclmological trajectory held less potential than the iron steamships trajectory 
pursued by the British. 
Although the profits paid by ships that flew the US flag (in foreign trade) were not attractive, some 
maritime activity still warranted investment. Americans made large investments in domestic shipping 
which was protected from foreign competition by cabotage laws. TOl1llage in coastal and lake shipping 
increased markedly over this period so that by 1910, there were nine tons of shipping in the protected 
co"astal trade for everyone in the foreign trade (Safford 1985:100). Secondly, many Americans who 
wished to invest in intemational shipping registered their ships in foreign countries so that they could buy 
cheaper foreign ships and reduce the costs of operation. By 1901, the number ofintemational trading ships 
under foreign flags owned by Americans was 75% of that flying under the American flag (ibid). Britain 
was the prefened flag of convenience. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth cenhlry, a number of institutions were created to help develop US 
capabilities and the growth of knowledge in marine technology. In 1874, schools were established in all 
the leading port cities, a result of the advocacy of the naval captain Stephen.B.Luce who hoped that 
effective training would offset the influx of foreign seamen into the merchant marine, provide competent 
crewmen and help reduce the appalling number of groundings, collisions and fires which plagued American 
ships (Allin 1979:72). In the same year, the United States naval institute was created, an organisation 
dedicated to the professional and scientific examination of naval and maritime problems. The United 
States Naval war College was founded to encourage thinking on naval probiems, including mercantile 
problems. In 1894, W.H.Webb created an institution to supply training for the construction of steel ships, 
the Webb Institute. The importance of these institutions lay in the future when self taught pioneers were 
increasingly replaced by institutionally trained businessmen. 
A large number of organisations tried to affect the condition of the merchant fleet in this period. The New 
York Ship owners association was one of the first, representing its members before congressional 
conunittees and petitions but, it achieved little. Others concemed with problems of the nations canying 
trade included the New York Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade, but they also achieved little. 
However, a major institutional advance was the creation of a Department of Commerce and, a Bureau of 
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Navigation within Treasury (Allin 1979:75). This provided the industry with the political and 
administrative organs in government to oversee the merchant marine and report on commercial conditions. 
Other institutions created during the late nineteenth century to serve the industry included the Captain and 
Vessel Owners Association, the Port of Wardens, the Board of Trade, and the Philadelphia Maritime 
Exchange. These helped to secure improvements that one member alone could not achieve and created 
economies of externalities by spreading the cost of their activities among their diverse members. The 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers served broader interests while labour fonned itself into a 
number of unions organised along trade lines. Numerous schools, professional associations and 
pUblications helped spread the latest developments in naval architecture (Thiesen 1997:27). 
Despite these advances, at the end of the nineteenth century, total tonnage flying under the American flag 
was substantially smaller than that of the United Kingdom. However, growth in the domestic economy was 
creating Hirschman-type linkages into maritime transport with the development of new companies and 
expansion of maritime capabilities. Early growth was primarily in protected trades or results of non-
maritime companies solving their transportation needs. On the Pacific Ocean, the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company was joined by the Oceanic Steamship Company. This organisation was started by a San 
Francisco entrepreneur Claus Spreckels, who started the line in 1880 to carry sugar from his plantations in 
Hawaii (at that time an independent kingdom) to the refmelY in California. The company eventually 
expanded to Australia and received subsidies from the British colonial government (Heinrich 1997:77). 
In the last three decades of the nineteenth centmy, vertical integration also provided the industry with new 
companies in the Atlantic. The Pennsylvania Railroad was the biggest company in the world at the time 
and a leading example of cOlporate capital. Under its head I.Edgar. Thompson, it developed an integrated 
transportation systems which included a tr·ansatlantic steamship line, thereby providing a continual 
transportation system from the mid-west of the United States through to Liverpool (Heinrich 1997:55). 
The Railroad was also instrl1mental in starting a transatlantic link to Antwerp. Together with Peter Wright 
and Company Shipping Agency and a small number of investors, it created the International Navigation 
Company. Because they used four British built ships, its tonnage was not considered part of the American 
Merchant Marine. They were registered in Belgium (Heinrich 1997:57). 
The railroad industry was also responcible for the creation of the only other American company on the 
Atlantic. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad gave birth to the Atlantic Transport Company. It is no 
coincidence that railmen outside of New Yark took an interest in developing this route (Navin and Sears 
1954:294). In New York, railmen had no need to develop the trade due to the large number of foreign 
ships arrivmg. The southern companies had to develop ocean-gomg shipping to feed their trains. Although 
established as competition, both these lines evenrually added New York as a terminal port for their 
operations. 
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In 1901-2, the Atlantic Transport Company and the International Navigation Company became part of a 
larger process of corporatisation. These companies were small fish in a big pond which was becoming 
increasingly competitive as growing French and Gelman shipping were taking the market towards an over-
supply situation; a situation in which the weakest would lose. The great Wall St [mancier lP Morgan 
considered the competition to be ridiculous. The situation resembled that identified by Richardson (1960) 
in which individual companies create over-supply because of poor coordination. The situation also bore 
similarities with that in the seventeenth centUlY which gave rise to the Dutch East India Company. Ships 
rushed out of New York on the same day in an attempt to be the first to reach Europe (de la Pedraja 
1992:5). If they distributed their sailing's more rationally, the result would be a more dependable and 
profit service. Morgan had created US Steel and amalgamated many of the railways and now weaved his 
magic on the shipping trade. The two American companies were amalgamated and combined with the 
British White Star and Leyland Lines. The new company, International Merchant Marine became the 
fourth largest industrial corporation behind US Steel, Standard Oil and American Tobacco Co. With 130 
steamers, it was the largest merchant fleet owned by anyone company in the world, although most ships 
were still registered under the British flag (de la Pedraja 1992:8-9). 
Other integrated companies born at this time included the Great Northern Steamship Company created by 
the Great NOlthern Railroad Company in 1900, after its tracks reached Seattle, in the hope of establishing a 
Pacific based canying trade which complimented its on-shore carrying. The Dollar Steamship company 
was created to cany Dollar's lumber products. Investment by companies such as Dollar reflects Silver's 
(1984) proposition that a potential supplier might be reluctant to risk investing in a developing market so 
the original company has to fill the gap in order to meet its own needs. Given that the 'mother' company 
understood the markets on which shipping services are derived (in Dollar's case, the lumber market) it can 
make the investment with greater awareness of the level of risk. 
The Spanish-American War provided other oppOltunities for growth. The defeat of Spain opened up 
trading opportunities in Cuba and Latin America. Although on a smaller scale, it led to a pattern of growth 
with similarities to British expansion with the growth of the British empire. Victory gave the United States 
two new colonies in Puelto Rico and the Philippines which would require shipping services. In the same 
year, 1898, Hawaii was also annexed. Routes to Hawaii and Puerto Rico were now covered by US 
coastwise laws, giving local caniers protection under the Navigation Act. The Matson Navigation 
company started in the 1890's to take oil to the sugar mills on Hawaii. The American-Hawaiian Steamship 
Company, created in 1899 with sugar plantation shareholders, also benefited from the exclusion of foreign 
caniers. At the same time, the New York and Cuba Mail Line was born, and the Munson Steamship began 
trading to the West Indies. Most of these companies were created as an extension of existing commercial 
activities, lumber, sugar and oil. Although established as a solution to transportation problems, these 
companies did not restrict caniage to their own goods and became public carriers. 
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Some companies did restrict calTiage to their own goods, such as the United Fruit Company which strongly 
illustrates the new pattern of economic co-ordination that was growing in the United States at the time (see 
Read 1983). The company was stalted by Captain Lorenzo. D. Baker, a fishennan who, in the off-season, 
brought bananas from Jamaica to New England. The demand for bananas was growing rapidly as a 
consequence of the increased migration and wealth stemming from industrialisation and population growth 
in the United States. However, the banana trade provided many difficulties for shippers who might alTive 
at a port and find no supplies available, and those that were available varied in quality and maturity. The 
shipper had to judge whether he should accept what was available or move on to another port and hope for 
something better. It added great cost to performing transactions in the trade. To make matters worse, 
bananas were a perishable fruit so profitability was directly influenced by the speed with which a ship 
sailed back to the USA. Weather and other delays in the Caribbean contributed to an average loss of about 
15% (Read 1983:182). Even on alTival in the USA, some ports would prevent landing out of fear of 
disease and many shippers suffered for lack of distribution outlets. Finally, if two ships alTived in the same 
port at the same time, the market would be glutted (another pOltrayal of the Richardson problem). These 
market problems of high risk, inegular supplies, imperfect market knowledge, lack of quality control and a 
concentration on short term profits over long term market development were eventually solved by 
integration. 
Technology helped overcome many of these problems. The replacement of sail with steam ships which 
were bigger, calTied more cargo, and were faster, reduced the rate of perishability and allowed more 
sailings evelY year. Technological developments in railways and refrigeration also allowed the company to 
develop new markets in the mid-west while telephone and telegraph improved communication and the flow 
of market knowledge. 
Organisational advances also helped to overcome the difficulties in the trade. In 1899, Lorenzo's shipping 
services were amalgamated with plantations in the Caribbean and distributors in the United States. The 
merger created the United Fruit Co., an integrated company that controlled the flow of bananas from point 
of production to point of sale. The company's 11 steamships and 12 chartered ships were integrated with 
production, purchase and marketing functions. The new organisational flow reduced the perishability of 
fruit and increased the reliability of infOlmation which dramatically reduced the costs of bringing bananas 
to the market. Horizontal integration into a number of production areas also reduced risk of natural disaster 
that might hit one region but leave others intact. Inside the company there was increased specialisation of 
tasks as different areas became responsible for their part of the trade flow. Finally, with 80-90% of all 
banana impOlis into the US, the company had a control over price and sales which provided more 
predictably and higher revenues for the company which encouraged futher investment. 
Diversified integration allowed United Fruit to displace the leading finn in the European banana trade. The 
British shipping line Elder Dempster had obtained the government mail subsidy to operate the route to 
Jamaica, a Caribbean linkage which provided access to bananas. This company eventually acquired a 
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company to distribute its fiuit in a process of vertical integration not too dissimilar to that of Boston Fruit. 
The new fIrm that was created, Elders & Fyffes was innovative, moving rapidly into refrigerated ships. 
However, it did not integrate as deeply as United Fmit into a wide source of banana crops. When a violent 
hunicane destroyed Jamaica's banana crops the company tumed to United Fruit for alternative supplies. In 
retum for a guaranteed supply of fiuit, United Fruit gained 45% of the company's stock. In 1910, United 
Fruit acquired the company outright, a consequence of its deeper integration. 
United Fmit was just one of many vertical integrated companies that appeared at the time. Another 
integrated proprietary company in Latin America was W.R. Grace and Company who initially canied 
guano before expanding into sugar plantations, textiles and Chilean nitrates. Oil companies also invested 
in their own shipping. A number of these young US companies, including Munson Steamship, Grace and 
United Fmit sailed under the British flag. Local wages and ships were simply too expensive. Either the 
tariffs on imPOlts needed to go or the local shipbuilding industry needed to dramatically reduce costs 
before shipping would take off. 
Ullder the existing government policy, the future of US shipping was dependent on improved capabilities in 
domestic shipbuilding. The development of capabilities to' build iron ships fIrst gained pace during the 
Civil war. Realising that the government would n(':ed iron clad ships, shipbuilders invested in new 
machinery and yard expansion (Thiesen 1997:20-1). For example, W.Cramp and Sons converted from 
wood to iron during the war building their fIrst iron ship for the nOlthem navy. By 1872, Cramps were 
fully involved in iron shipbuilding (Baker 1976: 1.12). Its early customers included the young steamship 
corporations plying the international sea-lanes such as the PacifIc Mail Steamship Company, and the 
American Steamship Company (Heimich 1997:59). 
The father of iron shipbuilding in America was John Roach who had learnt the moulding trade at a pig iron 
works in New Jersey before buying his own company. In 1853, he became the sole owner of Allaires's 
Etna Iron works, which he convelted to a marine engine shop in 1862. He subsequently bought the Morgan 
Iron Works and the Frankin Forge and the Allaire Works at that tinle owned by Commodore Vanderbilt. 
Having bought out all his major competitors and consolidating his work force he ended up with 'the fInest 
marine engine works in the United States' (Baker 1976:1.23). The Roach yard was pivotal to the industry's 
process of catch up. In 1881, it was the fIrst to introduce pneumatic power tools and in 1883, John Roach 
was the fIrst to begin rolling suitable plates at his mill in Chester. In 1881, they built the fIrst American-
built tanker, the Standard for the Standard Oil company. 
Iron shipbuilding became based on the Delaware River because of the availability of supplies of iron 
(Baker 1976:l.11). The Delaware gave buth to a Marshallian district with specialist proprietary owned 
producers. Sub-contt'acting relations stretched back into the iron mills. Given that the fIrst iron ships were 
all custom built and required custom built parts, close proximity was important to the success of the 
industty reflectulg a form of quasi-integration identifIed by Richardson (1972). As Charles Cramp stated, 
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'nearly every piece of iron entering into (a metal ship) must be made to special order, and this fact, together 
with the necessity of rapid delivery demands that iron mills should be near the shipyards' (quoted in 
Heinrich 1997:52). The federal government also assisted the industries development, helping to fmance a 
harbour improvement programme (with support of the Captain's and Vessel Owners Association) which 
deepened the river to accommodate larger iron steamships. 
Despite this process of catch up, American iron shipbuilding lacked the precision of other engineering 
industries and was still well behind the English. For example, inefficiencies in cutting procedures were 
sLlch that Charles Cramp claimed 'in the early days the crap heap was the largest mound in the yard' 
(quoted in Thiesen 1997:19). Americans were still dependent on Europe as a source of technology transfer. 
For example, Charles Cramp took his supervising engineer on a fact fmding mission to Britain where their 
discussions included compound engineering technology. One of the people they spoke to was the chief 
engineer of the British liner Italy, whom they ended up employing and taking back to America with them. 
By 1872, the shipyard was building ships with compound engines for the American Steamship Company 
(Heinrich 1997:62). 
Over time, the patterns of production and organisation emerging in the US were applied in ship building. 
As the industry grew, shipyards required greater administrative duties. The Cramp yard became so large, 
that its founder, William Cramp delegated the administr'ative duties to his sons so that he could continue to 
supervise the men. The greater scale of plant and production also meant a larger work hierarchy and 
increased division of labour. During the civil war, nine occupations worked on iron hull construction. By 
World War One, the division of labour was such that forty eight occupations now did the job (Thiesen 
1997:20). This process of simplification and specialisation OCCUlTed in the shadow of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor and other efficiency experts (Taylor had actually worked at Cramp's yard before going to 
Bethlehem steel). It took control of output away from the skilled worker who was seen as having too much 
control over output (Heinrich 1997: 142). 
As capital requirements increased, many of the proprietary owned shipyards eventually began incorporated. 
In 1872, William Cramp and Sons became the William Cramp and Sons Ship and Engine Building 
Company although in this first instance, family members remained the sole shareholders. Incorporatisation 
did however protect the private assets of the family members. Eventually, as the company expanded, the 
Cramp families control became more diluted. 
The govemment played a key role in the catch up process. When Congress ratified steel as the prefened 
material for warships, navy demand provided the opportunity for many to invest in the plant for steel hulled 
ships (Misa 1995:96-7, Bauer 1988:290, Heimich 1997:105). This activity gave birth to a Military-
Industrial Complex based on the Roach and Cramp shipyards and the Carnegie, Midvale and Bethlehem 
iron and steel plants (Heinrich 1997:99). The navy helped to facilitate technology transfer. When it 
imported engine plans from England for the cmiser USS Baltimore, it gave the Cramp shipyard a chance to 
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create more powerful engines based on the triple-expansion engine (Ibid: 103). The navy's policy of 
placing ordinance officers with European ordnance companies also provided a path for technology transfer 
as the officers gained experience and brought it back to the States (Mis a 1995:98). Naval contracts also 
provided the funds by which yards could upgrade their facilities; however, it took time to develop a 
working relationship between the yards and the navy. Inexperience caused some yards to under-quote 
while naval requirements frequently changed. These tender relationships brought Cramps to the verge of 
bankmptcy while Roach was forced to close his yard. Clearly, the form of relationships identified by 
Richardson take time to build and can be considered an investment in their own right. 
As the shipbuilding industry increased its investment and experience in the latest technology, the price 
difference between Amelican ships and British ships began to close. In the early 1880s, the price 
differential was 25%. By 1888, it had closed to 15% (Heinrich 1997: 107). However, the industry still 
suffered from a small demand that did not allow it to achieve the same level of specialisation that the 
British shipyards achieved (Ibid: 129). 
By the end of the centulY, the shipbuilding industly had increased in experience and was beginning to 
adopt the characteristics of mass production associated with other areas of the US economy. In 1898, the 
New York Shipbuilding Corporation built a new yard at Camden which incorporated a number of 
innovations; the use of templates for plates and shapes, prefabrication of large structural assemblies, an 
extensive overhead crane system, and installation of heavy equipment on to the ship before launching. It 
produced a number of cargo ships for the yOlmg shipping companies. Its first ship was the M.S Dollar. Its 
second was for the American Hawaiian Line. 
Between 1865 and 1913, American maritime industries had undertaken an impressive 'catch up' process. 
As Allin (1979: 101) states: 
They built schools to train naval architects, admirals and seamen. They learned to organise capital, make 
shipbuilding tools, heat steel and build and sail a navy. They carried business organisation almost to 
perfection, obtaining almost complete control of the trade that mattered, The North Atlantic ferry service .... 
[n only one respect did they fail. They failed to build an American marine. 
Americans still had to learn the complexities of international ocean commerce. By the onset of the first 
world war, the American merchant marine still carried less than ten percent of the nation's foreign trade 
(Bauer 1988:298). US shipping was still very much handicapped by a lack of organisation, experience and 
skills in foreign h'ade that the leading nations, Britain and Germany possessed. These countries also 
possessed active government suppOli, a consequence of their linking military and transportation needs. By 
contrast, the US militalY still thought primarily in terms of coastal needs not transoceanic, consequently, it 
did not favour government support for an international merchant marine (Safford 1985: 101). Tme catch up 
by the Americans would only occur when military goals and industrial expansion were in alignment, 
thereby giving shippers access to efficient supporting industries. 
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13.3 Twentieth Century Catch Up 
Between 1890 and 1910, British tonnage continued to grow from 10 to 18 million tons. However, British 
share of world shipping had fallen from 50% to just under 42% as other nations embarked on a process of 
imitation (Stmmey 1962:4). This was still a phenomenal market share built on flexible organisation, 
marketable cargoes and superior shipping tedmology and experience. However in the fIrst half of the 
twentieth centm'y, a process of catch up and advance was occurring consistent with our thesis. 
The first world war dramatically effected global shipping by providing a form of infant industry protection. 
The nations involved in the thick of the war needed their shipping resources to aid their war effort. As 
Britain's efforts in particular were focused on the war, American and Japanese shippers could enter those 
trades vacated by what had been superior competition. 
Asian markets were left entirely open to Japanese products (Yui 1985:xx). This created a huge window of 
opportunity for Japanese businessmen to increase their capital, skills and experience. Japanese shipping 
went through an unprecedented boom. Its network of routes grew to include Africa, the East Coast of 
South America and all the regions of Southeast Asia. Many new fIrms rose to prominence. Shagaisen 
bloomed dramatically on war time demand, out-distancing the Shasen who could not switch to more 
profitable routes because of their commitment to government subsidised routes (Miwa 1985:145). 
Japanese tomlage increased fl:om 1,514,OOOgwt in 1913 to 2,841,OOOgwt in 1919, and the loading rate had 
climbed to 70% (Ibid: 136-7). Japan now ranked as the third largest maritime nation behind Britain and the 
United States. This burst in Japanese activety was an entrepreneurially driven expansion, not govel"lllllental 
(Yui 1985:xx). However, after fIfty years of government guidance, the country had acquired the 
capabilities in steam ship technology by which the industry could now generate its own start-ups. 
American shippers also enjoyed the window of opportunity provided by World war one. It opened up new 
opportunities to enter trades previously dominated by Europeans who redirected their shipping to war time 
support roles. In their absence, American companies increased their knowledge, experience and investment 
in new foreign markets. 
F or the Americans, World War One also provided the long awaited re-alignment in military and shipping 
goals. President Wilson had long seen the merchant marine as an important pillar in global power and 
prestige (Safford 1979:143). He linked a decrease in tariff and expanding foreign trade to a policy of 
support for a strong American merchant marine. However, he initially came across strong resistance from 
the private sector who were concerned that the nation was edging away from the principles of fl:ee 
enterprise. Private enterprise was certainly benefIting from the war. Shippers were growing without the 
legislation, enjoying the benefits of neutrality and very high war-time freight. This encouraged investment 
into the industry. The successful expansion of companies in the industry signalled to people with money, 
such as Jolm D. Rockefeller and Averill Harriman (son of a railway magnate), that maritime activity was 
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now retul11ing good profits. Under such circumstances, government intervention might not seem necessary. 
Nevertheless, heightened war-time activity increased the demand for more shipping and these changed 
circumstances allowed President Wilson to pass the 1916 Shipping Act which established the United States 
Shipping Board 'to promote, investigate, regulate and administer the shipping industry' (Bauer 1988:298). 
This ensured war-time shipping needs were met. 
One of the Shipping Board's first tasks was the creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) which 
was responsible for meeting the needs of Americas war eff0l1. The resulting 'Bridge of Ships' to France 
became the largest industrial undertaking ever attempted in the United States to that time. Meeting the 
shipping needs of a war across the Atlantic required a massive investment in new shipyards and led to some 
important changes in shipbuilding. The most notable change from this huge war-time demand was an 
accelerating trend towards fabrication and pre-assembly, mass production techniques originally seen in the 
New York Shipyard (Heimich 1997:94). 
Initially, the EFC was handicapped by lack of experience, and managers leal11t as they went. While 
Ahlericans eventually acquired the capabilties to efficiently produce the required ships, it is hard to imagine 
this occuring in a a competitive commercial environment without the protection of war and war-time 
demand. At the begilllling of a steep leal11ing curve, the scheme encountered delays, waste and numerous 
clashes of personality and policies (Bauer 1988:299). In time, they mastered the neccesary capabilities and 
the output on the Hog Island yard was phenomenal. At its peak, it employed 34,000 workers and could 
produce more than all the yards in the UK combined. So great was the number of launchings at Cramps 
that, instead of bringing in dignitaries from town, they would call the company's restaurant from where a 
brawny cook named Maggie would come, swing a bottle of champagne and send the ship on its way 
(Heimich 1997:165). 
By the war's end, the United states had the world's largest merchant marine at 13.5 million tons (Bauer 
1988:301). However, it is one thing to have ships. It is another to be able to manage them competitively 
(Bauer 1988:301). With the war over, the Americans did not have the industry skills or trade routes to 
utilise such a vast tonnage and, their seamen were still the most expensive in the world. 
To remedy the situation, the government passed the 1920 Merchant Marine Act. Under the act, private 
entrepreneurs were given the chance to charter the ships on 'essential trade routes', gaining experience after 
which they could purchase them. This scheme was very similar to that in Japan however, there was one key 
difference. In a culture that valued independent producers, the Shipping Board encouraged the fommtion 
of small steamship lines in preference to assisting the larger corporations, a policy which attracted 
speculators without the managerial capacity or experience to compete with foreign carriers. 
A depression which hit the industry between 1920-2 was unfortunate for the scheme (Kemble and Kendall 
1979:151). However, the depression was in many ways a consequence of the American policy. Most of 
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the steel ships built for the Bridge to France were not delivered until 1921-2, unleashing a huge supply of 
shipping on the world market. To make matters worse, the Japanese fleet was also growing and, once 
European shipping returned to commerce action, the inevitable over-supply was manifest. Safford 
(1989:142) goes as far as saying that most of the US fleet should never have been built. We would expect 
the government to have greater coordinating power than individual shipyards and therefore be able to avoid 
this problem however, it would have been very difficult to halt this policy in a job-hungry post-war 
economy. 
In the resulting depressio~, the number of US carriers declined from 200 in 1920 to 39 in 1923 (Heimich 
1997:199). However, some fIrms did succesfully acquire the capabilities to compete internationally. The 
Farrell line purchased the Shipping Board's service to South Africa and developed it into a strong 
conunercial enterprise. The Board started a new United States Line and operated it profItably until 1929 
when they sold it to a syndicate led by the International Merchant Marine (de la Pedraja 1992:71). 
American Export Lines also grew out of tIns period and, with cheap ships from the government, mastered 
the route between the East Coast and the Mediterranean. Other companies that used the cheap ships to 
expand their operations included Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, Waterman Steamship Corporation. 
With a number of investors with coffee interests, the Delta Line began in 1919, to provide coffee merchant 
in New Orleans with direct shipments fi-om Brazil, eventually moving into the export of agricultural 
machines, lumber and petroleum products (de la Pedraja 1992:88). 
The subsidised Matson line which had begun in the previous century on the protected route to Hawaii 
expanded in the PacifIc, taking routes previously lUn by the British Union Steamship Company of NZ, a 
subsidiary ofP&O. The American company also benefIted from the fact that the British could not share in 
the San Francisco-Hawaii route which was considered domestic shipping and preserved for American ships 
(Hope 1990:360). This leg of the PacifIc trade contributed healthy income towards the company's costs. 
Many of the new shipping lines were the product of vertical integration in yet another example of 
Hirschman-type linkages propelling the development of capabilities. Henry Ford established his own line 
to carry Model T's to foreign markets while Bethlehem Steel operated the Calmar Line to bring iron ore 
from Venezuela. The Roach shipping yards were re-opened during the war and purchased by W.Averill 
Hardman, the heir to a railroad fortune. In 1919, he also statied the United American Lines under the 
Shipping Boards programme. However, like most new trans-oceanic ventures of the time, it failed and was 
eventually sold to Hapag in 1926. 
With the effect of the great depression that followed, 10 million ships lay idle and a number of US 
shipyards went out of business including William Cramp and Sons and Bethlehem Steel Company's 
Haarlan Plant. To make matters worse, technical advances were rapidly laying the American fleet obsolete 
(Baker 1976:1.29). In particular, diesel engines were now common place on the most modem ships. To 
remedy the situation, in 1928, Congress established a construction fund under control of the Shipping 
285 
Board and, dramatically increased the subsidies for carrying mail. Under the new Board, forty six mail 
routes were established and each contractor was to build a certain number of new ships to service the route. 
The ships built in this period were state of the art (Kemble and Kendall 1979:161). Unfortunately, the law 
was poorly drawn and lacked efficient criteria and procedures (Bauer 1988:305). It did not even require 
ship operators to use their income to build new craft and most companies used old ships left from the war 
time production. Almost all lines were given the maximum subsidy available. Consequently, ships could 
sail thousands of miles to deliver a few pounds of mail at immense profit to the owners (de la Pedraja 
1992:111). The subsidies fell into a raft of shady proceedings eventually exposed by a Senate select 
connnittee including unearned and exorbitant salaries and bonuses, secret expenses and a raft of other 
devices (de la Pedraja 1992:112). 
To overcome these shortfalls, a new Merchant Marine Act in 1936 created the US Maritime Commission 
under Joseph Kennedy to oversee modifies subsidy provisions (de la Pedraja 1992: 113). The Commission 
administered cheap loans for constlUction of new vessels. However, being drafted during the depression, 
the new act's principle concern was employment so, included a requirement of 100% American crews on 
freighters and 90% on passenger vehicles seeking the subsidies. Working conditions of the crew were 
protected with a mandatory three-watch system and minimum standards for quarters. As welcome as these 
changes were to an under-employed labour force, US labour was expensive and this undermined the 
competitiveness of the US fleet. 
If the government did not introduce these laws, American owned ships would have a greater chance of 
competing intemationally because they could have employed foreign crews and in poorer work conditions. 
It would have presented a variant of the International Product Life Cycle with investment fleeing to those 
nations with cheaper labor (I say a variant in that ships are mobile capital). With an eye to the free market, 
the logical question would be 'should Americans, given the cost of labor, be involved in shipping at all?' 
This would have benefitted American share-holders but not American labor. Perhaps the policies can be 
seen as a stakeholder conflict decided tmder conditions of democracy (in conjunction with the need for 
military sea-h·anspOltation). 
In conh'ast to the high wage Americans, the Japanese were a low wage/ low cost producer, a particular 
advantage in a depressed market. The Japanese fleet consisted mostly of old imported second hand vessels 
and the age of the fleet was the second highest in the world (Nakagawa 1985:3). Japanese wages were also 
much lower than their main competitors (Miwa 1985:144). Consequently, during the years 1929-1939, 
when on average, the US fleet shlUnk by 2.4% each year and the UK fleet shrunk 1.1 %, the Japanese fleet 
grew by 3.0% (Stunney 1962:392). Another low cost operator to emerge in this period was Greece (3.5% 
growth). The Norwegians also continued a steady climb based on a high level of flexibility to changing 
market conditions. 
286 
I. 
I 
II .. '.' 
1--' 
Table 13.1 World Major Ship owners in 1926 
Shin owners name Number of shins Gross Tonnage 
US Maritime Board 1,056 5,162,334 
P&O 451 2,481,984 
Royal Mail 495 2,117,490 
LM.M 104 1,134,396 
Cunnard 108 1,035,229 
Ellermans 213 973,801 
Fumess Withy 207 903,320 
HAPAG 146 792,732 
NYK 136 706,375 
Holt 85 661,369 
NDL 138 562,729 
Generale Transatlantique 100 561,249 
KLine 101 503,866 
OSK 138 458,379 
M.M 56 447,291 
(Source: Kawasaki in Nakagawa 1985:23) 
Low cost advantages did not relieve the Japanese of the worst of the decline. Many of the leading 
shagaisen companies also disappeared from shipping. In 1927, the gigantic Suzuki trading company went 
bankrupt causing panic all over Japan (Yui 1985:xxi). Many Japanese companies survived by diversifying. 
For example, Kokusai Kisen diversified into Atlantic routes and began operating a liner service between 
Europe and Japan using cargo ships. In 1931, NYK and OSK signed an agreement to cooperate on routes 
to avoid excessive competition and over-lapping investment (ibid:xxii). They also co-operated on joint 
accounts on parallel lines and in the use of overland facilities. This co-operation enabled them to mitigate 
some of the destructive elements of competition during a time of vulnerability. 
The Japanese also benefited fi.-om organisational advantages. These included the flexible relationships 
between shagaisen operators and ship owners which allowed them to gather around them the necessary 
ships as demand sought (Nakagawa 1985:3&18). Another factor was the close relationships between 
exporters and shippers, as the British complained at the time: 
The fundamental cause of the recent Japanese success is the superior Japanese methods of organization in 
particular the system whereby Japanese banking firms, export houses, and shipping companies work in close 
connection .. , It follows from this that the real remedy for the decline in British shipping would be to 
rationalize their organization and take a leaf out of the book and work in closer contact with the banking and 
exporting interests concemed... Whereas the peculiar history of Japanese industry has brought about the 
concentration of many enterprises of various characters into the hands of a few big families, involving forms 
of industrial and commercial organization of the horizontal cartel type, the English individualist tradition has 
lead to a certain inelasticity and to a reluctance to co-operate with outside interests. (Quoted in de la Pedraja 
1992:100). 
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Japanese shippers also benefited fi.-om the rising demand for shipping services in their home country. 
During the inter-war period, Japan continued a period of rapid industrialization. The growth of heavy 
industries led to a growing demand for imp0l1ed raw materials such as iron ore, coal, phosphorus ore, salt 
and raw cotton; as well as increasing the demand for foodstuffs. At the same time, trade in high value 
goods such as raw silk, cotton and silk cloth, cotton yam and chinaware also increased (Nakagawa 
1985: 12). 
During the period of depression, Japanese shipping continued to grow through strong entrepreneurship, 
growing domestic demand, cheap wages, govemment support and the conect application of the most 
suitable ships to each service. The nation strengthened its position as the third largest shipping fleet with a 
number of companies ranked among the world's major ship owners. 
One American company to suffer at the hands of the vibrant Japanese was the Dollar Line who operated in 
the Pacific. The Dollar Line had held the predominant position on the San Francisco-Orient route using 
high quality ships. It was to aid competition on this route that the Japanese government's plan to merge 
KYK and TKK first materialized and, to finance the crack ships necessary to win the route, the government 
provided the maximum subsidy the existing legislation pro'vided (Miwa 1985:139). While the Japanese 
line received tlus injection of funds and technology, the Dollar line also suffered from wasteful 
management (de la Pedraja 1992:100) To stave off bankruptcy, the company was taken over by the US 
Maritime Commission who changed the name of the company to American President Lines. In the US free 
market system, it was generally believed that inefficient government management would lead to the 
collapse of the company. However, government management freed the company from satisfying stock 
holders with profit and concems with take-over fights. The company's sole concern was to provide quality 
slupping service. With an injection of capital, sound management and increased demand stemming from 
W orId War two, the company emerged strong and profitable at the end of the war. 
During the shipping depression, the government picked up the pieces of a number of ailing companies. 
Ironically, during this time when private enterprise was conuptly milking the subsidy system and falling 
into operational difficulties, the United States Line and the Panama Line which were run by the government 
were operating velY efficiently. However, any thought of extending government ownership ran against the 
value system which placed private enterplise at the top (de la Pedraja 1992: 113). 
Table 13.2 Tonnage by Nationality 1939-1948 
(from Sturmey 1962:139) 
1939 1946 1948 
Tonnage (000) % Tonnage % Tonnage % 
Japan 5,427 8.8 1,200 l.7 1,370 l.9 
Uluted Kingdom 16,892 27.5 13,340 18.3 16,046 22.0 
United States 8,722 14.2 40,882 56.1 26,199 36.0 
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On the outset of World War II, the United States had built the seond largest fleet in the world. In 1937, 
155 liner vessels owned by 17 firms received operational subsidies from the government (Whitehurst 
1983:82). Another 230 vessels operated without subsidies creating a US liner fleet of385 vessels (tramp 
shipping was minimal). When combined with the nations other shipping, American tonnage was second 
only to Britain while its' fast growing rival in the Pacific had the third largest fleet. These positions briefly 
changed dming World War two, when history repeated itself. As in the first World War, a new Bridge to 
France had to be built and American shipbuilding reached staggering levels. Mass production techniques 
and contracts that rewarded performance meant that in 1943 alone, 12.5 million tons was launched from 
American yards (Bauer 1988:309). The War Shipping Administration also undertook a huge training 
progrannne to provide the officers and men for the vessels. It included the establishment of the US 
Merchant Marine Academy, seven training ships, and schools around the country. These institutions 
trained 270,000 seamen, 10,000 officers, 7,500 radio officers and 5,300 pursers (Ibid:310). The US 
mercantile fleet experienced a four-fold increase in size. By contrast, the fleets of America's competitors 
had been decimated. 
At the war's end, one hundred and thiIiy shipping companies and 4,500 vessels gave the United States a 
staggering 60% of the world's tonnage (although 70% of the cargoes were for relief and military supplies) 
(Ibid:311). Once again, the Americans had the world's largest fleet. Despite the massive leap in 
productive capabilities and capital the lead was once again sholt lived, a reminder that an industry is more 
than a production function of resources, labour and capital. Canying cargoes supplied by the US anuy 
state-side to the US army across the Pacific and Atlantic is very different to establishing a range of 
commercial contacts throughout the world. Nor did the acquired capabilities compensate for the continual 
problem of high wages. Within a few years the British had wrestled that mantle back off them with their 
huge experience and global wide investments for managing commercial shipping in global routes. 
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Chapter 14 
Britannia Shares the Waves 
14.1 British Entrapment 
As the previous section described, several nations had gone tlu·ough a process of catch up, slowly acquiring 
the skills and capabilities that Britain was so ably exploiting. Initially, Japan and Gennany grew by 
exploiting new trading opportunities arising from South American independence, immigration, and Pacific 
routes. The United Kingdom felt no losses from these developments; in fact the British had largely ignored 
Pacific routes. This provided a window of opportunity for the imitators to develop their maritime 
capabilities. When the first World War redirected British commercial shipping towards the war effOli that 
window of oppOliunity widened for Americans and Japanese, and the Pacific was becoming a Japanese 
lake. As the twentieth century progressed, Americans, Japanese, Scandinavians and Greeks dramatically 
increased their share of world tonnage while Britain floundered. 
In 1890, over 10 million tons of shipping sailed under the British flag, a phenomenal amount representing 
approximately 50% of the global total (Sturrney 1962:4). Yet, over the next half century, the British share 
of world shipping declined dramatically. By 1960, its market share had fallen to 16%, soon to decline even 
further. Total British shipping had grown to nearly 21 million tons, but it had failed to ride the 
development paths that others would use to detlu·one Britannia. There are two principal explanations for 
this. Sturrney (1962), in his definitive study of the decline focuses on balTiers to growth within the British 
industry For Stulmey, the critical period for British shipping was between 1920 and about 1958 when 
tremendous changes OCCUlTed in trading pattems, competition, ships, cargoes and passengers. The British 
industry was slow in adapting itself to these changes. It was an industry geared to maintaining its position 
of supremacy, not to the meeting of changes. When it woke up, the world had moved. By contrast Davies 
(1985:80-1) suggests that British shipping reflected the state of the British economy in general. For Davies 
'shipping is an integral part of a nation's economy and accurately reflects both its relative efficiency and its 
international competitiveness'. As the British share of world trade declined so did its shipping. Both 
explanations are consistent with the reCUlTent pattems of entrapment. 
British competitive advantage had been based on supportive government policy, superior technology and 
organisation, supporting industr·ies, skills, experience and reputation. The last three of these were lost as 
other nations caught up and acquired the skills and experience to compete. Eventually, the other sources of 
competitiveness also disappeared. 
14.1.1 Shipping Technology At the end of the nineteenth century, the British steamship represented 
the zenith of shipping technology at the time. In the first half of the twentieth century, the steamship was 
challenged by the alTival of two technological options. These were the replacement of coal with diesel-oil 
as a fuel, and the replacement of the steam-engine with the internal combustion motor. The British were 
not averse to innovating with these technologies (Fletcher 1975:5-6). As early as 1886, British ship-
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builders had built an oil-powered steamer. British builders also built the world's fIrst ocean-going motor 
vessel; a tanker ordered by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Although the UK played a significant role in the 
development of these technologies, British shipowners were slow in diffusing them. British shipbuilders as 
a whole remained wedded to the steamship and with some reason. Early diesel engines had a tendency to 
break down under less than ideal conditions whereas, the tramp steamer had been improved to the point 
where it was effIcient, reliable and economical (Ibid: 10). 
Even as technological bugs were removed, there still remained uncertainty over the availability of oil. 'For 
every person who asserted that the future would provide abundant supplies of low priced oil, there were 
several to announce either the world's supplies of oil would sh0111y give out, or that the trusts controlling its 
distribution would never allow the using public the advantage of low prices' (Ibid:6). Some shippers 
hedged their bets by building vessels that could burn either coal or oil while, some advocates of coal 
refused too give in without one major last ditch effort promoting pulverised coal with its advantages of 
efficiency, saving of labour, and steady steaming conditions but, it suffered from technical drawbacks 
(Fletcher 1975:8). 
During World War One, many navies around the world, including the British turned to oil helping to 
remove these uncertainties. However, this did not lead to mass conversion. One reason was timing. 
During World War One, a large proportion of the British fleet was destroyed and British owners could have 
taken the opportunity to buy replacements that embodied the new technology. However, with a shortage of 
ships, freight rates were very high and owners were keen to take the ships most readily available. That 
meant locally produced steamers, ships built during the war, and foreign acquisitions (Fletcher 1975:10). 
Consequently, by the 1920s, when questions of oil availability and reliability had been solved, these 
businessmen found they had high levels of investment sunk into the old technology - a situation augmented 
by a shipping depression in the 1920s that shattered investment possibilities in any new shipping 
teclmologies. Consequently, in 1925 motor ships accounted for only 3.9% of British merchant fleet 
compared with 21.4% Sweden, 18.1% Denmark and 12.9% of Norway's (Robertson 1988:193). 
Although uncertainty over oil supply may have been solved, other uncertainties remained. As late as the 
1930's the case for the motor-ship was still not clear cut. The Liverpool firm of T &J Harrison (the 
Char ante Steam Ship Company) looked very carefully from 1925 onwards into the potential of motor ships 
to enhance its profItability (Robertson 1988: 196). Their research was governed by the principle that 'any 
ilmovation must improve their expectation of profIt over the whole range of trades in which the company 
was involved'. They also conducted tests on a number of means of propulsion and applied DCF investment 
analysis, yet continued to order coal-fired steam engines in the 1930's. In this instance, it was also 
necessary to consider, among other things, routes travelled. Motor ships were not always the best buy. In 
1935, motor ships still only accounted for 16.6% of the British fleet compared to 48.6% in Sweden, 41.9% 
in Denmark and 36.6% in Norway (Ibid). Scandinavians were also using faster ships than the British who 
seemed to hold a genuine belief that slower ships would provide a superior economic performance 
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(Stunney 1962:352). However, this belief rimy have been an act of faith (Ibid) that helped resolve 
cognitive dissonance. 
Domestic factor endowments also contributed to British persistence with the coal-powered steam-engine. 
The principal economic advantages of oil were it required less space and had lower fuel consumption 
(Fletcher 1975:5). Savings of 30-50% in fuel made the new technology attractive, particularly for countries 
like Norway which had to import its fuel. The United Kingdom had high quality coal, and no oil, therefore 
the economic advantages were not so great for them. The difference was probably not just transport costs 
but, the sense of certainty in the fuel that the British environment provided. This is an example of Salter's 
(1966) observation that diffusion of teclmology can be affected by variations in local factor costs. Short 
time horizons of businessmen also affected investment decisions. The reluctance to switch also reflected a 
preoccupation with lower fust costs than in longer mn economies of operation. 
In contrast to the hesitation of British businessmen, the Japanese government actively promoted the 
building of these new 'crack ships' in yet another illustration of the key role of government policy in 
directing advance. However, Sugiyama (1985:258-9) states that the building of new ships was not always 
beneficial to private enterprise. The govemment was sometimes more motivated by prestige in its attempt 
to upgrade the quality of tonnage. The question whether to tum to diesel-powered motor ships was widely 
discussed noting that although it brought higher eamings and lower mnning costs, the higher initial costs 
did not always guarantee the expected profit. 
The first attempt by the Japanese to use diesel motors was in 1923 when aSK trialed one in a sllIall vessel 
operating on an inland sea route (Yui 1985:xxii). This success led to their deployment on emigrant ships 
travelling to South America. In the following two years, Mitsui and NYK also began using diesel on some 
of their routes. The successful introduction of diesel by these major companies was followed by the 
competitive introduction of large, modern, high speed ships. aSK ships achieved record speeds to New 
York through the Panama Canal, providing a successful operation canying raw silk and vegetable oil, 
earning a profit even in the midst of the depression (Nakagawa 1985: 14). aSK's success with high speed 
ships stimulated research at the government's Naval Architecture Experiment Tank where it was discovered 
a single screw ship with an appropriately designed hull, rudder and screw could save 15% on fuel 
requirements. The new technology was immediately applied by the llIajor companies who used them on the 
New York route, a route characterised by high value cargoes and speed was a competitive weapon. 
The British Government also introduced a number of initiatives to help their industry. In 1935, it 
introduced a scrap and build plan whereby ship-owners were provided with loans if they scrapped old 
tOIDlage and replaced it with modemised ships. However, unlike in Japan where a similar scheme led to 
some fleet modification, English ship-owners were slow to respond and the scheme was abolished. 
Admittedly, part of the scheme's failure was a result of changing circumstances when an increase in activity 
made it economical to use old ships (ShuTIley 1962: 109). The government also provided bounties to assist 
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ship owners and forced the industry to set up a Tramp Shipping Administration Committee to promote co-
operation among shipbuilders. The committee had some success in limiting some of the negative effects of 
competition during a period of very low rates. However, the British government had less influence over its 
much larger industry than its Japanese counterpart, and forces of decline continued to set in. 
14.1.2 Path Dependency - The General Purpose Tramp British shippers were also slow to respond 
to the changing demands of global shipping. Like the Dutch, Spanish and Chinese before them, the British 
suffered from alTogance. The industry had leamt from experience that they were the world's most 
competitive shippers. Having been in this position for so long, the generally accepted fact was 'that the 
British industry was best by definition' (Sturmey 1962:96). By the time that international competition 
became serious, the idea was so embedded that the crumbling of that paramountcy occurred almost 
unnoticed (Ibid:396). 
British shippers followed the indushy norms that had canied them to global leadership. They continued to 
provide all purpose vehicles while other nations created more specialised vessels to meet the needs of 
particular hades. For example, Scandinavians made increasing use of refrigerated holds for the 
MeditelTanean fruit hade. They showed a flexibility and enh'epreneurial attitude in sharp contrast to the 
British who clung to traditional attitudes (Ibid:94). 
The fastest growing category of specialised vessels was oil tankers, a reflection of the booming demand for 
oil. World tanker tonnage soared from 11 million tons in 1939 to 38 million in 1960 (Stunney 1962:262). 
Yet the British were slow to seize the opportunities tIris type of vessel offered, despite the fact that the 
British admiralty and oil companies owned half the world's tanker fleet in 1913 (Ibid 1962:74). British 
ship-owners were entrapped by an aesthetic of what constituted a good ship. They were experienced with 
all purpose carriers and they were aware of their versatility. To the British ship-owner, tankers weren't real 
ships but, floating pieces of pipeline (Hope 1990:369). When the British oil company, Anglo-Saxon sold 
off its tanker fleet to raise capital for exploration and h'ansportation, it was the Norwegians who bought the 
vast majority, not their fellow counh'ymen (Sturmey 1962:76). 
By contrast, the US was making a huge investment in tankers. In yet another example of veltical 
integration, oil companies such as Sun Oil built and purchased tankers to meet their own transportation 
needs (Heimich 1997:179). This section of the market provided rapid growth for the US industry, a 
consequence of the rising demand for oil. Between 1914 and 1923, the US tanker fleet grew by 1,400% in 
number and 2,500% in tonnage (Bauer 1988:290). 
Many of the US tankers were not registered under the US flag. Like British businessmen, the American 
government who wrote the 1936 Merchant Marine Act failed to recognise the importance of tankers. This 
oversight deprived oil companies of subsidies, so they were the first to flee a country that imposed higher 
costs and restraints on shipping. US flag tankers simply could not compete in the irltemational market (de 
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la Pedraja 1992:160-1). In 1946, a group of oil companies created a register in Liberia which, along with 
Panama and Honduras, would become the flags of convenience for this growing sector of the industry. 
14.1.3 Organisation Klein's (1977) assertion that a decline in competition leads to slower innovation 
is supported by the liner part of the market. StmIDey (1962:352-7) notes that the little effort to investigate 
the economies of faster ships and other areas of improvement can be attributed to the industry structure in 
the liner trades. The conference agreements provided stability but gave little incentive to break from 
conventional modes of thought. The barriers to entry associated with the conference helped maintain 
British tonnage at a high level but, in the long telID increased inefficiency opened up windows of 
opportunities for new entrants. Aggressive competition was explicitly avoided and liner-companies had an 
ovelwhelming tendency not to take an action which might invite reprisals. By contrast, foreign operators 
with little market share were not restricted by these fears, and enthusiastically seized opportunities to win 
trade from increasingly inefficient liner-companies. 
One might of thought that a competition like the Blue Riband, for the fastest ship across the Atlantic, might 
have stimulated innovation. In the early years, the competition did have an impact but as racing became 
more specialised, the technological innovations had less impact on merchant shipping. For example, speed 
would acquire great use of fuel which was Imeconomical combination in merchant shipping. 
The necessalY flexible response was also hampered by the distance managers of these companies now were 
from their core activities and information on the industly. Industry growth and reduced competition had 
helped to distance ship owners from ships and the smell of salt (Ibid:395). Leading ship owners were more 
accustomed to co-operation rather than aggressive competition. The enlargement of organisations isolated 
the owner from the shipmaster and the associated commercial intelligence. Working from offices they 
increasingly judged operations through balance sheets rather than the detailed competitive problems on any 
particular route. A reflection of this change was the increased social position that ship owners now held. 
They becanle socially important figures, the purchasers of land and the recipients of titles or, as Weiner 
(1981) would put it, they had gone through a process of gentrification. The result was a business elite 
distant from its core activities and problems. It augmented an arrogance that beset the industry. This is an 
example of what Marshall( 1890) was personally witnessing when he wrote his life cycle of the frrm. 
Long telID adaptability was also hindered by the organisational-management strucmre of the companies in 
which families had emerged as entrenched stake-holders. Even when companies merged, family members 
from the old merged companies still dominated the board of directors. Family management made the 
industry less attractive to people who had the ability and ambition and the industry suffered from a shortage 
of good management (SmlIDey 1962:396). 
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Table 14.1 Structure of British Shipping Industry in 1960 
ton % 
Liners 8,764,000 50 
Tramps 3,304,000 19 
Tankers 5,457,000 31 
Total 17,525,000 100 
(adapted from: Chamber of Shipping, see Davis 1962:361) 
Given the emphasis of Klein (1977) and Porter (1990) on the importance ofrivalry, the highly contested 
tramp side of British shipping might have been expected to show more innovative vigour than the liner 
trade. However, the competitive model did not prove to be show the longevity we might expect from 
0l1hodox economic theory. In fact, British tramp shipping was routed. As table 14.1 shows, tramp 
shipping which at the beginning of the century comprised 60% of the fleet was down to less than 20% of a 
similar total. There are a number ofreasons for the demise of British tramp shipping however, standing out 
is the fact that continuing with past commercial rationalities and paradigms proved a far stronger force on 
the industry than the benefits of competition. 
As a high wage nation, British tramp owners needed to keep at least one step ahead of low wage 
competitors in the adoption oflarger and faster vessels yet, by 1914, advance had practically stopped as the 
industry accepted the reliable economical ships as the embodiment of the ideal tramp. The reliable tramp 
ship was to the English what the fIuyt had been to the Dutch, an excellent trader with which they learned to 
maximise economies. They knew these ships well so built their strategies around them. Use of their 
technology became a core heuristic. As Sturmey (1962:78) notes 'The tramp-owners as a whole were 
cheese-paring by nature, meeting competitive pressures by continuous economies within traditional ship 
types, but rarely taking a longer view and endeavouring to reduce costs (or increase receipts) by spending 
money on ships designed for existing conditions' . 
This outlook was particularly damaging when ships were dramatically increasing in size. Size offered a 
number of economic advantages (Hope 1990:416). In 1968, a 5000 ton ship would cost 85 pounds per ton 
to build compared to 35 pounds for a 20,000-tonner. A large ship might require an engine 10 times more 
powerful but, it could carry 40 times the weight of cargo. Average mnning costs also declined with size, 
for example above 65,000 tons crew costs remained static. Although these figures come from later in the 
twentieth century, they reveal an economic phenomenon that had been occurring throughout the century. 
The British did not invest in larger ships 
One possible explanation is the small size of British ports which limited their ability to handle large tankers 
and bulk carriers. Sturmey(1962: 166) notes that 'ship owners were unduly conscious of the limitations of 
the British oil terminals in handling the biggest tankers'. However, given the fact that a tanker on 
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intemational routes might never visit Britain, the decisions are an example of bounded rationality and 
perhaps availability bias, in which the readily available and observable information is given unjustiable 
cognisance. The result is a false consciousness, an example of the local environment restricting a more 
rational view of global change. 
Family tramp fnms lacked the necessary capital to switch to large ships such as tankers (Sturmey 1962:61). 
The possibility of raising money through debt or issue of shares existed but the industry had a tradition of 
self financing. Like other proprietary corporations of the time, they avoided outside capital in order to 
retain control of the company within the family. Like the Gujaratis three hundred years earlier, strong 
competition housed an individualism which stunted versatility. 
The shunning of outside finance was also a reflection of business norms. These companies had grown from 
small begimlings by reinvesting profit. Extemal finance was never a key factor in their mental outlook. In 
fact, during the nineteenth century some companies did take the opportunity to bon-ow but, heavy debt left 
them vulnerable during the depression of 1904-1l. Many lines failed and the industry took the lessons to 
heart. The unwritten rule became financial conservatism (Ibid 106-7). Consequently, the small owner of 
two or three tramps saw investment in tankers as a risky and high debt project compared to what he knew 
he could do best. 
The company that was most re,sponsible for imbuing ship owners with a conservative stance was Royal 
Mail. On becoming chairman of the Royal Mail group, Owen Philipps (later Lord Kylsant) commenced an 
expansionalY programme which saw the company's tonnage grow from 92,352 grt in 1903 to 165,511 in 
1906. The company continued to expand and acquired a number of companies including Elder Dempster 
& Co in 1910, Pacific Stearn in 1910, Glen Line and Lamport and Jolt in 1911 and Union Castle in 1912. 
Most of tlns expansion was fmanced through the issue of debenture stocks, a method which raised fmance 
but left control in the hands of the original small family business (Green 1985:233). After the war, 
expansion was also financed by cross share holdings, particularly with Lord Pinie of Harland & Wolff 
ship-builders. Togetller, the two exercised tillchallenged influence over the fmance, strategy and 
organisation of the group. Nevertheless, family control does not always mean conservative management 
and, the company was quick to invest in the most advanced technologies, including the motor ship. During 
the war, the group had made healthy profits with which it continued to expand. Expansion did not stop 
during the slump that followed, and more extemal fmance was raised through loans by which the Group 
came to encompass 140 companies (not all of them in shipping) by 1926 (Hope 1990:365). By 1928, the 
group was highly in debt and now relied on a period of rapid growth but this slump lasted longer than 
previous downturns. The company collapsed in 1930. By this time the fleet comprised nearly 15% of total 
British shipping. Its decline sent a powerful message to other owners not to use extemal fmance. 
These norms were born from a historical process of learning that detennined business behaviour as the 
century progressed. They restricted fmancial options of businessmen who did not seize contrast strongly 
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with the itmovative fmancial techniques introduced by foreign entrepreneurs like Daniel Ludwig of the 
United States and the Greeks Aristotle Onassis and Niarchos. These entrepreneurs fmanced rapid 
expansion through external loans using long ternl charter contracts signed with the oil companies to 
guarantee the cash flow to meet loan repayments (Strange 1992:66). 
Another financial consideration which affected decisions was comparative profit. In the early days, the 
tanker market offered lower profit margins than the British were used to so, they did not consider 
switching. This left a window of opportunity open for a new competitor to gain an entrance into the 
industry. 
Finally, we must also consider the number of dish'actions, unceliainties and red herrings that abounded 
throughout this period of change. A number of factors could have blurred British businessmen from seeing 
the need to upgrade. During world war one, British ship owners earned high profits as the government paid 
handsome rates for the use of their ships. In such circumstances, high profits could be earned without a 
teclmical upgrade. Immediately after the war, there were shortages of shipping. British shipbuilders had 
fitll order books replacing the war-time losses (Burton 1994:182). Between the wars, the depression 
defined the economic environment and made new investment an unattractive option. Then world war two 
arrived, followed by a post-war shortage of shipping and very high profit rates which once again seemed to 
endorse the correcmess of the policies (Stmmey 1962:400). Full realisation of Britain's relative decline 
was also obscured by an expansion in world trade which provided some growth and stability in overall 
tOlmage. It hid the fact that faster paths to growth were being developed by other nations who were 
itlcreasing their market share. 
Uncertainty made efficient decision making difficult. For example, in the inflationary period following 
world war two, there was an expectation that, after the original burst of activity, a slump would occur as 
happened after world war one. The effect of this uncertainty on decision making is illustrated by Sir John 
Denhohl1 of J&J Denholm who explains: 
When the second war was over, my brother and I decided we had either to get out, or go right for it. We'd 
have done nicely if we sold out then, but we made the decision, and we went ahead while other firms waited 
for the slump that never came ... It seemed unfair to inflict the whole gamble on our share holders .... by 1951 
we had seven ships, all of them built or bought at prices we could never have hoped for if we had waited to 
see what would happen (quoted in Hope 1990:399). 
J &J Denholm expanded but many other tramp owners held off waiting for the expected slump in 
shipbuilding prices only to witness 16 years ofrising prices. 
14.1.4 Supporting Industries It is now time to consider Davie's explanation that the decline was a 
reflection of the health of the British economy and its international trade. The health of the economy was 
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important to the extent that it created a demand for shipping, had healthy cargoes to fill hulls and other 
supporting industries provided low cost inputs which helped attain competitiveness. 
At the outset of the First World War, Britain still enjoyed a healthy trade based on those industries that 
characterised the industrial revolution. Textiles, coal, iron and steel still contributed to two-thirds of 
British export eal11ings (Harley and McCloskey 1981:64). This over-commitment to old industries left 
Britain vulnerable to changes in the intel11ational economy, in particular rising protectionism which 
shielded a process of imitation in a number of countries which were once markets for British goods. 
However, Germany and the United States were not prepared to just imitate, and developed a new range of 
products and production technologies as outlined in the previous chapter. With new products and 
production techniques, these nations enjoyed an increasing share of world trade while Britain's share 
continued to decline. Although British industry was strongly committed to the old industries, it was not 
stagnant. New industries were rising in importance in both foreign exchange and national income figures 
(Harley and McCloskey 1981 :69). However, the transition was occurring at a dramatically slower rate than 
that in the new industrial power houses. Teclmology and commerce was now changing at a faster rate than 
the British had ever experienced. The compression of time and space, that Schoenberger recognised 
undennined American competitiveness in the second half of the twentieth century, was undermining British 
competitiveness in the [11"8t half. To get a foothold in the new opportunities they needed to respond at 
faster rate than they were used to. However, American first movers established themselves so quickly in 
the British market that local firms barely had a chance (Chandler 1990:275). 
Table 14.2 Changes of world leadership in industrial production, 1870-1938 
Percentage Share of World Industrial output of Top Five Nations 
Nations 1870 1913 1926-9 1936-8 
Britain 31.8 14.0 9.4 9.2 
United States 23.3 35.8 42.2 32.2 
Gelmany 13.2 15.7 11.6 10.7 
France 10.3 6.4 6.6 4.5 
Japan 1.2 2.5 3.5 
(Source: Based upon F.Hilgerdt (1945) Industrialisation and foreign Trade, Geneva: 
League of Nations, Table,l. Printed in Dickson 1986) 
In some instances, adoption of new technologies was hindered by environmental factors. In the same way 
that British coal enabled it to take the industrial mantle from the Netherlands, Britain lacked a Niagara falls 
or rivers flowing £i·om the European Alps that allowed Germans and Americans to exploit electrochemicals 
(Chandler 1990:279). Lack of a cheap, powerful water based power also affected production of non-
ferrous metals such as aluminium. 
In the textile industlY, Sandberg (1981: 115) notes efficiencies in the British labour market actually created 
a balTier to the adoption of the most modem technology. American and Japanese manufacturers, facing a 
shOliage of cheap skilled labour, adopted the ring spindle which could be operated by low skilled female 
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labour. The new machine provided great savings to the new competitors. The British, who did not face 
problems of skill shOliages, would not have achieved the same benefits from the new technology so did not 
adopt it. Tllis is an ironic situation in that British mechanisation had smpassed Indian textile production 
two centuries earlier under very sinlilar circumstances, yet another reflection of the recurring nature of the 
forces of entrapment. In this case, it is the recuITing nature of local factor costs as identified by Salter 
(1966). 
The nature of the British market also created a barrier to the adoption of many of the new production 
teclmologies conling out of America. The United States could exploit new mass production technologies 
because it has the mass market to wllich it could sell. By comparison, when Britain adopted new products 
it served smaller specialist quality markets (Alford 1981 :330). 
Adoption of foreign industrial techniques was sh'ongly inhibited by the structure of Proprietary Capitalism. 
Many of these rigidities have already been noted in the fanlily dominated shipping lines. Small industrial 
finns, like tramp shipping companies, could not by themselves muster the capital necessary to invest in 
l<rrger scale production, management and distribution systems that was propelling America to industrial 
leadership. With less capital and a desire to keep fanlily control, British finns were hesitant to engage in 
risky inveshnents and new and untried products and processes (Chandler 1990:335), a factor we have 
already seen in tramp shipping. This in shmp contrast to America where large corporations, with their 
industrial R&D laboratories, their accumulated specific stock of knowledge, their competence in large scale 
R&D projects, production and distribution and their financial resources had a capacity for advancing 
teclmology with which a perfectly competitive model could not compete. 
The desire for fanlilies to retain conti'ol meant they were reluctant to seek funds through increased debt or 
the share market (Chandler 1990:335). Consequently, British firms never made investments that would 
allow them to benefit from the econonlies of scale or scope that their counterparts across the North Atlantic 
were achieving. The changes that were made were smaller, more evolutionary within the confmes of the 
old organisational fonn (Ibid:262). If British firms amalgamated in an attempt to obtain econonlies of 
scale, they still continued to use the same old plants. Econonlies of scale achieved by the Americans 
remained elusive. 
Family Management groups became entrenched stakeholders. While managers in the United States were 
increasingly promoted by ability, British fanlily members inherited the leadership of the fanlily finn, 
effectively becoming a dish'ibutional coalition. Nowhere could this be seen more vividly than the textile 
indush-y, which between 1880 and 1940, was the biggest indush-y in terms of output, assets and 
employment (Chandler 1990:332). Writing in 1928, John Maynard Keynes noted 'There is probably no 
hall in Manchester large enough to hold all the directors of cotton companies, they (run) into thousands. 
One of the first things should be to disnliss the vast majority of these people, but the persons to whom this 
proposal would have to be made would be precisely those directors' (quoted in Chandler 1990:333). 
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Lazonick (1990) provided a different explanation of decline in the textile industry which was equally 
compatible with the idea of entrapment and ineltia. He believed the persistence of old craft control 
methods blocked the uptake of automated spinning and weaving technologies that were being adapted in 
the USA. The internal organisation of British firms saw the senior worker establishing a key position 
controlling output and the performance of subordinates. It was these lninders, not the capitalist owners 
who rec~uited, h·ained and supervised the work-flow. This form of organisation had been fundamental to 
British success in the industry (1990: 113). However, as key stake-holders, these minders were not going to 
welcome new machinery that sought to replace them. The power to introduce these changes was also 
limited by the weak power of the capitalists who owned the plants. With managerial control being 
exercised at the minder level, capitalists did not develop the managerial skills that arose in the US where 
large finTIS with top down hierarchies developed and the high level of competition between firms only 
weakened their power over these workers further. 
Across the nation, distributional coalitions developed inside finTIS. Skilled senior workers had the 
organisational skills to create very strong lmions that would create a banier to the adoption of automated 
production. The union position was not helped by management's traditional reliance on the market for 
labom. Faced with fluctuating hire and fire policies, workers sought a property right position, not in terms 
of career within a particular finn but, in terms of a right to work with particular types of machines or 
materials (Lorenz 1994:392). As these demarcation lines were drawn, lmions organised to reinforce such 
rights. Demarcation was also a result of a high degree of specialisation among the highly skilled workers. 
As the position of workers became more unceltain in a declining economy, unions became more defensive, 
responding with vigour to even minor changes in machinery or materials. Demarcation divisions make it 
difficult to co-ordinate labour as efficiently as Japan where workers identified with the company and co-
operated with the various machines and materials they used. Demarcation lines also made technological 
change a long, difficult and costly exercise. Burton (1994) notes that in the shipbuilding industry, when 
new teclmologies were introduced, demarcation disputes held up orders leading not only to higher costs but 
also lost customers. The loss of work made the unions even more defensive and, as the econolnic pie got 
smaller, unions became distrustful that employers were increasing their share at the worker's expense. 
Insecurity in the workplace bred new problems which undeTI"llined competitiveness. Burton (1994:229) 
notes that theft and absenteeism became expensive problems in shipyards. Workers were responding to the 
deteriorating situation with a rationality that said 'make as much out of a job as possible because there 
might be nothing once the job was over'. Consequently, men stayed away from work at the beginning of 
the week and caught up on the weekends when they earned overtime rates. As a ship they were working on 
neared completion, they would deliberately slow down to put off redundancy if nothing else came in. 
These were symptoms of a Perez-type soc i-institutional crisis. 
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Perhaps the biggest barrier to adjustment was the deeply embedded culture and institutional base. 
Education was a prime example. Public schools turned out excellent administrators to maintain stability in 
Britain's empire, but did little for the ideas of technical advance. These values of honour and public worth 
were not very different to Japan where they had been turned into an asset. In Japan, there had been a 
deliberate attempt to promote indush·y and commerce as honorable careers. Perhaps the biggest difference 
was that in England, there was little science in the curriculum. Science and working with hands to make 
money were not values endorsed by a society who increasingly saw industry as an area unworthy of a 
gentleman. The problem would not have been so confining but the public school formed the model for 
state schools. As late as 1902, the state system of secondary education was developed by public school 
graduates with the belief that the best form of education was that which they had received (Weiner 
1981:21). 
At university a similar pattern existed. Undergraduates were discouraged from pursuing commercial 
careers. Like the public schools, Oxbridge was the model for other universities, providing an education in 
political leadership with little introduction to the indush"ial world. While America and Germany were 
developing new science based education, English talent would not be given the skills to generate 
teclmological advance. An interesting illustration of the outlook of academia occurred at the turn of the 
century when a donor offered 100,000 pounds to establish a school of naval architecture at Cambridge. He 
eventually withdrew his offer in disgust after leal11ing students would have to qualify in Greek (Pollard and 
Robertson 1979: 144). Even, the Royal Society became more distanced from industry and more concel11ed 
with science (Von Tunzelmann 1981:148). The inevitable result for industry was a woeful shortage of 
skilled, scientific staff. While Japanese shipbuilders benefited fi-om a flood of graduates in marine 
sciences, Britain's academic institutions produced little of similar skills. This resulted in reduced R&D 
expenditure and commitment. 
An aversion to science also existed on the shop floor where the practical craftsman held sway. British 
shipbuilders did not have any faith in the ability of scientists to contribute to shipbuilding 'because 
scientists did not know how to build ships, and it was felt that only people who had passed through a proper 
apprenticeship in the yards and shops were likely to know enough of the problems involved in shipbuilding 
to be able to arrive at satisfactory solutions' (Pollard and Robertson 1979: 148). While Britain emphasised 
the values of the 'practical man' and technological levels that had brought them success in the past, other 
nations developed deeper understanding. 
An example of the limited scientific approach to shipbuilding can be seen in the development of the turbine 
by Parsons (Billion 1994:222). Development on the turbine proceeded on a pragmatic way with no attempt 
to understand for example, the fundamental physics and mathematics of blade design. New development 
was left to other countries, notably Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. There was little 
appreciation of basic science and systematic analysis. As late as 1958, R&D in shipbuilding was running at 
one per cent of net tul110ver (ibid). 
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The fact that innovations still came fairly regularly from the British Isles suggests that British industries 
had not entered Klein's (1977) slow history. Even the Liberty ship which propelled American shipping 
fOTward was based on a British design, but it was America which revolutionised their production with the 
introduction of mass-production teclmiques. The difference is clearly not the rate of innovations per se, but 
the rate of their diffusion, and other nations were developing and diffusing innovations quicker. 
There was also a failure to develop mOTe sophisticated marketing practices. Companies lacked clear 
market strategies while even the nations most successful selling and advertising practitioners had little or 
no understanding of the basic concepts of marketing. As Alford (1981:328) states 'advertising was 
regarded as a means of popularising what was produced, not as a means of exploiting what had been 
discovered about consumer tastes and wants'. Burton (1994:224), who examined the shipbuilding industry, 
suggests that the failure in marketing and selling grew out of a long history of customers beating a path to 
the British door. While others were doing their utmost to satisfy customer need, British builders declared 
themselves the best in the world, failing to notice the changes around them. 
Weiner (1981) believes the nation had experience a move from technology and commerce, a reflection of a 
"genhification" of the leaders in the economy. On success, business men bought land and retired to the 
country to enjoy it. Here they e~oyed the prestige of being a landowner and acquired the trappings of the 
genh-y. This process had been occuring since the mid-nineteenth century. As a consequence, the counh'ies 
most able men became divorced from the world of commerce and industry. Company directors became 
aloof from management, their board rooms exhibiting a gentleman's club atmosphere which nomished 
cautious policies. Nowhere was this more apparent than the prestigious Institute of Directors which 
inhabited three mansions in Belgrave Square. Its director general once explained that 'directors are a kind 
of aristocracy; they should be men of parts, and they should have interests outside business ... you could say 
we have a gigantic old boys network' (quoted in Weiner 1981: 149). The goal of the gentleman-
industrialists was not the wholehearted pursuit of economic growth but, gentility. The result was a 
conservative managerial culture which braked growth, placed stability ahead of growth and resisted 
institutional overhauls. It was as if Marshall's life cycle had become an industry/economy wide life cycle. 
These values also reached the government. The Tories, in particular believed that economic forces should 
be made to accommodate established patterns of social relationships (Weiner 1981:98). Conflict and 
uncertain change was to be avoided while, materialism should be minimised. Regulation conquered laissez 
faire. The comparison with China, where the Mandarins sought to preserve social harmony, is striking. 
Success had provided the English with a healthy sense of self belief and, like the Chinese and others before 
them, it inbreed a sense of moral superiority which created a barrier to adapting foreign production 
techniques. Americans were seen as being obsessed with size, speed, mechanisation and money. 
Gentleman-indush'ialists, like Peter Menzies of reI, put down American materialism saying it would be 
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wrong to 'take up the American patter' (quoted in Weiner 1981:142). Samuel Courtauld (1876-1942), 
chainnan of the company of the same name, admired the teclmical achievements of the Americans but even 
he confessed 'I view the so-called Americanisation of Europe with the utmost dislike. 1 doubt whether 
Amelican ideals of living - purely materialistic as they are - will [mally lead to a contented working nation 
anywhere when the excitement of constant expansion has come to an end'. Prime Minister Baldwin who 
came to power in 1923 and dominated British politicallife for the next 15 years shared these sentiments. A 
Midland's industrialist himself, he assured both business audiences and the general public that they need 
not abandon traditional standards in favour of apparently more successful foreign ones (Weiner 1981: 142). 
Once more there is a strong similarity with China who rejected foreign production technologies in a desire 
to protect the nations values. 
The UK economic system had produced its own aesthetics and this extended down to the workplace. 
American success was contrasted to an English founded on the values of humanity, honour and 
craftsmanship. Even leading engineering magazines objected to American ideas of scientific management 
with the comment that 'there are fair ways and unfair ways of diminishing labour costs ... ' (quoted in 
Weiner 1981:143). Wayne Harkin of Texas observed this pride when he inspected British shipyards: 
I found among these men a real pride in their accomplishments and indeed they have a right to be proud. 
Skilled craftsmen are in evidence all over the place. What amazed me was the fact that they had been able to 
turn out the quality of work with the facilities. (quoted in Burton 1996:236) 
The desire to avoid social disharmony and conflict was a very real issue and added a cost to change that 
Americans certainly weren't having to face. Britain possessed highly skilled specialised workers who 
would have suffered very real dislocation from the change to an unskilled mechanised industry. Both 
employers and employees showed some preference to uy to squeeze more out of the existing technologies, 
with the inevitable reduction of incomes and in some cases, loss of quality (Lazonick 1991 :46). 
The cargo whose decline most hurt shipping was coal. Between 1913 and 1938, British coal exports 
halved from 77 million tons to 38 million, and further still to 7 million in 1960 (Hope 1990:368 and 399). 
English shipping had derived a marked competitive advantage from the fact that it had an outward cargo, 
coal which in the days of steam engines which had a vast global demand (Davies 1985:80, Stunney 
1962:70 and 73). Coal exports declined with the rise of oil, an increase in foreign output of coal, and more 
efficient use of coal which reduced its use. The decline of coal was particularly damaging to Britain's 
tramp shipping which was well adapted to the coal u·ade. 
The reliance on coal as a suppOlting indusuy and the limitations of family firms in the tramp trades are well 
illustrated by the Cardiff based 'British Steamship Company'. Cardiff at the tum of the century was the 
largest coal exporting port in the world (Middlemiss 1989: 11) and had a large tramp fleet going to the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and Latin America where the return cargo was grain. The British Steamship 
Company was one of a number of companies founded by John Cory a master of coastal traders 
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(Middlemiss 1989:109-113). In 1854, he stalied his own business drawing on close association with Cory 
Brothers, coal exporters of Cardiff, and William Cory and Sons who operated colliers. In 1874, John Cory 
bought his first steamships and his fleet grew rapidly to number 19 in 1884. As befitting an age of 
proprietary capitalism, his sons were brought in as partners in 1885, the eldest taking over the business 
when his father died. By 1891, the company had become the largest importers of iron ore in South Wales. 
By the outbreak of the first world war, the company had 23 tramps and a world wide market for its unique 
blend of coal. 
World War One cost the company dearly, with war-time losses halving the size of the fleet. However, 
worse was yet to come with the decline in coal expOlis. Cardiff shipping suffered greatly and in 1923, 
more than half of the city's tramp-owners crashed. However, sound financial management enabled the 
Corys to survive. But other aspects of the company's business were declining. Imports of iron ore were 
stopped in 1927. By the Second World War, the company had only three tramps, only to lose all of them in 
the hostilities. 
With experience being their only remaining asset, they survived by chartering ships and making the 
occasional purchase, including the company's only motor ship in 1959. However, ships were getting 
bigger and more expensive. The family fum could not afford to build an expensive bulk carrier which 
meant they could no longer be competitive in the tramp trades. By 1989, they were no longer a shipping 
company but operate as shipping agents under the name Raymond Cory. They were a well managed 
company that reflected the rise and fall of the British fleet. 
The other key supporting industry was shipbuilding, but by now it was relatively easy to buy ships from 
other nations. However, Sturmey (1962:401) notes the tendency of British to continue building tonnage in 
Britain when better and cheaper ships could have been obtained from overseas. For example, the 
IGlowledge that tankers could be built more cheaply on the continent during the 1930s did not lead to 
buying abroad. It was just another reason for not having tankers at all. The owners would stick to their old 
routines and complain about British prices. 
However, the importance of linkages to weak shipbuilding industry should not be overstated. As Robertson 
(1988: 192) notes it was not the builder who determined the specifications of the ship. The builder might 
make suggestions however, the buyer had their own technical representatives who would over-see 
constmction and fitting out. In the early days, the close technical relationship between builder and ship 
owner had increased the flow of information and led to increased efficiency. However, close relationships 
can become a weakness if one partner becomes inefficient and weighs the other down or alternatively, if 
conU11Unication is based around old patterns and nOlms and does not change with the times. As Lundvall 
(1992:357) notes investment of time, infOlmation and tlUSt in such relationships can lead to rigidities that 
restrict more flexible change. It was a patiicularly harmful linkage given the integrated nature of the 
industry in Blitain. Many shipbuilders and shipping companies had close associated companies. 
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From the Second World War until the late 1950s, government restrictions stood in the way of foreign built 
ships as the government sought to preserve foreign exchange in the difficult post war environment (Hope 
1990:399). After these restrictions were lifted, ship owners often bought British ships out of goodwill to 
their fellow countrymen, an expensive gesture for some. In the 1960s, P&O continued to give orders to 
Fairfield shipbuilders even though Japanese could provide the ships much more cheaply. When Fairfields 
collapsed in 1965, P&O suffered as an unsecured creditor. As Sir Donald Anderson stated 'our gesture of 
goodwill towards British shipbuilding turned out to be very expensive for us, and of no help to the 
shipbuilding industiy' (quoted in Howarth and Howarth 1986:171). 
14.2 Attempts at Reform 
The Atlee Government (1945-51) was the first government to give a high priority to raising industrial 
productivity and created a number of policy measures, the most well known being the Anglo-American 
Council on Productivity (AACP) (see Tomlinson 1991). It was established in 1948 as a non-governmental 
body and comprised members representing both management and labour. It also included employers 
representatives from the United States. Americans were keen to raise British productivety as part of its 
concern for European prosperity that gave rise to the Marshall plan. 
The inclusion of Anlericans should have made the process of technology transfer relatively easy. The 
Council celtainly had open access to infOlmation. The programme included plant visits, exchange of 
production techniques, productivity measurement and other economic information. Forty-nine teams were 
created dealing with specific industries and another seventeen dealing with specialist subjects such as 
management accounting. They revealed factors leading to high US productivity as including 'extensive use 
of mechanical aids', 'appreciation by work people of need for higher productivity' and 'managerial 
techniques' including modern methods of costing, production planning and control and work study 
methods. Despite this free flow of infomlation, the AACP failed to have an impact. 
The AACP failed for a number of reasons. Stake-holder resistance was one of them. The principal 
employers' representative (FBI) had initially welcomed the AACP as it believed it would clear it of many 
of the negative comments made about British management. By conti'ast, the results actually stressed the 
failure of management technique in Britain. This raised a defensiveness among employers. Some of the 
employers' defensiveness held some validity. Much of the AACP's comments were devoted to spreading 
the gospel of scientific management which many saw as inappropriate to British industry. Britain did not 
have the mass American market which offered greater opportunities for standard costings than the small 
scale, craft orientated firms of Britain. Many of Britain's smaller firms, who were most in need of reform 
were not involved with AACP's fmdings. 
Tomlinson also suggests that the AACP failed because the productivity teams and their reports were sinlply 
inadequate to deal with problems that were so deep-seated. For ideological reasons, the government was 
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not prepared to take an even more interventionist role in the workings of industry. Government kept its 
distance. Timing did not help. The immediate post war environment was highly profitable for British 
businesses who were operating in a seller's market and must have undermined employers' sense of a need 
for change. The post war environment in Britain was also one which desired stability as a preference to 
economic growth. This is in sharp contrast to France who, having recently been occupied by Germany, 
seized the opportunity to upgrade their productivity with American techniques. The external threat for 
Britain was not so great. 
Connnitment to reform was also undermined by unce11ainty. The new American methods with high 
investment levels and bureaucratic administration were superior in times of stable growth and expanding 
mass markets, but would those conditions continue? British producers had experienced protracted 
recessions in the past and they were concerned that the post-war boom would be followed by a slump and 
they would be left with expensive ineversible investments. The old method of production which relied on 
the market with low administrative overheads, may have been more adaptable during periods of instability. 
TIus uncertainty undemrined commitment for change. 
Lorenz (1994:388) notes that virtually 'every plan for rationalisation of enterprise organisation in the 
shipbuilding, engineering and cotton industry ... floundered on the reluctance of conservative majorities to 
commit themselves to serious progrmmnes of institutional reform .... '. Declining profitability and the 
collapse of major producers eventually led producers to agree on the need for serious reform in 
shipbuilding, cotton, automobiles and various branches of engineering. In 1962, the Shipbuilding 
Employers Federation presented a plan for refOlID to the unions. However, by now the problems of 
uncertainty and trust tmdemrined co-ordination of the various refonns proposed (Lorenz 1994:392). 
Negotiations for refOlID operated in an environment of fear that the other side was trying to shiftthe longer 
term distribution of returns in their favour. The eventual results in most cases amounted only to local 
modification of the craft system. 
During the second half of the 1960s, the urgency of the matter was obvious to all and significant changes in 
work organisation [mally occuned. Local employers negotiated a series of productivity agreements 
offering greater job security in exchange for increased flexibility and inter-changability among the skilled 
trades. Recognising the severity of the crisis shipbuilders accepted the need for reform. The existing craft 
system was modified but, it was not replaced by the more successful bureaucratic administration of work. 
The changes that were made only amounted to local modifications of existing craft anangements with 
piecemeal adjustments. Consequently, it was not accompanied by substantial improvements in competitive 
performance. Plalming techniques remained mdimentary while skilled workers and shop level foremen 
continued to play a key role in co-ordination of work. British employers could not implement change 
successfully because they lacked experience with more bureaucratic methods. Like the Mandarins in 
China, their attempts at change were lin1ited by their own skill base and capabilities. Past investment in 
skills and established stake-holders kept Britain on the old econon1ic pathway. 
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Britain became the 'sick man of Europe'. Between 1945 and 1977, it had become a country conscious 'of 
accute and apparently insoluble economic problems: troubled by the consistent lag behind other countries 
in economic growth, lacking in pride and self confidence and given to moods of fustration, despair and at 
times desperation' (Caimcross 1981 :415). 
14.3 Discussion 
The British experience is consistent with the thesis as the nation had become entrapped on the path of 
economic development that had canied it to primacy. On the back of coal, iron and steam technologies, 
family fnms developed skills, capabilities and heuristics that brought them success. They reinvested profits 
and gained a technological edge with which others could not compete. Institutions were created to exploit 
these new technologies, in particular the unions which trained and facilitated an efficient allocation of 
labour. Marshallian industrial districts grew whose products provided key cargoes and capital goods for 
the shipping industry. Success showed that British techniques were the best, and they were. However, 
when superior techniques anived British shipping and industry were entrapped by an anogance, 
institutional and belief system which slowed down the pace of change. Britain was suffering from an over 
conIDutment to the products, organisational forms and production technologies it had developed in the 
industrial revolution. 
British slup owners neglected the oppOliunities associated witll the tanker, the diesel powered motor ship, 
and the importance of speed as a competitive factor. When other nations anived with new techniques they 
were perceived as cheating. It reflected a pre-occupation of old techniques and a lack of self criticism. 
Liners showed a greater ability to survive than the perfectly contestable tramps, a reflection that a large 
number of small competitors has trouble adapting to change that requires greater co-operation and higher 
levels of finance. It also recognises that profit maximisation is an insufficient explanation of business 
motives. Autonomy, family pride and the desire to adhere to firmly-held values are equally important when 
understanding commercial behaviour. 
Finally, adaptability was hindered by uncertainty and mistrust. As the situation deteriorated, groups who 
previously welcomed change protected their position in the economy, in the process becoming 
distributional coalitions. Interestingly, the position of labour appears to be more defensive on shore where 
union and management formed antagonistic polar blocks. It is worth noting that, in shipping, the Maritinle 
Board, which was created during World War One with representatives of both employers and unions, 
created a habit of agreement (Sturmey 1962:286). However, this positive outlook was not enough to stem a 
long decline. 
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Table 14.3 Entrapment of British Shipping 
Sources of Competitiveness Para diem Heuristics Sources of Entrapment 
Shipping Industry 
- Flexible Family Tramp Firm 
- Company is a vehicle for family to 
- Norms of not using external financ 
gain prosperity and autonomy limited opportunity to compete on 
- Self financing size. 
e 
- Reluctance to reduce control. 
- Families become a distributional 
coalition. 
- Ship technology 
- Use all purpose vehicles (the 
- failure to shift to faster, larger 
tramp). specialised ships. 
- Liner Companies/ Conferences 
- maintain stability by reducing price 
- Ship owners become distant from 
competition. productivity .. 
- Flexibitiy in Asian Trade 
- reduction in competition and 
increased barriers to entry 
Supporting ASl2ects of Economy 
- Iron and coal supply 
- Use coal powered vessels 
- Slow to move to diesel 
- Skills/expereince - Practical man 
- Unions become distributional 
coalitions 
- Knowledge Resources 
- Slow to move to science based 
(Education/Royal Society, etc) engineers ie: persistance with 
routines and reproductive education. 
- Family Firms - Company is a vehicle for family to - Families become a distributional 
gain prosperity. coalition 
- Expansion of Empire, government 
- Decline of empire and rise of 
policy and naval support. protectionism 
-industries more independent with 
growth. 
- Reputation - British are best by definition - arrogance 
- Ports and infrastructure - rely on British facilities 
- British ports are too small for large 
ships therefore don't enlarge 
Others 
Uncertainty 
Distrust 
14.4 A Brief Note on Shipping in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century 
By 1960, British share of global shipping had slipped to 16%, a huge decline from the beginning of the 
century when it propelled more than half of the world's ocean going vessels (Sturmey 1962:4). New 
growth paths were opening with markets in tanker shipping, bulk ore carriers, containerisation and the 
increasing growth of Pacific Ocean trade. 
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Table 14.4 Principal Merchant Fleets 1953 -1973 (million grt) 
1953 1963 1968 1971 1973 
Liberia 1.4 11.4 25.7 38.6 49.9 
Japan 3.3 10.0 19.6 30.5 36.8 
Britain 18.6 21.6 21.9 27.3 30.2 
Norway 6.3 13.7 19.7 21.7 23.6 
Greece 1.2 7.1 7.4 13.1 19.3 
USSR 2.3 5.4 12.1 16.2 17.4 
USA (1) 27.2 23.1 19.7 16.3 14.9 
USA (2) 14.2 11.6 12.0 11.3 12.4 
Panama 3.9 3.9 5.1 6.3 9.6 
World Total 93.4 145.9 194.2 247.2 289.9 
(Source: Central Office ofInformation:1974) 
Table 14.4 illustrates the changing status of the leading maritime nations in the post-war period. 
Unfortunately, these figures belie processes that make it hard for us to measure industrial leadership. In 
terms of pure tOlmage, the Americans possessed the most tonnage in the first two periods however, much of 
this was surplus from the war. The second figure for the USA does not include this reserve fleet giving a 
substantially smaller figure. However, even this does not reveal the true extent of American shipping as 
much of the Liberian and Panamanian shipping belong to A~erican companies fleeing their national flag to 
escape the constraints of American maritime law. American companies became significant owners of 
tankers, a market which grew dramatically in this period, and pioneered the advent of containerisation. 
While Liberia tops the table from 1968 onwards, most of its shipping is owned, controlled and managed 
from the United States. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, Greek shippers such as Aristotle Onassis figured highly among the 
Flag of Convenience owners, however, the introduction of more favourable government policy and tax laws 
saw many of these ships convelting to the Greek Flag (Sturmey 1962:393). Hence the rapid growth of 
Greece in this period. 
We can see in table 14.4 that by 1971, Japan had replaced Britain as the largest pure national fleet, a 
reflection of the strength of its local domestic economy, the strength of its export industry and demand for 
imports and the fact it's ship-owners did not use flags of convenience at this stage. Consistent with Porter's 
realisation that competitive advantage stems from early home demand, Japan gained leadership in bulk: ore 
shipping and also has a large number of tankers, a reflection of their domestic demand for bulk: imports. 
Japan also pioneered new areas of shipping such as car carriers. The importance of the domestic home 
environment looms large in Japan's post war shipping success. 
Norway (along with Greece) are strong on the cross trades, shipping between foreign nations that does not 
include their domestic ports. This suggests a declining role for the domestic environment in generating 
competitive advantage. However, Norwegian shipping draws strongly on its home based cluster which 
includes 20% of the world's ship insurance market, classification of 15% of the world's fleet, ship-gear 
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producers, educational facilities and brokerage houses. In contrast to the low cost Greeks, this cluster 
generates transport solutions at the high end of the value spectmm (see www.norwegianshipping.com). 
310 
Chapter 15 
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore the forces that detemrine the rise and fall of industrial leadership. It attempted 
to do this by applying an industry life cycle model to the shipping industry. While much has been written 
on the shipping industry, providing a wealth of infonnation, no one has taken a 10ng-telTIl view of shipping 
from the stand-point of the economic literature. Merchant shipping is an ideal indusuy to research given its 
intemational nature and the age of the indusuy, thereby giving insight into intemational competitiveness 
and indusu'ial development over a long time-frame. 
A historical view of an industry has much to offer in analyzing how an industry and competitive behavior 
changes and evolves over time. There are 'economies of time' that have a strong impact on an industry's 
performance. These include the legacies of past investments and the effects of frrst or early mover 
advantages. The historical approach also provides an opportunity to examine industrial behavior in a 
variety of contexts. Finally, it helps to reveal a chain of causation that is lacking in many statistical 
approaches to industrial analysis. For these reasons, I hope my thesis will contribute to the body of 
knowledge on industrial development. 
The industrial life cycle was posited on the basis of existing literature, particularly the growth of 
knowledge, evolutionary and institutional literature, which lend themselves to pattems of industrial growth 
and entrapment. On this basis, this thesis set out to examine whether industrial leadership can be explained 
by a four staged process of imitation, catch up, advance and entrapment. However, this thesis has exposed 
something more complicated. 
15.1 Imitation and Catch Up 
In the first stage we expected awareness of the advantages in adopting foreign technologies, overcoming 
the ban-iers to adoption and fmal adoption of those technologies. As knowledge and capabilities is built 
and buttressed with supporting institutions, these nations then enter a 'catch up' stage. The earliest 
economies we examined do not support a sU'ong process of irnitation. Certainly the Chinese bon-owed 
some aspects from the Arabs and Hindus and vice versa, but most early development was indigenous. 
Though difficulties of communication in the early period may have contributed to this lack of irnitation, the 
main reason is the regional nature of early shipping. Shipping was a highly risky industry in which a 
mistake could lead to loss of life. Consequently, shipping technology had to be well matched to the 
environment in which they operated. This resulted in light dhows in the Indian Ocean ships and heavy 
junks in the China Sea. Regional variation also reflected the availability of local resources including 
bamboo, wood and iron. 
European shipping showed clearer examples of imitation in productive technologies and in shipping this 
included the compass, stem-post rudder and lateen sail. Yet, even here, European shipping technology 
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reflected the demands of the Atlantic Ocean and available resources, the inheritance of the northern and 
southern traditions and was punctuated by the state sponsored R&D of Prince Henry. 
Clearly Medieval shipping followed three separate evolutionary paths reflecting the demands of the 
Atlantic, and Indian Oceans and the China Sea; and the associated resource base. The demands of the 
rough Atlantic and international exploration led Europe to develop the best early trader for long distances. 
However, in the Indian Ocean, it found it could not compete with the light-structured dhow, which was 
more specially designed for the environment, particularly the light winds. 
With the rise of the Dutch, British, Americans and Japanese a clear process of imitation, catch up and 
advance emerges. In the case of the Dutch and the English, it reflects the similarity of the seas these 
nations traveled to the nations they imitated (the Iberians). It also reflects the greater ease in 
communicating technologies as time progressed and distances shortened. In these later nations, imitation 
of shipping teclmology was also associated with imitation of supporting industries. This reflects the 
systematic nature of shipping through its linkage with cargoes, but also the importance of clusters in 
illdustrialleadership. 
A key question confronting us is why were successful imitating nations not entrapped in their old economic 
system? The first answer is the new economic activity was compatible with the old economic system and 
did not produce restrictive conflict. Chinese shipping was only clamped down on when it conflicted with 
defensive goals as it exposed the nation to piracy. In Spain and Portugal, shipping was a natural extension 
of the reconquista mentality while Europeans all saw shipping as a means to increase national wealth and 
defense. 
Standing out during this phase is the importance of government support. Given the fIrst mover advantages 
of the established leaders, government support was invaluable to the success of the imitation process. Such 
support included finance, infrastructure, educational facilities, high levels of demand, monopoly status in 
the early phase of development and incentives to make improvements. A notable feature of government 
policy in these years is the commitment to continuous improvement and expansion of capabilities. 
An aspect of the imitation process, linked with the ability to get government support, is the consistency of 
the new growth path with the country's religious and military goals. The military linkage is further linked 
with the existence of external threats as an agent for change. Where a new path is not fully consistent with 
the existing institutional infrastructure and value system, a process of legitimization or amalgamation of 
values is necessary. Effective occurrences ofthis, such as in Meiji Japan, came from above. 
In many cases, external threats served to shake economies out of their old patterns of production. This 
included Sung China, Spain (threat of Muslims), the Dutch (threat of Spain), the English (Spain, Dutch and 
French) and Japan. Even though the USA was not under threat, its shipping was seen as an important part 
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of its defensive strategy. However, war obviously was not restricted to these nations. For example, we 
could velY well ask why the Mughals did not shake up its productive systems when attacked by the 
Maharathas? In this case, the Maharathas were a land power so naval forces were not so important and 
secondly, as stated in the thesis, the Mughalleaders had retreated from technology. 
One final aspect to consider is the role of luck. Chance events have played a key role in shaping industrial 
leadership. One need only contrast the voyages of Cabot and Columbus and wonder if the Potosi silver 
mines were located in Newfoundland what differences would have occurred between sixteenth century 
Spain and England and their later development paths. 
The opening of windows of opportunity during imitation assisted the catch up process. Mistakes by the 
incumbent leader could open windows of opportunity, as se~n in the Dutch handling of the Chinese trade at 
Batavia or the Portuguese at the Mughal court a century earlier. Wars were another common opener of 
oppOltunities as they deflected the incumbent's resources and shipping and provided a level of 
protectionism to the imitator. Finally, a window of opportunity appears to exist in those activities outside 
t1~e rules of the incumbent, such as the Spanish fleet system, which left the market unattended for long 
periods and provided a window of opportunity for the Dutch 
15.2 Advance 
A process of advancing technologies was important in the rise of all countries looked at, with the exception 
of Gujarat. A process of technological advance is not suppOIted in the histOlY of Gujarat. Gujaratis 
adopted the best practice technologies which, at that time, had been well disseminated around the Indian 
Ocean but, this was not followed by any teclmological advance. Their competitiveness was based on 
environmental factors (supporting indusuies and sU'ategic location) and the experience and skills they built 
up over time. 
The causes of advance are varied. Some were spin-offs of existing military and religious institutions such 
as Chinese naval and Taoist spin-offs. In the case of Dutch windmills and other labour saving devices, or 
British steam, they were a response to bottlenecks OCCUlTing as the economy went through a growth phase. 
In all cases, they reflected a high level of education in the economic system. A factor that must have 
contributed to superior European seamanship was the greater diversity of seas that they sailed in from the 
sixteenth century on-wards. They were exposed to the greatest range of conditions, the greatest range of 
problems and therefore, had to generate the greatest range of solutions. 
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Table 15.1 Competitive Advantage from Industry and Environment 
China Gujarat Iberia Netherlands Britain 
Advantages Specific to Industry 
Shipping technology Y N Y Y Y 
Specialised skills/Experience Y Y Y Y Y 
Organisation Y Y Y Y Y 
Reputation Y Y Y Y 
Advantages from Environment 
Supporting industries Y Y Y Y Y 
Knowledge resources Y Y Y Y Y 
Government policy Y Y Y Y Y 
Linkage to Empire Y Y Y N Y 
I nfrastrllcture Y Y Y Y Y 
Factor endowment Y Y Y Y Y 
Compatable religious/military Y Y Y Y Y 
Our expectation was that advance would occur on a broad front with a new Perez-type tehno-economic 
style affecting all pillars of competitive advantage. Perez originally linked her techno-economic style with 
an advance in one factor of production eg: coal. To that extent, we do not have a complete match in places 
like China where different factors affected shipping and on-shore industries. A 'paradigm' is a better word 
to use as it is far more encompassing. And here there is some evidence for support. As table 15.1 shows, 
competitive advantage relied on strengths not just on in the industry, but in the supporting environment 
which also benefited from the wave of advance. In all cases, the road to leadership was linked with 
expansion across the domestic economic system and foreign markets. This obviously reflects the derived 
demand and systematic nature of shipping. Growth in the domestic economy provided better access to 
capital, markets, cargoes, led to the development of economies of scale and industrial clusters, increased 
opporhmities to build experience and increase specialisation. In many cases, it also lead to increased 
educational endowments and this aided teclmological advance. But perhaps an industry that does not rely 
on derived demand would not show the same level of dependency. 
Coupled with Perez's idea of a techno-economic style was the idea of a leap in best-practice technology, 
and this was not supported in all cases. When the British surpassed the Dutch (and Chinese in the earlier 
period) the improvements were not in the nature of a leap, but of many smaller improvements. Clearly both 
leaps and continuously minor improvements can affect leadership. 
15.3 Entrapment 
Although we speak of a process of entrapment, all the economies showed remarkable versatility. For 
example, Gujarat incurred a significant trading shift from the East Indian Ocean focused on Malacca to the 
West Indian Ocean with its focus on the Red Sea. The POltuguese evolved from a crown based system to a 
system of private enterprise and contracts, while the Netherlands evolved through many stages. It is wrong 
to see these economic systems in static or limited tenns. However, at some stage, the economy lost its 
vitality or lost its ability to accommodate change or generate innovation. 
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A Perez-type socio-institutional crisis in which institutions associated with the old techno-economic style 
are confronted by the new are clearly evident in China, Spain and Britain. However, the hypothesis is not 
suppOlted with Gujarat and Netherlands. Guajarat incun'ed a crisis but it was not the Perez-type crisis we 
were expecting where the old confronts the new. Gujarat's crisis was a consequence of the Mughal empire 
imploding. The Netherlands experienced a crisis of decline but once again, it was not the old confronting 
the new. Although the British certainly developed some superior technologies in the eighteenth century, 
when the Blitish first surpassed the Dutch, it was not on the basis of a superior economic style but superior 
resources, in particular military. Netherlands then experienced a crisis with loss of markets due to the fact 
that many nations were embarking on catch-up and taking away old markets. 
From the work of Klien(1977), this hypothesis suggested that decline would be linked to increased 
industrial concentration. We would expect this process to reduce the vibrancy of the industry. This study 
has revealed a number of instances of increased concentration from the Portuguese Fidalgoes to the British 
liner and conference system. This thesis reveals that such concentration repeatedly OCCUlTed in attempts to 
gain market control, increase market transparency and reduce risk of price shifts. In some suppOlting 
iildustries, it was also associated with technical possibilities that allowed the exploitation of economies of 
scale but increased the capital requirements of the industry. In the case of Dutch guilds and Spanish 
Consnlado these strongly contributed to a decline in vibrancy. However, this did not occur in all cases. 
For example, the Portuguese private traders developed a cartel that maintained its competitiveness. 
However, at the Asian end of their activities, competition would have kept them in an efficient and flexible 
state. In Britain, the corporate liners had the finance capacity to make the transition, while the highly 
competitive British tramp shipping showed the least ability to respond to the changing environment. In this 
instance, concenh'ation would appear to be more amenable to change that requires increases in resources. 
An interesting finding of the study is that the most competitive industries became entrapped and did not 
respond to the available opportunities. In this respect, the case of Gujarat and British tramp shipping are 
sh"ikingly similar. These were proprietary firms with family conh'oJ being an incentive, which was clearly 
more important than profit maximisation. Chinese shippers also operated in a very competitive 
environment but did not produce the technological innovations that Europe produced. High levels of 
competitiveness in key supporting industries similarly did not produce technological innovation. Clearly, 
even economic systems with high levels of rivalry can become entrapped by structural entrapment (caused 
by specialisation), paradigm entrapment, and entrapment in the supporting economic system. 
A feature of this thesis was the importance of saturation. It is a pattern that occurs time and time again. For 
example, Gujarat found the markets of the Indian Ocean saturated prior to its decline. Spain found the 
seventeenth century silver market flooded while Portugal later found the same with pepper (even the United 
States suffered from saturated shipping markets in the twentieth century). Satmation represented a limit to 
growth within the existing path of development and is associated with new entrants to the market 
perfomring catch up. It is a reflection of the Richardson problem on a large scale. In such circumstances, 
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we might expect producers to diversify or an illustration of Downie's innovation mechanism. The nation to 
emerge from such an over-supply situation was one that opened up new paths to growth, such as the Dutch 
proto-industry which emerged from the seventeenth century crisis or the British in the Indian Ocean. 
There is a clear linkage between the concepts of path dependency and technological frontier. The Dutch 
development path reached a frontier when the limits of its wood-peat based technologies were reached. 
The British, with an abundance of coal, found it hard to move from a development path kept on their path 
to diesel/electrical-based activity. More recently, Abramovitz (1986) noted that post-war convergence 
reflected the fact that the United States had reached a frontier and consequently other nations found it easy 
to catch up. There are some similarities to Vernon's (1961) product life cycle, in which he saw other 
nations advancing in an industry once it had become standardised. But how do you defme a technological 
frontier when this thesis has shown teclmological advance after advance? Certainly, at the frontier, 
teclmology has stabilised. We can no longer add significant value or reduce costs with the existing system. 
This process of saturation and advance is consistent with the thesis. The key is probably 'within the 
system'. For example, Britain was capable of generating improvements in shipping that the Dutch couldn't 
because it had a different resource base. It is the purest example of entrapment. The reason that Japan in 
the twentieth century could introduce so many innovations 'in the industries that the United States thought 
were 'mature' was because the Japanese were traveling a new growth path. 
An interesting aspect of entrapment is the repeated pattem in which Chinese, Iberian, Dutch and English 
merchants tended to buy land and education for their children on success, a reflection of the Marshall life 
cycle but on an industry wide basis. There are two aspects to this. Firstly, investment in land was wise 
given it is safe, and there were not the broad range of investment opportunities that we have today. 
However, it is also linked to what Weiner called a process of gentrification ie: a chance to assimilate into 
the social class that the entrepreneurs were always considered below. It must be remembered that often the 
incentives of entrepreneurs were not just profit but to raise their social standing and that of their families. 
This last aspect was the completion of a goal that put them on a path to entrepreneurship in the first place. 
We have a tendency to think of social mobility as a key contributor to economic growth. This can be found 
in Olson's position of distributional coalitions. This hypothesis shows the effects of social mobility and 
economic growth as a two way process. It is economic growth and change that delivers social mobility. 
For example, the Dutch, Chinese and English periods of growth clearly led to periods of social mobility. 
As growth declined and less change occurred, distributional coalitions seemed to develop proprietary rights 
in their social-economic positions. However, it should also be noted that when China went through its 
period of economic decline, social mobility had actually increased. The decline was not due to social 
forces but, a lack of changes in productivity stemming from a persistence ofroutines, heuristics and beliefs. 
At this point, it is worth considering North and Thomas's statement that 'A stationary state will result when 
there is no inducement in that society to undertake those activities that lead to economic growth' (1973: 1). 
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This history has revealed that access to resources to develop technology was equally important, and at 
times, more impOitant than property rights, lending some support to Schumpeter's (1942) innovation "by 
decree". Monopoly rights were key contributants to maritime advance in Portugal with Prince Henry's 
research into the African trade and the two great East India Companies, but they could also limit the 
diffusion of technique as seen in the monopoly steam-ship rights in early New York. 
An important aspect is the alignment of incentives with the old development path. We saw how, in the 
Mughal empire, the incentive system relied on expansion to reward its members however, when expansion 
stopped its members milked the system. They continued to seek rewards consistent with their value system 
and skill base. This meant seeking short-term returns and becoming distributional coalitions in the process. 
The expansion stopped with a reliance on the old fIrearm technology as the emperors distanced themselves 
from technological advance. It is interesting to compare this with criticisms of the US perfonnance in the 
1980's where share market investors and corporate executives became pre-occupied with short term ROIs. 
When stakeholders are established and expansion stops, it is ripe territory for the development of a rentier 
class. Of course, the development of a rentier class with its distance from core activities is also a reason 
why expansion slows. 
The rate ofteclmological change is an issue identifIed and a number of patterns have occurred. Klein's fast 
to slow history occurred in China and the Netherlands, but not in Spain nor Gujarat. Technological 
advance was not a factor in Gujarat's rise or decline. The Spanish break-through, with the discovery of 
America, owes more to luck than any technological superiority over its neighbours. Only after America 
was opened did Spain go through a period of 'fast history'. This eventually was followed by 'slow history' 
a century later. A more consistent pattem is a global quickening of technological change as seen with the 
English who advanced on the basis of 'fast history' but were surpassed by others producing faster history. 
On the psychological level, there was a constant re-appearance of cognitive barriers to change including 
cultural myopia and persistence of learned schema, values and routines. These can be seen in the English 
'practical man' and 'all-purpose tramp', Chinese Confucianism or the Iberian reconquista. When 
confronted with the new, fear of loss, unceltainty and conflict resulted which made change even more 
difftcult to introduce. Uncertainty could appear in a number of forms including the need for change, what 
to change and how to change it. Arrogance which acted as a barrier to imitate new competitors, was a 
function of past learning of superiority (and pride). 
15.4 An International Industry Life cycle? 
When dealing with only seven examples it is diffIcult to alTive at a defrnitive explanation. Nevertheless, in 
a pure and rigid form, an international life cycle does not appear to exist. Other forces are operating to 
undermine it, in particular, the movement from regional to global production and markets. Perhaps in the 
past, the shipping industry has been more influenced by regional environments than other industries due to 
the resulting death and losses that result if local environmental sensitivity is not highlighted. As 
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globalisation progressed and ships appeared that could handle a variety of markets, the life cycle appears to 
exist. Ironically, more recently, glQbalisation appears to tln'eaten the cycle by reducing the impact of 
domestic enviromnents 
Acknowledgement must be meade of early indigenous developments, not based on imitation, that do not 
immediately lead to a position of advance/leadership. In this light, a better explanation for stage 1 would 
be 'capability building' which includes acombination of imitation and indigenous developments. 
The stage of leadership was upheld in all cases, although in the case of Japan, it ouccrred after the time 
frame examined in this thesis. However, this fmding should be of no surprise as the nations studied were 
chosen for the very reason that the 1iterrature revealed that they would become leaders in this industry. To 
that extent, we have a bias of limited selection. An area of future research would focus more on the 'a1so-
rans' and examine to what extent their pattern advance mirrors that explained in the life cycle. However, to 
study every nation that launched a shipping industry but failed to obtain global stature over the same time 
period of this thesis would involve a mammoth task so, should perhaps be limited to certain comparative 
epochs. 
Table 15.2 Stages of the Life Cycle 
Imitation Advance Leadershi.Q Entra.Qment 
China very little Yes Yes Yes 
Gujarat already possessed Yes Yes Yes 
Iberian Peninsula some Yes Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes 
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes 
United States Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Japan Yes Yes Yes 
The cycle is also undermined by political and military forces which can not always be seen as exogenous. 
A stand-out example of this was the Dutch decline when loss of markets by military means occurred during 
Britain's period of catch up. Military and political maneuvering can reflect an alternative method for an 
economy to enhance its resource base and reflect the nation's value system. Despite this, the forces of 
imitation, catch up, advance and entrapment have occurred repeatedly throughout this thesis. To that 
extent, the model may have value as a descriptive tool once the affects of globalisation, luck, political and 
military forces are taken into account. 
Another question that needs to be addressed is to what extent the model put forward is applicable only to 
the indusny in question or the broader macro-economy. The question is relevant given that in each case 
shipping was declined by a general macro-economic decline and shipping's derived demand aspect. 
Clearly, given the industry's reliance on domestic capital, cargoes and knowledge capital, to some extent 
the model is driven by these broader forces, especially in the early phase in development when the industry 
is most directed towards the domestic enviromnent. However, once the industry has become international 
competitive, these forces are reduced but buy no means irrelevant. Many of the industries in the economy 
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that rise and fall with shipping are based on similar techno-economic regimes or paradigms, consequently 
they shared the same fate on arrival of a new paradigm or market shift. In this light, it is worth recalling the 
American experience in the 1970's when the 'rust-belt' industries of America were ravaged by superior 
Japanese competition. Other parts of the American economy managed to survive and revitalize themselves, 
a reflection that as economies become more diverse, and a number ofteclmo-economic paradigms co-exist. 
In this light, the macro-economic environment can experience forces of decline and capability building at 
the same time. 
It would be useful to see what extent these forces have been at work in other industries. Other areas of 
illture research could include other industries with such longevity. This could include ceramics, textiles 
and agriculture. In Revolution in Time, David Landes(1983) has performed an excellent examination of the 
account of the watch and clock industry which could be re-examined with an eye to an industrial cycle. 
15.5 Can the past predict the future2 
Margaret Hodgen's "Change and History: a study of dated distributions of technological innovations in 
England ADIOOO-1899 identified that the 'chief factor making for innovation in a community is prior 
itmovation'(quoted in Lynn White Jr 1963:). We now live in a society that has become accustomed to a 
faster rate of innovation than any society before it. If Margaret Hodgen is correct, we could perhaps expect 
our acceptance of innovation to reduce the chances of entrapment. Certainly, the recent growth of the 
United States in the 1990's begs the question 'do we know no longer need to fear entrapment?' As 
mentioned above, the United States was ravaged in the rust-belt districts but, the economy has been reborn 
with new Internet and bio-technology production. Our economies are more diverse with a number of 
different growth paths being developed at any given time. Anyone product may in itself combine a 
number of different technologies. While one part of the economy may be entrapped, another may have the 
vigour to advance regardless. At the same time, improvements in low cost transportation have reduced the 
chance of resource-based entrapment 
Other factors that could reduce the chance of entrapment are our greater scientific knowledge which is 
generating advances at dramatic rates. We have reached the stage where innovation itself has been 
institutionalised with R&D staff becoming responsible for ilmovative advance. We have large companies 
with R&D budgets far in excess of anything imaginable in eighteenth century Netherlands or Ming China. 
However, we should not forget that some of the most innovative companies in the United States were 
among the first to succumb to the Japanese challenge. We need only think of RCA, a company that 
pioneered many of the innovations that ended up being mastered by the Japanese. 
In an increasingly international age, it is now possible to buy ships in an international market, recruit sailors 
from the cheapest labour supply and, through modem communications, compete in any markets with little 
domestic ties. It seems the domestic market is no longer so important and this can free producers from the 
chance of entrapment. This is most blatant in the Flags of Convenience, in which ships can sail under flags 
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of nations such as Liberia and Panama with few lUles and allow the exploitation of the lowest costs 
available. In theory, the flags of convenience are not linked to any domestic economic system. 
Consequently, it represents an age where the domestic economic system would seem of less importance. 
However, many of these FOC ships have ties with organisations, which serve the same function as their 
domestic economy. For example, oil tankers registered under a FOC are likely to be connected to a 
multinational that provides access to markets, cargoes and information channels. Secondly, if we look at 
Norway, a nation that appears to excel on the cross trades, we [md Norwegian shipping draws strongly on 
its home based cluster which includes 20% of the world's ship insurance market, classification of 15% of 
the world's fleet, ship-gear producers, educational facilities and brokerage houses. It should also be noted 
that the domestic market is where the infant industry leams to walk. It is the early stages that the domestic 
environment is most important. The domestic economic system still appears to be playing a large role, 
albeit at a reduced level than that in the twelfth century. 
Over time, there seems to be a reduced influence of religion as a force of entrapment, however, military 
influences still seem to be strong. Even today, as military technology becomes more specialised there is a 
fear their programs could distracts scientists and resources from productive technologies. On the other 
hand, militalY R&D has produced many spill-overs including computer technology and the Intemet. 
Coming from outside the existing commercial pathway, this R&D has opened up pathways that might not 
otherwise exist. 
Technologies have a potential to reduce enh·apment. New teclmologies can improve information flows and 
the potential for flexibility in organisations but this force is in many ways negated by the increased size of 
companies. Teclmology allows larger flexible companies but, I suggest each teclmology has its own upper 
limits where the organisation problems pointed out by Greiner set in. 
Entrapment may also be overcome by the advanced knowledge of 'change management', which has in itself 
become a major area of academic study. However, the literature on change management has revealed that 
serious baniers to successful change still exist. Even with the latest knowledge of psychological, social and 
organisational processes, the introduction of change is not free of pitfalls. For example, David Collins 
(1998) identifies the difficulties managers have in imposing their ideas for change on others when those 
ideas conflict with deeply embedded social processes. Many beliefs and attitudes have been imprinted on 
society through a process of cultural reinforcement. Behavior that has been leamed and reinforced over the 
years can be very hard to change, especially when those behaviors have helped to create strong cohesive 
groups. Influences such as childhood leaming and home life will not give way ovemight to the desires of 
management. 
Management of change is embedded with issues of politics, conflict and control. Protagonists for change 
will be pitted against opponents in scenes of repeated struggles and shifting alliances. Underlying this 
landscape lurks uncertainty and distrust. Uncertainty can refer to whether environmental shifts leading to 
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the change will be enduring, whether a new solution is needed and what solution is appropriate. 
Infonnation flows during the change process will be riddled with rumors and tidbits that shape and distort 
expectations. Distrust is riddled with the fear that one party will gain from the change at the expense of 
others. 
Even with the appropriate changes in place, resource constraints and continued use of old knowledge, and 
old, now mis-aligned, incentive systems can undenmne the success of a change program. Finally, after 
change has been introduced, it can take years for results to flow after change has been introduced. The 
economy has to embark on a new process of learning and gaining of experience. It is a period of relative 
loss in which the old ways and glory days beckon a return to the past. 
In a 1995 Harvard Business Review article, Jolm Kotter of the Harvard Business School noted that of the 
more than 100 US companies that he had observed trying to remake themselves, only a few had been 
successful. Undennining the high failure rate was the difficulty of managing a change program. The 
problems he identified included not creating a powerful enough guiding coalition, not removing obstacles 
to the new vision, declaring a victory too soon and lacking a vision. At the end of the twentieth century, 
implementing change in a company is still embedded with difficulties despite our greater knowledge. 
These age-old problems are afflicting the most modem of industries. In Only the Paranoid Survive, 
Andrew Grove, the CEO of Intel gives an interesting account of changes that hit the computer industry. 
Intel had been a highly successful company making memories for computers. However, new Japanese 
competition was seriously threatening Intel. In the book, Grove describes many of the forces that acted to 
inhibit change. We can recognise many of the repeated patterns of entrapment. He described how CEO's 
are at the centre of fortified palaces 'and news from the outside has to percolate through layers of people 
from the periphery where the action is' (1999:22). Consequently, the CEO is often the last person to know 
when change occurs. He also spoke of devoting more time to charity during the period of crisis, an obvious 
example of cognitive dissonance as it meant he avoided being confronted with the crisis. Grove also spoke 
of the rationalities and belief systems that pervaded Intel: 
The company had a couple of beliefs that were as strong as religious dogmas. Both of them had to do with the 
importance of memories as the backbone of oLir manufacturing and sales activities. One was that memories were 
our "technology drivers". What this meant was that we always developed and refined our technologies on our 
memory products first because they were easier to test. .. The other belief was the full Product line dogma. 
According to this, our salesman needed a full product line to do a good job in front of our customers (1999:91). 
These beliefs were based on strong rational thinking. They had been keys to past success. They 
determined the company's priorities in allocating resources and making decisions. 'Our priorities were 
fanned by our identity; after all, memories were us.' But, eventually when there was a substantial shift in 
the competitive environment the lUles changed, and the CEO experienced a business crisis that took him 
tbTough all the forces of uncertainty that have faced decision makers in previous centuries: 
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It's a very personal experience. I learned how small and helpless you feel when facing a force that's "lOX" larger 
than what you are accustomed to. I experienced the confusion that engulfs you when something fundamental 
changes in the business, and I felt the frustration that comes when the things that worked for you in the past no 
longer do any good (1999:94). 
Fortunately for Intel, one part of their business was growing rapidly. This was microprocessors. Having 
divested themselves of memories, Intel became the leader in the microprocessor market. It opens the 
question what would have happened to Intel if this option had not been available? Perhaps they were 
forhmate that a new growth had opened up for them. 
15.6 Implications for Government Policy 
(1) Social and Education Policy Much entrapment occurred as a consequence of social 
stratification. TIns had important implications as key change agents had two characteristics (i) they had 
sufficient resources and educational ability to adopt and diffuse leading technologies and (ii) they had an 
incentive to improve their status. We see tlns again and again through the English yeoman, poorer 
Samurai, and religious minorities. Clearly there is a danger of class divisions that deny the most 'hungry' 
members of society from resources that they could use to expand the economy. In paliicular there is a need 
to ensure education is widely disseminated; a potential problem for the United States in the future as the 
cost of tertiary education rises. 
(2) Competition Policy In many cases, monopolies and national champions proved themselves to be 
effective in advancing technology and opening up new growth paths. The monopoly served to reduce risk 
and could mobilise greater levels of resources. It was only once the necessary capabilities had been 
acquired and the biggest barriers overcome, that monopolies failed to serve their purpose. We saw this 
with the Dutch East India Company and noted when the country failed to remove the monopoly, competent 
Dutclunen fled to other countries where they set up in competition. The inIplication is that Competition 
Policy should be dynamic in its application, recognising the age of an industry and the circumstances in 
which it operates. 
(3) Infant Industry Support There is clearly a role for infant industry support. In all cases examined, 
governments provided support in the attainment of capabilities, although in the case of Gujarat it was 
restricted to cargoes. When a nation has first mover advantage and is secure in its competitive strength, an 
inntating nation is hard pressed to compete without this support. 
It is interesting to compare, the examples of the United Kingdom with Japan. In the English example, the 
Navigation Acts provided a huge area where shippers were protected from the Dutch but individual 
shippers still operated in a highly competitive environment with other English shippers which must have 
helped to raise standards. By contrast, the Japanese had a monopoly structure in the early years but all 
government assistance was pegged to the expansion of capabilities. Both strategies worked. 
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By contrast, during the nineteenth centUlY, US shipping had no protection but was reliant on protected 
inefficient industries (ie: steel, iron and ship building). Clearly any protective policy must take into 
account the downstream effects on other industries. England in the seventeenth century also protected its 
shipbuilders, therefore saddling its shippers with high costs but, it compensated this by protecting its' 
shippers as well. 
(4) Governments should think beyond processes. There exists the possibility for a government to 
influence society's value systems in a manner that is more consistent with prevalent growth paths. This can 
occur not only through education but, also being aware of policies in which it continues to endorse the old 
regime. Japan showed remarkable success in redefining values and the leading social class in line with new 
development paths. Of course, the nineteenth Japanese were highly submissive and modem techniques 
need to be more sophisticated. 
(5) Agent for Systematic Change. Recognising the path-like nature of an economies development and 
the barriers to change resulting from market-based specialisation, governments need to be more sensitive to 
the potential of low growth due to market rigidities. The experience of the highly efficient and flexible 
Indian and Chinese market systems is a reminder that flexibility is limited by past investments. 
In conclusion, processes of imitation, catch up advance and entrapment have shown to be at work in the 
shipping industry. But we must also aclmowledge the effect of military and political forces that may not be 
exogenous, the trend from regionalism to globalisation, and early indigenous developments that are not 
based on imitation that do not immediately lead to a position of advanced leadership. In this light, a better 
description of the [n'st stage would be capability building. 
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